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

500 Years of Florida History—The Eighteenth Century

Guest Editor

Sherry Johnson

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Cover Illustration: A Map of the New Government of East & West Florida. London: *Gentlemen's Magazine*, November, 1763. This map was based on a Spanish manuscript map, as indicated by the Spanish coastal names. Map courtesy of the Jay I. Kislak Foundation.

Book Reviews

500 Years of Florida History—The Eighteenth Century

by Connie L. Lester and Daniel Murphree

Upheaval characterized eighteenth-century Florida. European powers continued to fight for dominance in the region and Great Britain emerged as Spain's primary competitor, obtaining control of the peninsula and its environs, at least on paper, for two decades (1763-1783) before Spain again claimed ownership. Most native groups continued to decline in population due to disease, migration, warfare and enslavement while others, specifically the Seminoles, grew in numbers and regional influence for many of the same reasons. African Americans, both enslaved and free, expanded their presence in Florida, steadily asserting their autonomy militarily, socially and culturally. St. Augustine and Pensacola remained the primary urban centers though by 1800, settlers of varied backgrounds were residing elsewhere along the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts, altering the environment as they migrated and set down roots. As revolution engulfed the Americas, inhabitants of Florida became involved in hemispheric systems and conflicts while at the same time maintaining localized patterns of subsistence and survival reminiscent of earlier centuries.

Scholars of eighteenth-century Florida have long compartmentalized the region, focusing on Spanish or British spheres but rarely addressing the century as a whole. Consequently, the historiography of the era is demarcated as well; Latin Americanists have tended to focus on the end of the 1st Spanish period (1513-1763) and beginning of the 2nd Spanish period (1783-1819) while North Americanists have shown greater interests in the

British period (1763-1783) and its connections to the development of the United States. These forms of compartmentalization are gradually changing, however. Scholars of Native America and the Atlantic World are increasingly considering eighteenth-century Florida across imperial divisions, highlighting themes that transcend political and academic divisions. Modern scholarship is more integrated as a result, and new directions of research are appearing that incorporate ties between the Spanish and British periods, as well as scholarly paradigms that encompass the Americas as a whole.

The essays that follow represent a variety of approaches to Florida's eighteenth century history. Guest editor Sherry Johnson opens the issue with an evaluation of twentieth and twenty-first-century scholarship on the topic and new directions moving forward. Susan Schwartz follows with an analysis of British Governor James Grant's administration of East Florida and the hemispheric events that helped shape it. Chuck Meide's article highlights the work of underwater archaeologists in helping uncover linkages between St. Augustine and the broader Atlantic World. Roger Smith then reassesses the role of Florida during the American Revolution, arguing that the region played a more significant part than previously assumed. James Cusick's subsequent article examines the previously hidden history of illicit sex and its implications on community relationships in the latter period of Spanish rule. The Special Issue concludes with Diane Boucher's examination of the seemingly borderless zones of interaction between Florida and the nascent United States during the 1780s, when allegiances constantly shifted and survival depended on pragmatism and frequently tenuous alliances. Together, these articles reflect both traditional and newer approaches to the past that will certainly expand readers' knowledge of eighteenth-century Florida.

This Special Issue is the third in a six part series dedicated to commemorating Ponce de León's first exploration of Florida and each century that has passed since then. Our goal is to provide readers with a sampling of the best scholarship being produced on Florida's past today. We hope these essays will promote debate and additional investigations of the time and region by both established and emerging scholars. They are not the final word on the subject but represent the culmination of research endeavors conducted over many decades. Readers will have differing opinions on the conclusions reached, but all should note the evolution of evidence

harvesting and interpretation application since historians first wrote about eighteenth-century Florida long ago.

Publication of this series would not be possible without the continued support of the Florida Historical Society and its members. The editors of this Special Issue are again grateful to Dean Jose B. Fernandez and the University of Central Florida College of Arts and Humanities for partially underwriting another component in this series. We are especially appreciative of the Jay I Kislak Foundation, which not only provided financial support for the eighteenth-century Special Issue but also contributed the map reproduction that appears on its cover. The collective efforts of the above supporters not only further the mission of the *Florida Historical Quarterly* but benefit all who are interested in the state's past.

The Historiography of Eighteenth-Century Florida

by Sherry Johnson

"Florida is the neglected stepchild of Spain's American empire," wrote Carl L. Swanson in his introduction to the reprint of Joyce Harman's *Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida, 1732-1763*.[1] Written in 2004, Swanson's observation decrying the limited number of books that dealt with early Florida was not too far from the mark. Like Jane Landers' observation on the difficulty in placing Florida into one historical tradition or another, such statements underscore the obstacles in crafting a cohesive article that overcomes the problems not encountered in writing historiographical essays for the other centuries of La Florida.[2] The challenges begin when one realizes that the eighteenth century is an artificial construct, whether examined within British imperial, Spanish imperial or Native American history. With the exception of Sir Francis Drake's raids in 1586, British imperial historians mark the beginning of their interest with the founding of South Carolina in 1670. Spanish imperial and/or Latin American historians speak of Spain's "long seventeenth

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Sherry Johnson is a professor of history at Florida International University. She is the author of two books, *The Social Transformation of Eighteenth Century Cuba* and *Climate and Catastrophe in Cuba and the Atlantic World in the Age of Revolution*, which won the Caribbean Studies Association's 2012 Gordon K. and Sybil Lewis Prize. She thanks James G. Cusick and Daniel Murphree for reading and commenting on early drafts of this article.

1 Carl L. Swanson, "Introduction to the 2004 Edition," Joyce Elizabeth Harman, *Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida, 1732-1763* (St. Augustine, FL: St. Augustine Historical Society, 1969, reprint ed., Fire Ant Books, 2004), xvi.

2 Jane Landers, "Historiography of Seventeenth-Century La Florida," *Florida Historical Quarterly* (hereafter *FHQ*) 92, no.3 (Winter 2014): 470.

century," but they cannot agree as to when the long century ended neither for the rest of the Americas nor for the Borderlands.[3] Historians of Native American societies constantly stress that the indigenous people had very different ways of looking at their world and their relationships with Europeans.[4]

Acknowledging these inherent problems, this essay employs a chronological approach, beginning around 1702, and then further divides the sections thematically. The intent is not to repeat ground already covered in previous issues but rather to point out that a degree of overlap is inevitable.[5] Moving through the closing decades of the first Spanish period that ended in 1763, this study examines the British period from 1763-1784; then it goes on to the return of Spanish rule from 1784 through the end of the century. The last section of the article celebrates the renaissance in Florida history by introducing new research being done by scholars within the past decade.

Recognizing that the boundaries of Florida changed over the period, I have primarily included books and articles that are wholly on Florida in the eighteenth century. The second criterion was to include scholarship that bridges time (i.e. from earlier and into later periods) in which a considerable portion of the material falls within the chronological parameters of this essay. Third, some works are mentioned that are not strictly about Florida but that contain a significant amount of material that contextualizes Florida within a wider scope. In most of these studies Florida plays an important role, and/or the content and analysis can enrich

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3 Possible dates include1700 and the end of Hapsburg rule; 1714 and the end of the War of Spanish Succession; or even the 1740s and the rebound in the mainland economy based upon silver production.

4 See, for example, Daniel H. Usner, Indians, *Settlers & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Kathryn E. Holland Braund, *Deerskins & Duffels The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993); Robbie F. Ethridge, *Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

5 See Paul E. Hoffman, "The Historiography of Seventeenth-Century La Florida," FHQ 91, no.3 (Winter 2013): 308-311, for a summary of resource materials, bibliographies and surveys including Rembert W. Patrick, *Florida Under Five Flags* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1945); David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992; Paul E. Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Michael V. Gannon, ed. *History of Florida* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013).

readers' understanding about the Florida experience.[6] Finally, the depth and breadth of the time span, the amount of material to be covered, and the limited scope of this article make it inevitable that some topics will be less well represented than others.[7]

The End of the First Spanish Period

Which nation would become sovereign over the "debatable land?"[8] This was the issue that consumed the attention of contemporary diplomats and military strategists and, thus, commanded the attention of subsequent generations of historians. The year 1702 marked a turning point in international relations when British forces led by South Carolina governor James Moore along with their indigenous allies began a series of raids across the frontier into Spanish Florida. Beginning with the studies of the father of Borderlands history, Herbert E. Bolton, scholars are unanimous in contending that British aggression had calamitous results for the Spanish colony. In 1941, Verne E. Chatelain, studying fortifications and military strategy, saw the raids as a turning point. Abandoning earlier policies, after 1705, the Spanish crown sought to fortify the frontier through increased spending on the military at the expense of the missions.[9] Nonetheless, the dire conditions of the garrison were a constant as established in the work of William

6 Many works on the American Revolution or the newer scholarship on the Atlantic World are examples that will be discussed later in this essay.

7 For example, readers will notice that a discussion of indigenous issues is barely touched in the section on the second Spanish period. They will be happy to learn, however, that this is not an oversight but rather the result of an agreement between this author and the author of the next issue, James G. Cusick. Even though the creation of the Seminole nation began at an indeterminate time in the mid-eighteenth century, both authors agreed that for continuity the section on the Seminoles would be carried over into the more extensive discussions in the early nineteenth century. One topic that was included in Hoffman's issue was a discussion of cartography, but given the explosion in mapmaking in the eighteenth century, including even a fraction of the maps drawn in the eighteenth century is beyond the space limitations of this essay. Fortunately, readers can turn to a forthcoming book by Max Edelson, *The New Map of Empire: How Britain Imagined America before Independence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming 2016).

8 Herbert Eugene Bolton and Mary Ross, *The Debatable Land; A Sketch of the Anglo-Spanish Contest for the Georgia Country* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1925, reprint ed., New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), and its companion work, Antonio de Arredondo, Herbert Eugene Bolton, and Mary Ross, *Arredondo's Historical Proof of Spain's Title to Georgia A Contribution to the History of One of the Spanish Borderlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1925).

9 Verne E. Chatelain, *The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565-1763* (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Institution, 1941).

R. Gillaspie (1968), who related that the residents were afraid to step foot outside the walls of the Castillo and oftentimes were reduced to eating dogs, cats, and horses. Gillaspie's article further demonstrated the power of creole family networks in thwarting the pretensions of peninsular (Spanish born) governors.[10]

The negative impact on the missions and the inhabitants was the theme of the work of Mark F. Boyd, Hale G. Smith, and John W. Griffin in *Here They Once Stood; The Tragic End of the Apalachee Missions* (1951), which many see as the foundational work for multidisciplinary studies.[11] J. Leitch Wright's *Anglo Spanish Conflict: English Challenges to Spain's Empire* (1971) expands upon the earlier studies and along with his complementary work, *The Only Land They Knew: The Tragic Story of the American Indians in the Old South* (1981), provides a comprehensive overview from the top-down (traditional military and political framework) and bottom-up (native American) perspectives.[12]

Fueled by the trend away from top-down history, scholars interested in mission life shifted their focus to tell the story from the indigenous perspective. Prominent among these scholars were/are John H. Hann and Jerald T. Milanich. Hann's numerous thematic studies generally concentrated on a particular group (Timucua, Calusa, e.g.) and spanned the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries.[13] His examination of the Apalachees is of particular

10 William R. Gillaspie, "Sergeant Major Ayala y Escobar and the Threatened St. Augustine Mutiny," *FHQ* 47, no. 2 (October 1968): 51-64.

11 Mark F. Boyd , Hale G. Smith, and John W. Griffin, *Here They Once Stood; The Tragic End of the Apalachee Missions* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1951; reprint ed. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999); Bonnie G. McEwan, "The Historical Archaeology of Seventeenth-Century La Florida," *FHQ* 92, no. 3, (Winter 2014): 498. See also Mark F. Boyd, trans., "Siege of St. Augustine in 1702: A Report to the King of Spain by the Governor of East Florida," *FHQ* 26, no. 4 (April 1948): 345-352; "Diego Pena's Expedition to Apalachee and Apalachicola in 1716," *FHQ* 28, no. 1 (July 1949): 1-27; and "Further Consideration of the Apalachee Missions," *The Americas* 9, no. 4 (April 1953): 459-480, which presents additional documents to those in *Here They Once Stood.*

12 J. Leitch Wright, *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971); and Wright, *The Only Land They Knew: The Tragic Story of the American Indians in the Old South* (New York: Free Press, 1981).

13 John H. Hann, *History of the Timucua Indians and Missions* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1996); *Missions to the Calusa*, introduction by William H. Marquardt (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991); *Indians of Central and South Florida, 1513-1763* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003); *The Native American World Beyond Apalachee: West Florida and the Chattahoochee Valley*, foreword by Jerald T. Milanich (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006).

significance to this essay since they were the greatest victims of the British raids.[14]Archaeologist Milanich's works are more synthetic, examining Florida Indians as a whole with a chronological scope that began prior to the arrival of the Europeans and continued through 1763. Two of Milanich's books relevant to this article contain significant material on the end of the first Spanish period, which he describes as "the end of time."[15] Another study that combined history and anthropology, examined both the missions and the military presidio, and offered important theoretical concepts to understand Florida is Amy Bushnell's *Situado and Sabana* (1994), a work that also spanned the entirety of the first Spanish period.[16]

Alongside the scholarship dedicated to the mission system and defense, a number of institutional histories form a critical mass for the study of Florida in the eighteenth century. Key among these are Michael Gannon's institutional history of the Catholic church, *The Cross in the Sand*, which remains the seminal work on the subject, and a complementary recent work by Robert Kapitzke, *Religion, Power and Politics in Colonial St. Augustine* (2001).[17] Although the majority of Kapitzke's work focuses on events in the1680s and 1690s (only one chapter deals with 1702-1763), its major contribution is that it moves the analysis out of a localized context and demonstrates that processes in Florida were remarkably similar to those in other

14 John H. Hann, *Apalachee: The Land Between the Rivers* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1988). Similarly, while the Yamasee War (1714-1715) was largely a South Carolina event, one article by Hann explores the consequences for Florida. John H. Hann, "St. Augustine's Fallout from the Yamasee War," *FHQ* 68, no. 2 (October 1989): 181–200. A recent study of the Yamasee War from a cross-border perspective is Denise I. Bossy, "Spiritual Diplomacy, the Yamasees, and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel: Reinterpreting Prince George's Eighteenth-Century Voyage to England," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 12, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 366-401.

15 Jerald T. Milanich, *Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995); *Laboring in the Fields of the Lord: Spanish Missions and Southeastern Indians* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999). Like Hann, Milanich has produced a number of books and articles on Florida Indians, the majority of which cannot be addressed specifically in this article.

16 Amy Turner Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana: Spain's Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida* (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1994), especially pages 190-211.

17 Michael V. Gannon, *The Cross in the Sand: The Early Catholic Church in Florida, 1513-1870* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press; 1965, reprint ed. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1983); Robert L. Kapitzke, *Religion, Power, and Politics in Colonial St. Augustine*, foreword by Jerald T. Milanich (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001).

areas of Spain's American empire. Contextualizing Florida from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries is one of the virtues of Robert S. Weddle's *The French Thorn: Rival Explorers in the Spanish Sea, 1682-1762* (1991), the second in a trilogy about the rivalry between Spain and France and the challenges Spain faced in maintaining its dominance in the Gulf of Mexico.[18] A recent work that utilizes a cultural approach to explore Europeans' perception of the indigenous people that also spans the first Spanish period is Daniel Murphree's *Constructing Floridians: Natives and Europeans in the Colonial Floridas, 1513-1783* (2006).[19]

While some scholars use the first Spanish period as a continuum, a number of books and articles are situated chronologically after the Moore raids in 1702-1704.[20] Many studies take as their starting point John Tate Lanning's *Diplomatic History of Georgia* (1936), which, in spite of its title, is relevant to Florida in its examination of the lead-up to the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739-1742).[21] Charles W. Arnade, best known for his expertise in colonial architecture and fortifications, expands his reach to examine the siege of St. Augustine in 1702 in minute detail.[22] The seminal work among institutional histories is John Jay TePaske's *The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763* (1964). TePaske takes the reader on a chronological and thematic tour of the problems of the governors from the time the Bourbon family ascended to the Spanish throne in 1700 to the time of Florida's cession to the British in 1763. Among the many issues that TePaske discusses are the Moore raids and the subsequent attempts to conquer Florida by Georgia governor James Oglethorpe in 1740, the problems of supply, the failure of the *situado* (military subsidy) to arrive in a timely fashion, and the

18 Robert S. Weddle, *The French Thorn: Rival Explorers in the Spanish Sea, 1682-1762* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1991). The first in the trilogy, *Spanish Sea: The Gulf of Mexico in North American Discovery, 1500-1685* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1985), is discussed in Hoffman, "Historiography of the Sixteenth Century," passim. The third work in the trilogy, *Changing Tides: Twilight and Dawn in the Spanish Sea, 1763-1803* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1995) is examined later in this essay.

19 Daniel S. Murphree, *Constructing Floridians: Natives and Europeans in the Colonial Floridas, 1513-1783* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006). Hoffman, "Historiography," 346-347, discusses Murphree's contribution to the literature.

20 Verner Winslow Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (Reprint ed., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

21 John Tate Lanning, *The Diplomatic History of Georgia; A Study of the Epoch of Jenkins' Ear* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1936, reprint ed., Cranbury, NJ: Scholar's Bookshelf, 2006).

22 Charles W. Arnade, *The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959).

conflict between the military and religious orders.[23] The failure to supply the garrison with adequate provisions was taken up by Joyce E. Harman (TePaske's student) in *Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida, 1732-1763* (1963). Demonstrating the vulnerability and weakness of Florida's economy, Harman's work established that while the responsibility to provision Florida was placed with the Havana Company, the majority of the foodstuffs that arrived in the province came from New York or Carolina merchants.[24] The overwhelming influence of the military presence in Florida is the subject of Juan Marchena Fernández, *Guarniciones y población militar en Florida oriental, 1700-1820* (1981), a study that, unlike many, begins with the Moore raids and continues examining Florida's *presidio* (garrison) to the cession of the Spanish colony to the United States in 1820.[25]

By the late 1960s, many scholars began moving away from institutional and military foci, using new sources and multidisciplinary methodologies, and emphasizing social issues in their works. In the new methodological climate, Arnade wove an innovative blend of architectural and social history, combining the spatial distribution of houses belonging to of the Avero clan in St. Augustine to establish the process of how Spanish (peninsular) men were integrated into Florida's military society through marriage with their "many daughters."[26] Processual archaeology produced trendsetting work in Kathleen Deagan's studies that have revealed much about the social relations of colonial St. Augustine. In one early article (1973), Deagan demonstrated convincingly that indigenous women married and/or formed consensual unions with lower-status peninsular men.[27] Adding archaeological evidence, her thesis was carried through and expanded significantly in *Spanish St. Augustine, 1700-1763: The Archaeology of a Colonial Creole Community* (1983).[28] At the

23 John Jay TePaske, *The Governorship of Spanish Florida, 1700-1763* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1964).

24 Harman, *Trade and Privateering*. For a different perspective, see Bushnell, *Situado y Sabana*. Bushnell argues that the economy of Florida supported what the Spanish crown desired, and posits a thesis that Florida functioned as a "maritime periphery," a buffer zone between outsiders whether British or indigenous.

25 Juan Marchena Fernández, *Guarniciones y población militar en Florida oriental, 1700-1820* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1981).

26 Charles W. Arnade, "The Avero Story: An Early St. Augustine Family with Many Daughters and Many Houses," *FHQ* 40, no. 1 (July 1961): 3-33.

27 Kathleen Deagan, "Mestizaje in Colonial St. Augustine," *Ethnohistory* 20, no. 1 (Winter 1973): 55-65.

28 Kathleen Deagan, *Spanish St. Augustine, 1700-1763: The Archaeology of a Colonial Creole Community* (New York: Academic Press, 1983).

same time, the influence of the community studies that had rewritten North American history made its way into scholarship on Spanish Florida. Borrowing from the techniques used successfully in studies of New England, Theodore Corbett (1974) produced a pioneering work that utilized parish records from the first Spanish period to demonstrate the depth and breadth of peninsular migration to St. Augustine prior to 1763.[29]

Watershed: The War of Jenkins' Ear, 1739-1742

In 1739, the tense situation along the frontier escalated into open warfare between Spain and Britain, the War of Jenkins' Ear. Military campaigns launched from Georgia to capture St. Augustine, the Oglethorpe Expedition of 1740, and a retaliatory strike from Spanish Florida in 1742 intended to annihilate the British settlements in Georgia were equally unsuccessful. While the immediate causes of the war were Britain's privateering activities and Spain's efforts to stop them (see Harman, *Trade and Privateering*, above), one of the subsidiary issues was a Spanish sanctuary policy that allowed escaping slaves from other areas to seek asylum if they would convert to Catholicism.[30] A subset of this line of inquiry was the importance of the free black community of Mose, founded by fugitive slaves from the Carolinas in the 1680s. The fugitive slave issue had been discussed in primary sources associated with the conflict, but not until the early twentieth century was the subject brought to the attention of the academic community. In 1924, one of the most careful, most prolific, and most overlooked scholars of Florida and Cuba, Irene A. Wright, published the first scholarly examination of the process of how fugitive slaves left Carolina and made it to Spanish territory. An indefatigable researcher, Wright's article reproduced key documents from the archives in Spain pertaining to the asylum policy and the creation of Mose.[31] Folklorist and anthropologist Zora Neale Hurston, inspired by

29 Theodore G. Corbett, "Migration to a Spanish Imperial Frontier in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: St. Augustine," *Hispanic American Historical Review 54* (August 1974): 414-430; Corbett, "Population Structure in Hispanic St. Augustine, 1629-1763," *FHQ* 54, no. 3 (January 1976): 263-284.

30 Harman, *Trade and Privateering*. The sanctuary policy is best known as it applies to the Southeastern frontier, but it was in effect wherever a frontier existed between Spain and Britain or other non-Catholic countries, such as in the Caribbean.

31 Irene A. Wright, "Dispatches of Spanish Officials Bearing on the Free Negro Settlement of Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose," *Journal of Negro History* 9, no. 2 (April 1924): 144-195.

Wright's article, wrote a letter to the editor of the *Journal of Negro History* in 1927 to bring the subject to the attention of the African American community.[32] Twenty years later, Spain's sanctuary policy was revisited in a broad article about African Americans in the South by Kenneth Wiggins Porter.[33] A little known but useful analysis focusing on the importance of the fugitive slave policy as a provocation to the British in Carolina was written by John J. TePaske as part of the Bicentennial conferences of 1976 (discussed later in this article).[34] The most recent scholarly treatments of the Mose community are ongoing by Jane G. Landers, in conjunction with the archaeological excavations at the settlement site.[35] Taking an environmental approach, Sherry Johnson has demonstrated how ecological crisis between 1737 and 1742 generated widespread migration of indigenous tribes, indentured servants, convicts, and fugitive slaves on both sides of the Florida-Georgia border. Environmental crisis that disrupted all structures of everyday life was a contributory factor in the fugitive slaves' success.[36]

With the exception of Weddle's book, *French Thorn*, discussed previously, relatively little attention has been given to the Gulf coast except within the context of French settlements in Louisiana. Exceptions in the historical literature are three companion articles about Spanish efforts to chart Tampa Bay. Years before the discipline moved to examining scientific expeditions in the eighteenth century, Arnade presented the historical background of the 1757 Francisco María Celí expedition and licensed coastal pilot, John D. Ware, contextualized the problems that mariners and engineers faced in trying to draw accurate charts of an area.[37]

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32 Zora Neale Hurston, "Communications," *Journal of Negro History 12*, no. 4 (October 1927): 664-669. I thank James G. Cusick for bringing Hurston's article to my attention.

33 Kenneth Wiggins Porter, "Negroes on the Southern Frontier, 1670-1763," *Journal of Negro History* 33, no. 1 (January 1948): 53-78, specifically pages 58-62.

34 John J. TePaske, "The Fugutive Slave: Intercolonial Rivalry and Spanish Slave Policy, 1687-1764," in *Eighteenth-Century Florida and Its Borderlands*, ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975), 1-12.

35 Jane Landers, "Spanish Sanctuary: Fugitives in Florida," *FHQ* 42, no. 3 (January 1984): 296-312; "Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose: A Free Black Town in Spanish Colonial Florida," *American Historical Review* 95 (February 1990): 9-30; *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999); and *Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

36 Sherry Johnson, "When Good Climates Go Bad: Pivot Points, Extreme Events, and the Opportunities for Climate History," "Forum: Climate Change and Environmental History," *Environmental History* (2014): 329-337.

37 Charles W. Arnade, "Celi's Expedition to Tampa Bay: A Historical Analysis," *FHQ* 47, no. 1 (July 1968): 1-7; John D. Ware, "A View of Celi's Journal of

William S. Coker's 1980 publication of Spanish engineer Pedro de Rivera's report on the fortifications in Pensacola in 1744 is a similar examination for the western Gulf.[38] In addition, a short article written by William B. Griffen appeared in a commemorative issue of the *Florida Historical Quarterly* in 1959 dedicated to the four-hundredth-year anniversary of Pensacola's founding in 1559.[39] Colonial Pensacola has been the subject of just two book-length studies.[40] For the most part, archaeologists have been in the vanguard in expanding our knowledge of the city's early years through their examinations of archaeological sites. Judith A. Bense's *Presidio Santa Maria De Galve: A Struggle for Survival in Colonial Spanish Pensacola* is an excellent example.[41] Finally, a study that fits into neither east nor west Florida is William Sturtevant's "Last of the South Florida Aborigines," (1978) a poignant look at the inhabitants of the Florida Keys in the waning days of Spanish sovereignty.[42]

Transition to British Rule and the *Floridano* Exodus

In 1756, war broke out again between Britain and France.[43] Spain did not join the conflict immediately, but in 1758 the Spanish monarch Ferdinand VI died, and his Anglophobe half-brother, Charles III, came to the throne. Within months, Spain was in the

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Surveys and Chart of 1757," *FHQ* 47, no. 1 (July 1968): 8-24; Ware, "Tampa Bay in 1757: Francisco Maria Celi's Journal and Logbook, Part II," *FHQ* 50, no. 3 (January 1972): 262-277.

38 Pedro de Rivera, and William S. Coker, *Pedro De Rivera's Report on the Presidio of Punta De Sigüenza, Alias Panzacola, 1744* (Pensacola, FL: Pensacola Historical Society, 1980).

39 William B. Griffen, "Spanish Pensacola, 1700-1763," *FHQ* 37 nos. 3-4 (January-April 1959): 242-262. The special issue contains articles on the earlier period by Alfred Manucy and Charles Arnade on the city's founding, articles on the British and the second Spanish period, discussed later, and subsequent articles on the Civil War.

40 James R. McGovern, *Colonial Pensacola* (Hattiesburg, MS: University of Southern Mississippi Press, 1972); John J. Clune and Margo S. Stringfield. *Historic Pensacola* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009).

41 Judith Ann Bense, ed., *Presidio Santa Maria De Galve: A Struggle for Survival in Colonial Spanish Pensacola* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003). Within the volume see John James Clune, "Historical Context and Overview," 12-24, and John James Clune, R. Wayne Childers, William S. Coker, and Brenda N. Swann, "Settlement, Settlers, and Survival: Documentary Evidence," 25-39.

42 William C. Sturtevant, "Last of the South Florida Aborigines," in *Tacahale: Essays on the Indians of Florida and Southeastern Georgia During the Historic Period*, ed. Jerald T. Milanich and Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978; reprint ed., 1994), 141-162.

43 The war is generally termed the Seven Years' War but known as the French and Indian War in the United States.

war. Florida was barely affected, but when the British forces laid siege to and captured Havana in 1762, the peninsular colony became a diplomatic bargaining chip. At war's end, to recover Cuba, Spain ceded Florida to Great Britain. Consequently, over the winter of 1763-1764, the *Floridano* residents began leaving their ancestral homes for relocation to Cuba or to the Yucatan peninsula. The pioneering work on the evacuation from Pensacola was done by Wilbur H. Siebert as early as the 1930s, and he turned his attention to St. Augustine in 1940.[44] Through the subsequent scholarship of Duvon C. Corbitt and the many publications of Robert L. Gold, scholars knew with certainty by the late 1960s that the resettlement location in Cuba was a specially-created site close to Matanzas, San Agustín de la Nueva Florida, which was sometimes called Ceiba Mocha for the existing village closest to the settlement.[45] As part of her work on the free black community in Florida, Jane Landers extended her analysis to demonstrate how the members of that group were resettled in Nueva Florida and became leaders of the free colored militia like they had been in Mose.[46] Recently, the evacuation and resettlement processes have been revisited in the work of Sherry Johnson. Using Cuban parish records and military documents, Johnson established that the evacuees who went to San Agustín de la Nueva Florida were civilians, mostly Canary Island farmers and members of the free black community, representing only 24.32% of the total population. The bulk of the exiles, Florida's military families and government employees (75.68%), remained in Havana or its environs. There the males were integrated into the reformed Spanish army, and the widows, wives, and daughters fought so tenaciously for their pensions that

44 Wilbur H. Siebert, "How the Spaniards Evacuated Pensacola in 1763," *FHQ* 11, no. 2 (October 1932): 11-29; "The Departure of the Spaniards and Other Groups from East Florida," *FHQ* 19, no. 2 (October 1940): 145-154; Robert L. Gold, "The Settlement of the Pensacola Indians in New Spain, 1763-1770," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 45, no. 4 (November 1965): 567-576.

45 Duvon C. Corbitt, "Spanish Relief Policy and the East Florida Refugees of 1763," *FHQ* 27, no. 1 (July 1948): 67-82; Robert L. Gold, "Politics and Property During the Transfer of Florida from Spanish to English Rule, 1763-1764," *FHQ* 42, no. 1 (July 1963): 16-34; "The Settlement of East Florida Spaniards in Cuba, 1763-1766," *FHQ* 42, no. 3 (January 1964): 216-231; "The Departure of Spanish Catholicism from Florida, 1763-1765," *The Americas* 22, no. 4 (April 1966): 377-388; and *Borderland Empires in Transition; The Triple-Nation Transfer of Florida* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969).

46 Jane Landers, "An Eighteenth-Century Community in Exile: The *Floridanos* in Cuba," *New West Indian Guide* 70 (1996): 39-58.

Photograph of the Floridano houses still in existence in Havana, Cuba. The photograph was taken in 2003 and provided to the *Florida Historical Quarterly* by Charlotte A. Cosner, Ph.D., Western Carolina University.

even the monarch was forced to admit that they were "women out of the ordinary."[47] Their experiences became the model for the way that pensions were awarded for decades.

The British Period, 1763-1784

With the transfer to British sovereignty, Florida was divided into two provinces: East Florida and West Florida, each with its own governing structure. If East Florida before 1763 received the lion's share of twentieth-century scholarly attention, the opposite was the case after the arrival of British sovereignty. Cecil Johnson began the trend in *British West Florida, 1763-1783* (1943), a book that was noteworthy in contextualizing West Florida in comparison

47 Sherry Johnson, "Casualties of Peace: Tracing the Historic Roots of the Florida-Cuba Diaspora, 1763-1804," *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* 10, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 91-125; "'Señoras en Sus Clases no Ordinarias': Enemy Collaborators or Courageous Defenders of the Family?," *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos* 34 (2003): 11-37. The figures and percentages for the evacuated community were calculated from figures in Juan Marchena Fernández, *Oficiales y soldados en el ejército de América* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1983), 286-287, who differentiates the population as "dependent," and "nondependent," i.e. civilians with no claim on the government.

to other British colonies.[48] Johnson's book was complemented by an early examination of West Florida's economy by Clinton N. Howard, *The British Development of West Florida, 1763-1769* (1947).[49] By the 1970s, scholars of West Florida were contextualizing the colony within current historiographical trends, most prominently the use of biography and economic history as analytical tools. The fundamental study that showed how West Florida was integrated into the wider British economy with special attention to the Caribbean was Robin F.A. Fabel's *The Economy of British West Florida, 1763-1783* (1988).[50] One of West Florida's governors, George Johnstone, was the subject of two scholarly biographies, the earliest released in 1968, that was superseded by a more recent study in 1987.[51] One of the most prolific historians of West Florida, Robert R. Rea, contributed *Major Robert Farmar of Mobile* (1990), that detailed the life of a British officer from his career beginning with the War of Jenkins' Ear through the Seven Years' War and his assignment to British West Florida, specifically Mobile, after 1763.[52] Earlier, Rea had introduced the scholarly community to the deadly conditions that faced soldiers and officials if they were unfortunate enough to be assigned to West Florida, which he termed the "graveyard for Britons."[53] Portions of Daniel H. Unser's (1992) larger work about Native Americans in the lower Mississippi valley address the importance—and lack of importance—that the change in sovereignty had on the indigenous populations.[54]

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48 Cecil Johnson, *British West Florida, 1763-1783* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1943). See also his "Pensacola in the British Period: Summary and Significance," *FHQ* 37, nos. 3-4 (January-April 1959): 263-280, in the commemorative issue of the *FHQ*, published in 1959.

49 Clinton Newton Howard, *The British Development of West Florida, 1763-1769* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1947).

50 Robin F.A. Fabel, *The Economy of British West Florida, 1763-1783* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988).

51 John D. Born, *Governor Johnstone and Trade in British West Florida, 1764-1767* (Wichita, KS: Wichita State University, 1968); Robin F.A. Fabel, *Bombast and Broadsides: The Lives of George Johnstone* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987).

52 Robert R. Rea, *Major Robert Farmar of Mobile* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990). See also Robert Right Rea, *Pensacola Under the British* (1763-1781) (Pensacola, FL: Fiesta of Five Flags, 1974); "A Distant Thunder: Anglo Spanish Conflict and the Americas in the Eighteenth Century," in *Cardenales de dos independencias* [symposium held at the Universidad Iberoamerica, November 1976] (Mexico City: Fomento Cultural Banamex, 1978), 175-187.

53 Robert R. Rea, "Graveyard for Britons," West Florida, 1763-1781," *FHQ* 47, no. 4 (April 1969): 345-364.

54 Usner, *Indians, Settlers & Slaves.*

For the most part, until the U.S. Bicentennial, East Florida did not receive a great deal of scholarly attention, possibly because of the depth, breadth, and quality of the classic study, Charles Loch Mowat, *East Florida As a British Province* (1943), that still stands as the seminal treatment of life in the province.[55] Mowat, along with George Rogers and others, addressed the issue of British efforts to make Florida profitable by trying to attract investors and settlers through extensive propaganda campaigns.[56] An oft-cited example was Andrew Turnbull, who, through his extensive contacts in England at the British royal court, received permission to recruit immigrants from the British islands in the Mediterranean. In 1768, Turnbull transported the unfortunate recruits to his plantation south of St. Augustine, New Smyrna, where they were treated as virtual slaves until they escaped to the provincial capital in 1777. Early examinations of Turnbull's colony focused on the horrible conditions of New Smyrna, until the release of Carita Doggett Corse's *Dr. Andrew Turnbull and the New Smyrna Colony of Florida* (1919). Corse's book revisited many of the issues raised in previous works, and readers came away with, if not a favorable opinion of Turnbull, at least an understanding that he was a man of his times.[57] It took nearly fifty years for Epaminondas P. Panagopoulos, in *New Smyrna: An Eighteenth Century Greek Odyssey* (1966), to offer a corrective to Corse's focus on Turnbull and look at the processes by which the colonists got to New Smyrna, the difficulties facing Turnbull and the immigrants, and Turnbull's political battles with Governor Patrick Tonyn.[58] By the 1990s, scholars were ready for a comprehensive reevaluation of the New Smyrna colony, and Patricia Griffin's *Mullet on the Beach: The Minorcans of Florida, 1768-1788* (1991) filled the need in her satisfying blend of anthropology, social history, demography and folklore. Griffin traced the Minorcans' sojourn from the Mediterranean to Florida, detailed

55 Charles Loch Mowat, *East Florida As a British Province, 1763-1784* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943; reprint, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964).

56 Charles L. Mowat, "The First Campaign of Publicity for Florida," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 30, no. 3 (December 1943): 359-376; George C. Rogers, Jr., "The East Florida Society of London, 1766-1767," *FHQ* 54, no. 4 (April 1976): 479-496.

57 Carita Doggett Corse, *Dr. Andrew Turnbull and the New Smyrna Colony of Florida* (Jacksonville, FL: Drew Press, 1919; reprint ed. St. Petersburg, FL: Great Outdoors Pub. Co., 1967).

58 Epaminondas P. Panagopoulos, *New Smyrna: An Eighteenth Century Greek Odyssey* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966). See also Jane Quinn, *Minorcans in Florida: Their History and Heritage* (St. Augustine: Mission Press, 1975).

the feud between Turnbull and Tonyn and carried their story into the Second Spanish period, arguing that by the time Spaniards returned, Minorcans had become the core group in a polyglot population.[59]

The Bicentennial and Revolutionary War Scholarship

Historians love milestones, watershed moments when they can revisit and celebrate important turning points in a region's history. Among these milestones was the Bicentennial of the American Revolution in 1976, which, like the Quincentennial of Columbus's first voyage in 1992, produced an outpouring of scholarship throughout the United States. The initiative was taken up by one of the most prominent figures in Florida history, Samuel Proctor, longtime editor of the *Florida Historical Quarterly*. After an organizational meeting was held in December 1970, Proctor became the chairman of the Florida Bicentennial Commission's Research and Publications program.[60] The program established the goal of highlighting Florida's contribution to the scholarship on the Revolutionary era in three ways. The first goal, imitating similar successful efforts that marked Florida's Quadracentennial in 1965, was to republish "rare, out-of-print Floridiana," in facsimile editions.[61] Lamenting that there was no up-to-date history of the

59 Patricia Griffin, *Mullet on the Beach: The Minorcans of Florida, 1768-1788* (St. Augustine, FL: St. Augustine Historical Society, 1991).

60 Christine Galbraith, "Bicentennial Commission Oral History Interview with Dr. Samuel Proctor," Friday, February 11, 1977, 1:00 PM, Florida State Museum, Gainesville, FL," 14. University of Florida Digital Collections. http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00007658/00001/16j?search=bicentennial, (accessed October 15, 2014).

61 Ibid. Only four of the twenty-five facsimiles dealt with the British period or the Revolutionary War era, including Philip Pittman and Robert Right Rea, *The Present State of the European Settlements on the Mississippi* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1973); Philip Lee Phillips and John D. Ware, *Notes on the Life and Works of Bernard Romans* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975); John Gerar William De Brahm, *The Atlantic Pilot* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1974); Denys Rolle, *To the Right Honourable the Lords of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, the humble petition of Denys Rolle, esq, setting forth the hardships, inconveniencies, and grievances, which have attended him in his attempts to make a settlement in east Florida...: a facsimile reproduction of the 1765 edition* (Gainesville, University Presses of Florida. 1977).

Richard L. Campbell's *Historical Sketches of Colonial Florida* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975) is about the entirety of colonial Pensacola history through 1821 and contains some material on the eighteenth century. In addition, two reproductions with material relevant to this article were Aileen Moore Topping, and J. Kirkpatrick, *An Impartial Account of the Late Expedition against St. Augustine Under General Oglethorpe: A Facsimile Reproduction of the*

British period, the second goal was to promote publication of monographs about the era. Two publications were direct results of these efforts. J. Leitch Wright was commissioned to write the definitive history of the British period, *Florida in the American Revolution,* which appeared in 1975.[62] Wright's student, J. Barton Starr, contributed *Tories, Dons, and Rebels: The American Revolution in British West Florida* (1976).[63] Another publication, *George Gauld, Surveyor and Cartographer of the Gulf Coast* was commissioned from John D. Ware, but Ware's unfortunate death prevented its completion.[64]

The third major project of the Research and Publications program was to sponsor a series of conferences to stimulate primary research on the British period, on which, at the time [1970-1975] little had been done, especially when compared to the voluminous literature on the Civil War period.[65] The conferences were held at universities around the state, each with a different theme with the intention that the conference proceedings would be published as stand-alone monographs. The first was held in Gainesville in 1972, and was dedicated to Florida and its borderlands.[66] In 1973, Florida International University hosted the second conference dedicated to Florida and the Caribbean.[67] The third conference took place at Florida Technical University in Orlando in 1974 with the theme Life on the Frontier.[68] Florida State University in Tallahassee hosted the fourth conference in 1975 in which the participants presented papers

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1742 Edition: with an Introduction and Indexes (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978); and Edward Kimber, *A Relation, or Journal, of a Late Expedition, &C.: A Facsimile Reproduction of the 1744 Edition* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976).

62 J. Leitch Wright, *Florida in the American Revolution* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975). In addition, although not a publication of the Bicentennial Commission, see his *British St. Augustine* (St. Augustine, FL: Historic St. Augustine Preservation Board, 1975), and "Blacks in British East Florida," *FHQ* 54, no 4 (April 1976): 436-438.

63 Galbraith, "Interview with Proctor," 36.

64 Ibid.," 17; The facsimile initiated by Ware was published under the direction of Robert R. Rea in 1982. John D. Ware and Robert Right Rea, *George Gauld, Surveyor and Cartographer of the Gulf Coast* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1982). A fourth manuscript on Bernardo de Gálvez was commissioned from Jack D. L. Holmes but was also never completed.

65 Galbraith, "Interview with Proctor," 19-22.

66 Samuel Proctor, ed., *Eighteenth-Century Florida and Its Borderlands* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975).

67 Samuel Proctor, ed., *Eighteenth-Century Florida and the Caribbean* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976).

68 Samuel Proctor, ed., *Eighteenth-Century Florida: Life on the Frontier* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976).

on Florida and the Revolutionary South, and in 1976, the impact of the American Revolution was the theme for the papers presented in Pensacola at the University of West Florida.[69] The list of conference participants reads like a who's who in Florida, Borderlands, Caribbean, and American history, and the resulting collections, all of which were published in a timely manner, contain scholarship that has stood the test of time for its originality and quality. As editor of the *Florida Historical Quarterly*, Proctor also initiated a Bicentennial edition of that journal that featured many of the scholars from the conferences and dealt with subjects such as loyalists, blacks in British East Florida, and French Huguenots, among many subjects.[70]

Maintaining Links with Spain

Among the themes that run through the historiography of the British period is the degree to which Spain sought to maintain linkages with its former colonies. Corse's work on New Smyrna first raised the issue when she argued that because the immigrants were Catholics, Turnbull allowed priests to come to the colony and those priests maintained contact with Cuba via fishermen. Contemporaneous with Corse's work, in the 1920s, Kathryn Abbey Hanna showed the degree to which Spain worked to maintain its influence in the region it ceded to Britain.[71] A key player in maintaining these contacts was Luciano de Herrera, one of the few Spaniards who remained in St. Augustine after 1764, and who was widely believed to be a Spanish spy.[72] In "Spanish Interest in British Florida and in the Progress of the American Revolution,"

69 Samuel Proctor, ed., *Eighteenth-Century Florida and the Revolutionary South* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978); and *Eighteenth-Century Florida: The Impact of the American Revolution* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=ufl2.uf00100519_00001;view=1up;seq=3, (accessed November 16, 2014).

70 Samuel Proctor, ed. *The Floridas in the Revolutionary Era. Bicentennial Issue, FHQ* 54, no.4 (April 1976): 425-564.

71 Kathryn Abbey Hanna, "Efforts of Spain to Maintain Sources of Information in the British Colonies Before 1779," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 15, no. 1 (June 1928): 56-68, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1891667, (accessedNovember 17, 2014); "Spanish Projects for the Reoccupation of the Floridas During the American Revolution," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 9, no 3 (August 1929): 265-285, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2506622, (accessed November 17, 2014).

72 Katherine S. Lawson, "Luciano de Herrera, Spanish Spy in British St. Augustine," *FHQ* 23, no 3 (January 1945): 170-176. See also Light Townsend Cummins, "Luciano de Herrera, "Luciano de Herrera and Spanish Espionage in British Saint Augustine," *El Escribano* 16 (1979): 43-57.

(1953) Mark F. Boyd and José Navarro Latorre introduced readers to the contacts that the captains-general in Havana maintained with indigenes who controlled the territory outside the primary cities, St. Augustine and Pensacola.[73] Among the most provocative contributions to the debate was presented by Ángel Sanz Tapia (1983), who argued that the Spaniards had formed a military alliance with the Uchises, who in turn, had promised to provide over 5,300 warriors if an attack was launched on St. Augustine. Sanz Tapia believed that the attack never occurred because Bernardo de Gálvez chose to put all of his resources into an attack on Jamaica instead.[74] Spanish interest in Florida as it related to larger issues of espionage became part of a book-length examination in Light Townsend Cummins, *Spanish Observers and the American Revolution, 1775-1783* (1991).[75]

A closely related topic to studies about continuing Spanish interest in the Floridas is the importance of Spain to the Revolutionary War effort. The question was first posed by Spanish scholars led by Juan F. Yela Utrilla in *España ante la independencia de los Estados Unidos* (1925), and was subsequently addressed in 1935 by Herminio Portel Vilá with particular reference to Cuba.[76] Cummins in Spanish Observers also takes the position that Spain was instrumental in securing American independence, and a recent, comprehensive contribution to this substantial body of scholarship is Thomas E. Chávez, *Spain and the Independence of the United States: An Intrinsic Gift* (2002).[77] Recently, the author of this article investigated the economic aspects of forging a relationship

73 Mark F. Boyd and José Navarro Latorre, "Spanish Interest in British Florida and in the Progress of the American Revolution, I," *FHQ* 32, no. 2 (October 1953): 92-130.

74 Ángel Sanz Tapia, "Relaciones entre Cuba y los indios de la Florida oriental durante el dominio inglés," *La influencia de España en el Caribe, la Florida, y la Luisiana, 1500-1800*, ed. Antonio Acosta and Juan Marchena Fernández (Madrid: Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, 1983), 281-308, especially the chart on page 306.

75 Light Townsend Cummins, *Spanish Observers and the American Revolution, 1775-1783* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991).

76 Juan F. Yela Utrilla, *España ante la independencia de los Estados Unidos* (Lérida, SP: Gráficos Academia Mariana, 1925); Herminio Portel Vilá, *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España*, 4 vol. (La Habana: Academia de Historia de Cuba, 1935).

77 Thomas E. Chávez, *Spain and the Independence of the United States: An Intrinsic Gift* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002).

between Spain and the United States via Havana as a consequence of environmental conditions in the Spanish Caribbean.[78]

In 1779, Spain officially entered the war as a combatant, and the Spanish military forces led by the governor of Louisiana, Bernardo de Gálvez, went on the offensive. Gálvez's first campaigns were conducted in the Mississippi River valley and on the Gulf coast east of New Orleans and were spectacular successes. In 1781, Gálvez turned his attention to Pensacola and launched a successful naval expedition to lay siege and to capture the city. As 1981 approached, the bicentennial of his victories along the Gulf coast commanded the attention of scholars with long experience in examining Spanish influence in the region. Most began their inquiries consulting the seminal work, John Walton Caughey's *Bernardo de Gálvez in Louisiana* (1934), which stood as the authoritative treatment of the young commander until the 1970s.[79] While a few articles about Gálvez and the victory at Pensacola had been published prior to the late 1970s,[80] the scholarly outpouring in English and in Spanish produced in conjunction with the Bicentennial reached industrial proportions. Scholars working on the Gulf coast in general, among them Jack D.L. Holmes, Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., and Eric Beerman, revisited the Pensacola campaign with a critical eye, and their studies were joined by a contemporaneous work in Spanish written by Carmen de Reparáz.[81] Secondary figures in the conflict also were the subject of attention including the governor of Mobile,

78 See Sherry Johnson, *Climate and Catastrophe in Cuba and the Atlantic World in the Age of Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

79 John Walton Caughey, *Bernardo de Gálvez in Louisiana, 1776-1783* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934).

80 Albert W. Haarman, "The Spanish Conquest of British West Florida, 1779-1781," *FHQ* 39, no. 2 (October 1960): 107-134; "The Siege of Pensacola: An Order of Battle," *FHQ* 44, no. 3 (January 1966): 193-199; Maury Baker and Margaret Bissler Haas, eds. "Bernardo de Gálvez's Combat Diary for the Battle of Pensacola 1781," *FHQ* 56, no. 2 (October 1977): 176-199. See also Bernardo de Gálvez, *Diario de las operaciones de la expedición contra la plaza de Panzacola concluida por las armas de S.M. católica.* Foreword by N. Orwin Rush (facsimile ed., Tallahassee, FL: n.p., 1966).

81 Jack D. L. Holmes, "Bernardo de Gálvez, Spain's 'Man of the Hour' during the American Revolution," *Cardenales de dos independencias* (Mexico City: Fomento Cultural Banamex, 1978), 161-174; *The 1779 "Marcha De Gálvez": Louisianas' Giant Step Forward in the American Revolution* (Baton Rouge: Baton Rouge Bicentennial Corp., 1974); Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., ed. and trans. *Tribute to Don Bernardo de Gálvez* (Baton Rouge and New Orleans: Historic New Orleans Collection, 1979); Bernardo de Gálvez, *"Yo Solo:" The Battle Journal of Bernardo de Gálvez during the American Revolution.* Eric Beerman, intro. (New Orleans: Polyanthos, 1978); Carmen de Reparáz, *Yo Solo: Bernardo de Gálvez y la toma de Panzacola en 1781* (Madrid: Serba, S.A., 1986).

José de Ezpeleta; Juan Antonio de Riaño Gálvez's brother-in-law and also a military commander; and the members of the Irish Brigade, expatriate Irishmen enlisted in the Spanish army.[82] The journal of Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis, Spain's emissary to the colonies, reiterated that Spanish interest reached the highest levels since Saavedra was sent directly by the King of Spain.[83] All such studies served to remind readers that Spain provided important support for the Patriot cause, and that Spain emerged from the conflict on the winning side.

While considerably less in terms of volume, the scholarship on the British efforts to defend Pensacola against the Spanish siege is equally solid starting with the work of N. Orwin Rush, *Spain's Final Triumph Over Great Britain in the Gulf of Mexico* (1966).[84] One of the few studies of the siege from the British perspective published in conjunction with the Bicentennial of Gálvez's success is James A. Servies, ed., *The Log of the H.M.S. Mentor, 1780-1781* (1982).[85] In addition, the Bicentennial conferences provided scholars of West Florida the opportunity to examine the contest from many perspectives, and topics such as diplomacy, the Jewish community, and black life were explored.[86] The theme of the Gulf Coast History and Humanities Conference

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82 Eric Beerman, "José de Ezpeleta," *Revista de Historia Militar* 21(1977): 97-118; Francisco de Borja Medina Rojas, *José de Ezpeleta, gobernador de La Mobila, 1780-1781* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, C.S.I.C., 1980); Eric Beerman, "Yo Solo' Not Solo: Juan Antonio de Riaño," *FHQ* 58, no. 2 (October 1979): 174-184; W.S. Murphy, "The Irish Brigade of Spain at the Capture of Pensacola, 1781," *FHQ* 38, no. 3 (January 1960): 216-225. The Irishmen joined the Spanish army in defense of Catholicism.

83 Francisco Morales Padrón, ed., *The Journal of Don Francisco Saavedra de Sangronis, 1780-1783*, trans., Aileen Moore Topping (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1989). Other studies include Miguel A. Bretos, *Charles III: Florida and the Gulf* (Miami, FL: Miami-Dade Community College/South Campus, South Division of Campus Communications, 1988); Patricia R. Wickman, *Charles III: Florida and the Gulf* (Miami, FL: Count of Gálvez Historical Society, 1990).

84 N. Orwin Rush, *Spain's Final Triumph Over Great Britain in the Gulf of Mexico: The Battle of Pensacola, March 9 to May 8, 1781* (Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1966).

85 James A. Servies, ed., *The Log of the H.M.S. Mentor, 1780-1781: A New Account of the British Navy at Pensacola* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1982).

86 Robert R. Rea, "British West Florida: Stepchild of Diplomacy," in *Eighteenth-Century Florida and its Borderlands*, ed. Samuel Proctor, 61-77; Bertram Wallace Korn, "Jews in Eighteenth-Century West Florida," and Roland C. McConnell, "Black Life and Activities in West Florida and on the Gulf Coast, 1762-1803," both in *Eighteenth-Century Florida: Life on the Frontier*, ed. Samuel Proctor, 50-59, 75-90. For a succinct summary of the diplomatic maneuvering going back to the beginning of the eighteenth century see Robert R. Rea, "A Distant Thunder , 175-187.

in 1981 was dedicated to examining Pensacola and aspects of the engagement of the Gulf coast.[87] Like the Bicentennial conferences of the 1970s, the proceedings were published in a timely manner, offering solid scholarship on multiple aspects of the conflict on the Gulf coast.[88]

Then, in 1783, the conflict was over and the two Floridas returned to Spanish sovereignty. Persons loyal to Great Britain faced the same choices that the Spanish residents faced in 1763: whether to leave or to remain under their enemies' rule. Yet now the scope of the evacuation was considerably greater as the population seeking resettlement was not just composed of Florida residents but thousands of Loyalist subjects who had fled to Florida in the closing days of the war. The seminal study of the loyalists as a whole remains Wilbur Henry Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785* (1929), noted for its comprehensive treatment of the Loyalist experience throughout the conflict.[89] Revisiting the topic for the Bicentennial conferences, in 1976, J. Leitch Wright reaffirmed that East Florida was a "Loyalist bastion."[90] The process of moving to and settling in the Bahamas was examined as a prosopography by Thelma Peters in twin articles published in the *Florida Historical Quarterly* in 1962 and 1963. Peters examined both elite and ordinary evacuees, especially their efforts to retake Nassau, that had been conquered by a Spanish expeditionary force in 1782. Peters' study further showed how their incorporation into Bahamian society came with mixed results because of the infighting between newly-arrived Loyalists and the resident Conchs.[91] By the 1980s, scholarly analyses of

87 The distinguished group of scholars presenting at this conference included Jack D. L. Holmes, Abraham P. Nasatir, Eric Beerman, J. Leitch Wright, Donald E. Worcester, Kathryn Braund, Robin F.A. Fabel, and Francisco de Borja Medina Rojas, among others.

88 William S., Coker, and Robert R. Rea, eds., *Anglo-Spanish Confrontation on the Gulf Coast During the American Revolution* (Pensacola, FL: Gulf Coast History and Humanities Conference, 1982). A special commemorative issue of the *Florida Historical Quarterly* was issued in July 1981 dedicated to the Bicentennial of the battle of Pensacola that ended on May 8, 1781. Samuel Proctor, ed. "Comment," *FHQ* 60, no. 1 (July 1981), facing front cover.

89 Wilbur Henry Siebert, Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785: The Most Important Documents Pertaining Thereto, Edited with an Accompanying Narrative, 2 vols. (DeLand: Florida State Historical Society, 1929).

90 J. Leitch Wright, Jr., "British East Florida: Loyalist Bastion," in *Eighteenth-Century Florida: The Impact of the American Revolution*, 1-13. See also Linda K. Williams, "East Florida as a Loyalist Haven," FHQ 54, no. 4 (April 1976): 465-478.

91 Thelma Peters, "The Loyalist Migration from East Florida to the Bahama Islands," *FHQ* 40, no. 2 (October 1962): 123-141; "The American Loyalists in

the Loyalist experience as a whole had expanded dramatically. For Florida, Carole Watterson Troxler identified the process by which refugees from Carolina and Georgia sought to reestablish themselves in East Florida as early as 1778, long before the course of the conflict was settled in 1783. In all likelihood, none ever dreamed that Florida would be retroceded to Spain, and their bitterness when learning of the terms of surrender is evident in Troxler's work.[92] Most recently, Maya Jasanoff has suggested that while the consequences of defeat might have had negative consequences for the exiles, paradoxically, the loyalist diaspora was a positive influence in spreading British values and culture to regions where they ultimately settled.[93]

Post Bicentennial scholarship

The end of the Bicentennial celebrations was anticlimactic, yet academic production of studies of the period continued, albeit at a lesser volume. In 1985, Martha Condray Searcy highlighted the confused (and confusing) events along the border between Florida and Georgia that appeared to be little more than anarchy, and shortly thereafter Paul Nelson studied a more peaceful time in his biography of East Florida governor James Grant that appeared in 1993.[94] The trend toward biography continued with Edward J. Cashin's attempt to rehabilitate one of the most controversial figures on the frontier, Thomas Brown. Cashin's study was not just about Brown's questionable behavior during the conflict, but it also exemplified what it meant to be a loyalist in East Florida

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the Bahama Islands: Who They Were," *FHQ* 40, no. 3 (January 1963): 226-240. The sole study of the Spanish capture of the Bahamas is James A. Lewis, *The Final Campaign of the American Revolution: Rise and Fall of the Spanish Bahamas* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991).

92 Carole Watterson Troxler, "Loyalist Refugees and the British Evacuation of East Florida, 1783-1785," *FHQ* 60, no. 1 (July 1981): 1-28; and in a greatly expanded version "Refuge, Resistance, and Reward: The Southern Loyalists' Claim on East Florida," *Journal of Southern History* 55, no. 4 (November 1989): 563-596. In this issue, Diane Boucher takes up the analysis where Watterson Troxler leaves off.

93 Maya Jasanoff, "The Other Side of Revolution: Loyalists in the British Empire," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3d ser., 65, no. 2 (April 2008): 205-232; Jasanoff, *Liberty's Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011).

94 Martha Condray Searcy, *The Georgia-Florida Contest in the American Revolution, 1776-1778* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1985); Paul Nelson, *General James Grant: Scottish Soldier and Royal Governor of East Florida* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993). See Susan Schwartz's study of Grant through an Atlantic world perspective in this issue.

and later a British exile in the Caribbean.[95] Cashin followed his previous study of Brown with a biography of William Bartram in which he integrated the famous naturalist into the events and people on the frontier both before and after the North American Revolution began.[96] The mantle of producing quality scholarship on almost every aspect of the British period, however, fell upon Daniel L. Schafer, whose many scholarly works span the entirety of the British period (and beyond).[97] Schafer is probably best known for his work on plantations, but the depth and breadth of his scholarship extends to studies on African Americans, British explorations of Biscayne Bay in the 1770s, and his most recent contribution, a website on Florida history, which is an in-progress treasure trove of images and documents that Schafer has created with his "student partners."[98]

The Second Spanish Period

If the first Spanish period has been neglected, the second Spanish period has fared better in terms of scholarly attention. In some cases, sacred cows have fallen, and the multiplicity of interpretations has also led to lively debates. In the early 1940s, a scholar better known for his work on Cuba, Duvon Clough Corbitt, hoped to inform readers on the ways in which the governmental system worked in the Spanish empire, which, by extension, applied

95 Edward J. Cashin, *The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999). Thomas Brown also makes an appearance in Roger Smith's article in this issue.

96 Edward J. Cashin, *William Bartram and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000).

97 Daniel L. Schafer, "Plantation Development in British East Florida; A Case Study of the Earl of Egmont," *FHQ* 63, no. 2 (October 1984): 172-183; *Governor James Grant's Villa: A British East Florida Indigo Plantation* (St. Augustine, FL: St. Augustine Historical Society, 2000); "'A Swamp of an Investment'?: Richard Oswald's British East Florida Plantation Experiment," and "Zephaniah Kingsley's Laurel Grove Plantation," both in Jane Landers, ed., *East Florida's Colonial Plantations and Economy* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000); Daniel L. Schafer, *William Bartram and the Ghost Plantations of British East Florida* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010).

98 Daniel L. Schafer, "'Everything Carries the Face of Spring'; Biscayne Bay in the 1770's," Tequesta (December 1984): 23-31; "'Yellow Silk Ferret Tied Round Their Wrists': African Americans in British East Florida, 1763-1784," in T*he African American Heritage of Florida*, ed. David R. Colburn and Jane L. Landers (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995), 71-103; *St. Augustine's British Years 1763-1784* (St. Augustine, FL: St. Augustine Historical Society, 2002); Schafer's website is http://www.unf.edu/floridahistoryonline/.

to the Floridas.[99] Likewise, Michael J. Curley's *Church and State in the Spanish Floridas* (1940) examined the interconnected workings of the Spanish state and the Catholic Church.[100] Spanish Florida was beset by religious problems because a considerable number of non-Catholic former loyalists chose not to leave when Spain regained control of the Floridas. The religious issue was one of the most pressing issues that faced Vicente de Zéspedes, the first governor of the second Spanish period.[101] Zéspedes' many problems, including his strained relationship with outgoing British governor Patrick Tonyn, are showcased in Joseph B. Lockey's collection of documents, *East Florida, 1783-1785* (1949), a volume that is still fundamental to scholarship on East Florida, sixty-five years after its publication.[102] The standard biography of Zéspedes was written by Helen Hornbeck Tanner in 1963 and covers the many problems that plagued the first governor, including his conflicts with Tonyn, the religious divisions that were exacerbated by the arrival of an ecclesiastical visitor Cyril de Barcelona in 1788, problems of supply, and the "banditti" (criminal element) in the countryside.[103] Indeed, the unrest on the frontier with Georgia was one of the most pressing problems that faced Zéspedes and his successors Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada and Enrique White.[104] In some instances, the problems originated from international issues such as Spanish-US diplomatic failures.[105] Sometimes external forces were at work such as when Napoleon was at war with Britain and French

99 Duvon Clough Corbitt, "The Administrative System in the Floridas, 1783-1821, Part 1," *Tequesta* 1 (1942): 41-62; "The Administrative System in the Floridas, 1783-1821, Part 2," *Tequesta* 2 (1943): 57-67.

100 Michael J. Curley, *Church and State in the Spanish Floridas (1783-1822)* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1940).

101 Richard K. Murdoch, "Governor Cespedes and the Religious Problem in East Florida, 1786-1787," *FHQ* 26, no. 4 (April 1948): 325-344.

102 Joseph B. Lockey, *East Florida, 1783-1785: A File of Documents Assembled, and Many of Them Translated.* Edited with a foreword by John Walton Caughey (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949).

103 Helen Hornbeck Tanner, *Zéspedes in East Florida, 1784-1790* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1963; Reprint ed., Jacksonville, FL: University of North Florida Press, 1989).

104 Janice Borton Miller, *Juan Nepomuceno De Quesada: Governor of Spanish East Florida, 1790-1795* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981); Ramón Romero Cabot, *Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada: comportamientos, normas y recompensas* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1985). A biography of the third governor, Enrique White, has yet to be written.

105 J. Leitch Wright, *Britain and the American Frontier, 1783-1815* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1976).

agents provocateurs infiltrated the region.[106] In other instances, the agitation was purely the work of internal forces, disgruntled former loyalists or criminals with no allegiance to any nation.[107]

One of the key debates that runs throughout the study of colonial Florida revolves around the economy. Favorite descriptors employed by previous generations of historians include backward, depressed, antiquated, moribund, stagnant, and weak. Much of the older scholarship was predicated on a comparison between Florida and its neighbors and was analyzed within the context of twentieth-century North America or Europe.[108] The obvious watershed, therefore, was the long-awaited extension of free trade to East Florida in 1793. The authoritative statement on the topic was a study by Arthur Preston Whitaker, *Documents Relating to the Commercial Policy of Spain in the Floridas, with Incidental Reference to Louisiana* (1931).[109] Whitaker's thesis was reiterated by Janice Borton Miller in an article in 1976.[110] Closely aligned with economic topics emphasizing East Florida's stagnation were theories of dependency, mostly advocated by scholars outside the United States.[111] As economic history became less fashionable in the 1990s, scholars moved to different aspects of economic activities in a collection of essays edited by Jane G. Landers, *Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida* (2000). In this work,

106 Richard K. Murdoch, *The Georgia-Florida Frontier, 1793-1796; Spanish Reaction to French Intrigue and American Designs* (Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint, 1974); Charles E. Bennett, *Florida's "French" Revolution, 1793-1795* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1981).

107 Susan R. Parker, "Men Without God or King: Rural Settlers of East Florida, 1784-1790," *FHQ* 69, no. 2 (October 1990): 135-155; James A. Lewis, "Cracker-Spanish Florida Style," *FHQ* 63, no.2 (October 1984): 184-204. Lewis, quoting a lengthy report from Zéspedes, defines the Crackers as, "frontiersmen possessing a host of unpleasant characteristics." 185.

108 John D. Ware, "St. Augustine 1784: Decadence and Repairs," *FHQ* 48, no. 2 (October 1969): 180-187; Abel Poitrineau, "Demography and Political Destiny: Spanish Florida from 1784 to 1819," *FHQ* 66, no. 4 (April 1988): 420-443.

109 For example, see Arthur Preston Whitaker, *Documents Relating to the Commercial Policy of Spain in the Floridas, with Incidental Reference to Louisiana* (DeLand: The Florida State Historical Society, 1931).

110 Janice Borton Miller, "The Struggle for Free Trade in East Florida and the Cédula of 1793," *FHQ* 55, no. 1 (July 1976): 48-59.

111 Elena Sánchez-Fabrés Mirat, *Situación histórica de las Floridas en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII (1783-1819): los problemas de una región de frontera* (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Dirección General de Relaciones Culturales, 1977); Pablo Tornero Tinajero, *Relaciones de dependencia entre Florida y Estados Unidos (1783-1820)* (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Dirección General de Relaciones Culturales, 1979).

Landers and a group of senior scholars investigated several of East Florida's plantations in the British and Second Spanish periods and looked beyond the commercial aspects to establish social, cultural, and biographical details of the plantations' inhabitants.[112]

One of the unchallenged assumptions in Florida history was the failure of the situado to arrive in a timely manner. Indeed, throughout the colonial period, the recurring theme of Florida governors' letters to Spain is the dire conditions on the frontier. Many scholars of Florida assumed that the same was true for the Second Spanish period until the completion of Ligia Bermúdez master's thesis in 1989. Bermúdez demonstrated convincingly in a painstaking quantitative study, that while Florida's governors might complain, the situado did arrive on time.[113] Shortly thereafter, James Cusick's work on external trade buttressed Bermudez's conclusions: "While Spanish Florida may have suffered hardship in times of warfare, the daily record of the colony's commerce reveals no evidence of impoverishment."[114] Cusick expanded on his original article by demonstrating that East Florida's economy was firmly situated within a wider Atlantic economy but, nonetheless, took its direction from the model established by the authorities in Havana.[115] Recently Sherry Johnson has shown how environmental conditions in the Spanish Caribbean affected trade patterns and how Florida's shipping interests were able to capitalize upon opportunities as they arose within the system.[116]

The Demographic Debate

Which demographic group was predominant in East Florida after the return of Spanish rule? Like the question about the

112 Jane G. Landers, ed., *Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000).

113 Ligia María Bermúdez, "Situado: A Study in the Dynamics of East Florida's Economy, During the Second Spanish Period, 1785-1820." (MA thesis, University of Florida, 1989).

114 James Cusick, "Across The Border: Commodity Flow And Merchants In Spanish St. Augustine," *FHQ* 69, no. 3 (January 1991): 277-299. The quotation is on page 279.

115 James Gregory Cusick, "Spanish East Florida in the Atlantic Economy of the Late Eighteenth Century," in Landers, ed. *Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida*, 168-188.

116 Sherry Johnson, "Climate, Community, and Commerce, Among Florida, Cuba, and the Atlantic World, 1784-1800," *FHQ* 71, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 455-482.

debatable land, the demographic makeup of East Florida has generated a great deal of academic interest. Scholars had a valuable starting point in Joseph B. Lockey's "The St. Augustine Census of 1786," (1939), an interpretation that was unchallenged for fifty years.[117] Lockey's article introduced scholars to the Spanish attempts to enumerate the population after 1784, but it suffered from the shortcoming of omitting large portions of East Florida's inhabitants. Subsequently, many scholars have produced revisionist studies that sought to remedy the omissions in Lockey's article (discussed below). Works produced in Spain generally have been heavily quantitative in methodology, such as the books and articles by Pablo Tornero Tinajero, who linked society and the economy in a number of publications produced by the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas.[118] By the 1990s, many different interpretations of East Florida's population began to appear. Patricia Griffin continued her study of the Minorcan population and was joined by Philip D. Rascio in an article that reproduced the text of the 1786 census on the Minorcan population that had been omitted from Lockey's article.[119] Jane Landers, one of Florida's most versatile and productive scholars, extended her work on the free black population far beyond the narrow confines of the peninsula showing how Florida's residents of African descent moved easily across political and geographic boundaries. Among the most prominent examples was her biography of Jorge Biassou, commander of the black forces allied with the Spaniards, who, in 1796, was evacuated to St. Augustine after the Spanish losses in Santo Domingo.[120] Susan R. Parker looked at the law-abiding and lawless in her reevaluation of the

117 Joseph B. Lockey, "The St. Augustine Census of 1786, Translated from the Spanish with an Introduction and Notes," *FHQ* 18, no.1 (July 1939): 11-31.

118 Pablo Tornero Tinajero, *Sociedad y población en San Agustín de la Florida, 1786* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1978); "Sociedad y Población en San Agustín de la Florida," *Anuario de estudios americanos* 35 (1981): 233-263.

119 Griffin, *Mullet on the Beach*; Philip D. Rascio, "The Minorcan Population of St. Augustine in the Spanish Census of 1786," *FHQ* 66, no. 2 (October 1987): 160-184.

120 Jane Landers, *Black Society* and *Atlantic Creoles*, passim. For Jorge Biassou and his entourage see, "Rebellion and Royalism in Spanish Florida: The French Revolution on Spain's Northern Frontier," *A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean*, ed. David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 156-177. See also Jane G. Landers, "Female Conflict and Its Resolution in Eighteenth-Century St. Augustine," *The Americas*, 54, no. 4 (April 1998): 557-574.

settlers in the countryside and on the Florida-Georgia frontier in an article published in 1991 as well as in a more recent chapter in 2013.[121]

Among the many groups of people who lived in East Florida were the government employees, both bureaucrats and military members, who were rarely if ever counted in the ostensible "censuses" created for other purposes.[122] The importance of the military was carried through into the second Spanish period in Juan Marchena Fernández, *Guarniciones y población militar*, available as a translation in Juan Marchena Fernández, "St. Augustine's Military Society," a work translated by Luis Rafael Arana in *El Escribano* (1985).[123] In a similar vein, Sherry Johnson's "The Spanish St. Augustine Community, 1784-1795: A Reevaluation" (1989) demonstrated that the military forces made up a significant portion of the permanent population and were instrumental in shaping life in the province.[124]

West Florida

While the dearth of publications about second Spanish period West Florida is not nearly as pronounced as for the first Spanish period, many such publications are so closely aligned with work on Louisiana that they are beyond the scope of this article. The most prolific scholar of the region was Jack D. L.

121 Parker, "Men Without God or King." See also Susan Richbourg Parker, "So In Fear of Both the Indians and the Americans" in *America's Hundred Years' War: U.S. Expansion to the Gulf Coast and the Fate of the Seminoles, 1763-1858*, ed. William S. Belko (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011), 25-40.

122 For the difference between "censuses" and the more common houselists used by Spanish enumerators, see William S. Coker and Rodrigo Fernández Carrión, "List of the Inhabitants of Pensacola Who Were Householders at the Time of the Capitulation," *FHQ* 77, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 68-72. See also William S. Coker and G. Douglas Inglis, *The Spanish Censuses of Pensacola, 1784-1820: A Genealogical Guide to Spanish Pensacola* (Pensacola, FL: Periwinkle Press 1980).

123 Juan Marchena Fernandez, *Guarniciones y población militar and Oficiales y soldados*, along with Luis Arana's translation, "St. Augustine's Military Society," translated by Luis Rafael Arana, *El Escribano* 14 (1985): 43-71. See also John D. Ware, "Vicente Manuel de Céspedes and Carlos Howard: Service Records and Related Documents," El Escribano, 8 (October 1971): 123-138.

124 Sherry Johnson, "The Spanish St. Augustine Community, 1784-1795: A Reevaluation," *FHQ* 68, no. 1 (July 1989): 27-54. See also Sherry Johnson, *The Social Transformation of Eighteenth-Century Cuba* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), in which she argues that the single most important factor in shaping events in second Spanish period Florida was the sudden death of Charles III in late 1788 and the change in royal administration in Cuba.

Holmes, whose long career spanned decades and whose work geographically transcended the Gulf coast region.[125] Publications that concentrate on the Spanish presence include an early article by Lyle N. McAlister in the commemorative issue of the *Florida Historical Quarterly* in 1959.[126] Among the personalized studies that were written during the Bicentennial celebrations include the works on the Spanish governors Arturo O'Neill, by Eric Beerman, and Vicente Folch, by David White.[127] A recent study, the third in Robert S. Weddle's trilogy, *Changing Tides: Twilight and Dawn in the Spanish Sea, 1763-1803* (1995), examined Spanish expeditions to produce accurate maps and charts in the best study of how the Enlightenment was carried to the Gulf coast.[128] Finally, no survey of West Florida would be complete without mentioning the magisterial work of William S. Coker, and Thomas D. Watson, *Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands: Panton, Leslie & Company and John Forbes & Company, 1783-1847.*[129] While *Indian Traders* is Coker's best known work, the activities of the partners, Panton, Leslie, and Forbes have wider significance to issues that are now coming to the fore in academic inquiry such as the loyalist diaspora and the transnational links between Florida and the Bahamas lasting into the second Spanish period and situating Florida in the Atlantic world.[130]

125 Jack D. L. Holmes, *Pensacola Settlers, 1781-1821* (Pensacola, FL: Pensacola Historical, Restoration and Preservation Commission, 1970); "Juan de la Villebeuvre and Spanish Indian Policy in West Florida, 1784-1797," *FHQ* 58, (April 1980), 387-399; *Do It! Don't Do It!: Spanish Laws on Sex and Marriage* (Pensacola, FL: Periwinkle Press, 1982). See also his scholarship on Gálvez, cited above.

126 Lyle N. McAlister, "Pensacola During the Second Spanish Period," *FHQ* 37, nos. 3-4 (January-April 1959): 281-327.

127 Eric Beerman, "Arturo O'Neill: First Governor of West Florida During the Second Spanish Period," *FHQ* 60, no. 1 (July 1981): 29-41; David Hart White, *Vicente Folch, Governor in Spanish Florida–1787-1811* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981); David H. White, "A View of Spanish West Florida: Selected Letters of Governor Juan Vicente Folch," *FHQ* 56, no. 2 (October 1977): 138-147.

128 Robert S. Weddle, *Changing Tides: Twilight and Dawn in the Spanish Sea, 1763-1803* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1995). A recent biography of one of the naturalists of the time is Walter Kingsley Taylor and Elaine M. Norman, *Andre 'Michaux in Florida: An Eighteenth Century Botanical Journey* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002).

129 William S. Coker and Thomas D. Watson, *Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands: Panton, Leslie & Company and John Forbes & Company, 1783-1847* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1986).

130 An example is Gilbert Din, *War on the Gulf Coast: The Spanish Fight Against William Augustus Bowles* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2012),

The Florida Renaissance: New, Cutting-Edge Studies Over the Past 10 Years

Recently, the editor of the *Florida Historical Quarterly*, Connie Lester, commented to this author that Florida history was undergoing a renaissance of sorts as evidenced by the number of submissions she was receiving from young scholars and scholars outside of Florida and/or the Southeast.[131] A survey of the books and articles produced within the past ten years on Florida in and of itself, or more often, as an integral part of the wider Atlantic world, verifies Lester's observation. Senior scholars are leading the way in adding to the number of publications that seek to integrate the Florida experience into a wider context. Daniel L. Schafer, Jane Landers, Sherry Johnson, S. Max Edelson, James G. Cusick, and Susan Parker have all published books and articles in the past decade that situate Florida studies in the newest trends in scholarship.[132] The archaeologists and historians at the Lighthouse Archaeological Maritime Program (LAMP), the research arm of the St. Augustine Lighthouse & Museum, are producing articles and reports on the British period that are models of interdisciplinary scholarship and cooperation.[133] Recently-minted or in-process Ph.D.s such as Susan Schwartz, Roger Smith, Diane Boucher, Diana Reigelsperger, and Debra Bauer, whose scholarship is included in these special issues and in other editions of the *Florida Historical Quarterly*, are writing quality pieces that are being well received in the academic community.[134]

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which will be discussed in the next Special Issue. See also Willam S. Coker, "Entrerpeneurs in the British and Spanish Floridas, 1775-1821," in Proctor, ed., *Eighteenth-Century Florida and the Caribbean*, 15-39; Thomas D. Watson, "Continuity In Commerce: Development Of The Panton, Leslie and Company Trade Monopoly in West Florida," *FHQ* 54, no. 4 (April 1976): 548-564.

131 Personal communication, Connie Lester to Sherry Johnson, January 2011, Cocoa, FL.

132 Schafer, William Bartram; Schafer, *Zephaniah Kingsley Jr. and the Atlantic World: Slave Trader, Plantation Owner, Emancipator* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013); Jane Landers, *Atlantic Creoles*; Sherry Johnson, *Climate and Catastrophe*; Sherry Johnson "When Good Climates Go Bad;" Edelson, *New Map of Empire*, Parker, "So In Fear." See Cusick's article in this volume. He will also be the guest editor of the next Special Issue.

133 Samuel P. Turner, "Maritime Insights from St. Augustine's British Period Documentary Records," *El Escribano* 47 (2010): 1-21; Roger Clark Smith, "The Fourteenth Colony: Florida and the American Revolution," (PhD diss., University of Florida, 2011). See also Chuck Meide's article in this volume.

134 Also see, Andrew McMichael, *Atlantic Loyalties: Americans in Spanish West Florida, 1785-1810* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008); Timothy P.

Lastly, a number of dissertations that are either unpublished or still in process are evidence that Florida history is undergoing a renaissance.[135] May it continue!

Grady, *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in Colonial Southeast America, 1650-1725* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010); Deborah L. Bauer, "'... in a strange place...': The Experiences of British Women during the Colonization of East & West Florida," *FHQ* 89, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 145-185; Cameron B. Strang, "Indian Storytelling, Scientific Knowledge, and Power in the Florida Borderlands," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d. ser., 70, no. 4 (October 2013): 671-700;. Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso, "'Having Served in the Troops': The Appointment of Military Officers as Provincial Governors in Early Eighteenth-Century Spanish America, 1700-1746," *Colonial Latin American Historical Review*, Second Series, 1, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 329-359; James L. Hill, "Bring Them What They Lack:" Spanish-Creek Exchange and Alliance Making in a Maritime Borderland, 1763-1783," *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 12, no.1 (Winter 2014): 36-67.

See also the articles by Diana Reigelsperger and Jonathan de Coster in the previous issues.

135 Jennifer Lynn Baszile, "Communities at the Crossroads: Chiefdoms, Colonies, and Empires in Colonial Florida, 1670–1741" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1999); Astrid Melzner Whidden, "Links Across the Gulfstream : The Florida/ Bahamas Zone, 1780-1900" (PhD diss., Florida International University, 2007); Alejandra Dubcovsky, "Connected Worlds: Communication Networks in the Colonial Southeast, 1513–1740" (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2011).

James Grant, British East Florida, and the Impending Imperial Crisis, 1764-1771

by Susan Schwartz

When newly appointed governor James Grant arrived in St. Augustine on August 29, 1764, the tiny population greeted him with all the pomp and circumstance they could muster.[1] A few weeks later, attended with "all due Solemnity" by the members of the Governor's Council, civil and military officials, and "many other Gentlemen of Distinction," Grant took his oaths of office.[2] As Grant thanked his subjects for their deferential welcome, he was unaware that he had entered into the beginnings of a political morass—an imperial crisis that would culminate in the separation of the American mainland colonies from Great Britain. In contrast to the kind wishes of Grant's constituents, colonists elsewhere on the continent were beginning to protest new Parliamentary taxation measures. Within a few months, many of those neighboring colonists would rise up against their royal governors and other

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1 James Grant to James Box, September 2, 1764, James Grant of Ballindalloch Papers (Jay I. Kislak Foundation, Miami Lakes, Florida), (Hereafter JGP, Kislak Collection), microfilm, reel 1. Charles L. Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province, 1763-1784,* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964), 14.

2 "St Augustine in the Province of East Florida," October 31, 1764, National Archives/Public Record Office, London, Great Britain, Colonial Office Records, Series 5, vol. 570, Library of Congress, microfilm, no. 1337. (Hereafter CO5/with appropriate volume number, e.g. CO5/570).

British officials. James Grant's term as governor of East Florida coincided with the enactment of the Stamp Act in March 1765 and the implementation of the Townshend Duties in June 1767, both of which were crucial moments on the path to Revolution.[3] This path to independence, however, was no foregone conclusion. In the colony's first years, its "infant" status necessitated a heavy reliance on the neighboring colonies of Georgia and South Carolina, colonies which did side with the patriot cause. Such reliance put East Florida at risk of being drawn into the imbroglio between Great Britain and the American colonies.[4] As Grant's tenure progressed and East Florida matured, the colony pulled more firmly away from the patriot leanings of their nearest neighbors. This twisted path between loyalty and revolt, long ignored by historians, underlines the importance of proximity, contingency, and individual action in the history of the British colonies and the imperial crisis.

James Grant's term as governor of East Florida, from 1764 to 1771, provides an opportunity to explore such issues by evaluating and gaining an understanding of East Florida's response to the imperial crisis. Upon Grant's arrival in the colony, East Florida was quickly integrated into the British Atlantic world of trade, communication, and politics. Far from being a forgotten outpost, East Florida was widely discussed as a potential area for investment, and Grant and other Floridians were not provincials, uninformed about the goings-on of the larger world. Indeed, the colony's experience with the Stamp Act and Townshend crises demonstrates that East Floridians remained attentive to imperial policies as well as the corresponding colonial outcry against such legislation. That the colony largely accepted the Stamp and Townshend Acts without complaint did not marginalize or make the colony irrelevant to contemporaries; yet historians, if they consider the colony at all, have treated East Florida as an outlier.[5] Historical studies of the

3 These were acts imposed by Parliament to raise revenues in the American colonies. The legislation is discussed in further detail below.

4 Grant often referred to East Florida as an "infant colony." For instance, James Grant to Ensign Wright, November [11], 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, microfilm, reel 2. James Grant to Thomas Gage, August 27, 1767, JGP, Kislak Collection, microfilm, reel 1.

5 See for instance: Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); T. H. Breen, *The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Benjamin L. Carp, *Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Woody Holton,

imperial crisis and the American Revolution consistently elide East Florida's role as one of the twenty six British American colonies.[6] In contrast, otherwise excellent texts on British East Florida neglect the earliest years of crisis, and instead position their examinations of the colony beginning in 1774 when Governor Patrick Tonyn arrived in St. Augustine.[7] With few exceptions, historians of British East Florida consistently periodize their investigations of the province during the Revolution according to a military timeline.[8] The American Revolution, however, did not begin with Lexington and Concord. Rather, a decade-long, escalating imperial crisis led toward that moment of no return. East Florida's existence as a British colony coincided neatly with this era of dissention. East Floridians remained loyal to the British Empire during the imperial crisis, and the colony's loyalty in these early years foreshadowed its ultimate trajectory in the American Revolution. The colony's allegiance to

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Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776* (New York: Norton, 1991).

6 Andrew O'Shaughnessy points out that there were twenty-six British American colonies: the thirteen "original" colonies, East and West Florida, and eleven West Indian colonies. O'Shaughnessy, *Empire Divided,* xii. The Floridas, however, are outside of the purview of O'Shaughnessy's study. Histories of the American Revolution from a southern perspective tend to acknowledge East Florida's existence more often, although the colony remains peripheral to the larger narrative. See for instance, Jonathan Mercantini, *Who Shall Rule at Home?: The Evolution of South Carolina Political Culture* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007); Paul M. Pressly, *On the Rim of the Caribbean: Colonial Georgia and the British Atlantic World* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013); Kinloch Bull, Jr., *The Oligarchs in Colonial and Revolutionary Charleston: Lieutenant Governor William Bull II and his Family* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991).

7 An exception to this approach is Roger C. Smith, "The Fourteenth Colony: Florida and the American Revolution in the South." PhD Diss., University of Florida, 2011. Smith argues for the military centrality of East Florida in the Revolution and outlines the importance of land in the East Floridians' loyalty. The crux of his work, however, is centered on the Tonyn administration beginning in 1774. Also see Smith's article in this volume. Another exception is Wilfred B. Kerr, "The Stamp Act in the Floridas, 1765-1766" *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 21 no. 4 (1935): 463-470. Kerr's work deals almost exclusively with West Florida. In addition, Paul David Nelson recognizes that East Florida was not "completely isolated" from the imperial crisis in Nelson, *General James Grant: Scottish Soldier and Royal Governor of East Florida* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 67.

8 The most comprehensive works on British East Florida are Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* and J. Leitch Wright, *Florida in the American Revolution* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1975). Both of these works, however, largely begin their accounts of the Revolution in 1774 and they dismiss the effects of the imperial crisis on East Florida.

Great Britain was a decision that hinged upon both local events and larger issues of British identity.[9] That East Floridians diverged from the path towards independence, despite connections with neighboring colonies that declared independence, raises important questions about our understandings of the causes of the Revolution and the limitations of applying strictly regional approaches when considering the breadth of colonial American history.

East Florida in the British Empire

East Florida joined the British Empire in 1763 when it was acquired from Spain in exchange for Havana in the treaty that settled the Seven Years' War. While there were certainly those who questioned the value of East Florida's "sandy desarts," [sic] proponents of the colony envisioned a profitable enterprise in which returns might be made through experiments in agriculture and plantation development, timber industries, and land speculation.[10] James Grant, a veteran of the recent war, requested a governorship in West Florida before the British government had even completed the business of setting territorial boundaries.[11] British naval officer George Johnstone, however, had already been promised that appointment. Johnstone was displeased to hear a rumor that he might be appointed to East Florida, which he feared would be a less lucrative enterprise, and he promptly wrote a letter of complaint to then Prime Minister Lord Bute (John Stuart). Apparently, Bute

9 In terms of British identity, although East Florida was developed on a South Carolina model, the colony also resembled the West Indian colonies as portrayed by Andrew O'Shaughnessy in *An Empire Divided.* Within this work, O'Shaughnessy demonstrated that colonists in the British West Indies maintained "close cultural and social ties with Britain," which encouraged a sense of loyalty to Great Britain. In particular, the West Indies had a transient population, a significant imbalance between black and white populations, and a lack of a "creole" identity, all of which encouraged loyalty over rebellion. (xv) East Florida also had some of these characteristics, which may have compelled Floridians into remaining loyal in the American Revolution. My dissertation in process explores this possibility in depth.

10 For debates about adopting East Florida as part of the Treaty of Paris settlement see Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 6; Robert L. Gold, *Borderland Empires in Transition: The Triple-Nation Transfer of Florida* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), 16.

11 According to Nelson in his biography of Grant, Grant requested the position in West Florida on June 24, 1763, Nelson, *General James Grant,* 44. George Johnstone, however, had already been promised the western colony as early as June 16, 1763. George Johnstone to Lord Bute, June 16, 1763, Ninetta S. Jucker, ed., *Jenkinson Papers, 1760-1766.* (London: MacMillan & Co., 1949), 157-9.

responded favorably to Johnstone's concerns with Grant being appointed governor of the eastern province while Johnstone obtained the same position in West Florida.[12] When Grant received his commission as governor of East Florida, he was pleased with the appointment, and he immediately began planning for the success of the new colony. In a comprehensive report to the Board of Trade in July 1763, Grant detailed his plans for the colony's development, including his suggestions for encouraging the settlement of "Industrious Adventurers" and French Protestants, as well as his ideas to produce a wide variety of commodities including indigo, rice, and naval stores.[13] Grant was not alone in his optimism for East Florida, and in the colony's first years, it would draw on a number of wealthy investors who hoped to increase their fortunes in the new province.[14] The efforts of the new governor and the colony's investors were intended to situate East Florida within the British Atlantic world of trade, and hopes were high that the colony might make "a "very beneficial acquisition" for the British Empire.[15]

James Grant and the East Florida investors had grand plans for the colony's future, and they looked to South Carolina as a desirable model worthy of replication.[16] In the early 1760s, Grant had served in the Cherokee campaign of the Seven Years' War in South Carolina. It was during this period that he formed relationships with some of the leading planters, merchants, and other elites in Charleston and the surrounding area.[17] These relationships, and his observations about the importance of enslaved labor for South

12 Jucker, *Jenkinson*, 157-159.

13 James Grant to John Pownall, July 30, 1763, CO5/540.

14 Daniel Schafer, "'A Swamp of Investment?': Richard Oswald's British East Florida Plantation Experiment" in *Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida.*, ed. Jane G. Landers, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 11-38; Patricia C. Griffen, "Blue Gold: Andrew Turnbull's New Smyrna Plantation" Ibid: 38-68; David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); George C. Rogers, Jr., "The East Florida Society of London, 1766-1767" *Florida Historical Quarterly* 54 no. 4 (1976): 479-496.

15 *London Magazine: or, Gentleman's Monthly Intelligencer* March 1, 1765, (London: R. Baldwin, 1765):120, (American Antiquarian Society Historical Periodicals Collection, Series 1).

16 Schafer, "Swamp of Investment," 12; David R. Chestnut, "South Carolina's Impact upon East Florida, 1763-1776" in *Eighteenth Century Florida and the Revolutionary South*, ed., Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1976), 5.

17 George C. Rogers, "The Papers of James Grant of Ballindalloch Castle, Scotland," *South Carolina Historical Magazine*, 77, no. 3 (July, 1976): 145-160, 148-149.

Carolinian success, ultimately shaped the new governor's plans for East Florida's development.[18] In addition to his connections with other planters, slave traders, and merchants throughout the British Empire, Grant depended on South Carolina's Henry Laurens for his expertise in slave-related matters and in plantation development. In a letter to Laurens, Grant arranged for the purchase of slaves on his joint account with a London merchant, Richard Oswald. Taking Laurens' advice, Grant requested "strong new negroes," not "Country-born," whom he deemed "to be full of Trouble."[19] Grant's interest in slave labor went beyond his own plantation ventures, and he requested that the British government purchase one hundred slaves for the general use of the colony. The governor suggested that enslaved people could be put to work on developing infrastructure and supporting the troops and other inhabitants.[20] Grant's plans for the new colony also benefited from the arrival of a number of experienced South Carolina planters who brought slaves, equipment, and expertise into the new colony.[21] In 1765, South Carolina planters, Francis Kinloch and John Moultrie began to develop large plantations in East Florida. Combined, they delivered to the colony more than one hundred enslaved people for their planned plantations.[22] Grant brought in still other South

18 Rogers, "Papers of James Grant," 148-149. Rogers argues that Grant formed friendships with Henry Laurens, John Moultrie, and James Coachmen during his time in South Carolina, and Grant turned to those men when he began to develop East Florida. Nelson also notes Grant's adamant decision to employ enslaved labor in the colony. Nelson, *James Grant*, 63.

19 Grant to Henry Laurens, July 16, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

20 For Grant's official report and the planned use of unfree labor for public works and roads, see James Grant to John Pownall, July 30, 1763, CO5/540; James Grant to Jonathan Bryan, July 4, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; Grant to Brigadier Bouquett, August 11, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1. For the planned use of enslaved African sailors see Grant to [unknown], February 6, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; Grant to Henry Laurens, [undated], JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; Grant to Laurens, July 16, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1. For examples of enslaved people being sent to East Florida, see James Grant, [Diary], January 13, 1767, and January 14, 1767, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1 and Grant to William Knox, July 15, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

21 In addition to South Carolina planters, East Florida also benefited from investors around the globe including London merchants and Members of Parliament. See Hancock, *Citizens*, 153-171 and Rogers, "East Florida Society," 479-496.

22 By July 1765, Moultrie had already brought in thirty to forty slaves to work on his East Florida plantation. Francis Kinloch brought in eighty persons. Both men were South Carolina planters who expected to expand their investments in the new colony. James Grant to William Knox, July 15, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1. Grant himself purchased forty slaves to work on his own plantation, Nelson, *James Grant*, 65.

Carolinians to act in leadership positions within the new colony. While East Florida had no popular assembly, it did have a Council, which assisted the governor in legislative matters and shared some of Grant's executive power.[23] Grant filled these offices with South Carolina elites including James Moultrie, who also served as Chief Justice, John Moultrie, John Ainslie, John Holmes, and William Drayton, the latter later assuming the position of chief justice.[24] These relationships with South Carolinians demonstrate the fluidity of movement between East Florida and the other southern colonies. Such linkages would prove crucial to East Florida's survival during the colony's first years of development, but the connections would also put East Florida at risk from political discord spreading from the neighboring colonies.

Grant, South Carolina planters, and investors from across the British Atlantic, utilized their knowledge of large-scale slave-based agricultural production within East Florida. Investors hoped that their expenditures would soon turn profitable, but they understood that it would take some time before the colony would be productive. The colony's planters experimented with a variety of produce, and they conjectured on the climate and soil, speculating that East Florida's latitudinal similarity to the Mediterranean would make the colony suitable for wine making.[25] East Florida planters also sought out competent overseers, and they made substantial investments in unfree labor and agricultural equipment to be used on burgeoning rice, cotton, and indigo plantations.[26] Notwithstanding these efforts, it was clear that the colony's first years might prove precarious. Grant recognized that the establishment of a colony, which had very little agricultural development or infrastructure, would be costly in its early stages of settlement.[27] The new governor expected that these expenditures would be temporary, and he predicted that the colony would be self-supporting within five years.[28] This was not an unreasonable timeframe for Grant to assume. While South Carolina took nearly seventy years to become one of the wealthiest colonies on the North American mainland, neighboring Georgia, which had recently

23 Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 40-41.
24 Ibid., 14-15;, 44.
25 James Grant to Richard Oswald, September 20, 1764, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; James Grant to [Mr.] Cheap, May 7, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 10.
26 Hancock, *Citizens,* 153.
27 James Grant to John Pownall, July 30, 1763, CO5/540.
28 Ibid.

taken up South Carolina's model of plantation development, took only four years to start realizing profits after adopting slavery in 1752.[29] In the meantime, East Florida would rely on the British government to support the civil establishment, to provide bounties on produce, to furnish presents for the Creek and other Native American populations, and to finance a military force within the colony.[30] Thus, while Grant and East Florida investors planned for the future, Parliament calculated how to finance the added costs of a larger empire. It was this search for revenue that would be the impetus for the imperial crisis, and as Parliament implemented new taxes to cover the expenses of an expanding empire, American colonists increasingly united in protest against unwanted revenue-raising legislation.

The Imperial Crisis and East Florida: a Neglected Connection

The establishment of East Florida as a British colony coincided with and related to the early stages of the imperial crisis. In the aftermath of the Seven Years' War, Great Britain gained vast territories on the North American continent, which increased the empire's expenses for the defense and support of new domains like East Florida.[31] Unwilling to burden further the population of Great Britain with additional taxes, Prime Minister George Grenville and the members of Parliament looked to the American colonies for revenue.[32] Grenville and Parliament began with the Sugar Act in 1764, which was the first open and direct tax on Americans.[33] Soon thereafter, Parliament enacted the Currency Act to better regulate commerce and the monetary system of the American colonies. Within the year, Grenville began to sketch out the Stamp Act, which would offset the costs "of defending, protecting, and

29 Pressly, *Rim of the Caribbean*, 192; 153.

30 Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province*, 34-41.

31 The revenues gained from the Sugar and Stamp Acts were designed to pay for defense, while the Townshend Act (mentioned later) would support the civil establishments of the colonies.

32 John L. Bullion, *A Great and Necessary Measure: George Grenville and the Genesis of the Stamp Act, 1763-1765* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1982), 16-7. The British already were heavily in debt primarily because of the expense of the Seven Years' War.

33 Peter D. G. Thomas, "The Grenville Program, 1763-1765." in *A Companion to the American Revolution*, ed. Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 119; Susan Schwartz, "Merchant Political Mobility during the Imperial Crises: The Impact of London and Northeastern American Merchants on Parliament and Colonial Policy, 1765-1775" *Atlantic Millennium* 10 (Fall 2011): 57-81, 1.

securing" East Florida and the other recent colonial acquisitions.[34] When the Stamp Act resulted in mass unrest within the American colonies, Parliament quickly repealed the legislation. The seeds of Revolution, however, had been sown, and Americans increasingly came to question Parliament's authority in matters of taxation.[35] Following a brief respite in the animosities between Americans and the British government, the imperial crisis resurfaced in 1767 with the enactment of the Townshend duties. The Townshend Act was intended to contribute towards the costs of defending the colonies as well as to fund the civil establishment in colonies, like East Florida, which were unable to support themselves.[36] Once again, American colonists dissented against the new taxes.[37] Although East Floridians would not participate in these protests in a significant way, their role as beneficiaries of the new revenue policies put them squarely in the middle of the imperial crisis.

As the rift over taxation between Great Britain and her American colonies grew, there were those who blamed East Florida and the other newly acquired North American territories for the latest revenue raising measures. Massachusetts assemblyman James Otis, writing under the pseudonym John Hampden, for instance, insisted that the colonies had never been an expense to the British government until "ill judged" efforts were made to settle "Georgia and Nova Scotia, [and] Florida."[38] Before the Seven Years' War,

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34 Great Britain. *Anno Regni Georgii III. Regis Magnae Britanniae, Franciae, & Hiberniae, Quinto: At the Parliament Begun and Holden at Westminster, the Nineteenth Day of May, Anno Dom. 1761, in the First Year of the Reign of Our Sovereign Lord George the Third ... and from Thence Continued by Several Prorogations to the Tenth Day of January, 1765, Being the Fourth Session of the Twelfth Parliament of Great Britain.* (London: Edes & Gill, 1765). (Early American Imprints, first series, no. 9986). In the Treaty of Paris, 1763, which ended the Seven Years' War, Great Britain obtained all of the territory east of the Mississippi River, which included East and West Florida, as well as French Canada.

35 Edmund S. Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, reprint edition 1995); Robert Middlekauf, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 93, 110

36 Great Britain, Parliament, ["The Townshend Act"], *The Avalon Project,* http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/townsend_act_1767.asp (accessed May 30, 2014)

37 Peter D. G. Thomas, *The Townshend Duties Crisis: The Second Phase of the American Revolution, 1767-1776* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 76. Thomas notes that the colonial protests against the Townshend Acts proceeded more slowly than the reactions against the Stamp Act.

38 James Otis, "John Hampden to William Pym" *Pennsylvania Gazette* January 23, 1766. (Accessible Archives) William A. Pencak, identifies Otis as "Hampden" in "From Racket to Natural Law: The Permutation of Smuggling into Free

Otis continued, the colonies had not incurred any significant costs to Great Britain.[39] "Junius Americanus" also attacked the acquisition of East Florida. According to the pseudonymous author, "the two Floridas" would never "be made useful, or advantageous to the State."[40] The author went on to decry the costs associated with maintaining the governments of the two colonies, which he claimed, offered "nothing but diseases and lamentation.[41] Pennsylvania assemblyman, and future representative to the Continental Congress John Dickinson, was also full of contempt for East Florida in his *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania.* Writing about the latest colonial acquisitions including Canada, Nova Scotia, and the two Floridas, Dickinson questioned the "justice" in charging the American colonists for the defense of new provinces.[42] Dickinson reasoned that these recently obtained territories offered no benefit to the other, more established colonies, and he went on to argue that as Great Britain would be the only beneficiary of expanded colonial development, the imperial government "alone ought to maintain them."[43] Dickinson's letters were of particular significance during the imperial crisis, with reprintings throughout the American colonies.[44] This widespread publicity likely put East Florida firmly in the minds of Americans as they pondered the burdens being imposed in far-away London.

While Parliamentary measures resulted in protests, riots, and other disturbances throughout the British colonies, Grant and his constituents in East Florida experienced little dissention. The Floridians' relative lack of participation in the unrest stemmed from a number of sources. First, the new colony had a small and transient population that was unwilling and unable to engage in the kind of mass unrest found in other more established colonies.[45] East Florida's plantations were "thinly scattered" across the

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Trade" ed., William A. Pencak, *Contested Commonwealths: Essays in American History* (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 2011), 303. Pencak notes that the pseudonym was meant to suggest that Americans "suffered under grievances equal to those which provoked the English Civil War."

39 Otis, "John Hampden to William Pym."

40 *South Carolina and American General Gazette,* October 2, 1769.

41 Ibid.

42 [John Dickinson], *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies* (Philadelphia: David Hall and William Sellers, 1768), 40.

43 [Dickinson], 42. Dickinson went on to decry the support of civil establishments as well. Emphasis in original.

44 Middlekauf, *Glorious Cause,* 155. Middlekauf writes that Dickinson's letters were printed in "all but four colonial newspapers."

45 Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 34; Nelson, *General James Grant,* 67.

northern half of the peninsula and there were probably no more than 3,000 settlers even as late as 1771.[46] Second, East Floridians benefitted from their relationship with the mother country and many of the first English colonists, like Grant, relied on the British Empire for their salaries, bounties on agriculture, and military expenditures.[47] Georgia had been the first colony to be subsidized by British taxation, and the latest colonial acquisitions of East and West Florida and Nova Scotia benefitted from that precedent.[48] In 1764 alone East Florida received £5,700 in salaries, a fund for expenses, and a bounty on silk cultivation.[49] West Florida, Georgia, and Nova Scotia received similar amounts. Few recipients of royal largess wanted to risk their source of income by openly protesting British policy, and since the inhabitants of East Florida generally paid no taxes, they had little about which to complain.[50] Finally, East Florida lacked a popular assembly, the institution in other colonies that provided Americans with a vehicle for and the experience in opposing royal authority.[51]

Perhaps the most important reason explaining East Florida's mild response to the imperial crisis was Grant himself. With respect to the assembly, for instance, Grant was clear in his motives for not allowing the popular form of government. "I can manage people singly," he wrote, but "when I talk to them in a body it might not be so easy to convince them what was right."[52] Instead, Grant relied on informal meetings and dinners in his home, in which all residents

46 Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 58; 64.

47 For the benefits that East Florida received, see Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 34-40; Nelson, *James Grant,* 67.

48 For reference to Georgia see, Alan Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001): 241. Mowat also notes that these subsidies were common for "infant" colonies in the British Empire, Mowat, East Florida as a *British Province,* 35. Newspapers and British magazines support Mowat's view, and the sources demonstrate that East and West Florida, Georgia, and Nova Scotia consistently received Parliamentary grants for their support. Ibid; "Savannah, October 8" *Georgia Gazette* October 8, 1766; "Miscelleneous [sic] Articles of Expence [sic]" *Boston Evening Post* July 23, 1764; *Boston Post-Boy* August 12, 1765.

49 Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 35. Even as late as 1768 East Florida still received annual subsidies of £4750. *The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, for the Year 1767,* fifth edition (London: J. Dodesly, 1796) (archive.org) http://www.archive.org/details/annualregisteror1767londuoft, accessed August 11, 2014; 218; Mowat, *British Province,* 36.

50 Nelson, *James Grant,* 67; Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 34.

51 For the lack of assembly in East Florida see, Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 34. For the idea that colonial assemblies provided training for opposition, see Mercantini, *Who Shall Rule at Home,* 1-25.

52 James Grant to Duke Atholl, December 24, 1768, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

were welcome.[53] Grant's letterbooks contain numerous references to dinner parties, in which the governor and his guests sometimes consumed as many as twelve bottles of wine in a single evening.[54] According to Grant, he rarely had "less than six and often ten at [his] table."[55] By cultivating friendly relationships with and between other East Floridians, Grant could maintain peace between his constituents. Consequently, while the colonists throughout the rest of the mainland increasingly factionalized against British officials, East Floridians remained "united" under Grant's governance.[56] Grant also interceded in every aspect of the colony's development. In addition to his not-insubstantial civil authority, Grant appointed himself as an unofficial intermediary between colonial overseers and the proprietors with large landholdings. Whenever possible he personally mediated arguments and dissention between his colonists. Grant could hardly be considered a "martinet," as some contemporaries suggested, but it was true that he promoted his plans for the colony with vigor, and he had little tolerance for popular government, "levelling," or disorder in East Florida.[57]

East Florida and the Stamp Act[58]

Grant's authority and charismatic leadership were put to the test early in his tenure when Parliament enacted the Stamp Act. The act, which was to go into effect on "Black Friday," November 1, 1765, provoked outspoken, violent, and extralegal protest from many American mainland colonists. From Boston to Charleston, Americans reacted to the stamp duties with petitions, riots, and nonimportation agreements.[59] Angry colonists burned effigies of

53 James Grant to Christopher D'Oyly, October 10, 1767, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

54 [James Grant's Diary], February 6, 1767, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

55 James Grant to William Knox, May 6, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

56 James Grant to Duke Atholl, December 24, 1768, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

57 Nelson, *James Grant,* 71. Nelson agrees that those who called Grant a 'martinet' or 'autocrat' were mistaken, and believes those rumors came from a rift between the governor and Wilhem GerardDe Brahm. De Brahm was disappointed that Grant had dismissed him from his position as surveyor and he also blamed Grant when he was "passed over for the job of governing East Florida." Nelson, *James Grant,* 71. For Grant's contempt for "levelling American heads" see James Grant to Duke Atholl, December 24, 1768, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

58 An earlier version of this research entitled "Imperial Crisis in British East Florida" was presented at the 2013 Florida Conference of Historians annual meeting.

59 There is only one scholarly work that deals specifically with the Stamp Act in the Floridas. Despite its title, however, it relegates East Florida to a couple of paragraphs and the remainder of the work is about West Florida. See Wilfred

stamp officers, tarred and feathered supporters of the Act, and destroyed the property of royal governors. In Charleston, the Sons of Liberty forced the stamp officers to resign under threats of violence.[60] In Savannah, where the stamp officer's arrival had been delayed, the governor himself was threatened by an angry mob said to be led by the Sons of Liberty.[61] In East Florida, there was no similar reaction; while their northern neighbors railed against the Stamp duties, clamoring about their rights as Englishmen, East Floridians remained relatively quiet. This is not to say, however, that East Florida was isolated from the crisis. Rather, East Florida's reliance upon its neighbors in South Carolina and Georgia for supplies and communications ensured that Floridians would be vulnerable to disruptions in trade during the Stamp Act crisis. Moreover, East Florida's proximity to its neighbors left Floridians acutely exposed to threats of unrest from across its borders. Indeed, Georgia's experience with Stamp Act riots were attributed to South Carolina Sons of Liberty, and Grant was well aware of the dangers posed by those protestors in the neighboring colonies.[62]

As part of the British Empire, East Florida was integrated quickly into the trade and communication routes of the Atlantic community. Consequently, disruptions to shipping in the neighboring provinces had a deleterious effect on East Florida.

B. Kerr, "The Stamp Act in the Floridas, 1765-1766" *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 21 no. 4 (1935): 463-470. For general accounts of the Stamp Act see: Edmund S. Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*; P. D. G. Thomas, *British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the American Revolution, 1763-1767* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Middlekauf, *Glorious Cause*; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1918); Charles McLean Andrews, *The Boston Merchants and the Non-Importation Movement* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1916); Gordon Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991); Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776* (New York: Norton, 1991); Breen, *Marketplace;* Gary Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Mercantini, *Who Shall Rule at Home?*; Pressly, *Rim of the Caribbean;* John L. Bullion, *A Great and Necessary Measure: George Grenville and the Genesis of the Stamp Act, 1763-1765* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1982).

60 "Charles Town, October 30" *South Carolina Gazette*, October 31, 1765.

61 ["Extract of a letter from Georgia, dated Jan. 6, 1766"] *South Carolina Gazette and Country Journal*, January 21, 1766.

62 Much of the protest effort in Georgia came from South Carolina Sons of Liberty who sent representatives into Georgia to recruit more rioters. Kinloch Bull, Jr., *The Oligarchs in Colonial and Revolutionary Charleston: Lieutenant Governor William Bull II and his Family* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991); 125. Also see, William Drayton to James Grant, November 3, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; and William Simpson to James Grant, February 14, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 10.

In South Carolina and Georgia, all variety of business came to a standstill as stamp officials refused to execute their offices, and royal governors hid stamped paper away from angry mobs.[63] According to South Carolina's Lieutenant Governor, William Bull, the "law, admiralty, and ecclesiastical" courts were closed, there were no land grants issued, and all shipping was halted as the ports were closed for lack of stamps.[64] In short, Bull summarized, "every transaction requiring stamps [was] at a stand."[65] With shipping lines closed, the movement of people into East Florida became increasingly difficult. For instance, East Florida Chief Justice William Drayton complained that he was having trouble getting passage to St. Augustine, as no ships could be cleared.[66] The obstacles to shipping also slowed the flow of other potential colonists into East Florida. Grant was concerned that any settlement plans would be delayed, perhaps by a year, because there were no "means of transporting" people and supplies into the colony.[67]

Throughout the Stamp Act crisis, Grant remained cognizant of the difficulties that the rest of the colonies were facing, and he worried that these "unlucky Disturbances" in the neighboring provinces would affect East Florida as well.[68] His apprehensions proved prescient. South Carolina and Georgia were major entrepôts for East Florida's supplies, and Grant's colony depended heavily on those places for food, supplies, and manufactures.[69] In large part, East Florida's reliance upon its neighbors stemmed from a less than adequate port system of its own. St. Augustine's harbor was difficult to enter, and direct shipments into East Florida were challenging. This was because large ships that brought goods from Great Britain could not cross the bar at the harbor entrance so products had to be offloaded in Charleston or Savannah and sent

63 In South Carolina, for instance, Lieutenant Governor, William Bull took the precaution of hiding away the stamps at Fort Johnson. Bull, *Oligarchs*, 117. In Savannah as well, the governor put the stamps under guard for their protection. Randall M. Miller, "The Stamp Act in Colonial Georgia" *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 56 no. 3 (1972): 318-331; 324.

64 Quoted in Bull, *Oligarchs*, 121.

65 Ibid.

66 William Drayton to James Grant, November 3, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 9.

67 James Grant to William Knox, January 12, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

68 Ibid.

69 For references to orders for provisions from South Carolina and Georgia, see: James Grant to Benjamin Barton, December 26, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; James Grant to Henry Laurens, March 15, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

on in shallow draft vessels. Consequently, nearly all goods, whether from England or elsewhere, came through Charleston.[70] When Charleston's ports closed for lack of stamped paper, the residents of St. Augustine found themselves "in urgent need of provisions."[71] The garrison stationed in East Florida nearly ran out of food when expected supplies failed to materialize.[72] Civilian inhabitants also suffered from the slowdown in shipping. A newspaper in Pennsylvania relayed rumors about the sad state of affairs in East Florida, reporting that the shipping stoppage was having an adverse effect on the southern colony. According to the account, the inhabitants of East Florida were in danger of starving.[73] There was some indication that this deprivation might stir Floridians against the Stamp legislation, and the author suggested that it was "as if the Stamp Act is got among them."[74] It was not until Bull wrote a letter of protection to a ship's captain, granting the vessel immunity from the stamp law, that a vessel full of provisions could be sent.[75] This action alleviated the "great Apprehension of Distress" within the colony, but it did not end East Florida's vulnerability to the larger Stamp Act crisis.[76]

East Florida also experienced direct and antagonistic actions by the South Carolina Sons of Liberty. In South Carolina opponents of the Stamp Act tormented Grant by tampering with East Florida's shipments of news and correspondence. In October 1765, for example, Grant complained about packages being opened and he asserted that some people were interfering with incoming shipments.[77] Grant explained that his newspapers, which he usually received along with his other mail, had gone missing. The packages from which he normally obtained his papers, Grant wrote, had "generally been opened," and it appeared to the governor that the newspapers had been removed from the latest shipment.[78] Initially,

70 Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 76. Also see Chestnut, "South Carolina's Impact upon East Florida, 1763-1776," 8. Also see Chuck Meide's article, this volume.

71 Bull, *Oligarchs,* 121.

72 James Grant to James Wright, December 26, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; James Grant to [William Knox], January 12, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; James Grant to Board of Trade, January 26,1766, CO5/548. Also see Bull, *Oligarchs,* 121.

73 ["From the Floridas they Write"], *Pennsylvania Gazette,* February 6, 1766.

74 Ibid.

75 James Grant to Board of Trade, January 26, 1766, CO 5/548.

76 Ibid.

77 James Grant to William Knox, October [16], 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

78 Ibid.

Grant was unsure of whom to blame for this particular incident, by December, however, Grant specifically named the "American Sons of Liberty" as the culprits behind the missing cargo.[79] Grant also came under fire from the South Carolina Sons of Liberty through his association with Henry Laurens. On October 23, 1765, a group of men arrived at Laurens' home, shouting "Liberty, Liberty & Stamp'd Paper, Open your doors & let us Search your House and Cellars."[80] Fearing that the men would destroy his home should he not comply, Laurens relented and opened the door. [81] After swearing to the mob that he had no insight into the location of South Carolina's stamped paper, his attackers made a perfunctory search of the premises. Laurens was convinced that the search was a "farce," and that the group had other motives in approaching him about the Stamp Act.[82] The Sons, it seems, were intent upon creating a rift between Laurens and Grant. The mob assured Laurens that they had no fight with him, if he would only "not hold way" with Governor Grant.[83] At this, Laurens became incensed. He proudly boasted that he did indeed "hold way" with the governor, and he knew of no reason that he should break off the friendship or business relationship.[84] Upon Laurens' refusal to condemn the governor, the mob departed, adding evidence to Lauren's suspicions that the intrusion was a pretense. In a letter to Grant relaying the troubling incident, Laurens added that he suspected Deputy Postmaster and *South Carolina Gazette* printer Peter Timothy of putting Grant's "name into the mouths of those Anti-Parliamentarians."[85] Timothy had been involved in holding back Grant's correspondence and Laurens was contemplating filing a formal complaint about the matter.[86] Grant agreed that the

79 James Grant to Henry Laurens, December 28, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1. Laurens did not support the Stamp Act, but he also opposed the unruly protests of his fellow South Carolinians. "Appendix to the Extracts," George C. Rogers, ed., *The Papers of Henry Laurens*, vol. 7 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1979): 106. (hereafter *PHL* with appropriate volume number, e.g. *PHL*, vol. 7)

80 Henry Laurens to Joseph Brown, October 28,1765, *PHL*, vol. 5: 29; Also see, Henry Laurens to James Grant, November 1, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 9.

81 Henry Laurens to Joseph Brown, October 28, 1765, *PHL*, vol. 5: 29-30.

82 "Extract of a Letter from Henry Laurens to J.B., Esquire," *PHL*, vol. 5: 38. According to Rogers, this was the extract that Laurens sent to Grant about the incident.

83 Henry Laurens to Joseph Brown, October 28,1765, *PHL*, vol. 5: 30.

84 Ibid, 31.

85 Henry Laurens to James Grant, November 1, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 9.

86 *PHL*, vol. 5: fn6, 28.

postmaster should be reported, and, in the future, he tried to avoid sending mail to Laurens in a manner that would give "that Rascall [sic] Timothy" access to his correspondence.[87]

Grant received another scare from South Carolina in December when his newly appointed stamp collector, Thomas Grahme, arrived in Charleston amid riots and confusion. Grahme was in Charleston when the Sons of Liberty forced South Carolina's collectors to resign.[88] Governor Grant, learning that Grahme might be in danger, had been irritated to learn that his new official had made no attempt to leave immediately for the relative safety of his post in St. Augustine. Grant was anxious that "the Liberty Boys (as they term themselves)" might attack Grahme and force a resignation from him.[89] Luckily for the governor, however, the official arrived in East Florida's capital with a supply of the stamped paper on November 30, 1765.[90] On December 2, Grahme took his oath of office and immediately cleared out two ships.[91] The governor expressed relief over the ease of this transaction, and was happy to report that East Florida had been able to implement the Stamp Act.[92] During the brief time that the Stamp Act was in effect, Grahme was able to collect £44.7.3 for the use of stamped paper, much to "the disgust" of the protesting Americans in other colonies.[93] In this, East Florida, along with some of the British Caribbean islands and Nova Scotia, was one of the few provinces that consistently utilized the stamps and collected duties.[94]

While Grant and Grahme were able to implement the Stamp Act with relative ease, it should not be assumed that East Florida was completely free from dissent over the revenue raising legislation. Evidence suggests that despite Grant's assertions to the contrary, East Floridians did engage in some forms of protest.[95] A Virginia newspaper, for instance, described the appearance of opposition to the laws in Grant's province. Quoting an unnamed

87 James Grant to Henry Laurens, January 4, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.
88 James Grant to William Knox, December 9, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid; James Grant to Board of Trade, December 9, 1765, CO5/548.
91 Ibid.
92 James Grant to John Graham [Lieutenant Governor of Georgia], December 26, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; James Grant to Board of Trade, April 26, 1766, CO5/548.
93 Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province*, 34; Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*, 215.
94 Morgan, *The Stamp Act Crisis*, 215.
95 Grant claimed that his colony was free of a "licentious spirit" in Benjamin Barons to James Grant, February 4, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 10; James Grant to [Board of Trade], April 26 1766, CO5/548.

source, the paper reported that "the people there showed as great resentment to the Stamp Act as any perhaps on the continent."[96] This, according to the author, was convincing evidence that "the Sons of Liberty [were] dispersed through all the provinces."[97] Additionally, in an offhand remark in Grant's correspondence to the Lieutenant Governor of Georgia, Grant wrote that he might have had a "Tryal [sic] of Skill with the Sons of Liberty" had the province been more populated.[98] By this comment, Grant seems to acknowledge the existence of a local oppositional group, although further evidence of their existence and activities during the Stamp Act Crisis has proved elusive. Grant also reported some efforts to have him ousted from office, which may have related to the crisis as well. While Grant was away from St. Augustine, a group of merchants forged an unauthorized application for transfer in Grant's name to Lord Albemarle.[99] Fortunately, Albemarle, not believing the request, refused to initiate the move without direct communication from Grant himself, and the governor remained at his post in St. Augustine.[100]

For those East Floridians who may have opposed the Stamp duty, there was little recourse. East Florida differed from the more established mainland colonies in two important respects, and these differences may have served to distance Floridians from the unrest elsewhere. First, East Floridians were excluded from the discussion among other colonies' residents when the news of the impending Stamp Act was announced. In June 1765, the Massachusetts Lower House of Assembly formed a committee to address the impending Stamp duties. The committee prepared a circular letter to be sent to all the colonial assemblies inviting them to send delegates to a "Stamp Act Congress" where they could discuss a "united, dutiful, loyal and humble Representation...to King and Parliament."[101] The new acquisitions, including both Floridas, Nova Scotia, and Quebec, however, did not receive an invitation to attend the

96 *Virginia Gazette*, July 25, 1766.
97 Ibid.
98 James Grant to John Graham, December 26, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.
99 There is no precise date for when this occurred, but it seems likely that it happened in November of 1765 when Grant was at Picolata in conference with Native Americans. Grant says the incident occurred while "he was away." James Grant to Henry Laurens, March 15, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.
100 Ibid.
101 C. A. Weslager, *The Stamp Act Congress: With an Exact Copy of the Complete Journal* (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1976), 62-63.

meeting.[102] Grant heard some gossip about the Stamp Act Congress from Lord Adam Gordon, who was in New York at the time of the assembly. Gordon was apparently not impressed with the "bible faced, absurd angry...Yankees," who made up some of the delegation.[103] In particular, he mocked the participants for their failure to properly understand social graces and polite society.[104]

The second way in which East Florida was distinctively different from its mainland neighbors was in the absence of a provincial agent. In each of the other mainland colonies, assemblies employed provincial agents to act as their representatives and to mediate issues between colony and empire. During the Stamp Act crisis, agents representing the other colonies petitioned Parliament in protest against the legislation. East Florida had a royally appointed crown agent, William Knox. Crown agents, unlike provincial agents, represented the British Empire, not the colony; they were paid by Parliamentary grant and their duties "differ[ed] sharply" from their provincial counterparts.[105] Not only was Knox employed by the crown, but he was also a staunch supporter of Parliament's right to tax the colonies.[106] Thus, even if some East Floridians had opposed the Stamp Act, with no invitation to attend the Stamp Act Congress and no provincial agent to represent them to Parliament, they would have had no official avenue through which to voice their dissent. Consequently, when Grant received notice

102 Ibid, 61.

103 Adam Gordon, "Journal of an Officer's [Lord Adam Gordon's] Travels in America and the West Indies, 1764-1765" in *Travels in the American Colonies*, ed. Newton D. Mereness (New York: Macmillan, 1916); 167-453; Adam Gordon to James Grant, October 5, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 9.

104 Adam Gordon to James Grant, October 5, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 9.

105 Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 35. Also see, Ella Lonn, *The Colonial Agents of the Southern Colonies* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945), 51. Lonn makes this distinction with regard to the crown agent of Georgia; Michael Kammen, *A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution.* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968),105. Although not listed by name, the salary for East Florida's agent was listed in the "Estimate of the Civil Establishment" CO5/570.

106 Knox penned a pamphlet supporting Parliament's right to tax the colonies. See, [William Knox], *The Claim of the Colonies to an Exemption from Internal Taxes Imposed by Authority of Parliament, Examined: In a Letter from a Gentleman in London to his Friend in America.* (London: 1765), (Sabin Americana) Gale, Cengage Learning, Gale Document No. CY3800187093, (accessed May 20, 2014). Georgia dismissed Knox from his post in retaliation for the pamphlet. For reference to Knox's dismissal, see Lonn, *Colonial Agents,* 365; Kammen, *Rope of Sand,* fn. 8, 112. Georgians also burned Knox in effigy for his suggestion that the colony submit to the Stamp Act. William Drayton to James Grant, November 3, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 9.

of the Stamp Act's repeal in August 1766, he announced, "every inhabitant rejoices," but he was quick to add that there had never been any "disturbance" within his province over the tax.[107] Grant may have exaggerated his constituents' total acquiescence to the tax; nonetheless East Floridians largely accepted the Stamp Act without major protest.

East Florida and the Townshend Crisis

If East Florida's response to the Stamp Act was mild, its reaction to the Townshend Crisis was nearly nonexistent. In part, this was because the other colonies were not unified in their protests against the new duties.[108] In the summer of 1767, when Parliament enacted the Townshend duties, many Americans once again opposed the taxation effort.[109] Unlike the Stamp Act, however, which had provoked immediate unrest, colonists across America were slower to react against the Townshend revenue plan.[110] When

107 James Grant to Board of Trade, August 21, 1766, CO5/548. Grant's correspondence very often denied the existence of any turmoil in the colony. For instance, James Grant to Lords of Trade, November 4, 1766, CO5/548. James Grant to Conway, April 26, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; James Grant to Henry Laurens, March 15, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; James Grant to John Graham, April 23, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1. Notwithstanding these attestations of peace and tranquility, however, it should be noted that Grant often overstated the positives of his colony. Nelson, for instance, reveals Grant's tendency to exaggerate about the colony's productivity. Nelson, *James Grant*, 59. Moreover, when Grant was forced to concede some ill, he was quick to add a positive note. For example, when a fever epidemic struck the colony, Grant wrote that "mortality" was "so trifiling" that no one would have taken notice of it had two popular officers not died. James Grant to William Drayton, July 25, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; James Grant to [Board of Trade], November 24, 1766, CO5/548. In another example of Grant's propensity to downplay bad news, when Grahme disappeared from the colony with some £800 worth of unpaid debt, Grant kept it quiet until the British Treasury requested the return of the unused stamped paper and Grant had to admit that the young man had "deserted the province." James Grant to William Knox, September 8, 1766, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

108 Parliament had in the meantime enacted the Declaratory Act, which announced Parliament's "full power and authority" over the colonies "in all cases whatsoever." William Cobbett and T. C. Hansard. *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England: from the Norman Conquest, in 1066, to the year 1803*.vol. 16, 161; Oxford Digital Library, *Cobbett's Parliamentary History Collection*, http://www2.odl.ox.ac.uk/gsdl/cgi-bin/library?e=d-000-00---0modhis06--00-0-0-0prompt-10---4-----0-11--1-en-50---20-about---00001-001-1-1isoZz-8859Zz-1-0&a=d&cl=CL1&d=modhis006-aap.2.5.1.39. (accessed May 17, 2014). In the midst of the celebrations of the Stamp Act's repeal, there was little outcry against the Declaratory Act. Morgan argues that many Americans misunderstood the act. Morgan, *Stamp Act Crisis*, 365.

109 Nelson, *James Grant*, 68.

110 Thomas, *Townshend Duties*, 76.

the law went into effect in June, there was no meeting of colonial representatives, nor was there action taken by colonial agents.[111] It was not until the end of 1768 that the mainland colonies offered a "universal reaction of protest" in the form of petitions to the king.[112] Even nonimportation movements, which were so effective in securing the repeal of the Stamp Act, were implemented sporadically during the Townshend crisis.[113] South Carolina, for instance, did not enact its nonimportation agreement until July 1769.[114] Georgians joined the effort the following month.[115]

In some ways, East Florida benefitted from the haphazard protest efforts of the other colonies. For instance, ships bound for Charleston laden with cargo forbidden by nonimportation movements were rerouted to St. Augustine where no such restrictions existed.[116] This may explain why shipping to East Florida increased in this period despite the difficulties posed by the shallow harbor.[117] To be sure, Grant expected an upsurge in East Florida trade as a result of the nonimportation movements. In 1769, he optimistically wrote that South Carolina and Georgia 's latest "[r]esolutions against English manufactures will make this a place of Trade before we had any reason to expect it."[118] He went on to boast that the colony would be sending "some Cotton, Rice, and Indigo...to the London Market" that winter, despite what had been an "unfavorable" season.[119] East Floridians may have also seen an increase in their Native American trade as well. According to South Carolina merchant and East Florida land speculator, John Gordon, Floridians involved in the "Indian trade" stood to gain if Georgia joined the nonimportation movement.[120] Gordon went on to write how a shift in trade might provide a method of "breaking up" an

111 Ibid., 33, 76.
112 Ibid., 85.
113 Schwartz, "Merchant," 18-20.
114 *Papers of Henry Laurens*, vol. 7, xvi.
115 *Georgia Gazette*, September 20, 1769.
116 This was the case with a Rhode Island ship, which was ordered away from Charleston for potentially violating a nonimportation agreement by reshipping goods from England. The ship was said to have gone on to "Georgia or St. Augustine." "Charles-Town, October 4," *South Carolina Gazette*, October 4, 1770.
117 According to Mowat, by"1768 the number of ships entering and leaving St. Augustine in a year had exceeded fifty." Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province*, 75.
118 James Grant to Thomas Bradshaw, November [6], 1769, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.
119 Ibid.
120 John Gordon to James Grant, August 1, 1769, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 18. Pressly identifies Gordon as "the largest deerskin merchant in South Carolina." Pressly, *Rim of the Caribbean*, 199; Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province*, 9, 53-4.

Augusta monopoly on Indian trade, and he looked forward to "depriving Georgia of the most valuable branches of its exports."[121] Grant was also optimistic about this shift in commerce, and he understood that if Carolina and Georgia kept up the embargo against British imports, the Native Americans in his province would have to acquire their English goods through East Florida's ports.[122]

Throughout the Townshend crisis, East Floridians continued to receive benefits from the British Empire and the relationship between the colony and the mother country remained strong.[123] At the same time, East Florida's affiliations with neighboring South Carolina underwent a change. The friendship between Grant and Laurens, for example, grew colder as East Florida's development progressed, and although Laurens certainly continued to fulfill his mercantile duties to the governor, it was clear that the South Carolinian had grown pessimistic about East Florida's prospects. As early as 1766, Laurens began to question East Florida's potential as a profitable enterprise citing poor soil and difficult navigation as major problems thwarting the colony's progress.[124] In 1768, Laurens warned East Florida plantation owner James Penman that he would "never make it worth [his] while to plant in East Florida."[125] Grant grew angry at Laurens' reports, and Laurens complained to New Smyrna planter Andrew Turnbull that he had "lost almost all of [his] East Floridian Correspondents."[126] Laurens was not the only "Anti Floridian in Carolina" who was skeptical about the new colony's potential, but his decreasing influence with Grant was representative of a growing divide between the two colonies.[127]

Despite Laurens' doubts, East Florida's economy had grown since the Stamp Act crisis. Since taking over the territory from Spain, East Floridians had begun to provision themselves, thus

121 John Gordon to James Grant, August 1, 1769, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 18

122 James Grant to Thomas Bradshaw, November [6], 1769, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

123 East Floridians still paid no taxes, and the "support of the colony depend[ed] entirely upon the estimate which [was] laid annually before Parliament." James Grant to Charles Lowndes, March [illegible], 1767, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1. Charles Lowndes is listed as Secretary of the Treasury in *The Annual Register or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, For the Year 1767.* Fifth edition (London: James Dodsley, 1800), 173.

124 Henry Laurens to Richard Oswald, August 12, 1766, *PHL*, vol. 5, 155-160.

125 Henry Laurens to James Penman, May 26, 1768, *PHL*, vol. 5, 705-706.

126 Henry Laurens to Andrew Turnbull, October 28, 1769, *PHL*, vol. 7, 177; James Grant to Laurens, June 24, 1768, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 2.

127 James Grant to William Knox, January 14, 1769, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 2.

lessening their dependence on their neighbors.[128] When East Florida began to produce goods for the market, the relationship between East Florida and the other southern colonies divided further. In 1767, Bristol received "400 barrels of pitch, tar, and turpentine, a quantity of indico [sic], tortoiseshell, and mahogany" from East Florida.[129] While this was a modest beginning, it indicated that East Florida was gaining a foothold in the Atlantic trade. Throughout the Townshend crisis, East Florida increased its quantity of exports to Britain, and in 1770, two shipments of cargo were sent to London. The first, in March, included "ship's lumber, animal skins, some indigo samples, a little rice, and even less cotton."[130] In October, East Florida sent a second shipment of indigo.[131] By 1771, there were "about eight impressive plantations" at work in Grant's colony.[132] As East Florida increased its trade, the colony lost some of its reliance upon South Carolina and Georgia for necessities. By 1768, Grant expected East Florida to begin to "supply itself" with enough food and supplies to be self-supporting.[133] Grant was pleased with this turn of events because it had been "expensive and discouraging...to pay a high freight for the provisions which were bought in Carolina and Georgia."[134] By March 1769, Grant predicted that it would be "the last Year that we shall ever want provision help from your Northern Regions."[135]

128 Quoted in Schafer, "Swamp of Investment," 13. Major Francis Ogilvie, who headed up East Florida's government until Grant could arrive, wrote that the Spaniards had to rely "intirly [sic] on our colonies in America for supplies of provisions." Francis Ogilvie to [Lords of Trade], January 26, 1764, CO5/540. Grant also wrote in September 1764 that there was "not even ten acres of corn" in the colony. James Grant to [Richard Oswald], September 20, 1764, JGP, Kislak Collection, microfilm, reel 1.

129 *South Carolina Gazette; American General Gazette,* July 10, 1767.

130 Nelson, *James Grant,* 66. According to Grant, East Florida produced "about twenty thousand weight of indigo to [send] to the London Market." James Grant to Thomas Gage, August 24, 1770, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1. By 1771, Grant reported that East Florida had "got the better of Carolina in the manufacture of indigo." James Grant to John Tucker, February 11, 1771, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 3.

131 Nelson, *James Grant,* 67.

132 Ibid., 65.

133 James Grant to [Lords of Trade], June 18, 1768, CO5/549. Grant was a bit premature in his assessment, however, and there were still those in the colony as late as 1771 who needed provisions from neighboring colonies, including a couple of plantations. James Grant to John Gordon, January 5, 1771, Kislak Collection, reel 3. Nonetheless, many, if not most East Floridians were provisioning themselves by this time.

134 Ibid.

135 James Grant to George Roupell, March 3, 1769, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 2.

This new self-sufficiency reduced the other colonies' ability to put pressure on East Florida during the imperial crisis.

In addition to the pragmatic reasons that explain why East Floridians remained loyal during the imperial crisis, including the continuing benefits received from the British Empire and the colony's increasing perception of itself as competition to the existing colonies, Grant himself once again deserves much of the credit for keeping the peace during the Townshend protests. Unlike so many other eighteenth-century gentlemen and statesmen in the American colonies, Grant evinced no Whiggish tendencies. Grant was "a royalist" and "he saw no virtue or logic" in the idea "that colonials deserved their own 'little parliaments.'"[136] Instead, the governor was always contemptuous of what he called "the levelling independent American system," and Grant's letters repeatedly revealed his commitment to hierarchy and order.[137] Within East Florida, Grant maintained control by personally choosing the members of his government, and he was largely successful in getting his appointments approved by the Lords of Trade.[138] Grant also continued to circumvent efforts to form an assembly, which he viewed as "dangerously democratic."[139] In doing so, he drew upon the precedent of a former British military leader of East Florida, Major Francis Ogilvie, who had used the excuse that there were too few inhabitants to form a government in East Florida. Of those residents that were there at the time, Ogilvie commented, "few of them [were] fit for these important offices."[140] In 1770, when East Florida's Grand Jury demanded a General Assembly, Grant ignored the request.[141] In general, Grant used his skills as mediator and his personal involvement with constituents to control the colony from the top down. In 1771, when the 21st "Musick" regiment visited St. Augustine, Grant was happy to report that his colony had "become

136 Nelson, *James Grant,* 48; 69-70. Nelson argues that Grant held something of a "viceregal position" as East Florida's governor.

137 James Grant to William Knox, February 10, 1769, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 2.

138 Nelson, *James Grant,* 47-8; James Grant to the Earl of Albemarle, September 24, 1769, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1; James Grant to William Knox, August 10, 1765, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

139 Nelson, *James Grant,* 70. Nelson argues that Grant "never felt the need for a popular assembly." Ibid., 67, 69. Mowat argues that Grant's personality probably had the biggest impact on avoiding an assembly. Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province,* 42-43.

140 Francis Ogilvie to Board of Trade, Jan 26, 1764, CO5/540.

141 *South Carolina Gazette and American General Gazette,* September 3, 1770; Nelson, *James Grant,* 69.

the gayest place in America."[142] According to the governor, East Floridians were too busy with concerts and parties to "enter into politicks."[143] He went on to suggest that his "northern neighbors [should] follow the example, [and] they would be happier themselves and would give less trouble to other people."[144]

Perhaps the greatest evidence of Grant's power over East Florida during the imperial crisis appeared upon his departure from the province.[145] In contrast to his years in office, Grant's eventual withdrawal from East Florida led to disorder. Grant fully understood the role he was playing in keeping the colony free from the discord of the imperial crisis, and when a death in his family required his attention back in Scotland in 1770, Grant hesitated before leaving. In a letter to Lord Hillsborough, Grant wrote, "People are accustomed to me... but I am afraid of trusting them to themselves."[146] Grant went on to write that "a change of measures or men" would likely cause "dissention," and all of the work that he had done in East Florida might come to naught.[147] In light of this belief, when Grant received permission to leave East Florida, he decided to postpone his departure, but he could not remain in the colony forever, and on May 9, 1771, Grant left for Scotland.[148]

Epilogue

As it turned out, the governor was right to be concerned that his presence was necessary to the colony's peace because when Grant left the colony, his carefully nurtured peace crumbled.[149] Throughout Grant's term in office, there was rarely mention of

142 James Grant to Thomas Gage, February 18, 1771, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Nelson, *James Grant*, 70. Nelson notes "It was only after Grant had returned to Britain in 1771 that opposition against his supposedly 'autocratic' style began to emerge." Mowat also notices an upsurge in unrest upon Grant's departure in Charles L. Mowat, "The Enigma of William Drayton," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 22 no. 1 (July 1943):3-33; 8-9.
146 James Grant to Lord Hillsborough, October 19, 1770. JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1. Apparently, Grant had requested a leave of absence from the colony to take care of business back in Scotland after his nephew's death, and although he received permission, he decided to stay in East Florida for another year.
147 Ibid.
148 Nelson, *James Grant*, 76.When Grant first left the colony, the assumption was that he would return. In 1773, however, upon winning a seat in the British House of Commons, Grant made it clear that he had no intention of returning to the colony. Nelson, *James Grant*, 80.
149 William Drayton to James Grant, May 13, 1771, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 22.

dissent among East Floridians, and certainly there were many, including the Council and other esteemed citizens who declared their approbation for Grant's term as governor.[150] Suddenly, however, a "mechanic class" of East Floridians united to declare their opposition to the absent governor.[151] While Grant's supporters offered positive statements and fond farewells, the governor's adversaries produced a negative address, which Peter Timothy printed in the *South Carolina Gazette.*[152] The dissenting address, citing the "wretched condition" of the colony, demanded a new government based on "popular forms" and offered hopes that interim governor John Moultrie might rectify the "many Evils" that the complainant claimed had occurred in the colony under Grant.[153] Another group confronted Governor Moultrie in person "as a committee of inhabitants."[154] According to Moultrie, the men spoke of "remonstrances and petitions to the king like other people," and they made a number of demands including the creation of an assembly, new laws to contend with debtors, and a "Negro Act."[155] Moultrie dismissed the men's demands, but the group continued to stir up trouble in the colony, leading St. Augustine merchant Spencer Mann to lament that the peace Grant had so successfully created, was not maintained in his absence.[156] Grant was undoubtedly disappointed to hear that his departure caused trouble, but he had accurately predicted it would happen. James Grant had hoped to keep his constituents in "good humor"

150 [Address of the Council and] "Principal Inhabitants of the Town of St. A.," Robert Wells, *The South Carolina Gazette and American General Gazette,* May 13, 1771.

151 George C. Rogers, "Commentary," in *Eighteenth Century Florida: the Impact of the Revolution,* ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1976): 28-37, 35. Rogers identifies Grant's opponents as "St. Augustine Sons of Liberty," but it is not clear that the men identified themselves as part of that group. Also see, "Papers of James Grant," 156 and *PHL,* vol. 7, fn. 8, 546.

152 John Moultrie to James Grant, June 10, 1771, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 22. For the negative address, see Peter Timothy's *South Carolina Gazette,* May 23, 1771. For the address of the Council and the address of the "Principle Inhabitants of the Town of St. A.," see Robert Wells, *The South Carolina Gazette and American General Gazette,* May 13, 1771.

153 John Moultrie to James Grant, June 10, 1771, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 22.

154 Ibid.

155 Ibid.

156 Spencer Mann to James Grant, September 1, 1771, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 22.

as long as he remained in the colony, but it would appear that his people could no longer avoid "the contagion of discontent."[157]

In the end, Grant accomplished much during his seven-year term as governor of East Florida. With his widespread connections around the globe, Grant brought the colony into the purview of the Atlantic world of communication, trade, and politics. He encouraged the creation of a plantation-style economy that he hoped might one day rival South Carolina. When reliance on the neighboring colonies proved risky in uncertain times, the governor encouraged his settlers and planters to produce enough provisions for self-sustainment. Grant's efforts on this front ensured that East Floridians could address the vicissitudes of political conflict on their own terms, choosing to adhere to imperial rulings while maintaining a close eye on their dissenting neighbors. Grant's individual efforts also ensured that East Florida remained relatively free from the discord and dissention found in so many of the more established colonies to the north. The colony's peace and ultimate loyalty to empire, however, does not undermine the importance of East Florida to the larger narrative of American history. East Florida was not forgotten or ignored by Grant's contemporaries, and it should not be overlooked by historians. Rather, the evidence presented here begs further investigation of the too-often neglected question of East Florida's engagement with the imperial crisis that led to the American Revolution, and the colony's experience of the imperial crisis underlines the importance of contingency, proximity, and individual action in historical events.

157 James Grant to Thomas Gage, February 18, 1771, JGP, Kislak Collection, reel 1.

"Cast Away off the Bar": The Archaeological Investigation of British Period Shipwrecks in St. Augustine

by Chuck Meide

Although the first underwater archaeological investigations in St. Augustine waters were conducted in the late 1970s, the first extensive, research-oriented archaeological survey seeking to discover and study historic shipwreck sites in the area took place in 1995.[1] This project used a marine magnetometer deployed from a research vessel to search an area encompassing the estimated location of the historic inlet to St. Augustine, a notorious but unavoidable hazard for shipping to and from the colonial capital.[2] This survey was conducted by a non-profit research

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1 Chuck Meide, "Thirty Years of Maritime Archaeology in America's Oldest Port," paper presented at the second annual Northeast Florida Symposium on Maritime Archaeology, March 12-15 (2008). These first underwater surveys were directed by FSU professor George R. Fischer at the Castillo de San Marcos in 1978 and Fort Matanzas in 1979.

2 Until the early 1940s, when jetties construction, dredging, and continuing maintenance operations by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers fixed the St. Augustine Inlet in place, the entry channel, the bar at its mouth, and the maritime landscape itself changed constantly over time. Archaeological researchers have attempted to reconstruct various positions of the inlet using historic maps to estimate areas that may contain shipwreck remains. Judging from the 1589 Boazio map, the inlet was at that time close to its present-day position, but by the eighteenth century it had drifted about two miles to

organization known as Southern Oceans Archaeological Research (SOAR), and led to the discovery of a number of shipwrecks, including the oldest yet found in Northeast Florida, the British transport *Industry*, lost in 1764.[3]

Realizing archaeology's potential contribution to public interpretation of St. Augustine's maritime history, the St. Augustine Lighthouse & Museum began to provide funding for SOAR's ongoing research excavations at the *Industry* site in 1997. Two years later, the St. Augustine Lighthouse & Museum established its own non-profit research organization, the Lighthouse Archaeological Maritime Program (LAMP). LAMP archaeologists conducted further excavations at the *Industry* site in the summers of 1999 and 2000, and have continued their archaeological research in St. Augustine waters to this day. In 2009 LAMP conducted another survey in the area of the relict inlet which led to the discovery of a second British-period shipwreck.[4] Known as the Storm Wreck, this vessel has not been identified by name, but it has been confirmed to be one of sixteen refugee ships lost in December 1782 while attempting to cross the bar.[5] These vessels were members of the last fleet to evacuate British soldiers and Loyalist civilians from Charleston at the end of the Revolutionary War. LAMP has spent five summer field seasons excavating the Storm Wreck and has recovered thousands of individual artifacts which are currently

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the south. See Chuck Meide, P. Brendan Burke, Olivia McDaniel, Samuel P. Turner, Eden Andes, Hunter Brendel, Starr Cox, and Brian McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012: Report on Archaeological Investigations," (St. Augustine: Lighthouse Archaeological Maritime Program, 2014), 5-8.

3 Marianne Franklin and John William Morris III, "The St. Augustine Shipwreck Survey. Phase One," (Pensacola: Southern Oceans Archaeological Research, Inc., 1996); Marianne Franklin, "Blood and Water; The Archaeological Excavation and Historical Analysis of the Wreck of the *Industry*, a North-American Transport Sloop Chartered by the British Army at the End of the Seven Years' War: British Colonial Navigation and Trade to Supply Spanish Florida in the Eighteenth Century" (PhD diss., Texas A&M University, 2005).

4 Samuel P. Turner and Kendra Kennedy, "LAMP 2009 Remote Sensing Survey," in *ACUA Underwater Archaeology Proceedings 2010*, ed. Christopher Horrell and Melanie Damour (Amelia Island, FL: Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, 2010): 11-16.

5 While it was initially believed that storm conditions probably contributed to the mass wrecking event, subsequent analysis of a naval escort ship's log indicates the weather consisted of moderate or fresh breezes during the period of the incident. The fault therefore lay with the infamously dangerous inlet and sandbar, and a greater number of ships attempting to cross, perhaps pressured by the threat of rebel privateers, than there were available pilots.

undergoing analysis and conservation at the Lighthouse & Museum for eventual display.

These two shipwrecks are particularly interesting for researchers of British East Florida as they neatly bracket the British Period, with the *Industry* having wrecked the year after Florida was ceded to Britain and the Storm Wreck taking place the year the Spanish regained control of the province. Both shipwrecks feature well-preserved assemblages of material culture—particularly the Storm Wreck which has produced a wide range of artifacts in remarkable condition—and each represents a time capsule that provides unique perspectives into colonial activities and lifeways during Florida's British Period.

St. Augustine as a British Port

From the time that Britain first acquired Spanish Florida and divided it into two colonies in 1763, colonial authorities were concerned with building their new possessions into industrious and lucrative territories. This endeavor relied not only on land grants to promote immigration and commercial enterprise but also on the development of new ports and the improvement of those in existence to support trade and communication. This latter goal entailed harbor, navigational aid, and coastal defense improvements along with detailed hydrographic surveys of the inlet and approaches to St. Augustine and other ports.

The maritime landscape of St. Augustine, East Florida's capital and principal port, provided a challenge to the expansion of trade. The constantly shifting sands at the mouth of the inlet limited the long-term accuracy of published sailing directions or pilot books and only small vessels could safely enter the harbor due to its shallow channels. St. Augustine had a very notorious sandbar at the mouth of the inlet—"unquestionably the most dangerous"—which was described in detail with dire warnings to mariners by visitors such as Bernard Romans and Johann Schoepf.[6]

Schoepf in particular provided a vivid account of the dangerous inlet and its potential for shipwrecks. He wrote that

6 Bernard Romans, *A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida* (Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Company, 1998), 239; Johann David Schoepf, *Travels in the Confederation (1783-1784)*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: William J. Campbell, 1911), 2: 226-229, 248-249. For more context on Schoepf's account, originally published in 1788, see Charles Tingley, "Over the Swash and Out Again," *El Escribano* 45 (2008): 87-122.

of all southern ports, St. Augustine had the shallowest and most exposed inlet, which was navigated with trepidation by captains, crews, and passengers alike. He estimated that a visitor could not walk 100 paces on the beach without coming across the remains of a wrecked ship, and that every two weeks to a month another vessel was shipwrecked.[7] It was not uncommon for both arriving and departing vessels to be forced to wait up to two weeks for the necessary conditions of wind and tide in order to cross the bar, delays that were an impediment to profitable maritime commerce.[8]

Despite the inconvenience and outright danger of the port's entrance, trade did prosper at St. Augustine. At least six years of port records, spanning 1764 to 1769, have survived and provide insight into the beginning and initial expansion of maritime commerce in British St. Augustine.[9] Trade was carried out primarily in small, coastal vessels, which is not surprising because of the shallow waters of the inlet. Fifty-eight percent of all voyages from St. Augustine between November 1764 and February 1766 were made by vessels between 20 and 25 tons, mostly sloops and schooners, and only two voyages involved ships of 50 tons, the largest seen in that time span.[10] St. Augustine's most important trading partner was the port of Charleston, South Carolina, while Savannah, Georgia, was the second most important. This was hardly surprising, since there was already a well-established trading relationship between these ports and St. Augustine that had begun under Spanish rule.[11] While most commerce was limited to Georgia and the Carolinas, ships from as far away as Philadelphia, New York, Bermuda, Antigua, St. Kitts, the Canary Islands, and Cork in Ireland engaged in the St. Augustine trade. Imports were primarily manufactured goods (such as furniture, soap, tools, and hardware) and foodstuffs (including pork, poultry, cheese, oil, wine, and rum). The most important export was both sweet and sour oranges, though other

7 Schoepf, *Travels*, 2: 227, 249.

8 Samuel P. Turner, "Maritime Insights from St. Augustine's British Period Documentary Records," *El Escribano* 47 (2010): 6, Schoepf, *Travels*, 2: 227, 248.

9 Naval Office Shipping Lists for East Florida, British National Archives (hereafter BNA), CO 5/553, 5/557, T 1/443, 1/454. These papers were discovered by LAMP researchers who have transcribed and conducted preliminary analysis of the import and export records; see Turner, "Maritime Insights."

10 Turner, "Maritime Insights," 10. As trade developed it seems larger ships began to participate; the largest ship to appear in the port records, by 1767, was 130 tons.

11 Joyce Elizabeth Harman, *Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida, 1732-1763* (St. Augustine, FL: St. Augustine Historical Society, 1969), 5-6, 46.

exports included cattle hides, deer skins, oysters, hogs, lumber, and live oak knees. These records display a trade imbalance during the early years of British St. Augustine; nearly half the departing vessels left in ballast, indicating more goods came into the port than left it. Surprisingly, indigo, often touted as one of East Florida's most important agricultural products, makes no appearance whatsoever in the export records, suggesting that it took more than six years to establish this industry in the colony.[12]

Unfortunately the port records for the remainder of St. Augustine's British period, 1770-1784, are either not extant or not yet discovered, but it is logical to assume that St. Augustine's maritime trade continued to expand, at least until the outbreak of the Revolution when rebel privateers at sea and incursions on land severely disrupted the local economy. Yet the exact scope and nature of this maritime trade through the end of the British period remains speculative. One promising avenue of research that could help fill this gap is the archaeology of sunken shipwrecks.

Establishing the New Colony and the Loss of the *Industry*

The Seven Years' War ended with the signing of the Peace of Paris in February 1763. Florida, which had been Spanish territory for the two preceding centuries, was ceded to Britain in exchange for Havana, which had been captured the previous August. British authorities established a garrison in St. Augustine as soon as the treaty allowed. On July 20, 1763, Captain John Hedges, with four companies of the 1st Regiment—the "Royal Scots"—who had occupied Havana, navigated the inlet with the aid of a Spanish pilot and took possession of the Castillo de San Marcos (which the British would call Fort St. Marks). Ten days later, Hedges relinquished command to Major Francis Ogilvie, who arrived with the 9th Regiment of Foot. Men of the 1st were either incorporated into the 9th or allowed to muster out of the army and settle in the new colony. Ogilvie was in charge of both military and civil affairs in the new colony until he was relieved by the newly-appointed Governor James Grant a year later in August 1764.[13]

Among his first priorities was to establish and man garrisons not only at the capital but at other former Spanish fortifications throughout East Florida. He only had 273 troops for the entire

12 Turner, "Maritime Insights," 13-14.

13 Daniel L. Schafer, "St. Augustine's British Years 1763-1784," *El Escribano* 38 (2001): 9-12.

province with which to man the forts at St. Augustine, Picolata, Mose ("Mossa"), Matanzas, and Apalachee. Artillery, ammunition, and other supplies were scarce or non-existent; the departing Spaniards had stripped their former possession nearly clean of every portable object before their evacuation. This exodus began in earnest in August, when ships sailed from St. Augustine every day carrying Spanish colonists, free African Americans, Indians, and all of the possessions they could carry. The final ship departed for Havana on January 21, 1764.[14] While Ogilvie's oversight of the evacuation prevented embittered Spaniards from setting fire to their buildings or orange groves, leaving the city's basic infrastructure intact, the colonial capital and British garrisons in the hinterland soon lacked food and essential supplies.

The *Industry* was one of four sloops hired between April 4 and June 22, 1764 as transports by the British Army to bring supplies from New York to St. Augustine.[15] It was commanded by Captain Daniel Lawrence, who had commercial and family connections in St. Augustine and had sailed the *Industry* safely from there as recently as the previous December.[16] Yet on May 6, 1764, loaded with critical supplies for the nascent colony, Captain Lawrence lost his ship on St. Augustine's notorious bar.[17]

According to various correspondence sent before and after its loss, the *Industry* was carrying "tools for the use of the garrison of St. Augustine," "Provisions, Artillery, and subsistence money," "Artificers tools," and "stores."[18] While "very little" was saved, not

14 Schafer, "St. Augustine's British Years," 10, 12-13; Sherry Johnson, "Casualties of Peace: Tracing the Historic Roots of the Cuban Diaspora 1763-1800," *Colonial Latin America Historical Review* 10:1 (Winter 2001): 91-125.

15 Gage Papers, Reel 2, 140G, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History (hereafter PKY), University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. The Gage Papers contain the correspondences of General Thomas Gage, Commander of the British Army in New York, between 1763 and 1765. Archived at the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, a copy of this collection was available to SOAR and LAMP researchers on microfilm held at the PKY.

16 Captain Lawrence and the *Industry* had been hired to carry evacuating Spanish subjects from St. Augustine to Cuba, having departed with 58 passengers on 23 December 1763. See Robert L. Gold, *Borderland Empires in Transition* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), 72, and Franklin, "Blood and Water," 92, 185. Franklin has conducted genealogical research which shows a familial link between the Lawrence family and that of the notorious St. Augustine merchant and real estate speculator Jesse Fish; Franklin, "Blood and Water," 176-187.

17 "Major Francis Ogilvie to Gage, May 13, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 18, 6.

18 "Gage to Ogilvie, April 5,1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 16, 3; "Gage to Ogilvie, May 6, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 18, 1; "Ogilvie to Gage, May 13, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 18, 6; "Gage to Captain John Harries, June 20, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 20, 2.

all was lost in the shipwreck.[19] Ogilvie sent out all available boats to assist the stranded vessel, and was able to secure "Six Boxes of Money, some Flower [sic] and Carpenter's tools." He posted a guard to prevent illicit salvage but because "the Wreck was greatly scattered along the Coast" it was impossible to station enough soldiers to prevent local inhabitants from collecting shipwrecked materials that legally belonged to the crown. Ogilvie lamented the character of these scoundrels, complaining that the population of East Florida had largely fled from other colonies to avoid prosecution for debts and other crimes. He also made one of the earliest complaints about insurance fraud in Florida, noting that the colony would be ruined if steps were not taken to prevent the deliberate loss of vessels insured above their actual value.[20]

The loss of the *Industry*'s cargo was a frustrating blow for the officials in East Florida, but the story was not over yet. As soon as more tools and weapons could be assembled, a second chartered sloop, the *Anne*, was loaded in New York. *Anne* departed for St. Augustine in July, but never arrived. Missing for months, the official report finally determined that it had been shipwrecked off Cape Lookout in North Carolina in September 1764.[21]

The Excavation of the *Industry*, 1997-2000

The shipwreck *Industry* was discovered in 1997 by SOAR archaeologists diving on a magnetic target identified during the 1995 geophysical survey.[22] The site is located in about 20 ft. (6 m) of water less than 1/8 mile (1.5 km) from shore, southeast of the Lighthouse. During the course of the four-year excavation, an area spanning approximately 65 by 20 ft. (20 m by 6 m) was investigated, with identified wreckage spanning an area of around 26 by 20 ft. (8 m by 6 m). Cultural material was typically buried under around 3 ft. (0.91 m) of sand, and visibility was poor, usually ranging between total blackness and around 3 ft. (0.91 m). At the time of its discovery, no cultural material was exposed on the seafloor except for the fluke of a buried anchor. Subsequent excavation revealed a row of eight tightly-packed iron cannon, arranged end-to-end as cargo rather

19 "Gage to Harries, June 3, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 19, 2.
20 "Ogilvie to Gage, May 13, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 18, 6.
21 Franklin, "Blood and Water," 119.
22 John William Morris III, Marianne Franklin, and Norine Carroll, "The St. Augustine Maritime Survey, Survey Report No. 2," (Pensacola, FL: SOAR, 1998), 36-42.



Figure 1. Archaeological site plan of the *Industry* wreck site. This view depicts the site as it appeared in July 1999, after the removal of three additional cannon, which are not included here. Drawing by John William Morris III, courtesy of LAMP.

than on carriages as shipboard armament, along with three single-fluked anchors, two millstones, three cannonballs and a few pottery sherds (Figure 1). After this initial inspection the site was named the "Tube Site" and was assigned the site number 8SJ3478. During the following excavation season on June 2, 1998, archaeologists raised one of the cannon from the wreck site, which was cleaned, conserved and displayed at the St. Augustine Lighthouse & Museum.[23] Once cleaned of marine encrustation, the cannon was identified as a British six-pounder manufactured during the reign of King George II (1727-1760). This was the first definitive clue to the nationality and date of the shipwreck. Further archaeological evidence gathered over the final two excavation seasons, in conjunction with historical documents discovered in the Gage Papers, led to the identification of the wreck as that of the sloop *Industry*.[24]

23 John William Morris III, Marianne Franklin, Norine Carroll, Kelly Bumpass, and Andrea P. White, "The St. Augustine Maritime Survey: 1998 Report on the Tube Site 8SJ3478," (Pensacola, FL: SOAR, 1998).

24 "Gage to Ogilvie, April 5,1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 16, 3; "Gage to Ogilvie, May 6, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 18, 1; "Ogilvie to Gage, May 13, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 18, 6; "Gage to Harries, June 3, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 19, 2; "Gage to Harries, June 20, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 20, 2.

Sometime between April 15 and July 15, 1999, the site of the *Industry* was looted by persons unknown. The perpetrators blasted a 20-ft. (6 m) wide crater into the seafloor with a propeller-wash deflector and then stole two cannon, and perhaps additional artifacts whose presence was not previously known to archaeologists. This illegal disturbance exposed an unprecedented amount of the site at once and resulted in the subsequent emergency recovery of more artifacts than initially planned for the 1999 field season.[25] The final season of excavation took place in 2000 and saw the excavation of a 6.6 by 16.4 ft. (2 m by 5 m) long trench and an additional 6.6 ft. (2 m) square unit, on opposite sides of the cannon pile.[26] It was hoped that these excavations would expose articulated hull remains, though none were located. Extensive probing carried out in this and previous seasons, using a 12 ft. long hydraulic probe to penetrate beneath the sand, was also unable to locate any intact hull remains. Researchers concluded that the observed wreckage constituted a "pocket" of stowed cargo that remained intact after the vessel broke apart. The pocket likely occurred due to the weight of the cannon and anchors that were probably lashed down to the timbers beneath, which may have served as a temporary cargo platform or been part of the orlop (lowermost) deck. Any original sections of hull may have been swept away after the vessel broke up (as described by Ogilvie) or could possibly be buried so deeply that they remained out of the probe's (and archaeologists') reach.

Artifacts from the *Industry*

Over 1,000 individual artifacts or objects were recovered during the four years of excavation on the *Industry*.[27] More than

25 John William Morris. III, "Site 8SJ3478 The Tube Site 1999 Field Season Report," (St. Augustine, FL: LAMP, 2000), 4-7, 9-13.

26 John William Morris III and Jason Burns, "The Lighthouse Archaeological Maritime Program's 2000 Field Season Report: The Continuing Investigations of St. Augustine's Underwater Archaeology and Maritime History," (St. Augustine, FL: LAMP, 2001).

27 Franklin reports that 65 specimens were recovered between 1997 and 1999, usually comprised of multiple artifacts grouped or encrusted together, and that these were separated in the laboratory to make a total of 785 individual artifacts, over 500 of which were musket balls. In addition, Morris reports that 23 additional specimens were recovered in 2000, comprising as many as 263 individual artifacts from the 2000 excavation, for a total of 1,048. Many of these individual objects were so friable they could not be saved in the conservation laboratory, and there are currently 704 artifacts from the *Industry* collection housed at the St. Augustine Lighthouse & Museum. See Franklin, "Blood and Water," 83, 96, Appendix C; Morris and Burns, "2000 Field Season Report," Appendix C.

half of these were lead musket balls, which comprised the bulk of the collection by count. The artifact assemblage was conserved at laboratories at Texas A&M University and LAMP, and is currently on display and curated at the St. Augustine Lighthouse & Museum on long-term loan from the State of Florida.

One of the most prominent artifact categories on the wreck is military arms. Eight six-pounder cannon were present on the site and, closely arranged end to end, they clearly represented stowed cargo. The cannon that was raised and conserved by archaeologists, a military piece, featured a number of diagnostic markings including the British Broad Arrow (denoting government property), the crest of George II (1727-1760), its weight in hundredweights (17-2-2, or 1,962 pounds), and the letter 'A' on the right trunnion denoting its manufacture at the Ashburnham foundry in Sussex. The number '10' was also incised adjacent to the crest; while similar numbers in this position have been seen on other British naval guns, their significance remains unknown.[28] In addition to the cannon, one swivel gun was found positioned between two of the cannon (Figure 2), which would have fired a ¾ pound ball. A partially degraded wooden box full of this sized cast iron shot was found nearby. Due to its placement amid the stowed cannon, the swivel gun likely was cargo rather than shipboard armament. Unlike the cannon, the swivel gun bears no markings, which is more typical of a civilian piece rather than a military weapon, though it may represent a poor quality gun quickly cast and sold to the Board of Ordnance during the Seven Years' War for arming transports, packets, or storeships. These were produced crudely and in great numbers to meet wartime demands.[29]

Other military hardware recovered includes nine cannonballs, all intended for the six-pounder cannon, and a large number of lead shot or musket balls.[30] All of the musket balls were suitably sized for the Brown Bess musket, the ubiquitous 18th-century British infantry weapon. In addition, a single gunflint was discovered.[31] It was believed by archaeologists to be French due to its rounded

28 Various scholars speculate that these numbers may represent inventory marks, Board of Ordnance testing marks, or a piece number used for placement within shipboard batteries; see Franklin, "Blood and Water," 99; Russell K. Skowronek and George R. Fischer, *HMS Fowey Lost and Found* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), 126, 128.

29 Artillery expert Ruth Rhynas Brown offered this interpretation which is cited in Franklin, "Blood and Water," 105.

30 A total of 833 individual 0.69 caliber musket balls were recovered, along with just twelve 0.63 caliber shot.

31 Morris and Burns, "2000 Field Season Report," 15.



Figure 2. The cast-iron 3/4–pounder swivel gun recovered from the *Industry* shipwreck. The entire yoke has survived though the tiller is mostly deteriorated. It measures 86 cm or 33.5 inches in overall length Photo courtesy of LAMP.

back, and thus likely represents captured munitions from the Seven Years' War.

The munitions found on the shipwreck were typically found in British forts on colonial frontiers and are consistent with specifications in the Gage papers. Just over a month before the *Industry*'s loss, Ogilvie wrote Gage requesting ordnance desperately needed for the advanced posts of East Florida, indicating that Forts Matanzas and Mose needed six or four pounder cannon and Fort Picolata needed four swivel guns. A later letter from Gage to Captain Harries stationed at Apalachee on the Gulf coast suggests that the cannon lost with the *Industry* were six-pounders, the same caliber as those on the shipwreck site.[32]

A wide variety of tools were also found amid the wreckage.[33] Some were individual specialized tools, such as a trowel for smoothing mortar or a lathing or turning gouge, for removing wood turned in a lathe. Other tools were packed in bulk. They include shovels; some fourteen shovel blades, both rounded and square, were packed for shipping. None had been fitted with wooden handles, as wood was plentiful in the Floridas. One additional shovel was perhaps an onboard tool, as it had a sharpened blade and a portion of its attached handle survived. Also found without handles was a bundle of files, wrapped in cloth probably made of flax. The nine files and single blank were fashioned of steel,

32 "Ogilvie to Gage, March 25, 1764," Gage Papers; "Gage to Captain John Harries, June 20, 1764," Gage Papers, Reel 1, Vol. 20, 2.

33 Morris and Burns, "2000 Field Season Report," 11, 25-26; Franklin, "Blood and Water," 120-133, 192.

most likely in Sheffield, England, for shipment to the colonies. Three carpenter's handsaws also survived, packed together. While the steel blades survived in a fragmentary state, the brass-riveted wooden handles were well-preserved, with two completely intact.

One of the most remarkable tool finds were three wooden boxes packed with axe heads.[34] One was broken open and missing six axe heads, but the other two remained sealed and intact, each revealing 20 axe heads when opened in the laboratory. On the lid of one of these boxes was written in dark ink "No. 5 Illinoise Ax's 20". A similar inscription, not as legible, was on the other box. The axes were wrought-iron and designed as felling axes. Illinois Country, also known as Upper Louisiana, was ceded to the British by the French after the close of the Seven Years' War, and these axes may have been originally intended for that frontier territory.

Other tools recovered included knife blades (probably drawknives), a whetstone, and the wooden handles for two hand tools whose bodies did not survive. A total of six millstones were also encountered. These were large, round stones with square holes in their centers, with at least one that was cut or dressed for milling. Three of the stones were marked with their weight and also with letters of unknown significance.[35] Numerous pieces of iron barstock were also observed on the wreck site, and would have been intended for a blacksmith's workshop.

Many artifacts related to food consumption were also recovered.[36] These typically were individual finds, and so are more likely to represent personal items or implements for shipboard subsistence than bulk supplies for East Florida garrisons. The largest such item is a cast-iron, pot-bellied, three-legged cauldron, which may have been used in the ship's galley. An iron serving fork, pewter plate or charger fragment, and several broken pieces of ceramics and bottles were also found. The partially crushed remains of a copper teapot with its lid serve as a reminder that the British practice of taking tea endured at sea and on the frontier. Actual food remains include the bone of a chicken, quail, or pheasant, broken to extract marrow, and the butchered ulna of a cow. A few fish bones recovered could represent food remains or else could have been introduced to the site naturally after wrecking, though

34 Franklin, "Blood and Water," 110-119.

35 Morris and Burns, "2000 Field Season Report," 10; Franklin, "Blood and Water," 136-139.

36 Morris and Burns, "2000 Field Season Report," 16-18, 22-23; Franklin, "Blood and Water," 139-148.

there was also a lead fishing weight collected from the wreck, suggesting that crew or passengers supplemented their shipboard diets with fresh fish.

A few personal items were also identified, all related to clothing. These include 16 brass straight pins, a brass shoe buckle, and three buttons.[37] The straight pins were used to hold garments during tailoring or for daily use as an alternative for buttons.[38] Two of the buttons were crafted of silver while the third is pewter. These were presumed to be civilian buttons, since most military uniform buttons featured regimental numbers by this time. Silver buttons suggest an individual of some wealth; perhaps these were from Captain Lawrence's wardrobe, or a merchant on board.

There were also three anchors found on the site, which were recorded but left in place.[39] Like the cannon, these were tightly arranged end to end and therefore were stowed in the hold and not working ship's equipment ready to be deployed. Furthermore, all three are single-fluked anchors, which means they were mooring anchors. Mooring anchors typically had one fluke only so that a ship moored in a shallow anchorage would not set down on the upright fluke and punch a hole in its own hull at low tides.[40] The inclusion of three mooring anchors suggests that colonial authorities were establishing permanent moorings in the harbor at St. Augustine, or perhaps in front of Fort Matanzas to the south. These could have been intended for military vessels servicing the forts, or to foster commercial trade, or both.

East Florida's Loyalist Influx and the loss of the Storm Wreck

While the loss of the *Industry* was a setback for the initial development of British East Florida, as the years went on under the stewardship of Governor Grant, interim Governor John Moultrie, and Governor Patrick Tonyn, the colony did stabilize and begin to prosper, establishing an increasing number of business and agricultural enterprises and expanding systems of defense and

37 Morris and Burns, "2000 Field Season Report," 18-19; Franklin, "Blood and Water," 149-153.

38 Starr Cox, "Personal Items Recovered from the Storm Wreck, a Late Eighteenth Century Shipwreck off the Coast of St. Augustine, Florida," in *ACUA Underwater Archaeology Proceedings 2012*, ed. Brian Jordan and Troy Nowak (Baltimore, MD: Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, 2013), 46.

39 Morris, "Tube Site 1999 Field Season Report," 24.

40 Betty Nelson Curryer, *Anchors: An Illustrated History* (London: Chatham Publishing, 1999) 94, 135-137.

maritime trade.[41] The outbreak of the Revolutionary War would dramatically change the economic and social dynamics of the colony, however. When open hostilities broke out between Britain and the thirteen colonies to the north in 1775, Florida remained loyal to the King, and the colony soon became a haven for Loyalists displaced by rebellion.[42] As the war proceeded, the number of Loyalist refugees migrating to East Florida steadily increased, expanding the white population of St. Augustine from its pre-war figure of 1,000 to over 4,500 by late June 1782.[43]

After the fall of Yorktown in October 1781, as rearguard actions replaced decisive battles, treaty negotiations gained prominence for the remainder of the war. Rumors proliferated that Britain was planning to end hostilities and abandon its colonies and loyal subjects to the rebels. In March 1782 these rumors were confirmed in Savannah when public notice was given that an agent was available to meet with refugees willing to accept Tonyn's offer and settle in East Florida.[44] Throughout the latter half of 1782, both southern Loyalists and colonial authorities were preoccupied by the logistical challenges of evacuation.

As there were not enough ships available for the clearing of more than one major port at a time, Savannah—seen as the most vulnerable to rebel attack—was the first to be evacuated. Beginning on July 11, 1782, using all available military transports in North America and additional ships hired by Georgia's Lieutenant Governor, thousands of troops, civilians, and slaves set sail. Wilbur Siebert calculates that some 5,148 individuals arrived in St. Augustine from Savannah by July 18, doubling the white population of East Florida and increasing the black population by one fourth or more.[45]

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41 See the articles by Schwartz and Smith in this volume.

42 Roger Clark Smith, "The Fourteenth Colony: Florida and the American Revolution," (PhD diss., University of Florida, 2011), 262; Linda K. Williams, "East Florida as a Loyalist Haven," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 54, no. 4 (April 1976), 465.

43 Robert Stansbury Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution* (Clemson, SC: Clemson University Digital Press, 2010), 187; Smith, "Fourteenth Colony," 262, 271.

44 Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 178.

45 "General Sir Guy Carleton to Lord Shelburne, August 15, 1782," BNA, CO 5/106, ff. 166-169; David Syrett, *Shipping and the American War 1775-83: A Study of British Transport Organization* (London: Athlone Press, 1970), 236-237; Wilbur H. Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785: The Most Important Documents Pertaining Thereto Edited with an Accompanying Narrative,* 2 vols. (Deland: Florida State Historical Society, 1929), 1: 105-107, 109. Siebert's breakdown

The evacuation of Savannah opened the floodgates, resulting in a demographic explosion in St. Augustine, which had previously been the smallest colonial capital in North America. East Florida, already known as "an asylum for refugees," was the closest safe refuge for southern Loyalists.[46] Many from the Carolinas and Georgia, especially planters, preferred Florida to Canada because of its comparable climate, which was more suitable for the slave-based economic system under which they had prospered.[47] It was also a much shorter move, and many refugees probably saw Florida's proximity as an opportunity to re-possess their former properties should the war take a turn in their favor or if the fledgling republic dissolved shortly after its birth, as was generally anticipated by many Loyalists.[48]

Charleston was the next city to be evacuated.[49] With its greater population, authorities estimated that Charleston would take three times the tonnage to evacuate as was needed in Savannah.[50] By mid-August more than 4,200 people had registered for the evacuation, including nearly 2,500 women and children, along with some 7,200 slaves.[51] The volume of humanity, possessions, and supplies to be moved forced the evacuation of Charleston to take place in two distinct stages. Enough ships were assembled for the first evacuation fleet by the end of September, though delays kept the ships in port until the second week of October. Among those departing for East Florida was St. Augustine's new military commander, Lt. Colonel Archibald McArthur, along with several provincial regiments and many Loyalist families, including some "substantial" planters and merchants along with many others less affluent and without slaves.

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of the Savannah evacuation is: 1,042 Loyalists (503 men, 269 women, and 270 children), 1,956 slaves, at least 500 loyal militiamen, 350 Choctaw and Creek Indians, and 1,300 regular troops.

46 American Manuscripts Commission (hereafter Am. Mss. Comm.), *Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain*, 4 vols. (Dublin, Ireland: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1904, 1906, 1907, 1909), 2: 527.

47 Smith, "Fourteenth Colony," 279; Carolyn Watterson Troxler, "Loyalist Refugees and the British Evacuation of East Florida, 1783-1785," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 60, no.1 (July 1981), 21.

48 Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 186; Smith, "Fourteenth Colony," 279; J. Leitch Wright, "Lord Dunmore's Loyalist Asylum in the Floridas," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 49, no. 4 (April 1971), 377.

49 Joseph W. Barnwell, "The Evacuation of Charleston by the British in 1782," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 11, no.1 (January 1910): 1-26.

50 "Carleton to Shelburne, August 15, 1782," BNA, CO 5/106, ff. 166.

51 Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 182.

Enough provisions were sent with this fleet to feed 1,000 refugees and 2,000 of their slaves.[52]

An eyewitness description from a British officer provides insight into the hardships facing the Loyalists escaping Charleston:

> To provide in some measure for these poor wretches, the commanders of the garrisons (though contrary to their orders) protracted the evacuations as long as they possibly could without offending the Ministry. Transports were procured, and several hundreds with their personal property went to St. Augustine, in Florida, the Governor of which granted each family a tract of land upon which they sat down and began the world anew. . . . There were old grey-headed men and women, husbands and wives with large families of little children, women with infants at their breasts, poor widows whose husbands had lost their lives in the service of their King and country, with half a dozen half-starved bantlings taggling at their skirts, taking leave of their friends. Here you saw people who had lived all their days in affluence (though not in luxury) leaving their real estates, their houses, stores, ships, and improvements, and hurrying on board the transports with what little household goods they had been able to save. In every street were to be seen men, women, and children wringing their hands, lamenting the situation of those who were about leaving the country, and the more dreadful situation of such who were either unable to leave or were determined, rather than run the risk of starving in distant lands, to throw themselves upon, and trust to, the mercy of their persecutors, their inveterate enemies, the rebels of America.[53]

After a fleet of nine ships bound for Halifax with troops, munitions, and about 500 refugees set sail on the first of November, Charleston's final evacuation fleet was gathered and ready to depart by the middle of December. A total of 111 transports left Charleston, crossing the bar on 18 December 1782.[54] This vast fleet

52 Am. Mss. Comm., *Report*, 3: 220; Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida*, 1: 114, 124, 133-136; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 182.

53 Thomas Jones, *History of New York During the Revolutionary War*, 2 vols. (New York: New York Historical Society, 1879), 2: 235-236. See also Barnwell, "Evacuation of Charleston," 1-5.

54 "List of Transports appointed to receive the Garrison at Charles Town, 19 November 1782," BNA, CO 5/108, ff. 38-41; "Abstract of the distribution of

was divided into five groups each headed for a different destination: 48 ships were bound for New York with supplies and troops, 20 ships were bound for England with refugees, government officials, and military officers, five ships were bound for St. Lucia with troops and baggage, black cavalry horses, the "Frame of a Fort," and 200 Black Pioneers (assembled from free blacks considered too "obnoxious" to remain without facing reprisal), 29 ships were bound for Jamaica with 1,260 refugees (591 men, 291 women, and 378 children), 2,613 slaves (a total of 3,873 souls), merchandise, and provisions, and eight ships registering a total of 1,387 tons were bound for St. Augustine with refugees and their effects.[55]

It appears that there were actually many more ships than the eight listed leaving Charleston for St. Augustine. This was the last fleet to leave and anyone else with a ship intending to depart would choose to sail with the main fleet to share the protection of the Royal Navy escort. The St. Augustine squadron was accompanied by the 24-gun frigate HMS *Bellisarius* and a number of smaller armed galleys including the *Rattlesnake* and *Viper*. The number of additional civilian vessels (not hired transports) making the voyage with the official convoy is difficult to determine. The captain's log of *Bellisarius* noted 120 ships in the convoy headed south (the combined flotillas bound for St. Augustine, St. Lucia, and Jamaica) suggesting that as many as 72 additional vessels were sailing with the transport vessels and their naval escorts.[56] Also, the accounts of the shipwrecks at the St. Augustine bar, detailed below, indicate that twice as many ships wrecked at St. Augustine as were supposedly in the fleet bound for St. Augustine.

Regardless of the exact number of ships that were sailing from Charleston to St. Augustine, when the fleet arrived, on or around

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Transports, Army & Navy Victuallers, and Oat Vessels appointed to receive the Garrison of Charles Town, Stores, Inhabitants, &c, &c, 3 January 1783," BNA, CO 5/108, f. 76; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 183.

55 The individual tonnages and identities of the ships departing for East Florida, along with numbers of refugees, slaves, troops, and the nature and amount of cargo, remain unknown. The "List of Transports" dated November 19, 1782, a month before the evacuation, makes no mention of a Florida-bound fleet. The "Abstract of the distribution of Transports" dated January 3, 1783, a fortnight after the fleet departed, does list a total of 8 Florida-bound ships under convoy of HMS *Bellisarius*, but all of the preceding pages of this document, which should have listed these ships individually along with the numbers of refugees and slaves on each, appear to be missing from the BNA.

56 "Logg [sic] Book on Board His Majesty Ship *Belisarius*, Richard Graves Esq. Commanding, from August 30, 1782 to Oct 1783," BNA, ADM (Admiralty Records) 52/2161, Book 3, entry dated 19 December 1782.

December 31, 1782, it met with disaster. The earliest account of this shipwreck event was written by Elizabeth Lichtenstein Johnston, in a letter to her husband, a British soldier, on January 3, 1783, just three days after the disastrous event. Johnston was a Loyalist refugee who had only just arrived in St. Augustine. She noted that sixteen small vessels from the last fleet out of Charleston were lost on and around the St. Augustine bar, and that six to eight were cast ashore on the beach.[57] The next account of the wrecking is in a letter from McArthur to General Sir Guy Carleton, the commander-in-chief in New York. McArthur provides us with the date of the disaster, detailing that the refugee convoy escorted by *Bellisarius* arrived on December 31, and lost the galley *Rattlesnake*, two provision ships, and six private vessels when attempting to cross the bar. He goes on to mention that four lives from the private vessels were lost, the 18-pounder cannon and rigging from the galley were successfully salvaged, and the cash (probably soldiers' pay) arrived safely. McArthur mentions a total of only nine wrecked vessels, not sixteen, but he likely felt the need to only report the loss of military-owned and hired vessels (the "private vessels" he notes probably refer to hired transports) to his superior and omitted mention of the loss of additional civilian ships accompanying the convoy by their own choice.[58] Johnston's assertion that there were sixteen ships lost was independently corroborated by Johann Schoepf when he visited St. Augustine just over a year later. His memoirs, published decades before Johnston's letter was made public in her own memoirs, state that no less than sixteen vessels carrying refugees and their possessions were stranded and beaten to pieces.[59]

One discrepancy between these accounts is the number of lives lost. Schoepf states that "many persons" perished, while McArthur notes only four lives were lost. Johnston does not mention any loss of life, but does lament the suffering of an acquaintance, who lost "the greatest part" of his property.[60] It seems likely that Schoepf's account, written over a year later with a lurid account of the danger of the bar, exaggerated the loss of life. Even if relatively few lives

57 Elizabeth Lichtenstein Johnston, *Recollections of a Georgia Loyalist*, (New York: M. F. Mansfield & Company, 1901), 210. It is unclear from Johnston's letter if she meant there were six to eight vessels on the beach in addition to the sixteen lost on the bar, or if there were a total of sixteen wrecked on both bar and beach, though the former scenario seems more likely.

58 "McArthur to Carleton, January 9, 1783," BNA, PRO 30/55/60/6728, 1.

59 Schoepf, *Travels*, 2: 227-228.

60 Ibid., 2: 228; "McArthur to Carleton, January 9, 1783," BNA, PRO 30/55/60/6728, 1; Johnston, *Recollections*, 210.

were lost in these shipwrecks, multitudes of hapless refugees found themselves cast ashore in a horrendously overcrowded St. Augustine, destitute after the loss of all their possessions.

Those possessions were dispersed by wind, waves, and currents as the ships broke apart in the surf. What remained, from one wreck at least, settled into the sandy bottom and would lie forgotten for more than two centuries, preserved with the scattered remains of one of these refugee vessels, now known as the Storm Wreck.

The Excavation of the Storm Wreck, 2009-2014

The historic shipwreck site known as the "Storm Wreck," discovered in 2009, has been subjected to scientific archaeological excavation by LAMP researchers every summer since then.[61] The shipwreck site is located about a mile (1.6 km) offshore St. Augustine and within 500 yards (450 m) of the *Industry* wreck, in about 25 to 30 feet (7.6 to 9.1 m) of water. In the 1780s, this location would have been in or immediately adjacent to the inlet, and would have been in less than nine feet (2.7 m) of water at high tide.[62] The physical nature of the site can be described as a dense scatter of cultural material, extending across an area of at least 40 by 36 ft. (12 m by 11 m) and typically buried under at least 1 to 2 ft. (30 to 60 cm) of sand (Figure 3). The site has been divided into a series of one meter square gridded units for systematic control during excavation. Divers use handheld, water-powered dredges to remove sand from within one unit at a time, exposing buried artifacts which are then documented before being brought to the surface. Conditions on the bottom, like those at the *Industry* site, are often difficult for divers, usually featuring heavy surge and extremely poor or non-existent visibility. Despite this adverse environment, in five summers of fieldwork archaeologists have successfully excavated 409 square ft. (38 square meters) of

61 Chuck Meide, "Investigation of the Storm Wreck, a Late 18th Century Shipwreck Off the Coast of St. Augustine, Florida: Results of the First Two Excavation Seasons, 2010-2011," in *ACUA Underwater Archaeology Proceedings 2012,* ed. Brian Jordan and Troy Nowak (Baltimore, MD: Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, 2013), 17-25; Chuck Meide, Samuel P. Turner, P. Brendan Burke, and Starr Cox, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2010: Report on Archaeological Investigations," (St. Augustine, FL: Lighthouse Archaeological Maritime Program, 2011), 104-190; Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 143-322.

62 Schoepf, *Travels,* 2: 227, reported the inlet as being no deeper than 8 to 9 feet at high tide.



Figure 3. Site plan of the Storm Wreck, 2010-2013 excavation seasons. A few isolated artifacts have also been discovered to the west of this area and are not depicted here. Drawn by Chuck Meide and Olivia McDaniel, digitized by Tim Jackson. Courtesy of LAMP.

Figure 4. LAMP archaeologists raising a four-pounder cannon from the Storm Wreck on June 28, 2011. Photograph courtesy of LAMP.

the site. A total of 429 field specimens, representing thousands of individual artifacts, have been recovered for conservation, analysis, and eventual display.

In general, cultural material is very well preserved, as with the *Industry* wreck, though in comparison there are a greater number and diversity of artifacts on the Storm Wreck. Many iron objects have become encrusted, often along with other small artifacts, in a rock-like material known as concretion. These conglomerates are often impossible to identify until imaged with an x-ray or CT scanner, which reveals items preserved within, often in great detail (Figure 4).[63] Concretions are then carefully cleaned using delicate pneumatic scribes, pen-like devices commonly used to engrave script on metal. The exposed objects invariably need further stabilization through electrolytic or chemical cleaning to eliminate salts. Waterlogged archaeological objects left to dry without first undergoing conservation treatment will suffer accelerated deterioration and eventual destruction. With a collection of

63 Matthew Hanks, "The Storm Wreck Concretions: A Look Beneath the Surface," *ACUA Underwater Archaeology Proceedings 2012*, ed. Brian Jordan and Troy Nowak (Baltimore, MD: Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, 2013), 32-37.

artifacts as sizable as this one, stabilization treatment will likely continue for years after fieldwork has been finished. At the time of this writing, preparations are underway for a sixth field season and the conservation and analysis of artifacts recovered in previous seasons is well underway. A wide range of eighteenth-century material culture has been studied, providing a unique perspective into the final voyage of this vessel and the lives of the Loyalist refugees on board.

Insight into the Loss of the Storm Wreck

Like the *Industry*, the Storm Wreck is located within the confines of the eighteenth-century inlet, suggesting that, like so many other vessels, this one ran aground on the notorious sandbar while attempting to enter the port. Some of the artifacts studied have provided a better understanding of the moments immediately after the ship ran aground. The most notable example was a heavy deck pump.[64] This large, cylindrical device made of lead, would have been situated upright on the deck, with its attached piping extending down below the waterline. It was used to bring up clean seawater for washing, firefighting, or other purposes. Only two other examples are known of similar pumps archaeologically recovered from shipwrecks.[65] After recovery, researchers observed very obvious cut marks in the lead plumbing and on the body of the pump. It was clear that this piece of equipment was desperately hacked free from the ship using axes or cutlasses in order to throw its heavy bulk overboard in an effort to re-float the stranded vessel. Six cannon discovered nearby, positioned in an apparent spill pattern, suggest that they too were thrown overboard, and the ship's bell in the same location may also have been jettisoned. A brass tap, meant to be inserted in a water cask or beer keg, was found in the open position, which might indicate that the water casks were drained into the hold to be emptied by operating the bilge pumps, which probably would have been the fastest way to remove

64 Michael Jasper, "Ship's Fittings and Equipment Recovered from the Storm Wreck, a Late Eighteenth Century Shipwreck off the Coast of St. Augustine," in *ACUA Underwater Archaeology Proceedings 2012*, ed. Brian Jordan and Troy Nowak (Baltimore, MD: Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, 2013), 53-55.

65 They are from the Spanish vessel *San Jose*, lost in 1733 in the Florida Keys, and HMS *Swift* lost in 1770 in Patagonia. The Storm Wreck pump, however, looks more similar to a French example pictured in Jean Boudriot, *The Seventy-Four Gun Ship: A Practical Treatise on the Art of Naval Architecture*, 4 vols. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 2: 151-152.

the weight of the ship's water supply. An alternate explanation is that discipline broke down after running aground, and sailors or passengers drank the beer keg empty.

Collected artifacts believed to represent components of the ship itself, including a plank and timber along with a possible iron deck stanchion, suggest that the attempt to save the ship was unsuccessful. Numerous small finds, too tiny to have been jettisoned for weight reduction, also imply the ship was a total loss.[66]

Identification as Member of the Final Charleston Evacuation Fleet

The first datable objects encountered on the shipwreck were lead pellets intended for use as birdshot or scatter shot. These were manufactured by a process first published in 1665 but were used throughout the colonial period. By the end of the 2010 field season a wider range of objects had been found that could be more narrowly dated to the eighteenth century. A number of these artifacts, including the base of a wine glass with a plain conical foot dating to ca. 1780-1805, implied that the wreck occurred in the final quarter of the 1700s.[67] Most artifacts appeared to be of British manufacture. By the end of the initial field season, archaeologists hypothesized that this wreck was one of the sixteen refugee ships carrying Loyalists from the final fleet to evacuate Charleston. When the ship's bell was discovered, it was anticipated that it might identify the ship by name and year of launching, but when cleaned of marine encrustation it unfortunately yielded no inscription of any kind.

Subsequently two cannon were recovered in hopes of finding diagnostic markings indicating date and nationality (Figure 5). While the four-pounder cannon, typical of civilian ordnance, did not feature such markings, the nine-pounder carronade bore the date 1780 on its right trunnion. In addition, the serial number on the opposite trunnion confirmed that it was cast at the Carron Iron Company in Falkirk, Scotland, and inventoried on 31 July 1780.[68]

66 Meide, Turner, Burke, and Cox, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2010,"131-132, 151-156, 160-163, 166-171; Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 182-192, 199-201, 218-221, 227-243, 249-268.

67 Meide, Turner, Burke, and Cox, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2010,"155-156; Ivor Noël Hume, *A Guide to Artifacts of Colonial America* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Philadelphia Press, 1969), 190-191.

68 "Carron Company Invoice Book, 1778-1781, Vol. 2," National Archives of Scotland, GD (Gifts and Deposits) 58/4/19/15, p. 229. The carronade was amid a shipment of guns shipped on the company ship *Carron* to London to be sold on consignment by an agent or merchant named Robert Sinclair.



Figure 5. Example of a concretion, or conglomerate of encrusted objects, recovered from the Storm Wreck, as seen by the naked eye (left) and through x-ray imagery (right). The x-ray reveals 1. A rigging hook, 2. A ring of unknown function, 3. A large spike, 4. numerous lead shot (birdshot), 5. A rigging hank, 6. A coin, and 7. A Queen Anne's boxlock pistol, also known as a coat or pocket pistol due to its small size. Courtesy of LAMP.

It is at this time believed to be the second oldest dated carronade to have survived anywhere in the world.[69] The nine-pounder carronade was never adopted by the Royal Navy and was therefore intended for the civilian market. This was interpreted as further evidence that this ship was a merchantman, either working as a hired military transport or else evacuating independently of the government effort. In all, two carronades (nine-pounders) and four traditional cannon (four-pounders) have been encountered on the wreck, though only two guns (one of each type) have been raised. Six guns was the minimum mandated by government regulation for a hired transport, and carronades were allowed to replace long guns if desired.[70] This battery meets that requirement and represents the appropriate firepower for a small merchant vessel of the time.

69 Samuel P. Turner and Chuck Meide, "Artillery of the Storm Wreck," in *ACUA Underwater Archaeology Proceedings 2012*, ed. Brian Jordan and Troy Nowak (Baltimore, MD: Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, 2013), 28.

70 Syrett, *Shipping and the American War*, 115.

More convincing evidence as to the identity of the ship came in the form of two pewter military buttons.[71] The first displayed a crown motif over the letters "R P," indicating it came from a Royal Provincial unit, and that its owner was, by definition, a Loyalist. Archaeologists considered this strong circumstantial evidence that the ship was a Loyalist vessel. The second button was even more compelling. It was from a non-officer's uniform from the 71st Regiment of Foot. This Scottish regiment, known as Fraser's Highlanders, suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Cowpens and later at Yorktown, with many men captured. In December 1782 its remaining 189 soldiers departed Charleston on the final evacuation fleet.[72] Researchers are confident that this button links the Storm Wreck to the final evacuation of Charleston and, when considered with the full body of archaeological data analyzed to date, identifies the shipwreck beyond a reasonable doubt as one of the evacuation vessels lost at the St. Augustine bar on or around 31 December 1782.[73]

Domestic or Household Objects

A significant component of the artifact collection represents household items, which is not surprising considering the passengers were abandoning their homes and taking with them the basic necessities required to start new lives. Many of these recovered artifacts are related to the preparation and consumption of food. Eight cast-iron cooking pots or cauldrons have been recovered, and fragments of what appeared to be two additional cauldrons were observed but not collected.[74] Similar to the *Industry*

71 Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 231-232.

72 "List of Transports appointed to receive the Garrison at Charles Town, November 19, 1782," BNA, CO 5/108, f. 38.

73 Some questions remain unanswered, however. The 71st Regiment left Charleston for Jamaica in the *Sally*, and arrived there on January 13, 1783. For a reason that remains unknown, at least one of the soldiers of the 71st did not arrive in Jamaica but was instead shipwrecked at St. Augustine. Researchers have speculated that perhaps one or more soldiers may have been assigned guard duty on other ships, or that a wounded soldier was sent on the shorter trip to St. Augustine to convalesce.

74 Annie Carter, "A Wreck of a Site: An Archaeological Examination of Cauldrons from the Storm Wreck, 8SJ5459" (Undergraduate thesis, New College of Florida, 2014); Brian McNamara, "Cooking with Fire: What Cookware and Tableware Can Tell Us About an Unidentified Eighteenth Century Shipwreck," in *ACUA Underwater Archaeology Proceedings 2012*, ed. Brian Jordan and Troy Nowak (Baltimore, MD: Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, 2013),

cauldron, these are round-bottomed, round-bellied, and narrow near the top before flaring out. Each also features opposing ears on the rim to accommodate a handle or bail, and three legs, so they could have been suspended over or set upon a fire. They vary in size, ranging from 6.7 to 15.7 inches (17 to 39.9 cm) in height. When cleaning the interior of the smallest cauldron, conservators discovered and carefully extracted the remains of its last prepared meal, a single, small, green pea.[75] Peas were one of the standard provisions provided to refugees by the colonial authorities, and its presence confirms that this cauldron was not a cargo item but one in use, probably by a single family. Other cookware items from the shipwreck include a set of nested copper pots with flat bottoms and straight sides, and a circular, wrought-iron gridiron, meant to stand in or hang over a fire for light cooking or food warming.[76]

A large, cast-iron tea kettle was also recovered. It is round-bodied and flat-bottomed with a spout, though its handle and lid are missing. It was most likely intended for use at the hearth to boil water, as opposed to in the parlor for serving. By the late 18th century, British colonial families of virtually all statuses were practicing the social ceremony of taking tea. Archaeologists have encountered porcelain teawares on farmstead sites across the Carolina backcountry, suggesting that by the 1750s this characteristically British tradition with its gentile materiality was practiced well outside the sophisticated urban center of Charleston.[77] It is interesting to speculate what meaning this common family ritual may have had in the aftermath of the evacuation. Perhaps maintaining the regular practice of teatime would provide at least a temporary sense of normalcy in an otherwise frightening and uncertain time.

Recovered tableware items include two pewter plates, one brass and thirteen pewter spoons, plus an additional pewter handle from either a spoon or a fork.[78] A lack of makers' marks on all the pewterware that have been cleaned thus far might indicate colonial

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39-41.

75 Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 244, 246.

76 Ibid, 246-250.

77 James Deetz, *In Small Things Forgotten: The Archaeology of Early American Life* (New York: Doubleday, 1977), 60; David Colin Crass, Bruce R. Penner, and Tammy R. Forehand, "Gentility and Material Culture on the Carolina Frontier," *Historical Archaeology* 33, no.3 (1999): 14-31.

78 Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 249-258, McNamara, "Cooking with Fire," 38, 41-42.

origins, outside the control of guilds that regulated the manufacture and sale of such goods in Europe. Several styles of spoons were recovered.[79] Of special interest are possible owners' marks on two of the spoons. While owners' initials have been observed on other contemporary spoons, in these cases an "X" was crudely scratched in the back of one handle, and an asterisk-like mark onto another. These have been interpreted as the personal marks of two owners who were probably illiterate. At least two knives have also been identified, one consisting of a wooden handle with fragmentary blade remains, and another which appears to be a folding knife. Glassware for the table includes the previously mentioned wine glass foot, the broken remains of a few bottles, probably for wine or spirits, and a leaded glass stopper with a decorated edge for a decanter.[80]

Not all domestic objects in the assemblage are associated with foodways. Clothing-related items include nine clothing or flat irons, a belt (or possibly strap) buckle and two shoe buckles, as many as fourteen buttons of various styles (not including the two aforementioned military buttons), at least twenty-nine brass straight pins, similar to those on the *Industry*, and what appears in an x-ray image to be a thimble.[81] The pewter face of a toy or false watch (*fausse montre*) was also found, with the encircling Roman numerals I – XII and a pair of immobile hands cast into its surface. It was either a toy or a cheaper alternative to a pocket watch.[82] Other household items include a brass drawer handle from a piece of furniture, a brass candlestick, a padlock, and a key that appears to have been meant for winding clockworks rather than for a lock. One final object of interest is a small, flat box fashioned of brass and

79 The various spoons featured rat-tail, shellback, and drop bowl attachments, and dog-nose and fiddleback style handles. The handles of several spoons were cut off, apparently deliberately, a practice which made it easier for sailors or travelers to keep their spoon in their pocket.

80 Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 264-265.

81 Cox, "Personal Items," 46-47; Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 227-239, 260-262.

82 Watches were a popular status symbol, and wearing two watches, the secondary of which was often a false watch, became fashionable in 1770s London and would have spread to the colonies thereafter. See Carolyn L. White, *American Artifacts of Personal Adornment, 1680-1820, A Guide to Identification and Interpretation* (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2005), 132. The design on this false watch face is most similar to those defined as Type 5 in the typology presented in Hazel Forsyth and Geoff Egan, *Toys, Trifles & Trinkets: Base Metal Miniatures from London 1200 to 1800* (London: Unicorn Press, 2005), 336-385.

partially obscured by concretion when discovered. X-ray analysis and subsequent cleaning revealed that it is a door lock, probably removed from an evacuated house. It is clear this specimen was removed from the door in which it had originally been installed, as its iron key was stored inside the lock housing, which would be inaccessible when attached to a door. Stripping homes of hardware before abandonment was a common practice, and many evacuees disassembled their entire homes and transported them for eventual reassembly. One documented example was William Curtis, who decided to "pull down" his recently built home in Charleston and take it with him to St. Augustine. His house and other effects were lost, however, when his ship wrecked on the St. Augustine bar.[83]

Tools of the Trade

A variety of tools and equipment have been identified in the Storm Wreck artifact assemblage, giving some insight into the various occupations of people on board. Three hammers have been found, all hafted with wooden handles and therefore more likely to represent working tools than cargo items. Two of these appear to be common carpenter's hammers, with clawed heads. It cannot, however, be assumed they belonged to carpenters, as such hammers would have been used by a variety of colonists or could have been part of the ship's store. The third hammer, however, is a specialized variant. It is a cobbler's hammer, and would most likely have been part of a shoemaker's toolkit. There were also four axes, two of which have been cleaned of concretion in the laboratory. Two appear to be felling axes, used for cutting down trees and stripping branches, while the two deconcreted specimens are broad axes, used for dressing timber. Three of the axes are hafted, indicating they were working tools, not cargo as with the *Industry* axes, though one of the broad axes does not appear to have had a handle, which may have been removed for easier stowage.[84]

What may be a caulking iron was observed in an x-ray image of a concretion. It could have belonged to an evacuating shipbuilder or the ship's carpenter. Other maritime tools, both navigational instruments, include a small brass fitting from an octant and a pair of dividers. A similar mathematical device, a folding brass sector rule, may also have been used by the ship's navigators, though it

83 Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 183-184.

84 Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 262-264.

alternatively could have been carried by a soldier for use in aiming artillery or an evacuating surveyor.[85]

Five small lead weights for use with a balance pan scale might have belonged to a Charleston merchant hoping to re-establish his trade in St. Augustine. Some display markings which, upon further cleaning, may be identifiable as assize, owner's, or maker's marks, or possibly weight indicators. Another tool which has only been observed by x-ray is an iron hook with a short wooden handle.[86] This appears to be a baling hook, which as with all agricultural tools, would have been in short supply in East Florida given the vast numbers of incoming refugees intending to set up farms. Another tool intended for the farmstead was a livestock tether. This was a large, heavy, cylindrical weight, iron with a lead core, with a large ring at its top, which could be used to fetter horses or cattle.

One final class of vocational equipment includes the tools of the professional soldier, whose presence on board was first indicated by regimental buttons. Other military hardware from the shipwreck includes three virtually intact Brown Bess muskets. The first has been identified as a 1769 Short Land Pattern, which was produced between 1768 and 1777. X-ray imaging astonished archaeologists when it revealed the musket remained in the "half cock" position and was still loaded with a cartridge of buck and ball. Consisting of a .69 caliber ball along with three .32 caliber buckshot, this load was intended to increase the damage inflicted by a unit's volley of fire. The second musket has been identified as a 1756 Long Land Pattern, produced from 1756 to 1790. It was also in the half cock position but was loaded with birdshot or tiny lead pellets (not the standard military-issued buckshot). Other examples of these lead pellets have been found in great numbers scattered across the excavation area, presumably from a cask that broke open during or after the wrecking event. The third musket, a 1777 Short Land Pattern produced 1777-1782, was neither cocked nor loaded.[87] The fact that two out of three muskets were ready for

85 Meide, Turner, Burke, Cox, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2010," 163-165; Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 217-221; Ronald Pearsall, *Collecting and Restoring Scientific Instruments* (New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1974), 36-38.

86 Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 306, 309.

87 Ibid., 182-192.

firing at a moment's notice underscores the imminent danger of rebel privateers even in the final days of the war.

Artifacts as Markers of Social Status

In addition to enabling the observation of various professional occupations among the passengers on board, some artifacts allow perspectives into their social hierarchy. The departing refugees came not only from Charleston, among the wealthiest and most stylish of colonial cities, but also from across the Carolina backcountry and lowcountry, and included every socioeconomic level and family status.[88] The two spoons with personal marks mentioned previously suggest illiteracy, and could have belonged to a sailor, impoverished Loyalist, or possibly a slave. One item that probably indicates a wealthy owner is a Queen Anne's or pocket or coat pistol, so-named because it was small enough to be hidden in a coat pocket (Figure 4). A box-lock, breech-loading pistol, it was a very sophisticated weapon for its time and was both more accurate and more powerful than its muzzle-loading equivalents. By the late eighteenth century these guns were increasingly accessible to the general public, especially after 1780 when a plainer version developed, foregoing artistic elegance for mass production.[89] The example from Storm Wreck may be a transitional piece, as it features the slab-sided handle of the later type but appears in the x-ray image to feature a decorated handle, possibly even with inlaid silver wire.

The glass stopper also probably belonged to an elite passenger, as it would have been considerably more expensive than cork and was intended for fine glassware holding liqueur or possibly perfume. A single gold guinea coin, dated 1776 and bearing the likeness of George III, was also probably owned by a higher-status passenger. Two silver coins were also found, though they are highly degraded and their type and denomination remain unknown. The final coin encountered on the shipwreck is believed to be a George II halfpenny minted between 1740 and 1754, and is more representative of coinage used by the masses.[90]

88 Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 187.

89 John W. Burgoyne, *The Queen Anne Pistol, 1660-1780*, (Bloomfield, Canada: Museum Restoration Service, 2002), 52-55.

90 Meide, Burke, McDaniel, Turner, Andes, Brendel, Cox, and McNamara, "First Coast Maritime Archaeology Project 2011-2012," 240-242.

Two rectangular, Artois-style shoe buckles may also lend some insight into the social status of their owners. Buckles, particularly for upper-class persons, were worn like jewelry as a reflection of social status.[91] Neither of the Storm Wreck shoe buckles are jeweled or crafted of silver, which would have been the most extravagant and restricted to the gentry or wealthiest of merchants. The next most expensive buckle material was brass or copper, as with one of the two recovered specimens. These were sometimes tinned to emulate silver, which does not seem to be the case with this example, though it features some decoration with raised bands and beaded lines. The next cheapest material for buckles, only one step up from iron, was pewter.[92] The second shoe buckle is fashioned from pewter, but it is extravagantly decorated, featuring four raised bands separated by perpendicular ridges and four beaded bow-tie motifs garnished with tulip or shell designs. Its elaborately cast decorations imply that the owner, even if from a lower class, had upwardly mobile ambitions.

Conclusion

Twenty years of maritime archaeology in the waters of our nation's oldest port have resulted in a unique archaeological perspective into Florida's British history. The two oldest and most significant shipwrecks that have been discovered and studied off St. Augustine, the *Industry* lost in May 1764 and the as yet unidentified Storm Wreck lost in December 1782, neatly bookend the entire British Period. These two ships were both lost trying to enter the infamous St. Augustine Inlet, coming to rest within 1500 feet of each other, and they both lay buried and forgotten beneath the murky seas before being discovered just over two and a quarter centuries later. Facing identical environmental conditions, the two shipwrecks both feature well-preserved remains and each constitutes a time capsule of material culture that has lent insight into both the dawn and sunset of Britain's occupation of Florida.

Industry was a merchant sloop operating out of colonial New York during and after the Seven Years' War. It made regular runs between New York, Charleston, and St. Augustine, and was hired by the British Army to transport supplies from New York to the newly-

91 Elżbieta Wróblewska, "Buckles from Shoes and Clothing," in Waldemar Ossowski, ed., *The* General Carleton *Shipwreck, 1785* (Gdańsk: Polish Maritime Museum, 2008), 210.

92 Noël Hume, *Guide to Artifacts*, 86.

acquired colony of East Florida. Its principal cargo was munitions and "Artificers tools," along with specie for troops' pay, which was successfully salvaged. The artifacts recovered from the shipwreck provide a deeper understanding of the supplies that were seen as necessary for maintaining a newly established colony on the frontier, and more generally of the British colonial system that operated on both regional and global scales. The eight cannon were cast to strict specifications at an English foundry for the Board of Ordnance, while the crudely cast and unmarked swivel gun, which may have originated in the colonies, suggests a compromise of standards made for wartime expediency. At least sixty American-style felling axes were probably wrought in New York and boxed for shipment to the Illinois Country, before being diverted to the Florida frontier. The drawknives appeared crudely made, likely in the colonies, while the files were probably English-built of quality steel, and at least one gunflint was originally from France. The mooring anchors represent the infrastructure desired to build the Floridas into industrious and profitable colonies. As an assemblage, these artifacts speak to the specific needs of a new colony and to lines of supply that spanned the Atlantic World in a way that is not decipherable in primary documents.

The Storm Wreck was a merchant vessel that participated in the final evacuation of Charleston at the close of the Revolutionary War. The ship was probably serving as a hired transport for the Army, like *Industry*, and carried at least some British troops, both regulars and provincials, along with civilians and their possessions seeking refuge in East Florida. The war had thrust the colony into a state of chaos as border raids and privateer attacks impacted commerce and supply lines while thousands upon thousands of Loyalist refugees flooded into St. Augustine and the surrounding countryside. "The collective story of the Loyalist refugees is filled with suffering and tragedy," writes Daniel Schafer, "and is often tempered by survival and recovery."[93] The multitude of artifacts from this shipwreck, greater in number and diversity than those from the *Industry*, bring this Loyalist story vividly to life. The artifacts found on the Storm Wreck represent people forced from their homes, departing with all the worldly possessions that they could manage to bring with them in order to try and make a new life for their families in the only refuge left for them. The assemblage reflects a wide range of colonial society, from soldier to shoemaker, and from enslaved

93 Schafer, "St. Augustine's British Years," 216.

laborer to landed gentry. The goods accompanying them include cookware to feed the family, teaware to maintain a semblance of stability, and craftsmen's and farming tools with which to build a new life.

Together, these two shipwrecks make a significant contribution towards our understanding of the British period of Florida's history, a period that in general has been underappreciated by historians and forgotten by most of the general public. With the analysis of the *Industry* largely complete, and even with that of the Storm Wreck just getting underway, the value of these archaeological perspectives on Florida's British Period are readily apparent. As conservation and analysis of the Storm Wreck assemblage continues, the study of these shipwrecks promises to bring into sharper focus this brief yet pivotal period of Florida history, and with the development of a planned Storm Wreck exhibit at the St. Augustine Lighthouse & Museum to complement the *Industry* display currently housed there, the stories of Florida's British colonists will be shared with millions of visitors from around the world.

The Failure of Great Britain's "Southern Expedition" of 1776: Revisiting Southern Campaigns in the Early Years of the American Revolution, 1775–1779

by Roger Smith

The first five years of the American Revolution are traditionally viewed as a New England-based conflict, fought principally by a continuously-depleted Continental Army and Yankee Minute Men; only after the siege of Charleston in 1780 did the focus of the fighting shift south.[1] Historical documents pertaining to Florida, however, reveal a far more complex story that exposes the fallacy that tens of thousands of able-bodied fighting men from the southern colonies remained inactive while George Washington's Continental Army was out-manned, out-gunned, and battered to pieces during the first five years of the war. The absence of southern regiments and militia in northern campaigns—campaigns desperately in want of more men and supplies—is an indicator that southern troops were needed in the South. To believe that the southern colonies were virtually ignored by the British until the siege of Charleston would be to suggest that the only reason General Sir Henry Clinton, commander of the failed

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1 Timelines constructed by sources that are highly regarded by the general public support this premise: http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/gwtimear.html (accessed January 2008); http://www.nps.gov/revwar/about_the_revolution/timeline_of_events_06_10.html; http://www.pbs.org/ktca/liberty/chronicle_timeline.html (accessed January 2008).

British "Southern Expedition," sailed into Charleston Harbor with an assault fleet in 1776 was because he was lost.[2]

Colonial debates on rebellion and independence in the southern colonies were very much a concern to King George III and the ministers at Whitehall throughout the Revolutionary period. The production of sugar, indigo, coffee, and cocoa in the West Indies during this era was the driving economic force underpinning the fiscal needs of empire.[3] The role played by the North American colonies in the larger scheme of British imperial priorities was that of a vast source of cheap provisions for the British West Indies.[4] The political stability of the southern colonies of North America was crucial to maintaining Britain's Atlantic world trade. Yet the process for filling British imperial coffers faced a devastating imbalance when Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia fell in quick succession to the rebellion and the Continental Congress imposed a trade embargo on Great Britain, Ireland, and the British West Indies.[5] The dearth of southern food-stuffs and essential supplies destined for British ports was exacerbated by devastating hurricanes, drought, famine, and epidemic disease throughout the Caribbean.[6] In the British West Indies, this deadly

2 For just a few examples of esteemed scholars who have advocated this school of thought concerning the dearth of Revolutionary events in the southern colonies prior to 1780, see Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Gordon S. Wood, *The American Revolution: A History* (New York: Random House, 2002); Edward Countryman, *The American Revolution* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985—Revised Edition 2003); John Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780–1782* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985); Simon Schama, *Rough Crossings: The Slaves, the British, and the American Revolution* (New York: HarperCollins Publishing, 2006).

3 Jan Rogoziński, *A Brief History of the Caribbean: From the Arawak and Carib to the Present* (New York: Plume Group, 1999), 108.

4 Philip D. Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History*,2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 153.

5 Sherry Johnson, *Climate and Catastrophe in Cuba and the Atlantic World in the Age of Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2011), 132-134, 136; see also Richard B. Sheridan, "The Crisis of Slave Subsistence in the British West Indies during the American Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 33, no.4 (October 1976): 615-641; Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 143, 161-162.

6 For a full study of the ecological disasters and ensuing calamities brought to the Caribbean region from the El Niño/La Niña cycles of the Revolutionary War era see Johnson, *Climate and Catastrophe*, 92-153; see also Sheridan "Crisis of Slave Subsistence," 615-641; O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided*, 143, 152.

combination led to numerous slave revolts and the deaths of thousands.[7]

With such calamity already in process it is inconceivable that London had no plans from the earliest stages of the war to secure southern interests, whether by strong-arm political maneuvers or military force, for the sake of protecting supplies that would sustain production in West Indian agriculture. That the southern colonies only became of interest to Britain's war strategy after General John Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga in the fall of 1777 is perhaps the greatest misconception of the American Revolution. Great Britain's efforts to reclaim the southern colonies were in evidence as early as September 12, 1775, and would continue throughout the war.[8]

If the South was not insignificant nor idle during the early years of the war, neither was the colony of East Florida isolated from southern Revolutionary events.[9] When viewed from a wider Atlantic world perspective, the American Revolution was less about thirteen colonies in rebellion than the preservation of an empire consisting of thirty-three colonies in the British Americas, stretching from Nova Scotia to Grenada. Revolutionary events impacted the entirety of this region, and East Florida sat at the geographic center of British interests in the Americas, wedged squarely between the sugar-producing islands of the West Indies and the rebellion. East Florida did not join the thirteen colonies to the north, thereby providing the British military with a secure fortified base for campaigns into the South. The colony also

7 Johnson, *Climate and Catastrophe*, 133; see also O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided*, 145, 151, 161-162.

8 Edward J. Cashin, *William Bartram and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000), 189, 227. Britain lost the southern colonies as follows: North Carolina: May 31, 1775. North Carolina History Project. http://www.northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/812/entry (accessed August 2012); Virginia: June 8, 1775. Encyclopedia Virginia. thttp://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Governors_of_Virginia#start_entry (accessed August 2012); Georgia: June 9, 1775 (though the royal governor was allowed to remain in the colony in a lame duck role until January, 1776). *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society* (Vol. 1–21; Savannah: Georgia Historical Society, 1840-2010), 3:183-185, 195, 218-220, 226-227; South Carolina: September 1775. Preservation Society of Charleston. http://www.halseymap.com/Flash/governors.asp (accessed August 2012). From the Chesapeake Bay south, only East and West Florida maintained fealty to the Crown.

9 "On 4 November 1775, Congress authorized three battalions of Continental troops for South Carolina and one battalion for Georgia…recruiting would be allowed in Virginia and North Carolina." Martha Condray Searcy, *The Georgia–Florida Contest in the American Revolution, 1776–1778* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985), 24.

granted the British navy a haven from which to protect the trade routes between the West Indies and Europe. East Florida's role in shaping Revolutionary events provides valuable insight concerning the whole of Britain's Atlantic world vision. This, in turn, opens new discussions on the importance of the entire South, which, in fact, was a hot bed of Revolutionary activity long before the siege of Charleston in 1780.

As southern colonies fell one-by-one to the rebellion throughout the summer and early fall of 1775, loyalties to either side in the war were often pledged eagerly. Yet for some, loyalty was coerced—even demanded. On August 2, 1775, a large group of Sons of Liberty from Augusta, Georgia, called on Thomas Brown demanding that he sign an oath of loyalty to the independence movement under threat of serious physical harm. Just twenty-five years old, Brown was the son of a wealthy shipping magnate and the great-grandson of Sir Isaac Newton. Brown made it well known throughout Georgia and South Carolina that he was an aristocrat, a magistrate, and a king's man. He stood his ground against the threat and castigated those who would claim to stand for liberty while demanding that he sacrifice his own freedom of choice in the process. Approximately half of the men departed Brown's residence, but the rest of the mob pressed onto the porch. The fight was brief, as Brown shot one of the leaders before receiving a rifle-butt blow from behind that fractured his skull. The mob then led him to Augusta where he was stripped down to his boots, severely beaten, and tied to a tree.[10]

Various accounts establish that Brown was scalped at least three times, perhaps four, and then tarred and feathered. His legs were badly scalded as the tar collected in his boots, ultimately costing him at least two of his toes; some reports say three. What is unclear is whether Brown lost his toes directly as a result of the boiling tar, or soon thereafter when his boots were pulled off and hot brands and lighted sticks put to his feet. The Sons of Liberty then tossed Brown into an open cart and paraded the injured man from one end of Augusta to the other. The *Georgia Gazette* mockingly described the torture as Brown "being presented with a genteel and fashionable suit of tar and feathers," while the Sons of Liberty would subsequently tag him with the nickname of

10 Cashin, *William Bartram*, 134; see also and Edward J. Cashin, *The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 27-29.

"Burnfoot Brown."[11] Thomas Brown survived the ordeal, which, in this particular case, served to strengthen his resolve to stand fast for king and country.

Soon thereafter, on September 12, 1775, the commander of all British troops in North America, General Thomas Gage, instructed John Stuart, Superintendent of the Southern Indian District, to employ the region's Native Americans to "take arms against His Majesty's enemies and to distress them in all their power for no terms is now to be kept with them."[12] Such a measure for controlling the North American frontier was consistent with previous British policies. Outrage ran high in the colonies as the great majority of Native Americans in the southern backcountries supported Britain in their fight against the land-hungry colonists.[13] That Whitehall could not foresee the potential consequences of such a directive on southern Loyalists as well as those in rebellion further reveals how little they understood of life in the colonies, especially along the frontier. Yet not all colonists protested. Thomas Brown, for one, not only supported the decree, but was positioned both politically and socially to use the situation to further his aims against the rebellion.[14]

During his recovery, Brown conferred by letter with deposed governor William Campbell of South Carolina, who recommended a meeting with East Florida's governor Patrick Tonyn and Superintendent John Stuart.[15] Upon his arrival in St. Augustine, Brown assured Governor Tonyn that he had the names of four thousand backcountry Loyalists from South Carolina and Georgia who had pledged to form a force dedicated to the destruction of the rebel movement and were willing to join with the aforementioned

11 For the collective account of the multiple reports concerning Thomas Brown's assault see "Patrick Tonyn to Lord Germain, November 23, 1776," PRO, CO 5/557, 20-21; Cashin, *William Bartram*, 134; Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 27–29; Searcy, *The Georgia–Florida Conflict*, 13; Charles B. Reynolds, *Old St. Augustine: A Story of Three Centuries* (St. Augustine, FL: E.H. Reynolds, 1884), 92-93.

12 Cashin, *William Bartram*, 189, 227.

13 Hellen Hornbeck Tanner, "Pipesmoke and Muskets: Florida Indian Intrigues of the Revolutionary Era," in *Eighteenth-Century Florida and its Borderlands*, ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975), 17–19, 21–22, 24–25, 27.

14 Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 35, 41–42.

15 Patrick Tonyn was governor of East Florida from March 1, 1774, until the colony was officially reclaimed by Spain on July 12, 1784. Before his appointment as governor, Tonyn spent thirty-three years as an officer of dragoons in the British Army. Roger C. Smith, "The Fourteenth Colony: Florida and the American Revolution in the South" (Ph.D. diss. University of Florida, 2011), 51-54, 288.

British-allied Native Americans.[16] Such an Anglo/Indian collaboration would provide Stuart with the one facet of General Gage's directive yet to be resolved: how to teach a large Indian army to distinguish between Loyalists and rebels. Brown reckoned that his frontiersmen would be more familiar with the ways of the Indian allies, but he was not convinced that he could raise such an army unless British regulars offered a demonstration of strength along the Atlantic coast. Brown believed that with rebel attentions focused on an amphibious assault by sea from the British army and navy, the backcountry uprising could sweep down through Georgia and the Carolinas, from the piedmont to the coast.

Brown needed a large supply of powder and other war materiel, which he hoped to requisition from Superintendent Stuart's storehouses in Pensacola. Brown would personally carry these goods north from Pensacola through Creek lands in present-day southern Alabama, then lead the Native American allies to a rendezvous with his backcountry Loyalists just west of Augusta.[17] In addition to his bitterness toward the people of Augusta, Brown argued that the Indian trade business through Augusta was critical to the colonies of Georgia and South Carolina. There, the Savannah River and roads from the coast linked with several traditional Indian trade routes that led to the heartlands of multiple southern tribes.[18] Brown understood that to lose Augusta would "distress the rebels beyond measure."[19]

To guarantee his success, Brown needed Stuart's agents to focus on maintaining the recent peace that they brokered between Creek headmen and other Native American leaders in the region. This was a difficult task given that Stuart spent the previous decade intentionally manipulating talks and negotiations between the British and the southern Indian leadership in a manner that would keep the Choctaws and Creeks at war with one another, so as to distract their attention from encroaching settlers; there was even consideration of

16 Cashin, *William Bartram*, 215.

17 The Creek confederation was the most feared of southern Native American tribes and nations during the Revolutionary era and, even though they were allied to the British, gaining their cooperation in such efforts was not taken for granted. "Talk with Indian Chiefs at Fort Bute by Charles Stuart, October 14, 1772," PRO, CO 5/74, f. 218. For more information on the Creek confederacy, see Colin G. Callaway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 215, 247.

18 Tanner, "Pipesmoke and Muskets," 15.

19 Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 44.

bringing the Cherokees into the war on the side of the Choctaws.[20] The Creek now demanded an iron-clad assurance from the British that their towns and lands would be safe from Choctaws attack once their men waged a new war against the rebels to the east.[21] Most important to Brown, Native American warriors and backcountry frontiersmen had to put aside the ingrained distrust that brewed over the past century from Anglo-settler encroachment on Indian lands. Regardless of the potential drawbacks, John Stuart favored Brown's plan; Patrick Tonyn was elated.[22]

By November 1775, with the capitals of the colonies of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia under rebel control, Governor Tonyn, Superintendent Stuart, and Governor Peter Chester of West Florida were anxious to quash the rebellion coursing southward toward St. Augustine and Pensacola.[23] While Brown waited for word from London concerning his proposal, Tonyn oversaw the efforts to improve East Florida's defenses.[24] Tonyn's first priority was to safeguard St. Augustine, at the time the only loyal Atlantic coast capital between Boston and Kingston, Jamaica.[25] St. Augustine was home to a large, seventeenth-century, Spanish-built, masonry fortress. A smaller masonry fort was located fourteen miles south of St. Augustine at the Matanzas Inlet. As Washington would soon learn, Britain was in the process of storing large quantities of much-needed arms and munitions in the primary fortress in St. Augustine, presumably for an incursion into Georgia.[26]

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20 "Report of Governor George Johnstone to the Board of Trade, May 19, 1766," PRO, CO 5/67, f. 45.

21 "Letter from John Stuart to Lord George Germain, January 1, 1779," PRO, CO 5/80, f. 155.

22 Cashin, *William Bartram*, 215. Patrick Tonyn saw Brown's plan as his opportunity to return to the battlefield. Tonyn, an aging veteran, feared that his last opportunity for a battlefield commission was fading.

23 Cashin, *William Bartram*, 209.

24 "Patrick Tonyn to Lord Dartmouth, July, 1, 1774," PRO, CO 5/554, 31; see also Albert Manucy andAlberta Johnson, "Castle St. Mark and the Patriots of the Revolution," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, 21, no. 1 (July 1942): 8.

25 Boston would remain under British control until March 1776, while New York City was still in the hands of the rebel forces until the following September. Joseph J. Ellis, *Revolutionary Summer: The Birth of American Independence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 4, 148.

26 This is the first mention of St. Augustine by Washington in his papers, both as a military concern and a military target. The George Washington Papers (hereafter GWP), "George Washington to Continental Congress, Cambridge, December 18, 1775." http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw040168)) (accessed February 2006).

General Sir William Howe replaced Gage in October 1775. By this point, former North Carolina governor Josiah Martin had guaranteed to raise Clinton an army of ten thousand Loyalists eager to support an invasion of the southern colonies.[27] Hearing of such a large army of faithful subjects, military strategists up to the highest level of the British court were encouraged that this venture would be successful. In a letter dated December 6, 1775— fully six months prior to the Declaration of Independence and contemporary with Bunker Hill and Breed's Hill— Lord George Germain, who replaced Lord Dartmouth as Secretary of State of the American Colonies on November 10, 1775, informed Clinton he was to "Command an Expedition to the Southern Colonies." Germain references a letter dated October 22, 1775, stating that King George III had officially called for the invasion of the southern colonies, dubbing it the "Southern Expedition," for the purpose of "reducing to Obedience the Southern Provinces of North America, now in Rebellion."[28] By this point, Clinton had been made aware of Brown's proposed backcountry strike at Augusta, fully understanding how its success would provide support to his own incursion into the southern colonies.[29]

The directive from Germain not only invoked the authority and wishes of King George III, but provided significant detail to the plan, including George III's desire that the "15th, 37th, 53rd, 54th, and 57th Regiments of Infantry, together with two Companies of Artillery, should embark at Corke [Ireland] about the 1st of December [1775]."[30] This was not an inquiry to gather opinions from the empire's military leadership, but an order from the king to put the process in motion for the invasion of the South. The directive refutes the idea that the British had little interest in the southern colonies until the siege of Charleston in 1780. The question is, what happened to the Southern Expedition?

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27 "Lord Dartmouth to General William Howe, October 22, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 68, 4.

28 "Lord George Germain, November 10, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 83, 1. The date that King George officially signed this decree was October 16, 1775. "Lord Germain to Major General Clinton or the Officer appointed to command an Expedition to the Southern Colonies, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/92, f. 375, 759.

29 Cashin, *King's Ranger*, 32, 41.

30 "Lord Germain to Major General Clinton or the Officer appointed to command an Expedition to the Southern Colonies, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/92, f. 375, 759.

Clinton's objective was to strike out from New York with Admiral Sir Peter Parker and "a squadron of warships (two 50-gun two-decker 'fourth rates,' four 28-gun frigates and a half dozen other vessels of substantial potency) plus transports...fifty sail in all."[31] Clinton was to rendezvous at the mouth of the Cape Fear River with Martin's ten thousand North Carolina Loyalists. There they would be joined by the fleet from Ireland, under the command of the Earl, Charles Lord Cornwallis.[32] This fleet carried ten thousand stands of arms destined for Loyalist militias.[33] Cornwallis's landing forces would eventually swell to seven full regiments of British regulars and the aforementioned companies of artillery; 2,500 redcoats in all.[34] A coastal attack by Clinton and Cornwallis and a pincer attack from the west provided by Brown seemed like sound strategies to the Lords at Whitehall and George III. Both attack plans employed conventional military tactics of the era, which held that coinciding land and sea assaults on coastal enemy strongholds were key to victory. The Royal Navy and the British Army were without equal in the discipline required to execute this type of amphibious operation.[35]

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31 The warships ships listed in this letter were the "*Bristol, Acteon, Solebay, Syren, Sphinx*, and *Deal Castle*, the *Hawk* Sloop, and *Thunder Bomb*." "Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/592, f. 375-82, 759-84; see also John W. Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution: A Battlefield History* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 37. For a detailed account of the battle at Fort Sullivan (first British assault on Charleston Harbor) see Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution*, 36-46; see also "May 31," in William Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution, So Far as it Related to The States of North and South Carolina, and Georgia*, (Vol. 1 and 2; New York: Printed by David Longworth, for the Author, 1802; reprint Arno Press, 1968), 1:140.

32 Cornwallis was a late addition to this expedition at the request of King George III. When the decision was made to include Lord Cornwallis, his 33rd Regiment of Foot was substituted for whichever of the aforementioned regiments General Clinton so chose. "Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/92, f. 382, 784.

33 "Lord Dartmouth to General William Howe, October 22, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 83, 1; see also Ira D. Gruber, "Britain's Southern Strategy," in *The Revolutionary War in the South: Power, Conflict, and Leadership; Essays in Honor of John Richard Alden*, ed. Robert W. Higgins (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), 210.

34 In this correspondence, Lord Germain specified that the seven regiments involved were the 15th, 37th, 53rd, 54th, and 57th Regiments of Foot, with the king dictating the addition of the 20th and 46th Regiments of Foot after they were blown off course by a storm on their way to Quebec. "Lord George Germain to Sir William Howe, November 8, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 80, 1–8; "Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/92, f. 375–82, 759–784; see also Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution*, 37.

35 Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution*, 37.

Lord Germain was ardent in his preference for Savannah as the primary target of the Southern Expedition, though he was careful not to defy George III's wishes that General Clinton, who knew the colonies better than anyone at Whitehall, would determine where the initial strike should occur.[36] Germain repeatedly expressed that Charleston, Lord Dartmouth's preference, was only to be considered if it was deemed an easy victory.[37] If not, Germain insisted, there was no other option more preferred than Savannah—going so far as to pin-point the landing site for the army at Cockspur Inlet at the mouth of the Savannah River.[38] Germain was also well aware of Brown's plan for a counter-rebellion in the west and its value to Clinton's invasion. Germain's preference for Savannah was logical because Lieutenant Colonel Augustine A. Prevost, commander of British forces in East Florida, could support the invasion by bringing troops up from St. Augustine to place the targeted invasion site in a vice. Savannah was the nearest port city under consideration within sensible striking distance from St. Augustine.[39] In an earlier letter to General William Howe, even Lord Dartmouth described Savannah as a desirable target and the expedition as "a measure of so much importance, every Circumstance, that can give facility of Security to the landing of the Forces from Ireland, will deserve attention."[40]

Germain enjoyed political good fortune by inheriting a campaign that was considered crucial to a quick and decisive resolution to the rebellion in the southern colonies. Economically, Charleston was the richest of the southern port cities under rebel

36 "Lord Dartmouth to General William Howe, October 22, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 68, 4. On November 7, 1775, Lord Dartmouth issued a curious countermand to King George III's wishes that General Clinton select the invasion sight of his choosing. In a letter to Governor Josiah Martin, Dartmouth directed Clinton to strike at Charleston. Three days later, Lord George Germain wrote that Lord Dartmouth had resigned and Germain had been appointed to replace him. "Lord Dartmouth to Governor Martin, November 7, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 82, 1–4; "Lord George Germain, November 10, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 83, 1.

37 "Lord Dartmouth to Governor Martin, November 7, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 82, 1-4; see also "Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/92, f. 375–382, 759–784.

38 "Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/92, f. 375-382, 759-784.

39 Upon Lt. Colonel Prevost's arrival in St. Augustine on April 4, 1776, Governor Tonyn's hopes of leading his colony's troops into battle were quashed completely, along with any pretense of cooperation between Tonyn and Lt. Colonel Prevost. "Patrick Tonyn to Lord Germain, April 11, 1776," PRO, CO 5/556, 152-154.

40 "Lord Dartmouth to General William Howe, October 22, 1775," PRO 30/55/1, doc. 83, 4-5.

control, but a British defeat would have potentially devastating political ramifications for Germain. Germain structured his orders to Clinton with just enough nuance to secure his own political footing, while leaving Clinton in a position to face the consequences in the event of failure. Clinton was likely aware of Germain's political gamesmanship, but he also understood that a sweeping victory at Charleston would add to his social status in London far more than taking the smaller target of Savannah. The choice was his to make, regardless of Germain's prodding.[41]

By January 1776, Britain's southern strategy included an invasion fleet bearing Cornwallis en route from Corke to the Cape Fear River in North Carolina for a mid-to-late February rendezvous with a force of ten thousand Loyalists.[42] Clinton would provision a second fleet in New York to strike out for Cape Fear, while Brown collected twenty pack-horse loads of powder in Pensacola for Indian allies.[43] British planners also set aside funds to provision 1,500 British regulars in St. Augustine under Lt. Colonel Prevost, which were roughly 1,100 more troops than St. Augustine typically garrisoned up to that time.[44]

The planners of the British war effort were not the only military strategists interested in East Florida. As early as December 1775, Washington focused on three large-scale offensives that would span the length of the colonies. The commander-in-chief was personally directing the siege of Boston while General Richard Montgomery was in Canada demanding the surrender of Quebec. On December 17, 1775, in the midst of these two campaigns, Washington was handed a packet of captured letters written by the deposed royal governor of Virginia, John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore. Lord Dunmore's correspondence was addressed to various royal governors in the Americas, including Patrick Tonyn.[45]

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41 "Lord George Germain to Henry Clinton, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/92, f. 375–382, 764.

42 Ibid., f. 382, 784.

43 "Lord Germain to Major General Clinton or the Officer appointed to command an Expedition to the Southern Colonies, December 6, 1775," PRO, CO 5/92, f. 375, 759–761; see also Cashin, *King's Ranger*, 42.

44 "John Robinson to John Pownall, Treasury Chamber, March 28, 1776," PRO, 30/55/2, doc. 148, 1–2.

45 Lord Dunmore was the last royal governor in Virginia. In what became known as Dunmore's Proclamation, he offered freedom to slaves who would take up arms against the rebellion. Dunmore believed that the threat of arming slaves would cause a panic that would subvert the revolt. Douglas R. Egerton, *Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 6, 66, 68-73.

It was from these intercepted letters that Washington learned that the British were stockpiling a large cache of munitions in St. Augustine's masonry fortress. As strained as he was with current endeavors, Washington wasted no time drafting a letter to Congress concerning St. Augustine. Washington beseeched the delegates to authorize an immediate, full-scale attack, relaying information that "Governor Tonyn's and many other letters from Augustine shew the Weakness of the place, at the same time of what vast consequence It would be for us to possess ourselves of it, and the great quantity of Ammunition contained in the forts."[46]

On January 1, 1776, a committee in Congress responded to Washington's request to seize the barracks and "castle" of St. Augustine.[47] In addition to the state militias of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina requested by Washington, Congress also sent regiments of the regular Continental Army from Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Originally, Major General Charles Lee, second in command only to Washington, and the newly-appointed commander of the Southern Department of the Continental Army, was slated to lead the attack on St. Augustine with Major General Robert Howe as second in command. In all, there were 1,500 Continental regulars and 500–1,000 militia amassed to invade East Florida.[48] Lee, however, went to Charleston to assist in

46 This letter was read in Congress (December 30, 1775) and referred to Thomas Lynch, William Hooper, George Wythe, Silas Deane, and John Adams. http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw040168)) (accessed February 2006)

47 GWP, "George Washington to Continental Congress, Cambridge, December 18, 1775," http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3a/001/098097.gif (accessed February 2006)

48 Searcy, *The Florida–Georgia Contest*, 54; see also Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 53. From the beginning of the American Revolution till the present day, the United States has employed the policy that it is the civilian branches of the government, specifically the president and Congress, who set the policies that the nation's armed forces enact on the ground in times of war. Many times this policy has been publically contested, such as with President Truman and General McArthur, or President Lincoln and General McClellan. It was Congress that ordered Washington to release six regiments of Continental regulars to invade Canada while he was in the midst of besieging Boston. This is why Washington's letter to Congress on December 18, 1775 is in the nature of a request to invade East Florida rather than a decree of military purpose. Congress then voted on the measure on January 1, 1776. This vote directed Washington to send regiments of the Continental Army in addition to the southern state militias that Washington initially requested. Ellis, *Revolutionary Summer*, 43; see also, GWP, "George Washington to Continental Congress, Cambridge, December 18, 1775," http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3a/001/098097.gif (accessed February 2006)

the city's defense against the oncoming siege by Clinton. As the British heightened military activity in St. Augustine, Howe's army of Continental regulars and state militia was marching through the southern colonies toward East Florida. Congress was so confident in the outcome of Lee's mission that South Carolina delegate John Rutledge was sent to East Florida to inspect what he presumed would be the newly acquired provincial capital at St. Augustine and its fortresses.[49]

Nothing went according to plan. The efforts of both the rebel army and Britain's Southern Expedition were so poorly executed that neither would maintain any resemblance to the plans envisioned by Washington and George III.

For Great Britain, the first calamity involved Governor Josiah Martin's ostensible army of ten thousand loyal North Carolinians. In reality, the army numbered approximately 1,500 men who were poorly armed and unprepared for battle. On February 27, this ill-equipped militia was intercepted at Moore's Creek Bridge by one thousand well-armed North Carolina rebels bent on independence. The battle was short-lived with thirty or more Loyalists killed or wounded and virtually the entire remaining Loyalist militia captured.[50] When Clinton arrived at the Cape Fear River rendezvous on March 13, two weeks behind schedule, he learned that his ten thousand-man Loyalist army was not coming.

More bad news arrived at Clinton's camp at Cape Fear on March 15, when Stuart sailed in from St. Augustine to advise the general that he had reconsidered the wisdom of allowing Brown to march their Indian allies, especially the Creeks, as far east as Savannah. He claimed that having so many Creek warriors fight on the coast would leave their villages unprotected from Choctaws attack.[51] Clinton could do little but protest Stuart's interference in the operation. Tonyn viewed Stuart's actions as nothing more than

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49 GWP, "George Washington to Continental Congress, Cambridge, December 18, 1775." http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3a/001/098097.gif (accessed February 2006).

50 According to historian Hugh F. Rankin, "It was impossible to determine the casualties suffered by the loyalists. There were at least thirty, but it was assumed that a number had fallen into the creek and drowned, or had died of their wounds in the swamps after fleeing from the field of action." Based on a letter from "Caswell to Hartnet, February 27, 1776," C.R.X., 482, in Hugh F. Rankin, "Moore's Creek Bridge Campaign, 1776," *North Carolina Historical Review*, 30, nos. 1-4 (January–October 1953): 52.

51 Cashin, *William Bartram*, 215.

an attempt to reposition himself as the sole arbiter of southern Native American matters.[52] Stuart's feelings toward Brown were not personal, but rather were ascribed by Brown as guilt-by-association since Stuart and Tonyn despised each other and Tonyn held Brown in such high esteem.[53] But Stuart's actions were motivated by more than just his feelings for Brown. Stuart was the Superintendent of the Southern Indian Department, not Brown. If anyone received praise from London for leading these Native American allies into battle, it would be Stuart.[54] He went to great lengths to guarantee the failure of Brown's attempt to raise his backcountry army, a move that would serve to confuse American veterans even after the war. In his *Memoirs*, rebel general William Moultrie, who commanded the fort on Sullivan's Island in the defense of Charleston in 1776 and many other southern campaigns, recalled that if the British had brought their Indian allies down upon the backcountries one month before Clinton attacked the coast, it would have forced thousands of rebel soldiers to remain behind to protect their families.[55] Stuart wanted to show that he alone controlled the Southern Indian Department.[56]

As a result, Brown roamed the Indian lands of West Florida and Georgia in search of a legion of Creek warriors that was never to form.[57] He arrived in the Lower Creek town of Chiaha along the Flint River in southern Georgia with his cargo of gunpowder, where he awaited Stuart's agent to assist with distribution.[58] It was at Chiaha that Brown received word to turn back; there would be no Native American alliance arranged through Stuart's office.[59] Brown, now bitter, remained in the backcountry until September, hoping to revive his plan, which coincided with Clinton's understanding that the plan was not canceled, just postponed until Lord Germain could be consulted.[60] Stuart, on the other hand, went so far as to

52 "Patrick Tonyn to General Henry Clinton, May 8, 1776," PRO, CO 5/556, 172.
53 O'Donnell, "The Florida Revolutionary Indian Frontier," 62–63; see also, Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 55.
54 "Patrick Tonyn to General Henry Clinton, May 8, 1776," PRO, CO 5/556, 172.
55 Moultrie, *Memoirs*, 1:185.
56 Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 45.
57 Searcy, *The Georgia–Florida Contest*, 28.
58 John E. Worth, "The Eastern Creek Frontier: History and Archaeology of the Flint River Towns, ca. 1750–1826." Paper presented in the symposium "Recent Advances in Lower Creek Archaeology" at the annual conference of the Society for American Archaeology, Nashville, TN., April 4, 1997. http://uwf.edu/jworth/WorthSAA1997.pdf (accessed February 2014)
59 Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 48.
60 Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 45. On May 5, 1776, Brown stated that he could raise

invite Creek and Cherokee headmen to a congress in Pensacola to ensure Brown's failure to recruit an Indian army.[61] Upon Brown's eventual return to St. Augustine, Tonyn compensated him with a commission of lieutenant colonel of militia and command of the East Florida Rangers.[62]

On May 3, 1776, Cornwallis and the invasion fleet from Ireland straggled into the Cape Fear River. The ships had been scattered after receiving the brunt force of a hurricane while crossing the Atlantic and had regrouped in Jamaica before proceeding to Cape Fear.[63] With Brown's Anglo/Indian alliance doomed before he ever arrived in Creek lands, Clinton no longer saw Savannah as a target. On the other hand, Peter Parker, commander of the fleet, argued against Charleston as a viable option, believing that it would be more heavily guarded than Savannah and there was no hope of ground support from St. Augustine. Parker was eventually coerced by Clinton to sail his fleet to Charleston and engage in what would become a defeat so humiliating that the two men spent much of their remaining careers—both among their peers in the military, as well as on the floor of Parliament—blaming the failure of the ill-conceived attack on the other.[64] The Southern Expedition was in shambles, but Washington's urgent call to capture East Florida fared no better.

The Continental Congress would learn that something was amiss with their plans to invade East Florida shortly after John Rutledge arrived in Charleston. Rutledge wrote back to Philadelphia on February 13, 1776, stating that St. Augustine was not still taken because the rebel army had yet to attack.[65] In spite

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2,000–3,000 Loyalists in just one month's time. "Letter from Thomas Brown Concerning Indian Issues, May 5, 1776," PRO, CO 5/556, f. 172–180.

61 Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 54-55.

62 PRO, CO 5/556, 173-180, in the "Lawson Files" at the P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History and Special Collections at the University of Florida. The East Florida Rangers were a military unit drawn from former Georgia and South Carolina backwoodsmen and small planters. Many of these refugees from revolutionary upheaval in their home colonies were hand-picked by Governor Tonyn and saw them as his personal army, over which he claimed "absolute authority." "Patrick Tonyn to Augustine Prevost, July 5, 1777," PRO, CO 5/557, 148–49; see also Callaway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country*, 259; Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 59, 61-62, 64-65, 74, 78-79, 89-90.

63 Gruber, "Britain's Southern Strategy," 213. Note: the use of the term "squadron" is an acceptable reference since there was no ship-of-the-line involved in this convoy.

64 Frances Reece Kepner, "A British View of the Siege of Charleston, 1776," *Journal of Southern History* 11, no. 1 (February 1945), 94.

65 "Martin Jollie to Patrick Tonyn, February 13, 1776," PRO, CO 5/556, 81. In

Map of Southern Expedition (1776). Source: Dixon Ryan Fox, *Harper's Atlas of American History* (1920), modifications by the author. Courtesy of Historic Print & Map Company, St. Augustine, Florida.

of this set-back, by the summer of 1776 the Continental Army was much better organized in the southern theater than their British counterparts, yet their efforts also came to nothing. Lee was in Charleston to take command of the city's defense against the oncoming siege, while Robert Howe and his rebel troops marched to Savannah where they held a defensive position until August 19, presumably on the off-chance that Clinton and Parker turned their strike force south.[66] Despite Washington's urgent call for the immediate invasion of East Florida nine months earlier, a British invasion fleet poised to besiege Charleston took precedence.

Lee was a narcissistic braggart who believed himself more valuable to the Revolution than anyone, including Washington. His arrival in Charleston in June to assume command from General Moultrie was timed in such a manner that he would reap as much glory as possible if victorious, while risking little if the rebel army was defeated.[67] Lee then spent the month of July leading and directing raids against Cherokee villages in Virginia and the Carolinas before finally joining Robert Howe's assault force in Savannah that was bound for St. Augustine. Lee, as the superior-ranking officer and true to his flair for the grandiose, took command of the army and led it out of Savannah toward East Florida, unaware that a courier with a letter dated August 8, 1776, carried orders for Lee to return north and rejoin Washington on Long Island. With Lee recalled, Howe took full command of the rebel army and continued the march southward.[68]

Meanwhile in East Florida, British regulars gathered on the banks of the St. Marys River as early as May 29, awaiting orders to join the Southern Expedition. Cornwallis's late arrival at the Cape Fear River had thrown the British invasion hopelessly off schedule, however.[69] After a month of border skirmishes, various companies of Georgia rebel militia had built up strong defenses along the northern banks of the St. Marys River. By late July, fighting escalated to such a pitch that the Georgia militia could breach East Florida's defenses and push the British army back to the southern banks of the

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all fairness, it would be another two weeks, February 27, 1776, before the "Continental Congress created a Southern Military Department, consisting of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia." Searcy, *The Georgia–Florida Contest*, 24.

66 Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 53.

67 Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution*, 38-39. See also, Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 51-53.

68 Cashin, *King's Ranger*, 53.

69 Searcy, *The Georgia–Florida Contest*, 44.

St. Johns River.[70] As Howe's Continentals reached Sunbury, Georgia, an outbreak of multiple fevers struck the rebel camp. By the time Howe reached the banks of the St. Marys River just three days later, disease had ravaged his ranks and the army was too sick to cross the river into East Florida.[71] Howe's army was too weak to reinforce the Georgians and press the campaign further into East Florida. At the same time, the Georgia militia holding the ground between the St. Johns and St. Marys rivers found a new threat against which they had no defense: rumors of Cherokee raids in the Georgia backcountry. To protect their families and possessions, the Georgians abandoned the campaign against East Florida to return to their homes. In a letter dated June 8, 1776, Tonyn noted that "[t]he Americans [were] a thousand times more in dread of the Savages than of any European troops."[72] Frustrated by the campaign's failure, Washington recalled Robert Howe and the army.

The backcountry raids that struck such fear among the Georgia militia were engineered by Stuart, who had begun his own Indian war against the rebels. Discouraging the Indians from allying with Brown or anyone else sent by Whitehall, Stuart encouraged the Cherokees to form an alternative alliance.[73] The Cherokees achieved early successes during the months of June and July 1776, raiding from Virginia through the Carolinas and into Georgia.[74] By August, rebel militias counterattacked unprotected Cherokee villages and towns, the very concern that Stuart had raised when discussing the flaws of Brown's plan at the Cape Fear River discussed with Clinton in March. Stuart's plan also put innocent Cherokees in harm's way, verifying Tonyn's assertion that Stuart's only true concern was in keeping others from diminishing his control over southern Indian affairs.[75] As mentioned previously, after Lee assisted with the defense of Charleston, he joined Virginia militiamen in strikes on Cherokee villages of the mountain regions, while Carolinians

70 Ibid., 50.
71 Searcy, *The Georgia–Florida Contest*, 61.
72 "Patrick Tonyn to General Henry Clinton, June 8, 1776," PRO, CO 5/556, 177-180; see also, Higgins, *The Revolutionary War in the South*, 255.
73 Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution*, 46.
74 James K. Swisher, *The Revolutionary War in the Southern Backcountry* (New York: Pelican Publication Company, 2008), 66–67.
75 John Stuart's concern for Thomas Brown's impact on the control of southern Native American affairs may not have been without grounds. When Stuart died in 1779, Brown was named his successor. Wilbur H. Siebert, ed., *Loyalists in East Florida: The Narrative* (Deland, FL: Publications of the Florida State Historical Society, No. 9, vol. I and II, 1929), 1:24, 76.

crushed the lower Cherokee towns. South Carolina statesman William Henry Drayton later bragged of his role in the destruction of Cherokee settlements.[76] The onslaught devastated the Cherokee nation so thoroughly that by 1777, tribal leaders signed over all remaining lands in South Carolina to rebel leadership.[77] Only the young warriors continued the fight against the European onslaught by moving south into Creek and Seminole lands.[78]

As the southern war continued, Washington renewed his quest to secure the fortress at St. Augustine. On May 6, 1777, a second rebel invasion of East Florida began. It was short-lived, thoroughly quashed in just three days, as the rebel army of approximately 1,200 Continental regulars from Virginia and Georgia, as well as Georgia militia, was soundly defeated by the recently-promoted General Prevost's British regulars, the East Florida militia, and Brown's East Florida Rangers.[79] Dogged determination kept St. Augustine safe during this invasion, as the inhabitants volunteered almost to a man to defend the city. At one critical point General Prevost recommended a scorched-earth policy to keep the outlying plantations from providing food and shelter to the invading rebel army. One of the threatened plantations was that of Tonyn, who never questioned what must be done. The governor ordered the complete destruction of his 20,000 acre plantation, which included two large frame houses, more than two dozen outlying buildings, quarters, and mills, and all the produce and timber on the property.[80] As fate would have it, British efforts turned back the invading army before it reached Tonyn's plantation. Thomas Brown intercepted Colonel John Baker's Georgia dragoons, driving them into the waiting sights of Major Mark Prevost, General Prevost's younger

76 "William Henry Drayton to Francis Salvador, July 24, 1776," Robert Wilson Gibbes, *Documentary history of the American revolution: Consisting of letters and papers relating to the contest for liberty, chiefly in South Carolina, from originals in the possession of the editor, and other sources* (New York: D. Appleton & Co.; Columbia, S.C.: Banner Steam Power Press, 1853–1857), 1:183–184, 196–198.

77 Gordon, *South Carolina and the American Revolution*, 53.

78 "Dragging Canoe became the leader of the Chickamauga Cherokees, a strongly anti-American faction of the Cherokee Nation. The Chickamauga would ultimately secede from the Cherokee Nation and withdraw south along the Tennessee River to an area more accessible to British agents coming through the Creek country from Pensacola and St. Augustine." O'Donnell, "The South on the Eve of the Revolution," 72.

79 Searcy, *The Georgia–Florida Contest*, 88-90.

80 Daniel L. Schafer, "Florida History On-Line," with special acknowledgment to the James Grant Papers and the Florida Claims Commission. http://www.unf.edu/floridahistoryonline//Plantations/plantations/Colonel_Patrick_Tonyn.htm (accessed March 2006).

brother, and his British regulars. The main body of the Continental Army under Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Elbert entrapped itself on Amelia Island and contributed little more than property damage to the invasion.[81]

Yet the successful repulsion of the rebel invasion does not show that every East Floridian had the same determination to obstruct the rebel invasion at any cost. When news reached St. Augustine that rebels had breached the East Florida border, merchants Spencer Mann and James Penman, along with Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bissett, the engineer who built the King's Road from the Georgia border to New Smyrna plantation, came to Tonyn demanding that the colony be surrendered to the invading forces.[82] These three men even proposed to bribe the rebels to leave their plantations unmolested. Penman declared that if Tonyn denied their request, he would disregard the governor completely and meet the oncoming army alone with a flag of truce to make his own arrangements.[83] This was not the sort of demand one should make to an individual who had just destroyed his own valuable property for the sole purpose of frustrating the invading army. In a letter to Germain, Tonyn accused the three of cowardice in the face of the enemy. Bissett, as an officer in the British army, was particularly targeted in Tonyn's letter as unfit for duty.[84]

In the rebel camp, the 1777 invasion of East Florida was doomed from the start because of the conflict between two political adversaries: Button Gwinnett, Georgia's militia leader and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and Brigadier General Lachlan McIntosh of the Continental Army. Each man presumed superiority over the other and their in-fighting became so inflamed that the Georgia assembly recalled them to Savannah to explain their actions. McIntosh insulted his rival in front of the Georgia Assembly and Gwinnett challenged McIntosh to a duel. Both men

81 *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, Volume V, Part 2, Order Book of Samuel Elbert, Colonel and Brigadier General in the Continental Army, 1776–1778, Published by Wymberley Jones DeRenne as a Contribution to Georgia History* (Savannah, GA: The Morning News Print, 1902), 26. http://books.google.com/books?id=dLs6AQAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed February 2014).

82 William S. Lowe, "An Aerial Search for the Old King's Road," November 6, 2006 http://academic.emporia.edu/aberjame/student/lowe2/old_king_road.htm. (accessed April 2014).

83 Searcy, *The Georgia–Florida Contest*, 107.

84 "Patrick Tonyn to Lord Germain, May 8, 1777," PRO, CO 5/557, 104.

received wounds and Gwinnett died days later.[85] This left the rebel army without strong leadership on the eve of the invasion.

The 1777 rebel invasion of East Florida was so inept that the most significant impact of the invasion was Tonyn's destruction of his own property. This invasion exposed even further the lack of strong leadership in the Southern Continental Army, which needed a man who could maintain the respect of those in command of state militias. In April 1778, Washington called for a third invasion of East Florida, once again sending a combined army of Continental regulars under the command of Robert Howe, along with Georgia militia led by their governor John Houstoun, nearly two thousand troops in all.[86] Howe and Houstoun, like others before them, would soon discover that the East Florida terrain was as much the enemy as British regulars and East Florida Rangers.[87]

At the same time, Germain was planning a second campaign against the southern colonies, which he hoped to have in place as early as January 1778. British supreme commander Sir William Howe, however, ignored Germain's orders, allowing Washington to strike first. Robert Howe's rebels began their assault on East Florida on June 28, 1778. Again, in-fighting between Continental and militia leadership predestined the effort to failure. Houstoun believed that the best approach was to hit St. Augustine directly, avoiding Brown and a small company of East Florida Rangers at Fort Tonyn just across the St. Marys River. Howe insisted that they remove the threat at Fort Tonyn first, and then proceed to St. Augustine. The debate became so heated that Houstoun refused to cross the river at all, leaving Howe to attack Fort Tonyn on his own. Brown saw an advance party of approximately one hundred mounted rebel dragoons cross the St. Marys River, so he set fire to the fort and escaped through the swamps to the south. The rebel dragoons gave chase as Howe brought the main body of the Continental Army across the St. Marys River and set up camp at the smoldering ruins of Fort Tonyn. Brown led the charging rebels on

85 Georgiainfo: An Online Georgia Almanac. http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/topics/people/article/military-leaders/lachlan-mcintosh (accessed April 2014).

86 W. Calvin Smith, "Mermaids Riding Alligators: Divided Command on the Southern Frontier, 1776–1778," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, 54, no. 4 (April 1976), 443–464, 459.

87 "Letter from Col. Pinckney, Sunberry, July 23rd, 1778," in William Moultrie, *Memoirs of the American Revolution, so far as it related to the States of North and South Carolina, and Georgia* (Vol. 1 and 2; New York: Printed by David Longworth, for the Author, 1802; reprinted New York: Arno Press, Inc., 1968), 1:238.

a seventeen mile hunt before they realized that Brown had steered them into an ambush at Alligator Creek Bridge. Mark Prevost's regulars and the remainder of the East Florida Rangers routed the exhausted rebels, though some managed to escape to rejoin the main army. By then, Howe's men were out of food and ravaged with camp fevers. Houstoun finally crossed into East Florida on July 6, and immediately began arguing with Howe over leadership. Half-starved and demoralized, the rebels re-crossed the St. Marys River into Georgia on July 14, ending the third attempt to take East Florida in as many years.[88]

Other studies support contemporary beliefs concerning the importance of capturing St. Augustine in order for Georgia and South Carolina ever to know peace. These works argue that the failure of the invasion of East Florida in the summer of 1778 set the stage for the British invasion of Georgia in December of that same year.[89] Yet while Germain was keen to initiate another thrust into the southern colonies, his generals were wary. William Howe refused to answer the call for a southern strike in January 1778, and Clinton delayed action on the orders for an immediate action against Georgia that he received the following May. He would not consider another move into the South until December.[90]

Washington clung tenaciously to his instincts concerning the importance of removing a British base in East Florida and rightfully so, as he had suspected that a strike into Georgia would come from St. Augustine even before the first British attempt in 1776.[91] Having now authorized three failed attempts to capture St. Augustine, Washington began planning for the southern army's next offensive, set for the fall of 1778. At this point Washington's instincts were proven correct. General Benjamin Lincoln gained command of the Southern Department of the Continental Army in September 1778, and soon thereafter received intelligence

88 Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 78; see also Searcy, *The Georgia–Florida Contest*, 142-145, for a full account of the Battle of Alligator Creek Bridge.

89 Alan Gallay, *The Formation of the Planter Elite: Jonathan Bryan and the Southern Colonial Frontier* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 156.

90 Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause*, 410.

91 As Gary D. Olsen writes, "It was obvious that both loyalists and British authorities would seek to use East Florida as a base from which to launch military expeditions aimed at the re-establishment of royal government in the Southern colonies." Gary D. Olson, "Thomas Brown," in, *Eighteenth-Century Florida and the Revolutionary South*, ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978), 15.

concerning another British strike into Georgia.[92] On the British side, once the rebel invasion was repulsed in the summer of 1778, the commanders were determined to put East Florida's troops on the offensive. By pacifying Georgia, Clinton hoped to secure a corridor of Loyalism along the Atlantic coast from St. Augustine to Savannah before advancing on Charleston, then on to North Carolina and Virginia.[93] At the same time, the Continental Congress gave Lincoln the authority to launch another campaign against St. Augustine before the end 1778.[94] It was a matter of which army would strike first, but French general Jean B. Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau convinced Washington that there was little time to plan a fourth invasion of East Florida and the troops would be needed to defend Savannah.[95] With the fourth incursion into East Florida cancelled, the British were clear to invade Georgia.

On November 27, 1778, Clinton unleashed Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell, along with the 71st Regiment, two regiments of Hessians, four Loyalist Battalions, and a small artillery company, approximately 3,500 troops aboard a fleet of thirty-seven ships, to lay siege to Savannah.[96] As Campbell's invasion fleet sailed southward from New York, General Prevost was to march into southern Georgia with an army of 2,500 British regulars, East Florida Rangers, and approximately 160 Creek warriors.[97] The initial plan called for General Prevost to approach Savannah from the south as Campbell anchored off Tybee Island at the mouth of the Savannah River and moved inland.[98] But General Prevost received his orders

92 John C. Cavanaugh, "American Military Leadership in the Southern Campaign: Benjamin Lincoln," in *The Revolutionary War in the South: Power, Conflict, and Leadership; Essays in Honor of John Richard Alden*, ed. Robert W. Higgins (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979), 102.

93 Ibid., 102.

94 Ibid., 102–03.

95 GWP, "George Washington to Robert Howe, Head Quts., Camp at Morris Town, July 4, 1777," http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3b/003/332331.gif (accessed February 2006); GWP, "George Washington to John Rutledge, Head Quarters, Morris Town, July 5, 1777," http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3c/002/111110.gif (accessed February 2006).

96 Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause*, 435; see also Cavanaugh, "Benjamin Lincoln," 105; see also "A Letter from Col. Huger, Savannah, December 28, 1778," in Moultrie, *Memoirs*, 1:252.

97 General Prevost's army increased in size as it marched through Georgia as many Loyalists took the opportunity to join in the victory. One British deserter reported to rebel General William Moultrie that "about 200 Georgians have already joined the enemy, most of them horsemen." "A Letter to Col. Charles Pinckney, Purisburgh, January 16, 1779," in Moultrie, *Memoirs*, 1:264.

98 The following information on the initial strike into Georgia and the capture of Savannah may be found in Gruber, "Britain's Southern Strategy," 221.

a month late and was just entering Georgia when Campbell arrived at Tybee Island. As General Prevost fought his way past the rebel fort at Sunbury and continued toward Savannah, Campbell happened upon a most fortunate incident.

A slave woman approached a British reconnaissance patrol and showed them a little known walking path into the city. This allowed Campbell to bring his troops into Savannah and capture Robert Howe's rebel army with barely a shot being fired. On January 15, 1779, General Prevost took command of the combined armies in Savannah and directed the remainder of the conquest of Georgia. Campbell then turned westward with approximately 1,000 troops, and secured Augusta with little resistance.[99] On February 13, 1779, however, Campbell abandoned Augusta in full retreat for Savannah as General Lincoln moved down from Charleston toward Augusta with 3,600 Continental regulars, with an additional 1,500 men riding ahead of the main army. General Prevost developed a strategy that would save Campbell's outnumbered army and stop Lincoln in his tracks. He took 2,500 British regulars and Brown's Rangers north from Savannah while Campbell, with the aid of the younger Prevost, fought their way back to Savannah.[100] Once Lincoln heard of the elder Prevost's maneuver, he reversed his army back to protect Charleston, three days behind General Prevost.

Moultrie positioned a small rebel army between Charleston and the advancing British but quickly surmised it best to safeguard the city from behind its defenses rather than on open ground. Though General Prevost had not brought proper siege cannons or other provisions for such an endeavor, he played-out a decoy maneuver by taking up offensive positions around Charleston, giving Campbell more time to reach the safety of Savannah before Lincoln could intercept his troops. After nearly three days, General Prevost then retreated to Savannah, utilizing the coastal sea islands of South Carolina and Georgia. Lincoln eventually caught up to

99 "Extract of a Letter to Col. C.C. Pinckney, President of the Senate, and Member of the Council of Safety, Purisburgh, January 10th, 1779," in Moultrie, *Memoirs*, 1:261.

100 The preceding information on Campbell's retreat and General Prevost's ensuing advance on Charleston is found in Moultrie, *Memoirs*, 1:321-54. Campbell was caught at Briar Creek by the advanced army of rebel dragoons and won a stunning victory that allowed Campbell to complete his retreat to Savannah. Moultrie considered the British victory at Briar Creek devastating to rebel hopes of successfully staving off the permanent loss of Georgia. For information on Brown's Rangers escorting General Prevost on his decoy maneuver on Charleston, see Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 97.

him, however, forcing the British to fight their way most of the journey down the coast.[101] By late June 1779, British troops at Savannah, which included regiments from St. Augustine and Brown's Rangers, prepared the city's defenses for a siege.[102]

Though the senior Prevost, now a major general, entered Georgia with no immediate intention to advance on Charleston, he nearly accomplished with 2,500 regulars in 1778 what Clinton could not with 2,500 men and fifty ships of war in 1776.[103] Forcing the rebels to split their defenses among Charleston, Savannah, and Augusta was the key to a successful invasion of Georgia; it was also a critical strategy for taking South Carolina. By late July and early August 1779, however, it was clear to all concerned that victory in South Carolina depended upon the pacification of Georgia, and vice versa. Georgia could only remain pacified if rebel influences from South Carolina were not allowed to slip back into Georgia to regroup.[104] The mechanics of a southern conquest conceived by Germain hinged upon the stabilization of Georgia for the purpose of subduing Charleston. Conversely, subduing Charleston, and ultimately South Carolina, meant securing Georgia from further rebel outbreaks. It was either a tandem approach or certain failure. Had East Florida fallen to any of the rebel incursions, Germain's entire strategy would have lost its foundation. Additionally, General Prevost and his combined East Florida-New York army proved to be pivotal in the recapture and securing of Georgia. Ironically, Clinton's hesitancy in responding to Germain's orders to attack Georgia earlier in 1778 might have unwittingly secured the success of Britain's invasion of that colony in December. If Clinton had responded immediately, General Prevost would have struck out for Georgia in the early summer months and marched his army headlong into the muskets of Robert Howe's Continental troops as they prepared to invade East Florida.

The final step in the stabilization of Georgia was the most crucial: holding Savannah. There are many accounts of the failed Franco/American siege of Savannah in the fall of 1779, as General Prevost's East Florida-New York-based troops repulsed the

101 The accounts of this action may be read in full in Lee, *Memoirs of the War*, 118-127; see also Cavanaugh, "Benjamin Lincoln," 107-114.

102 Brown's troops, now renamed the King's Rangers, and their location may be found listed on a contemporary sketch showing the defenses of Savannah during this siege. Cashin, *The King's Ranger*, 86–87.

103 Cavanaugh, "Benjamin Lincoln," 110.

104 Gruber, "Britain's Southern Strategy," 225.

combined armies of General Lincoln, French Admiral d'Estaing, and Poland's Count Casimir Pulaski and his cavalry. The ferocity of General Prevost's resistance has been noted as rarely being equaled during the war and is often compared to the Continental Army's valiant, though unsuccessful, stand at Bunker Hill.[105] General Prevost, however, had spent the past three years defending East Florida against rebel invasions, experiences that prepared his army well for this important role in the American Revolution.

Once news of General Prevost's success in holding Savannah reached New York, Clinton was able to focus on Charleston.[106] This was typical of Clinton's maneuvering for his own benefit: let General Prevost and Campbell risk their reputations by invading and holding Savannah. Once Georgia was secure, Clinton could approach Charleston as a conqueror, sterilizing the blemish on his military record from the humiliating failed attempt in 1776. Thus, Clinton's attack on Charleston was dependent upon securing Savannah.

Like Clinton, Lord Germain understood that to sail directly into Charleston with no support from any direction was, as Clinton learned in 1776, to stray into a hornets' nest.[107] The best way to avoid a repeat of Clinton's earlier debacle was to link the port cities of the southern Atlantic coast, providing a corridor of British sovereignty from St. Augustine to Savannah. With a Loyalist safe-zone at his back, Clinton could focus his full attentions upon Charleston.[108] Germain would wait until news of a successful defense of Savannah arrived in London, and only then would he continue with his plans to besiege Charleston.[109]

There is, of course, a great deal of well-known Revolutionary War history in the southern colonies after 1780: the fall of Charleston, Cornwallis's Carolina campaigns, and the conclusive victory at Yorktown. Washington would call for another invasion of East Florida in 1780, but once again Rochambeau discouraged such a move and convinced Washington to focus all of their efforts on Cornwallis.[110] By the end of 1781, the war on the North America

105 Cavanaugh, "Benjamin Lincoln," 119.
106 Ibid., 120.
107 Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 57.
108 Ibid., 57.
109 Smith, *Loyalists and Redcoats*, 125.
110 GWP, "George Washington to Benjamin Lincoln, Head Quarters, Morris Town, April 15, 1780," http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3b/011/274271.gif (accessed /February 2006); GWP, "George Washington to Jean B. Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau, and Charles Louis d'Arsac, Chevalier de

mainland was basically over and the Southern Invasions from their inception in 1775 through the last attempt in 1780, had been dismal failures. The entirety of the war in the southern colonies from 1775–1779 needs to be placed into the larger Revolutionary War discussion. East Florida was significant to the British war effort as a spearhead for both the Southern Expedition in 1776 and the Southern Invasion of 1780, which helps to explain why St. Augustine was targeted for invasion by George Washington five times, the last two of which were canceled because the first three had been dismal failures.

Southerners did not sit idle for the first five years of the war. Multiple fleets carrying thousands of British regulars were ordered into the southern colonies by George III as early as October 16, 1775. When examined from an Atlantic world perspective, the evidence demonstrates that Great Britain's first campaigns to quash the American rebellion were not launched from Canada in 1777, but from St. Augustine, Pensacola, New York, and Corke, Ireland as early as 1775.

William Howe and his brother, Admiral Lord Richard Howe, are typically credited for directing the first major British offensive of the American Revolution against Washington on Long Island in the summer and fall of 1776. The combined battles of Saratoga, from September 19–October 17, 1777, have been highlighted in American history as the sole turning point of the war. These positions need to be revised and the role of the southern colonies from 1775–1779 revisited. When the Revolution is viewed in its entirety, from both a British and American perspective, the cumulative results of all campaigns, in all theaters of war, provide a greater clarity to what actually occurred and why. Neither of the southern campaigns were responsible for the increasing disillusionment in London in and of themselves, but when contextualized within the larger picture of an Atlantic world conflict, they were contributory factors whose importance has been underplayed.

For the British, a study of the early southern campaigns shows a significant increase in the negative impact of costly defeats, both in men and materiel, over what has been viewed previously. It also exposes the pragmatic alienation of Indian allies and many loyal British subjects in the southern backcountry. By late 1777, when the general public in London had become fatigued with bad news

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Ternay, New Windsor, December 15, 1780," http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw3d/001/184183.gif (accessed February 2006).

from the battlefronts, they had suffered through the embarrassing loss of two major campaigns—Clinton's Southern Expedition in 1775-1776 and Burgoyne's northern campaign in 1777—not just one.

For the American cause of independence, a tenacity in the leadership of Washington is evident as he never took his eye off of the prize of a unified southern region. For the British, the stability of the southern colonies was a principle concern from the outset of the rebellion. This study opens a larger discussion concerning the South and the strategic plans of both the victorious rebels and the British that includes East Florida, which typically has been seen as irrelevant to Revolutionary War events.

Slanders and Sodomy: Studying the Past through Colonial Crime Investigation

by James G. Cusick

Editorial Note: The primary documents quoted in this article contain explicit sexual language.

Between 1784 and 1821, Spanish officials in St. Augustine regularly launched investigations into crime, covering cases that included slander, theft, burglary, assault, wounding, murder, and sex crimes, as well as specifically military offenses, like desertion. The records of their detective work are contained in the criminal court proceedings of the East Florida Papers, a well-preserved archive of what might be called C-CSI (or colonial crime scene investigation). In contrast to surviving records from earlier parts of the colonial period, which overwhelmingly describe high-level crimes against Church and Crown such as heresy, piracy, and revolt, the cases in the East Florida Papers bear the characteristics of street crime. Everyone appears in them—sometimes as victim, sometimes as accused, most frequently as witness. They are a chronicle of injuries done to ordinary people, to children, slaves, free blacks, soldiers, sailors, and all ranks of men and women, from laborers to elites.

This article introduces the court proceedings and the challenges officials faced in administering justice in a small

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frontier community. During the late 1700s and early 1800s, Spanish East Florida had only one attorney with formal training, whose efforts were supplemented by men familiar with military law and by notaries capable of serving as court recorders. These thin reserves of personnel imposed difficulties on the justice system, yet like bureaucrats who faced similar situations in the larger colonies, St. Augustine's authorities were exacting in their investigation and prosecution of crime. They visited crime scenes, collected forensic evidence, appointed court guardians for minors, took down witness depositions, and reviewed pertinent law. Case records document their investigations from arrest through sentencing, often extending to hundreds of pages of testimony and legal argument.[1]

The study of crime and the judicial process in St. Augustine fits within a much wider scholarly literature on this subject for early modern Spain and the Spanish colonies. Fundamental to all such research are three classic works of analysis, William Taylor's, *Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages* (1979), Mary Elizabeth Perry's *Crime and Society in Early Modern Seville* (1980), and Charles R. Cutter's *The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain, 1700-1810* (1995). Each of these works made groundbreaking contributions to the field while establishing the value of court records for social history. Taylor delved deeply into tavern and street violence in colonial Oaxaca, exploring the motivations and circumstances surrounding brawls and murders. Perry, writing about urban life in early Seville, a city of 120,000 people, combed

1 Trial records for St. Augustine have been preserved in near completeness for the late colonial period as part of Section 64, Record of Court Martials, 1785-1821 and Section 65, Records of Criminal Proceedings, 1785-1821 in the East Florida Papers at the Library of Congress. There is also a massive record on seditious slander and rebellion, specifically associated with a revolt in 1795, in Section 66. Another important subset of cases involving verbal or physical abuse, especially against slaves and free people of color, occurs in "Memorials" rather than in the criminal proceedings. Jane Landers has analyzed many of the cases in this latter section in several published articles and, with one exception, they are not re-introduced here. See Jane Landers, "Female Conflict and its Resolution in Eighteenth-Century St. Augustine," *The Americas* 54, no.4 (April 1998): 564-568; and *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 136-156, 185-191. The case of María Whitten is repeated in Jane Landers , "African and African American Women and their Pursuit of Rights Through Eighteenth Century Spanish Texts," in *Haunted Bodies: Gender and Southern Texts*, ed. Anne Goodwyn Jones and Susan V. Donaldson (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997), 69-70. Landers also found important cases in Section 92, Selected Papers, 1784-1820, East Florida Papers, Reel 174. Cases cited in this paper are recorded in "Records of Criminal Proceedings, 1785-1821," Section 65 of the East Florida Papers (Library of Congress) and are available on the microfilm version of these papers, reels 122-128.

through archives on the prison system, executions, autos de fé, and houses of charity. From these came her descriptions of prison life, of soldiers and garrisons, thieves, beggars, prostitutes and street gangs. Cutter described the administration of justice along the northwest frontier of Mexico, where crime was common but resources to investigate it were limited.[2]

More recent studies have linked the analysis of criminal records to other broad topics. Types of studies that draw heavily on court proceedings include those about violence and sex crimes. Both Renato Barahona and Mary Elizabeth Perry have addressed this topic in studies of Vizcaya and Seville, and Federico Garza Carvajal examined hundreds of inquisitorial records to document the prosecution of sodomy. Studies of children, orphans, and child-rearing, have also drawn heavily on testimony given in legal cases.[3]

Another field of study, closely tied to court cases about libel and slander, has focused on questions of honor and the defense of honor, an area of inquiry that frequently explores concepts of masculinity and femininity, codes of conduct, and the basis for status and reputation. In Spain and the colonies, upholding honor meant adhering to widely accepted views on morality and avoiding public damage to reputation. "It has become almost commonplace," one key contributor has noted, "to assert that . . . male honour for the most part was based on social considerations while female honour revolved primarily around sexual virtue." An important characteristic of honor was that it came from other

2 William Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1979); Mary Elizabeth Perry, *Crime and Society in Early Modern Seville* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1980); Charles R. Cutter, *The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain 1700-1810* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995). For studies of slander in colonial Spanish America, see Lyman L. Johnson, "Dangerous words, provocative gestures, and violent acts: The disputed hierarchies of plebian life in colonial Buenos Aires," in *The Faces of Honor: Sex, Shame, and Violence in Colonial Latin America*, ed. Lyman L. Johnson and Sonya Lipsett-Rivera (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 126-151.

3 Mary Elizabeth Perry, *Gender and Disorder in Early Modern Seville.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Federico Garza Carvajal, *Butterflies will Burn: Prosecuting Sodomites in Early Modern Spain and Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003); Bianca Premo, "Minor Offenses: Youth, Crime, and Law in Eighteenth-Century Lima," in *Minor Omissions: Children in Latin American History and Society*, ed. Tobias Hecht (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), 114-138; Bianca Premo, *Children of the Father King: Youth, Authority, and Legal Minority in Colonial Lima* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Ondina E. González and Bianca Premo, ed., *Raising an Empire: Children in Early Modern Iberia and Colonial Latin America* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007).

people and could be taken away if people refused to acknowledge it. Aspersions on family, lineage, race, religion, honesty, courage, or sexual mores could expose a person to brutal mockery and quite literally cause doors to be shut in one's face.[4]

When confronted with dishonor, women had only a few means of redress: "They could do nothing and consequently bear their disgrace grudgingly . . . seek out-of-court monetary settlements . . . or they could stand their ground and fight through legal means."[5] Males, if not equally vulnerable, were far from immune. In a study of colonial Buenos Aires, Lyman L. Johnson concluded that "a man who failed to defend himself against the challenges of his peers found life intolerable. He was, in essence, feminized and became the target of endless jokes, pranks, and insults . . . exiled from full participation in the society of men."[6]

Honor is also a central theme of this article, which examines two types of offense that sullied peoples' reputation or made them objects of humiliation. The first type consists of slander, instances where gossip, pranks, or ill-will threatened to destroy a person's standing in the community. Complaints about slander were widespread in the colonial era, and have been examined in scholarly works about Chile and Mexico as well as in studies about enslaved women and free women of color in the border colonies of Louisiana and East Florida.[7] Cases in St. Augustine exhibit many parallels with those reported from other areas. The second type is represented by a single, lengthy, and complex sodomy case, in which ten soldiers were accused of luring ten- and eleven- year old

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4 See Renato Barahona, *Sex Crimes, Honour, and the Law in Early Modern Spain, Vizcaya, 1528-1735* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 120.

5 Ibid., 121.

6 Johnson, "Dangerous words," 130.

7 María Eugenia Albornoz Vásquez, "La injuria de palabra en Santiago de Chile, 1762-1822," *Iere Journée d'Histoire des Sensibilités,* March 4, 2004, http://nuevomundo.revues.org/document240.html, (accessed June 27, 2008); Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, "De Obra y Palabra: Patterns of Insults in Mexico 1750-1856," *The Americas,* 54, no. 4 (April 1998): 511-539; Lipsett-Rivera, "A Slap in the Face of Honor: Social Transgressions and Women in Late Colonial Mexico," in *The Faces of Honor,* 179-200; Cheryl English Martin, "Popular Speech and Social Order in Northern Mexico, 1650-1830," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 32, no. 2 (April 1990): 305-324; Kimberly S. Hanger, "'Desiring Total Tranquility' and Not Getting It: Conflict involving Free Black Women in Spanish New Orleans," *The Americas,* 54, no. 4 (April 1998): 541-556; Landers, "Female Conflict," 562-567 and "African and African American Women," 69-70.

boys into male prostitution. It was a notorious scandal, and carried possible death sentences for the accused.[8]

These cases vary greatly in their complexity and length, but they follow standard procedures for investigating crime. As judicial proceedings, they are similar to those described for other areas in the Spanish empire, such as Oaxaca and New Mexico. As was true elsewhere, records in St. Augustine regularly contain the particulars about the crime, information on the victim and accused, the court proceedings, and the verdict.[9]

Cases opened with an accusation (*querella* or *denuncia*) and a brief statement about the offense. Slander cases usually began with a *querella de parte*, a complaint brought before a magistrate by the victim or victim's family or guardian with a request for justice or restitution. The investigation into the case of sodomy, on the other hand, began with a *denuncia* (denunciation), a statement that a crime had taken place. The *querella* or *denuncia* was followed by the

8 The slander cases, noted individually below, are drawn from criminal cases reported in Section 65, Records of Criminal Proceedings, 1785-1821 in the East Florida Papers, Library of Congress, bundles 283 to 290. The sodomy case, also cited below, can be found in Section 64, Records of Court Martials, 1785-1821, bundle 280.

9 Court records in St. Augustine follow fairly closely those described for Mexico by William Taylor in *Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion*, and also those described for the borderlands of the American Southwest by Charles Cutter in *The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain*. "Important recurring sources of information in the records are (1) the initial one- or two-page report of the crime made by the village officials to the *alcalde mayor*, usually dictated within a few hours of the act; (2) the offender's declaration (usually a preliminary declaration shortly after arrest and a formal declaration made under interrogation during the trail, covering two to five pages); (3) testimony by victim, expert witnesses, eyewitnesses, and character witnesses, which comprise the bulk of most trial records; (4) the judge's summation of incriminating evidence; (5) the defense lawyer's case, including legal arguments and the testimony of additional witnesses; and (6) the judge's explanation of the verdict and sentence (the last three categories usually take up six to ten pages). Witnesses usually responded to specific questions put to them by the court but the victim and offender in the preliminary and formal declarations responded to a more open-ended inquiry into their views of what happened." Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion*, 76. Cutter, *Legal Culture*, 110, notes "Whether referred to as *juicio sumario* or *juicio extraordinario*, simplified procedure proved to be the most common in the borderlands . . . Ordinary legal procedure, both civil and criminal, could indeed be a time-consuming and highly technical affair that required a good measure of expertise to administer. Simplified form, however, alleviated much of the complication and suited well the circumstances of a simple society. While it lacked formal training, the local judiciary might still carry on their duties in a rudimentary yet lawful manner."

cabeza de proceso, a statement of what was known about the crime and the reasons for starting an investigation.[10]

Once these formalities were complete, officials accumulated information comprising the lengthy *sumaria* (court dossier), the main section of the proceedings, containing both the indictment and the collection of evidence. Typically a *sumaria* began with a fact-finding phase of investigation. The purpose was to verify that a crime had been committed and confirm that there were sufficient witnesses and evidence to proceed. Most of the *sumaria,* however, was composed of witness depositions, sometimes taking up two-thirds of the entire written court record.[11] For a crime involving some physical assault or harm to a victim, there would be a *reconocimiento de heridas,* similar to the report of a medical examiner, describing and characterizing injuries, or, in the case of a killing, the cause of death. Once this was complete, authorities identified witnesses and began taking depositions.[12]

At some point in the early proceedings, officials issued an indictment or *auto de prisión,* and the accused, if not already in custody, was arrested. His or her goods were placed under embargo, a parallel to the modern idea of bond. If an accused person was judged to be a minor, he or she was assigned a guardian. More testimony followed, along with the *declaración* or *auto de confesión* of the accused, usually the first time investigators directly spoke with a prisoner.[13]

The next stage of the proceedings, the *plenario,* was more legalistic in nature. It consisted of *ratificaciones* (additional testimony), interrogatories (a type of cross-examination, an established set of questions put to witnesses, including witnesses who had testified previously), and *careos* (a procedure where

10 This structure of proceedings corresponds closely with those noted in Cutter, *Legal Culture,* 111. For crimes that became publically known almost immediately, such as a serious wounding or a murder, authorities usually acted *de oficio,* that is, they initiated an investigation as soon as they became aware of the crime.

11 Ibid., 112. Magistrates usually wanted two or three credible witnesses as proof that they had a basis to continue investigating. The accused, if identified, might be placed under arrest at this point. Those arrested were not informed of the charges against them, usually were not interviewed, and, in cases with multiple alleged perpetrators, were not allowed to communicate among themselves.

12 Ibid., 115.

13 Ibid., 119-120. As Cutter notes, although termed a "confession" it was more often a denial, a statement that the accused knew nothing about the crime in question, or a statement that put the blame elsewhere.

magistrates might question several witnesses at once, especially if their testimony conflicted, or where accused and witnesses might be brought together and questioned). After the close of testimony, the lead magistrate summarized the case, both the facts and the points of law involved, a *defensor* put forth the case for the accused, and there was a chance to disqualify witnesses or impugn their testimony, a procedure called the *tacha*. The entire case record then went forward to the governor for review, verdict, and sentencing.[14] Finally, the *sentencia* consisted of a short statement by the governor at the end of the case, specifying his decision and sentence, usually without any explanation of his grounds for reaching the decision.[15]

Most criminal cases in St. Augustine followed this structure. The principal difference from colonial New Mexico was in the staffing of judicial investigations and hearings.[16] If the case involved soldiers or sailors in government employment, it could be tried as a court martial under the *fiscal*, an official trained in military law. Cases involving civilians, on the other hand, and sometimes those involving civilians and soldiers, were conducted by the *asesor general*, the only person in the colony with formal training as an attorney. The *asesor general* combined the functions of a modern-day prosecutor, district attorney, and legal counselor. Whether *fiscal* or *asesor general*, the duties of the chief magistrate in the case were similar: to apply the law, arrive at the truth of a case, advise the colonial governor on points of law pertaining to it, and render an opinion. The governor, as the head military and political authority in the colony, passed sentence. For sentences in excess of ten years, or for capital sentences, his decision required further approval from the Captain General of Cuba and/or the Council of the Indies. Both the *asesor* and the *fiscal* were assisted in their inquiries by a royal notary, or *escribano*, who served as the court stenographer and took down depositions. In cases where parties in the suit were legal minors, the governor would appoint a guardian. Because people in St. Augustine spoke a variety of languages, an interpreter was also sometimes required. In keeping with general

14 Ibid., 125-129. Both *ratificaciones* and *careos* figure extensively in cases of violence and murder in St. Augustine, and margin notes identify them. The *tacha* is at times present although rarely identified as such in documentation.

15 Ibid., 130-138.

16 John H. Matthews, in "Law Enforcement in Spanish East Florida, 1783-1821" (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1987), 44-46, describes officials and their duties.

principles of Spanish law, the role of magistrates was to restore public tranquility, to punish offenders, to compensate the plaintiff or complainant if justified, and to attempt a reconciliation of the parties involved.[17]

It is important to recognize that judicial proceedings in St. Augustine had none of the trappings of a modern-day trial. There seems to have been no regular physical locus for conducting proceedings. Presumably the *asesor general* had an office in Government House. Witnesses might be called before the investigating magistrate to give their depositions; but frequently the magistrate and a notary called on people at home, went to the crime scene, or saw prisoners in the holding cell inside the Castillo or at the jail. The purpose of a proceeding was to amass in writing all pertinent information about a case, which was then submitted to the officers of a court martial or to the governor.[18]

Slander cases were among the more common types of legal action to come before a magistrate. Complaints about slander arose frequently in St. Augustine, which seems to have been a hotbed for malicious gossip. It was a small and compact city. About 2,000 people, of different ranks, classes, and places of national origin, lived in a grid work of streets that extended only a half mile in length and about 330 yards in width. Social tensions among town residents often exploded into insults and threats. People were especially thin-skinned about being subjected to name-calling or rumor, and probably with good reason. Society in St. Augustine was steeped in the cultural mores of Spain and (closer to home) Cuba. These mores included a fierce protection of personal and family honor, reputation, and good name. Anyone who left a slander unanswered not only lost face in the local community but risked becoming the favored target of whispering campaigns and mockery, a circumstance that could make life extremely difficult

17 Ibid., 39. Matthews identifies the *auditor de guerra* as another legal authority. On sentencing and expected duties of magistrates, see Ibid., 47, 64, 67.

18 For almost half the period under consideration here, most investigations fell to a Holmes and Watson duo, headed by the *asesor general*, Don Manuel de Ortega, assisted by the royal notary, Don José de Zubizarreta. This eighteenth-century pair of gum-shoes quite literally had to walk the streets of the city in quest of evidence and testimony. Between them, they perambulated their way through most of the shouting matches, knife fights, deaths by violence, and other disruptions to the King's peace that kept tongues wagging and cells occupied, Ortega with his head full of law and Zubizarreta with his arms full of paper, quills, and parcels of ink. They were a mobile unit, sweating in the waistcoats, breeches, and dress or frock coats that custom demanded, and wearing out the leather soles of their shoes in performance of duty.

if not miserable. What was true for the largest cities of colonial Spanish America was also true for the provincial capital of tiny East Florida: "In a society where identities and descriptions of individuals carried so much weight, words could cause great harm."[19]

People responded to slander in different ways, including direct action. A simple insult, uttered in a moment of heat, could spark anything from a counter-insult to a blow to a knifing. There was also a legal recourse, however. Under Spanish law, to speak slanders, or *palabras injuriosas,* was a criminal offense, and slanderers could be charged and brought before a magistrate.

Studies of slander in Spain and Spanish America provide plenty of evidence about what colonial people found insulting. For example, in a survey of more than 150 years of slander cases from colonial Santiago de Chile (1672-1822), María Eugenia Albornoz Vásquez identified words that were consistently regarded as insults requiring some sort of response. Use of the term *puta* [whore] for women and the racial terms *mulato* and *mulata* for men and women are examples of these. "In the case of men," Albornoz Vásquez noted, "the racial insult *par excellance,* for most of the eighteenth century, was mulatto." Referring to someone as a dog—either a *perra* or a *perro*—also became a common insult in the 1700s, as did use of the term *borracho,* or drunk. By the late 1700s, the lexicon of commonly used insults was growing. Thus, Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, in a study of slanders in Mexico between 1750 and 1850, constructed a glossary of expressions that she routinely found in slander cases. Insults aimed at women were predominantly sexual and vulgar, led by *puta* (whore) and *ramera* (prostitute). In contrast, insults aimed at men were broad-ranging. They included terms that struck at masculinity—like *cornudo* (cuckold) and *puñetero* (masturbater) but also *chismoso* (gossip)—a trait that was considered effeminate. Also common were the more evocative *ladrón* (thief), *pícaro* (rogue), *cabrón* (bastard; also cuckold), the ever popular *hijo de puta,* along with *embustero* (cheat), *arrastrado* (brownnoser) and *alcahuete* (pimp).[20]

By extension, certain gestures or actions also subjected a person to shame. Touching someone, even in jest, ran the risk of creating outrage. Slapping or punching at the face or head of another person was specifically cited in Spanish law as an offense.

19 Lipsett-Rivera in "De Obra y Palabra," 511, explains: "while violent acts harmed the body, words attacked an individual's honor."

20 See the section "Los miedos y los 'otros rechazados'" in Alborniz Vásquez's "Injuria de palabra;" also the glossary in Lipsett-Rivera, "De Obra y Palabra," 537-539.

Being grasped by the arm, shoulder or hair, having one's hair pulled, or one's clothes torn, was a form of humiliation. Bailiffs and catchpoles, people assigned to arrest miscreants, typically manhandled them. By extension, any kind of manhandling, no matter who did it, was demeaning and called for retaliation. As in modern Islamic countries, hitting or slapping someone with the dirty sole of a shoe was also a gross insult.[21]

In colonial Mexico, for example, insults and taunts frequently led to a brawl or a free-for-all, especially in places where there was a lot of drinking. In his study of Oaxaca, William Taylor identified various insults as "fighting words," especially "*puta, cornudo, alcahuete,* and *cabrón* (whore, cuckold, pimp, he-goat . . .)". In the face of these taunts men would throw a punch, deliver a beating, or pull a knife. Cheryl Martin, again from studies of Mexico, found that name-calling commonly escalated into violence. She described a typical pattern as beginning with a taunt like *perro* (dog), followed by a racial remark like *mulato* or a slight on honesty, and then a sexual insult—cuckold for men, whore for women. The first might be ignored, but the latter usually required a response. For men, cuts at their manhood exposed them to public ridicule; for women, blots on honor were a potentially dangerous label that might jeopardize marriage or make them objects of public disdain and gossip. The potentially explosive consequences of slander help to explain official concern.[22]

Slander, of course, struck directly at honor, and since slander was spread by gossip, it was an effective method of causing public humiliation. Going to court over slander was a double-edged sword. It could result in punishment for the slanderer, a public apology, or some restitution, but it also tended to publicize what had been said, especially if many witnesses were called upon to report what they had heard. Slander cases in St. Augustine have much in common with those reported from Chile, Mexico, and other areas in Spanish America. Many of the expressions mentioned previously were commonly used as insults in Florida. Taunts were especially dangerous in environments where people were drinking heavily or easily exasperated by teasing. It did not

21 Lipsett-Rivera, "De Obra y Palabra," 514-515.

22 See Taylor, *Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion*, 81-83; Martin, "Popular Speech," 312. Lyman Johnson notes "plebians were every bit as sensitive to the experience of shame and humiliation as elite members of Spanish American society. Indeed plebians were more likely to resort to violence to prevent or avenge an insult." Johnson, "Dangerous Words," 130.

take much to send fists flying or knives flashing. Social tensions between upper and lower classes and between military personnel and civilians also frequently found expression in insult and abuse. St. Augustine was a garrison town—almost an eighth of the free male residents made their livings as soldiers or officers—and many other inhabitants earned their keep by providing food, drink, and goods for the military. Local authorities frequently had to deal with drunk and disorderly conduct among the soldiers, the crews of the local pilot and gunboats, and sailors from visiting ships. These men spent their off hours playing cards and gambling, and got into fights with their own comrades or with any vendor or purveyor of food or goods they thought cheated them.

So, from a knifing case in 1786, comes an example of "fighting words" in action. The incident involved Fernando Amonoso, described in the records as a *chino,* usually denoting a person of African and Indian ancestry. Amonoso was also serving out a sentence as a *praesidario,* or a convict sentenced to labor at St. Augustine's main fortification, the Castillo de San Marcos. One night he went out with friends to a tavern run by Juan Villalonga, a resident from a town in Minorca. *Praesidarios* were restricted to a section of the barracks at the south end of town at night but were free to go about the city prior to curfew. At the tavern, Amonoso and his friends began drinking and got into a card game with a group of sailors, apparently from a gunboat. One of the sailors, Pablo Sabate, accused Amonoso of misdealing the cards, and called him a string of names, saying he was a *perro* (a dog), a *pícaro* (a rogue), a *ladrón* (a thief), *indigno* (of no worth), a *mulato,* and a *puñetero* (which, depending on the context, meant a miserable wretch or a masturbator).

Any one of these words was the sort that would start a fight, so it is not too surprising that Amonoso stood up and slapped Sabate across his face. This was the typical escalation noted by Taylor in his research—drinking, gambling, an argument, insults, a physical blow. At this point the owner of the tavern, Villalonga, apparently saw where things were headed. He came over to the group, saying, "What's all this, fellows. I don't want any fighting in my place." He threw them out, whereupon the quarrel carried into the street. Sabate then collected some other comrades to track down Amonoso, who, when confronted, pulled a knife and wounded one of them. The whole group eventually found themselves under arrest, but the sailors, after questioning, were released. Amonoso, the convict *chino,* was held, not only for the

wounding, but because he was a person of color who had drawn a knife on a white person.[23]

In this particular case, the magistrate's interest focused on the knifing by the *chino* rather than the insults by the sailor. Nonetheless, the verbal taunts leading to the knifing comprised much of the evidence, a scenario typical in several other cases that ended in assault. While not strictly an investigation into slander, the case does provide a vivid picture of the types of words used by people in confrontational situations. Parallels occur in cases from Buenos Aires: "A direct allegation of dishonesty, even when the allegation was abundantly justified by evidence, was likely to provoke violence . . . no man could passively accept being branded a thief or a liar without losing face."[24]

Another case stemming from gambling had a less violent outcome. In 1797 Antonio Caballero, a Spaniard, wagered on a bowls or skittles game between two Minorcan townsmen, Sebastian Coll and Gabriel Frau. When Frau lost, there was a disagreement about the payment of the wager and Frau became angry with Caballero. According to Caballero's own account, Frau called him a person of *mala sangre* (tainted blood) and said "that he knew all about my lineage, and that the soles of his shoes had a better one than I did." Frau then implied that Caballero's grandfather had been disgraced, possibly cuckolded. Caballero sued, demanding that Frau prove his accusations or withdraw them. Notably, Frau's slander included a cacophony of offensive innuendo. Besides calling Caballero's legitimacy into question, itself a serious defamation, Frau equated him with something dirty and bestial—the cow hide of his shoe—all extremely insulting to male pride in the eighteenth century. The fact that the insult came from a Minorcan, often looked upon as a second-class citizen by Spanish residents, made it all the more intolerable to Caballero. Frau was required to apologize publically and pay court costs.[25]

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23 Witnesses quoted Sabate's insults as well as the intervention of Villalonga saying "Que es eso, caballeros? Yo en mi casa no quiero pleitos." Prosecution of Fernando Amonoso, sailor Pablo Sabate, and José Capo for fighting, Section 65, Criminales, July 24, 1786, East Florida Papers, Bundle 283, Reel 122.

24 Johnson, "Dangerous Words," 138-139.

25 Frau's statement in Spanish was paraphrased in testimony as "que conocia a todo mi linage y que la suela de su zapato era mejor que yo." Prosecution of Gabriel Frau for slandering Antonio Caballero, Section 65, Criminales, May 27, 1797, East Florida Papers, Bundle 287, Reel 124. Frau is listed as a Minorcan fisherman in Philip D. Rasico, *The Minorcans of Florida: Their History, Language, and Culture* (New Smyrna Beach, FL: Luthers Pub., 1990), 161. See also Matthews, "Law Enforcement," 143.

In fact, seemingly innocuous arguments could lead to an outburst of temper or insults. This had less to do with the subject of conversation and more to do with a simmering resentment or a grudge between the participants. A case in point comes from a conversation that took place early one Sunday morning in 1798 near the wharves of the town's bay front along the estuary of the Matanzas River. Miguel Iznardy, a prominent, well educated, and well-connected Spanish merchant, was taking part in a good-natured debate about the gun on one of the launches protecting the harbor. Several men maintained the gun was fixed and could only fire directly ahead of the bow. Iznardy argued that it was a swivel and could be adjusted several points to the left or right. Another resident, Manuel Solana, a somewhat crusty Florida native and self-made cattle rancher, was listening to the debate from a short distance away. As Iznardy was giving his opinion, Solana angrily butted into the conversation, made a point of coming up abruptly and telling Iznardy that he was wrong, and that he was a typical know-it-all who pretended superior knowledge when in fact he knew nothing about the matter. Iznardy brought suit, saying Solana had demeaned him in public. The other men present were called as witnesses. They confessed that they were startled by Solana's behavior and his remarks but could offer no explanation for them and knew of no enmity between the men. The charge was eventually dismissed. It is likely, though, that this altercation stemmed from personal dislike. Solana and Iznardy were rivals in the highly competitive market to win the government meat contract; although both were wealthy and influential, they came from different social backgrounds. Solana, a local *Floridano*, raised in the colony, prided himself as a frontiersman who lived life in the saddle. He probably had little use for the erudite and gentrified Iznardy, an Old World Spaniard from Andalusia. In Solana's eyes, Iznardy would have been something of a snobbish dandy.[26]

Another seemingly innocent exchange got George Backhouse, a hold-over from British colonial days in Florida, into trouble with authorities. In June 1792 he was brought up on a charge of having

26 Prosecution of Manuel Solana for slandering Miguel Iznardy, Section 65, Criminales, March 1, 1798, East Florida Papers, Bundle 287, Reel 124. On rivalry over control of the meat market, see Susan R. Parker, "The Cattle Trade in East Florida, 1784-1821," in *Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida*, ed. Jane G. Landers (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 157-161. For information about Solana and Iznardy, see Donna Rachal Mills *Florida's First Families: Translated Abstracts of Pre-1821 Spanish Censuses* (Naples, FL.: Mills Historical Press, 1992), 36-37.

called the wife of Clemente de Salas a whore. De Salas immediately brought suit on behalf of his wife, producing several witnesses, including two slaves, who all gave the following account of events. They said that Backhouse had come to the Salas residence and had asked the matron of the house for some chili peppers. She had replied that she did not have any, but she would bring him some the next day. Backhouse, according to witnesses, replied "*Puta* [whore], why can't you give them to me now, the same as tomorrow?"[27]

Questioned by the magistrate, Backhouse gave a different version of what happened. He spoke to the *asesor general* in English, his native language, while a court-appointed interpreter translated what he said into Spanish, for the benefit of the official record. Translated from Spanish back into English, the gist of his testimony seems to be this: he told the magistrate that his conversation with Señora de Salas had also taken place in English, and that the witnesses had misunderstood his words. Backhouse said he was well acquainted with de Salas's wife, that they had known each other since childhood, and that he had gone over to the house to ask her for some peppers for his dinner; that when he arrived, she met him at the door and asked "What do you want?" and that he replied, "Some chili peppers." She said she did not have any, not until tomorrow, and he replied that he needed them right then, to eat. She then said something like *"para fuera,"* probably "go away" or "get lost," and he had answered, *"Anda fuera, tu gran Perra,"* or "You get lost, you big bitch."[28]

Backhouse defended himself, saying that he had meant no insult, but had only been joking around with de Salas, as he often did; but that everyone present had misinterpreted his use of the word "bitch" in English as the equivalent of *"puta"* (whore) in Spanish, when in fact, he explained, it was the equivalent of *"perra"* (a female dog). He went on to argue that the word "bitch" as used in English did not carry the same degree of insult that *"puta"* had in

27 The statement, taken from witnesses in Spanish, is all important in this case because of Backhouse's defense that the conversation was actually in English. Witnesses cited him as saying *"Puta, porque no puede darlos ahora, lo mismo que mañana?"* This and all following testimony is from Prosecution of George Backhouse for slandering the wife of carpenter Clemente de Salas, Section 65, Criminales, June 20, 1792, East Florida Papers, Bundle 285, Reel 123. Mills, *Florida's First Families,* 56, has a description of Backhouse from the 1787 census as a native of the West Indies, Protestant, occupation tailor. De Salas is also in Mills, *Florida's First Families,* 83.

28 Ibid.

Spanish. Still, Backhouse could have no doubt about the outrage he had caused. The parish priest, Father Miguel O'Reilley, showed up at his door immediately after the incident. He had learned about it from the two slaves who had overheard it, and came to scold Backhouse for his behavior. No sooner did the priest leave than Clemente de Salas, the woman's irate husband, arrived at the house with an axe. Backhouse barred the door but de Salas used the axe to break it down and came inside and threatened him until neighbors intervened.[29]

The *asesor general* ultimately accepted Backhouse's plea that the seriousness of the insult had been inflated. In his ruling, he called it a misunderstanding that had gotten out of hand, ordered Backhouse to publically apologize, and recommended that the parties, who clearly knew each other well, should reconcile themselves. Yet he also admonished Backhouse to watch his mouth, reminding him that under Spanish law words could cause just as much injury as deeds.[30] One also has to wonder, in this case, if Clemente de Salas's violent reaction might have been a result of some underlying jealousy, perhaps a suspicion that the familiar relations between his wife and Backhouse were not as innocent as a mere joking acquaintance.

Cases like these were often just instances of outbursts of tempers; but sometimes they had lasting effects and were not so easily resolved. A good example comes from another case involving Minorcan residents. In 1802, the sailor José Ximénez got into an argument with Pedro Llul (also known as Pedro Hull) about debt. During the dispute, Llul's wife, María Isabel Crosby, threatened the wife of Ximénez, saying she should have her belly slit open. Ximénez retorted that María was a *habladora* (gossip) and *mulata*, and that she should have her tongue cut out. This was only the latest in a series of incidents involving racial slurs against Crosby's parentage. Llul and Crosby had already confronted this issue in 1798 when a neighbor had questioned María's "whiteness." The following year, another neighbor wanted to know why it took a lawsuit to decide if Crosby was white or black. With the 1802 case, Ximénez was once more throwing the issue in her face, which shows how a label could permanently attach itself to someone's identity and plague them in local society. Llul, citing the previous slanders against his wife, wanted the matter put to rest and demanded a public apology from

29 Ibid.
30 Matthews, "Law Enforcement," 140.

Ximénez so that people in the neighborhood would cease to have any doubts about his wife's honorable ancestry.[31]

In the cases just cited, each woman had a male defender, her husband, who brought suit. By contrast, the case of Luisa Rodriguez from 1799 illustrates a case where a woman did not have a defender. Rodriguez, testifying in a court case, complained that Adjutant Major Benito de Pangua, of the Third Battalion of the Infantry of Cuba stationed in St. Augustine, had slandered her, accusing her of sexual improprieties. She said de Pangua was spreading gossip about her, saying that since the death of her husband, she was engaging in sex with the garrison blacksmith, Benito Reynal, and that Reynal provided her with clothing and provisions. De Pangua responded by bringing a slander suit against Rodriguez, saying that by calling him a gossip, she had placed a blot on his honor. He admitted that he had told people Rodriguez was living in the same house as Reynal, something that was a well-known fact, but, being an officer and an honorable man, he had never stated or implied anything else.[32]

De Pangua's suit triggered a flood of testimony about Luisa Rodriguez's entire sexual history. The *asesor general* inquired into the facts about her first marriage, her affair with Reynal after the death of her first husband, her second marriage, and her current cohabitation with Reynal after the death of her second husband. The parish priest gave a lengthy deposition on his efforts to persuade Rodriguez to leave Reynal's house and go back to her own in order to end the public scandal. Ultimately, the *asesor general* dismissed the case, saying there was no evidence Benito de Pangua had suffered harm to his reputation. At the same time, he issued instructions to preserve the testimony for use in a case pending against Luisa Rodriguez's son. In addition to all her other troubles—financial straits and public scandal—the widow Rodriguez had no male family member to protect her. Her son, a

31 Prosecution of sailor José Ximénez for slandering Pedro Llul and his wife María Isabel Crosby, Section 65, Criminales, October 30, 1802, East Florida Papers, Bundle 288, Reel 125. This case is also covered in Landers, "Female Conflict," 562-564. Lull (Hull) and María Isabel (Crosby) appear in the 1793 census, ages 42 and 28, respectively. See Mills, *Florida's First Families,* 99. José Ximénez appears in the 1814 census. See Mills, *Florida's First Families,*143.

32 Complaint by Adj. Maj. Benito de Pangua against Luisa Rodriguez for slander, Section 65, Criminales, September 7, 1799, East Florida Papers, Bundle 288, Reel 125., Lipsett-Rivera notes that traditionally "male heads of families responded to insults to the honor of individuals within their households." See Lipsett-Rivera, "A Slap in the Face," 181.

soldier, was under arrest for assault, apparently driven to it by the rumors being spread around town about his mother.[33]

The culture of slander was so pervasive in St. Augustine that newly arrived residents could quickly run afoul of it. Take, for example, the case of John Egan. A recent arrival from Wilmington, Delaware, Egan brought suit against Juan Abadie in 1799 for defaming him. Abadie, a Frenchman who was also a recent arrival, apparently had known Egan when they both resided in Wilmington, Delaware. He began to tell friends that Egan was a dishonest person and someone who could not be trusted. According to Egan, Abadie said as much to a fellow French resident, Pedro Lefebvre, and then repeated it to Eusebio Bushnell, a local trader. After that he tried to repeat it to Don Valentine Fitzpatrick, a physician and plantation owner. Yet finding that Fitzpatrick could not understand him—Abadie was apparently speaking in either French or Spanish—he went away and came back with a translator and then asked the translator to repeat his remarks about Egan. Abadie was questioned in the case, but it was dismissed because Egan could not prove his reputation had been damaged and produced no witnesses to support the charge in his *querella*.[34]

Evidence suggests that slander cases became more and more embroiled in local politics as St. Augustine entered the nineteenth century. For example, the case of Gaspar Rosy from May 1813 is instructive. The Spanish colony of East Florida was under American military occupation related to the War of 1812 and St. Augustine was under semi-siege, cut off from normal commerce and its sources of food.[35] The city had also recently undergone a major change in government. Under the Spanish Constitution of 1812, residents were authorized to elect a local *alcalde*, or mayor, who headed the town *cabildo* and was empowered to handle city affairs. Among other duties, he was authorized to take charge of judicial matters. The Rosy case, which involved a charge of slander and abuse brought against a military officer, therefore came before the new *alcalde*, rather than an *asesor general* or the governor.[36]

33 Adj. Maj. Benito de Pangua against Luisa Rodriguez for slander, Section 65, Criminales, September 7, 1799.

34 Accusation of John Egan against Juan Abadie for slander, Section 65, Criminales, May 25, 1799, East Florida Papers, Bundle 288, Reel 125.

35 James G. Cusick, *The Other War of 1812, The American Invasion of Spanish East Florida* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007), 224-235, 245.

36 For an in-depth study of the promulgation of the constitution, and the changes it wrought in East Florida, see M.C. Mirow, "The Constitution of Cádiz in Florida," *Florida Journal of International Law* 24, no. 2 (August 2012): 271-329. The conflict between Kindelán and Álvarez is covered in Alejandro Quiroga

All the witnesses in the case gave essentially the same testimony. According to the *querella,* Rosy, a thirty-one-year-old baker born in Florida to Italian parents, was summoned to the house of Don Manuel de Castilla, a captain of infantry in the Third Infantry Battalion of Cuba and an assistant sergeant major of the plaza of St. Augustine. There Captain Castilla and his wife berated Rosy and accused him of giving their son a beating. Rosy denied this, whereupon Castilla struck him and showered him with insults. Rosy backed out of the house, hat in hand, with Castilla following and threatening him with a blade. At the door, according to one witness, Castilla roared at him "Knave! Lout! Whoreson! Don't you know that my son is a cadet and an honorable boy, and I'll kill the first whoreson that lays a hand to him."[37]

The case is a good illustration of the serious altercations that could occur between the military classes and the civilian population of Minorcan-Greek-Italian residents who made their living in St. Augustine. There is also a hint of local politics in this case. The *alcalde constitucional,* Gerónimo Álvarez, and the governor, Colonel Sebastián Kindelán y O'Regan, disliked one another. Kindelán regarded the new *alcalde* as a thorn in his side and complained that he interfered too much in administration of the colony. At the time this case came before him, Álvarez was engaged in a heated debate with Kindelán, saying the governor was blocking him from his constitutional powers as judge and magistrate. Kindelán himself was away from the capital, trying to reestablish order in the border town of Fernandina as American troops withdrew from the colony. The governor was not pleased when the *alcalde* presented him with a case against one of his officers, especially during a time of war. The court record contains no resolution of the case but Kindelán's

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Fernández de Soto, "Military Liberalism on the East Florida "Frontier': Implementation of the 1812 Constitution," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 79, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 453. "The *Ayuntimiento* was designed to govern the town. Consequently, it soon became the new center of political power, leading to a clash between the governor and the mayor concerning the exercise of civil functions." Álvarez was linked to the Minorcan community by marriage and, like Rosy, once earned his living as a baker. He headed the new town *cabildo* and there was apparently a concerted effort by the *cabildo* to assert its authority against the traditional military powers of the town; for the struggle over judicial powers, see Fernández de Soto, "Military Liberalism," 452-463.

37 Witness depositions in Spanish quoted Castilla as saying "Pícaro! Bribón! Hijo de Puta! No sabe Ud. que mi hijo es un Por cadete y hijo de honor, y mataré al primer hijo de puta que le pegue." Gaspar Rosy complains against Capt. Manuel de Castilla for slander and assault, Section 65, Criminales, May 12, 1813, East Florida Papers, Bundle 290, Reel 126.

exasperation is apparent in the curtness of his annotations to the file. The last document is simply a terse note from Kindelán ordering both Rosy and Castilla to appear before him, followed by a statement that he would seek to reconcile them. In effect, then, the case was ammunition in an ongoing power struggle between two men.[38]

As cases of slander demonstrate, gossip and public insults could traumatize and disrupt family life and even lead to outbreaks of physical violence. Rarer but more serious were crimes that both victimized individuals and scandalized the entire power structure of the colony. One such case occurred in 1788 when officials discovered that soldiers at the garrison were paying ten- and eleven-year-old boys for sex. The resulting scandal touched people high up in St. Augustine's military and bureaucratic hierarchy. One of the boys involved was the ward of Captain Carlos Howard, a military attaché who advised Governor Vicente Manuel de Zéspedes on Indian affairs and defense of the border. Some of the sex acts occurred at the house of Don Dimas Cortés, the second highest official in the Royal Treasury. By the time the month-long investigation was over, seven soldiers, two corporals, and four boys were under arrest and rumors about their activities had spread throughout the town, including to the dozens of boys enrolled in the local school.[39]

Under Spanish law, sodomy comprised a host of sexual behaviors that were considered both immoral and criminal. The most serious was anal intercourse, in which one male achieved orgasm within the rectum of another male. This offense, a capital

38 Besides the court case itself, information on Gaspar Rosy comes from Mills, *Florida's First Families,* 147. In 1814, the year after this suit, his household included his wife Matilda, a young son, and Mariana Dulcet, age 15, and Francisca Sanchez, age 7. In his *querella,* Rosy alluded to the fact that the younger Castilla, the cadet, had called one of his nieces a whore, indicating additional bad blood between the two families, who lived only two houses apart.

39 Proceso formado contra los soldados en el 2º Piqte del Regto de la Havana, Josef de Torres, Bentª Billamarin y Gregoria Quevedo, accusados de haver incurrido, en el crimen de sodomia, con los muchachos Timoteo Claveria, Archer Stone, Francº de León y Nicolas Dimaracht, y otros soldados reos de menor gravidad, comprehendidos in el expresado proceo, 13 de Sept., 1788, "Court Martials," Section 64, East Florida Papers, Bundle 280, Reel 119. To make matters worse, the arrests and investigation occurred while Zéspedes was in the middle of hosting a visit from the Cuban bishop Cyril de Barcelona, who was reviewing religious and moral life in the colony. See Helen Hornbeck Tanner, *Zéspedes in East Florida, 1784-1790* (Jacksonville: University of North Florida Press, 1989), 167-168. The parish priests and the instructors at the local school were extremely concerned about the fate of the boys involved.

crime, carried the death penalty, originally by hanging, and subsequently by burning at the stake.[40] By the 1700s it also could be punished by exile, hard labor, or the pillory. Lesser offenses that could be prosecuted included engaging in masturbation with a partner or having sexual contact that did not include penetration of the body. Technically, sodomy did not have to be between two males—it was also criminal for men to engage in this type of sex with women. However, it was sex between males that was most frequently reported to the authorities and investigated.[41]

Prosecutions of sodomy cases are well-represented in historical studies of early modern Spain and the Spanish colonies. Both

40 "Officials reserved their most severe condemnations for sodomites. Las Siete Partidas required the death penalty for sins 'against nature,' except for those people forced against their will or for children younger than fourteen years. (Partida 7, Title 21, Laws 1 and 2)," Perry, *Gender and Disorder,* 123. "Punishment of those found guilty could be severe and brutal, ranging from exile to service in the galleys to death by strangulation (after which the accused's body was burned at the stake)," Geoffrey Spurling, "Under Investigation for the Abominable Sin: Damián de Morales Stands Accused of Attempting to Seduce Antón de Tierra de Congo (Charchas, 1611)" in *Colonial Lives: Documents on Latin American History 1550-1850,* ed. Richard Boyer and Geoffrey Spurling (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 112-129. The *ordenanzas* governing the army also retained the ancient punishment of death by hanging or burning for soldiers convicted of the *delito nefano,* or sodomy by anal intercourse. *Ordenanzas del ejército, para su régimen, disciplina, subordinacion y servicio: dadas por Su Majestad católica en 22 de octubre de 1768.* Reimpresas de orden del gobierno de Venezuela por la primera edición real de Madrid de 1768 (Caracas, en la imprenta de V. Espinal, 1841), 286.

41 The term sodomy could mean anal intercourse with a same-sex partner (perfect sodomy), or between a man and a woman (imperfect sodomy), or sexual relations with animals (bestiality). Alain Saint-Saens, "Homoerotic Suffering, Pleasure, and Desire in early Modern Europe (1450-1750)," in *Lesbianism and Homosexuality in Early Modern Spain, Literature and Theater in Context,* ed. María José Delgado and Alain Saint-Saens (New Orleans: University Press of the South, 2001), 3-86. According to Cristian Berco,"At different times and place sodomy could mean anything from a wide understanding of nonprocreative sex to a very specific notion of anal intercourse alone. When inquisitors tried sodomy cases in Aragon, the term encompassed anal intercourse between men, heterosexual anal sex, and bestiality. In cases involving men, inquisitors tended to focus on anal sex, especially what they termed 'perfect sodomy' (*sodomía perfecta,* that is anal intercourse with ejaculation inside the rectum) because its occurrence called for the death penalty. Nonetheless, both because perfect sodomy was difficult to prove and because the inquisitorial net was cast widely, inquisitors also prosecuted a variety of erotic behavior between men that need not have involved anal intercourse. They utilized the term *molices* to identify other sexual behaviors between men such as mutual fondling, masturbation, oral genital contact, and even kissing that they considered conducive to the ultimate sin," "Producing Patriarchy: Male Sodomy and Gender in Early Modern Spain,"*Journal of the History of Sexuality* 17, no. 3 (September 2008), 356-357. *Molices* = "effeminacies."

Mary Elizabeth Perry and Cristian Berco, among others, have written major works on the subject.[42] Sodomy usually involved an adult male and an adolescent youth or boy. More than 500 cases examined in Spain demonstrated that in seventy percent of them, adult males were the active sexual partners who solicited sex and achieved sexual orgasm through anal intercourse, while their partners were usually teens or pre-teens.[43]

A codified set of procedures determined the steps for charging and prosecuting offenders.[44] Sodomy differed from many types of capital crime in that it was regarded as a crime against nature rather than person. Except in cases of rape, all parties who engaged in sodomy could be arrested and charged.[45] According to law, boys under fourteen years of age were considered too young to be responsible for their actions, but various factors could influence a court's attitude.[46] If sex seemed to be consensual, rather than rape, younger partners were treated as accomplices. Interrogatories,

42 The following books and articles discuss and also quantify cases: Chapters 4, 5, and 9 in Perry, *Crime and Society in Early Modern Seville* and Perry, *Gender and Disorder*, 123-127; "The 'Nefarious Sin' in Early Modern Seville," in *The Pursuit of Sodomy: Male Homosexuality in Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe*, ed. Ken Gerard and Gert Hekma (New York: Harrington Park Press, 1991); Cristian Berco, *Sexual Hierarchies, Public Status: Men, Sodomy, and Society in Spain's Golden Age* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) and "Producing Patriarchy," 352-75; Geoffrey Spurling, "Honor, Sexuality, and the Colonial Church, The Sins of Dr. González, Cathedral Canon," in *The Faces of Honor,"* 45-67. Other articles on homosexual behavior in both Native American and colonial society in the New World appear in Pete Sigal, editor, *Infamous Desire: Male Homosexuality in Colonial Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

43 Berco, *Sexual Hierarchies*, 24-26.

44 Officials in Spain subscribed to the prevailing attitude that men, because of their unbridled lusts, would seek sexual pleasure by any means available to them, and that sodomy was therefore a constant temptation. Prisons and military garrisons, where men had little access to women as sexual partners, were regarded as places of high risk for homosexual behavior. Some large cities, Seville among them, maintained licensed brothels in the belief that access to women prostitutes would provide males with a sexual outlet and keep them from engaging in anal intercourse of any kind, with males or females. Berco, "Producing Patriarchy," 363 and associated footnotes; Perry, *Gender and Disorder*, 123-124, and *Crime and Society*, 84; Saint-Saens, *Homoerotic Suffering*, 10-11. B.R. Burg, in his classic study *Sodomy and the Pirate Tradition, English Sea Rovers in the Seventeenth –Century Caribbean* (New York: New York University Press, 1984) found much the same attitudes towards men, lust, and sodomy in England. During Elizabethan and Restoration times, sodomy was treated as one sex crime among many, and not singled out as especially abhorrent. English moralists were also inclined to think that male lusts would lead to sodomy with other males in environments where there were no women available as sexual partners.

45 Saint-Saens, *Homoerotic Suffering*, 15-16.

46 Berco, "Producing Patriarchy," 361.

the questions asked during proceedings, were designed to assess complicity. They included questions such as: Did you receive any gift or money for your actions? Why did you do it? Did you get pleasure from what you did or did it hurt you? How often have you done this? If testimony indicated habitual sexual activity or sex for pleasure or for money, minors might be treated as adults. Officials also did not shy away from graphic details about sexual activity. In order to prove anal intercourse, the court needed evidence that a partner ejaculated semen into the rectum of his partner. In seeking to establish this fact, they would question the accused and witnesses closely.[47]

The case in St. Augustine followed standard procedures for such investigations. Because it involved soldiers, it was constituted as a court martial, headed by a *fiscal* and a panel of six officers. It commenced with a *denuncia* or indictment. In this case, a resident of St. Augustine, José Saby, a local baker, testified under oath that three soldiers from the infantry regiment of Havana had abused an eleven-year-old English orphan boy, Archer Stone, for sex. Stone lived with an older brother in Saby's home. The charge was confirmed by Captain Carlos Howard, who said that his ward, eleven-year-old Timothy Clavería, had also been abused. Called upon to testify, Clavería admitted he had been "fooling around" with some soldiers. Asked exactly how he had fooled around with them, he replied that sometimes by taking their penises in his hand, and sometimes, with one soldier, in his rear end. Clavería implicated a third boy, Francisco de León, son of a *praesidario*, a convict sentenced to serve the military in St. Augustine. Soon afterwards, officials heard from Antonio de Yguíñiz, instructor for writing and mathematics at the local school, that another boy, ten-year-old Nicholas Dimarachi, had also admitted to sleeping with a soldier. Francisco de León and his father both denied the charges, and Dimarachi could not immediately be found, having been relocated out of town by his guardian.[48]

47 Ibid.," 361-362.

48 Proceso formado contra los soldados en el 2º Piqte del Regto de la Havana, Josef de Torres, Bentª Billamarin y Gregoria Quevedo, accusados de haver incurrido, en el crimen de sodomia, con los muchachos Timoteo Claveria, Archer Stone, Franco de León y Nicolas Dimaracht, y otros soldados reos de menor gravidad, comprehendidos in el expresado proceo, 13 de Sept., 1788, "Court Martials," Section 64, East Florida Papers, Bundle 280, Reel 119, leaves 3-17, hereafter referred to as Proceso. The three soldiers initially accused were José de Torres, Buenaventura Villamarin, and Gregorio Quevedo of the Second Pickett in the Havana Infantry. They were in their mid-twenties. Torres's duties apparently

During the first ten days of the court martial, officials called numerous witnesses, taking depositions and assembling information, much in the manner of a modern day police investigation. The boys were taken into custody. The court ascertained their ages and appointed *custodios* or legal guardians, who had to be present anytime the boys were questioned. Three soldiers, José de Torres, Buenaventura Villamarín, and Gregorio Quevedo, of the Second Pickett in the Havana Infantry, were arrested and were placed in confinement in the Castillo de San Marcos.[49]

A key witness in the preliminary stage of the case was Howard, who gave a long deposition in which he recounted his growing uneasiness and fears about the behavior of his ward, Clavería. The boy's parents were dead, and his godfather was in the military in Cuba and traveled frequently. Therefore Howard, a friend of Clavería's father and godfather, had agreed to take the boy in and had been responsible for him for about five years. Thinking the house of a soldier was no fit place for the boy, he had placed him

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attached him to the treasury and he bunked in the kitchen outbuilding at the residence of Dimas Cortés, where he had a canvas cot and a chest for his clothes. Although the boy, Nicolas, is identified as Dimaracht throughout the record, he signs his name Dimarachi. Yguíñiz taught at the school from 1787 to 1793. The parish priests were anxious to establish the school, telling Zéspedes that the Minorcan boys in St. Augustine were wandering around the streets and speaking English instead of Spanish. This case must have reinforced their conviction that boys needed to be off the streets and under supervision. James Cusick, "The Boys' School in Colonial St. Augustine, 1786-1820, *El Escribano*, Vol. 42, 2005, 23-46. It should be noted, however, that although Yguíñiz was conducting an investigation into what Dimarachi was doing, he suspended it when the boy stopped showing up for school. He also noted in his testimony that Timothy Claveria had stopped attending school. This illustrated a typical pattern in the case—that adults did not pursue matters if they fell outside their immediate jurisdiction. Orphans lacked the social net expected in Spanish culture. "Parents had a moral obligation to provide for their children. They owed them four things: subsistence, education, the means to secure a proper lifestyle, and a good example . . . It was a mortal sin to fail to provide for children materially or spiritually." Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, "Model Children and Models for Children in Early Mexico," pp. 52-71, in *Minor Omissions: Children in Latin American History and Society*, ed. Tobias Hecht (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), 60.

49 This case followed closely the procedures that Cutter outlines in *Legal Culture of Northern New Spain*, 105-146. However, it was a court martial, and therefore it also conformed to the regulations set out in the *reales ordenanzas*. These set forth the jurisdiction of courts martial, the required number of officers, the standards for evaluating evidence, the formulas for voting, and the sentences for offenses. Premo, ," outlines the various ages of responsibility and how this affected legal rights and also explains opening court procedures and the appointment of legal protectors (*curador ad litem*) for those under the age of twenty five. See Premo, "Minor Offenses," 117-119.

with a prominent English widow and merchant, Honoria Clarke, who had sons of her own, so that he could live with a family. He also enrolled him in school. Clavería's parents had been English and Spanish and Howard wanted to "give him the kind of education that would allow him to make a career in commerce."[50]

These ambitions for the boy did not go well. According to Howard, over the course of a year and a half, Clavería's behavior became disorderly. When the boy's godfather arrived in St. Augustine, the boy expressed a wish to be near him, and Howard agreed. He soon learned, however, that Clavería was missing for days at a time both from the home of his godfather and from the household of the Clarkes, and that he was also going out late at night, claiming he was attending Rosary. People told Howard that Clavería always seemed to have money, more money than Howard gave him in an allowance.[51]

When he confronted the eleven-year-old about the money, Clavería lied to him, first saying he had received it from various people, then that he found it in the street, then that it came from a baker he had helped. Howard's inquiries around town eventually led him to the Saby household and one of Clavería's friends, the English orphan named Archer Stone. Howard had a bad opinion of Stone and had tried to keep the boys apart. He tracked Stone down, demanding to know if he was spending time with Clavería. Stone, after initially denying this, fell down on his knees and said he would tell the whole truth as long as Howard did not punish him.[52]

To Howard's horror, the boy then told him that Clavería had not stolen any money, that they had gotten it by giving their bodies to some soldiers: "Asked what he meant, Archer said that the soldiers would put their members in their hands, showing them how to move their hands, until liquid came out of the said organ; and that some were in the habit of putting their members between the cheeks of his buttocks, and that others would make him lay face down and open his legs, raising the said member to his rear end, and inserting it painfully into his body. When asked if he was certain about this, he said, yes, and asked if this didn't hurt him, Archer replied that it hurt a lot, so much that he screamed

50 Proceso, 17-19.
51 Ibid., 19-20.
52 Ibid., 20-21.

aloud, and would try to avoid the contact, sometimes succeeding, sometimes not, until he felt the liquid enter his body."[53]

Stone then recounted a specific incident that had taken place in the kitchen building at the house of Dimas Cortés, the chief accountant for the Treasury. The soldier who lodged there, José de Torres, had him face down on a cot with his pants down, and was sodomizing him, he said, when Cortés walked in and yelled at the soldier, saying if he ever did anything like that again, he would throw him out. Clavería was also present and had also been sodomized. But Cortés, Stone said, had then turned around and walked out, leaving them there.[54] Timothy Clavería later admitted all this to Howard and repeated it in his court testimony. Much of the remainder of the case was directed at trying to substantiate these statements.

Almost immediately, however, the investigation ran into a major obstacle. Dimas Cortés, summoned to give testimony immediately after Howard, contradicted everything that Howard and the boys had stated. There were never any boys inside his house, he said, and he did not know the boys in question, and had never seen them around the place.[55]

Temporarily abandoning this line of inquiry, the court focused instead on the other boys, calling witnesses to determine if either Francisco de León or Nicholas Dimararchi had been seen in the

53 Ibid., 23-29.

54 Ibid., 24-25. In the middle of the case, José Saby died from drowning. Within a year, Ransom Stone had applied to marry Saby's widow. Lipsett-Rivera notes that infancy was considered over at three years of age, and that in eighteenth-century Mexico Archbishop Lorenzana y Buitron in his *Cartas pastorals y edictos* advised that boys and girls should have separate sleeping areas after ten years of age. Children were considered to have *uso de razón* at age seven, and could be married although the Church recognized marriage at age twelve for girls and fourteen for boys; by law, children under the age of ten "could not legally be punished for any crimes they committed." Lipsett-Rivera, "Model Children," 59-60. Premo gives the legal age as ten and a half, and from there to seventeen youths were considered to know right from wrong, although imperfectly. Premo, "Minor Offenses," 117-118. According to Ondina E. González, "Down and Out in Havana, Foundlings in Eighteenth Century Cuba," in *Minor Omissions: Children in Latin American History and Society*, ed. Tobias Hecht (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), 105, abandoned children were turned out of foster care at age five in Havana, although in the 1760s Charles III ordered that children, once removed from foster care, be put into a seminary or convent. For the fear that Stone and Dimarachi both expressed at being punished (probably beaten) see Lipsett-Rivera, "Model Children," 64-65. Discipline by beating, if softer measures failed, was considered a parental duty. See Premo, "Minor Offenses," 116-117.

55 Proceso, 30-31.

company of soldiers, especially those under arrest. At the same time they ordered medical examinations of all the boys, asking the chief surgeon at the Royal Hospital and the medical practitioner to make an examination of the anal region of each boy, to look for signs of bruising or violence, and to state if there was any evidence that a man had penetrated their anuses. Over the next weeks, the case followed several identifiable patterns. First, the *fiscal* grilled the boys about why they had prostituted themselves, apparently unconvinced that their sole motivation was money. Second, adults called in as witnesses distanced themselves from involvement. Typically, after answering preliminary questions, they responded "that they did not know anything" (*que no sabe nada*). Third, and in contrast, several boys from the school, called upon to testify, talked freely. While also denying any direct knowledge about the case, they repeatedly said that they could report "what they heard"—namely, that the boys under arrest had been fooling around with soldiers and getting money for it. The *fiscal*, Don Ignacio Royo, a lieutenant in the Havana Regiment, was especially disturbed to hear that rumors about the case were circulating widely, complicating the task of getting clear testimony, and spreading a scandal.[56]

Finally, as witness after witness expressed ignorance, officials began a search for physical evidence. Besides the medical examinations, they called in the slave women who washed the laundry in the homes of Stone and Clavería, asking if they had ever noticed blood stains on the boys' shirt tails or bed sheets.[57] Just as evidence seemed to be dwindling, ten-year-old Nicholas Dimarachi, called in to testify, stirred things up again by stating that soldiers had solicited him for sex and that he had engaged in sex with Juan Quevedo, one of the accused. This started another round of depositions.[58]

In all, the court called thirty-six witnesses. Inquiries began to concentrate on the house of Dimas Cortés. Members of his household and visitors to his house were asked if they recalled seeing any of the boys on the premises. They all reported that they had

56 In fact, José Saby and Carlos Howard, the two adults who first brought the case to the authorities, had feared this would happen. Howard testified that he had agonized for forty-eight hours before reporting what he knew, afraid of the scandal that would surround his ward. He had only gone to the authorities after conferring with one of the parish priests, who had advised him that the matter was bound to become public and had to be reported.

57 Proceso. 32-60.

58 Ibid., 52- 54. Stone's guardian, José Saby, and Eusebio de León's father, both died before the conclusion of the trial. Ibid., 36.

no recollection of seeing them. The three accused soldiers were questioned and also denied knowing the boys or engaging in sex with them. Other soldiers from their unit, called to testify, reported that they knew nothing.[59] Then, in a procedure known as *careo* or confrontation, witnesses who had given conflicting testimony were brought together. All the boys in the case confronted one another and stuck to their original statements. The accused soldiers were confronted by Stone and Clavería, but denied knowing them. Cortés was confronted by the boys and also denied having ever seen them. The *fiscal* also asked Clavería and Dimarachi to review a line-up of troops and identify the men who had molested them. They could not or would not make a positive identification.[60]

Meanwhile, however, the *fiscal* put Stone's testimony to the test in what would be decisive evidence for the court. He took the boy to the town plaza, accompanied by the court recorder and Stone's legal advisor. Then he asked Stone how to get to Cortés' house, which was not visible from where they were standing, and which, according to adult testimony, the boy had never visited. Stone gave him specific directions, explaining that the route lay south on the main street (modern-day St. George Street), past the property of Don Gregorio Huet, and then east on the cross street (modern-day Cadiz). The *fiscal* followed up by asking Stone to describe the interior of the house, its layout and furnishings, the contents of the kitchen building, and other details. Stone's responses were written down, and with this record in hand the *fiscal* proceeded to the residence of Cortés. He later reported to the court that the location of the house, its layout and yard and the furnishings inside the kitchen building closely matched Stone's testimony.[61]

59 Ibid., 58-98.

60 Ibid., 114-132.

61 Ibid., 56-58. Stone's directions to the house indicate it was the property identified as No. 212 on the 1788 map of St. Augustine by Mariano de la Rocque. According to the map key, this property, which was the lot at the southeast corner of modern day St. George and Cadiz Streets (now property of the Sisters of St. Joseph) was owned by Bernardo Seguí. The Álvarez registry book of property ownership, held at the St. Augustine Historical Society, also indicates that No. 212 was owned by the Seguí family. However, Dimas Cortés married one of the Seguí daughters and the property may have come to the couple as part of the dowry. A tax list for the city indicates that Cortés was the owner of the house. This is according to a typescript of the tax list, Box 7, File 15, MC 63 at the Saint Augustine Historical Society, based on the original with the East Florida Papers, Library of Congress, labeled East Florida Assessor's Inventory, Number 78. Archer Stone's description conforms closely to the layout depicted for No. 212. Assuming the property was entered through a gate at the northeast corner of the lot on Cadiz, then, as Stone testified, the main

After a month of investigation, the three soldiers originally arrested still stood accused of sodomy and in addition two corporals and five other soldiers had been charged with lesser sex crimes. The defense mounted an attack on the weak points in the case, noting that the descriptions the boys gave of their molesters did not conclusively point to those in custody and that no witnesses, other than the boys, could corroborate that any crime occurred. Officers of the court marital agreed. In rendering their decision, they unanimously ruled that the most serious charge—sodomy by anal intercourse—had not been proven. However, the *fiscal,* in his summary of the case, noted that the circumstances were extremely suspicious and that other evidence pointed to the soldiers having abused the boys. The medical evidence, while not conclusive, showed trauma or bruising around the anuses of both Clavería and Stone; there was evidence for bloodstains on Clavería's bed sheets; and Stone had been able to describe the interior of a kitchen building where one of the soldiers bunked, even though adult witnesses insisted he had never been there. He argued that if the three principal soldiers were guilty, they deserved to be hanged. The boys, he said, should receive six months under house arrest, and the other soldiers involved ought to get eight months in prison. Ultimately the court exonerated the soldiers of the main charge, but nonetheless voted to sentence the three principals to two years hard labor in Puerto Rico, and recommended that the five soldiers and two corporals serve one month in jail. The four boys received six months of house arrest and were remanded to their parents or guardians for whatever punishment they saw fit. Two of the boys, Nicholas Dimarachi and Francisco de León, were subsequently sent away to Havana, to the care of relatives.[62]

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house is to the right and the kitchen building, oriented with its narrow face north-south, was to the left upon passing the gate. The back or south side of the main house contained a *comedor* (or *loggia*) flanked by two small identically sized rooms at the east and west ends, giving access to the main room *(sala)* of the house. According to Stone, the kitchen, the scene of the soldiers' sexual escapades, contained a cot and trunk, a shelf for cooking utensils, and, on the west wall, the hearths for cooking. Stone answered questions about the location of the well, and described paint and tile work. His deposition left little doubt that, despite the testimony of Cortés and others, the boy had been inside the house and was familiar with its layout.

62 Ibid., October 22, 1788, 135-145. The court was apparently following procedures pertaining to *medias pruebas*—testimony that fell short of what the law required to convict on a capital offense, but that was pertinent to lesser offenses, such as the charge that the soldiers had used the boys as tools for masturbation. The regulations for court martial allowed the court to issue a

The intensive investigation surrounding this case, the only one of its kind from St. Augustine, highlights many aspects of life in the town. Poor and orphaned children there faced many of the same dangers found in large cities. Although urban centers such as Seville and Havana, and even medium-sized towns like New Orleans, operated houses of charity and orphanages to care for the needy, youths who lacked any protection faced a harsh world in which they were expected to survive on their own from an early age. Young boys living on the streets of Seville, for example, imitated the behavior of older gang members, learning to steal and beg, sometimes pimping to prostitute their sisters, and sometime prostituting themselves.[63] In a world with little privacy, they witnessed sexual intercourse at very young ages, and mimicked sex acts.[64] They were also in constant danger of being suborned by adults on the prowl for sexual partners. Neighborhoods with all-male enclaves, such as prisons or barracks, had especially dark reputations and were considered danger areas for youths.[65]

The case from St. Augustine demonstrates that the size of the city did not matter. Even in a small town, Stone, Clavería, and the others could disappear for days and evade adult supervision.[66] Officials likely started a school for boys in St. Augustine in part to curb the problem of youths wandering around freely. Certainly the soldiers' barracks at the south end of town gave them cause for concern. It had a seedy reputation as a haven after dark for all sorts of sexual encounters among the men.

Of the four boys involved in the case, three were orphans and one had a bed-ridden father who died during the course of the case. Archer Stone, the English boy, seems to have led the stereotypical orphan's hard life. Stone did not go to school, making the rounds each day to deliver bread from the Saby bakery. Francisco de León visited his ill father at the military hospital but otherwise went

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pena extraordinaria, or sentence at the discretion of the presiding officials, in such a case. They cited Tradado 8, Titulo 5, Articulo 48 (*Ordenanzas del ejército*, 258-259). *Medias pruebas*, in current Spanish legal parlance, means testimony that comes from a single witness, without corroboration. Henry Saint Dahl, *McGraw Hill's Spanish and English Legal Dictionary*,(New York: McGraw Hill, 2004). In the sentencing of the boys, the court was apparently exercising its legal prerogative to try the boys as adults but to sentence them more leniently than adults. Premo, "Youth, Crime, and Law in Lima," 118-119.

63 Perry, *Crime and Society*, 195-211.

64 Berco, "Producing Patriarchy," 369-370.

65 Perry, *Crime and Society*, 84; Berco, "Producing Patriarchy," 363 and associated footnotes; Perry, *Gender and Disorder*, 123-124.

66 Cusick, "Boys School," 32-33.

about most of the day on his own. Following his arrest, and his father's death, he had no place to live, and remained incarcerated in the Castillo, from where he petitioned the governor to release any clothing and other articles he had inherited, so that he would not suffer so much from cold. The enigma in the case seems to be Timothy Clavería, who, although an orphan, had a godfather and a guardian, and a comparatively privileged life, yet prostituted himself for money.

It is clear from court depositions that the boys were lured into sexual liaisons, although the court was equally convinced that they consented to sex. In a revealing piece of testimony, Clavería described the ploys the soldiers used to lead the boys on. In initial encounters, they exposed themselves, then encouraged the boys to touch them. Later, they sought more bodily contact, and ultimately anal intercourse. This is remarkably similar to tactics used by modern pedophiles. The offer of money may have been intended as a reward or as a bribe to buy silence. The soldiers also made attempts to isolate the boys, meeting them in outbuildings or stalls, and always after dark.[67]

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the case was the behavior of most adults, who seemed more intent on suppressing scandal than on the fate of the boys. The deposition of Dimas Cortés' was the single most important piece of testimony in the case. It directly contradicted the statements of Archer Stone and Timothy Clavería. If the boys were lying, then the *fiscal* would have been justified in his later opinion that Clavería, at least, was capable of great malice. The preponderance of the evidence, however, suggests it was Cortés who was being less than truthful. If so, he was responsible for saving Torres and Villamarín, at least from conviction on a capital charge and subsequent execution. The court martial did not completely exonerate the soldiers, indicating it found the boys' testimony more compelling than that of a host of adults.

No taint of scandal seems to have attached itself to Cortés, however. Five years after this case, he became the schoolmaster for writing and mathematics at the school for boys.[68] By contrast, the scandal undoubtedly touched Carlos Howard, guardian of Clavería. For the rest of his time in St. Augustine, until his duties took him west to the Louisiana territory, he commanded soldiers

67 Proceso, 24-25.
68 Cusick, "The Boys School," 27.

who were well aware that some of their compatriots had abused a boy under his protection and a member of his household.

The ultimate fate of the boys, as they went on in life, is unknown. With the end of the case, they disappeared from the documentary record. In all likelihood the social consequences for them were severe. For a male in Spanish culture, submitting to anal intercourse was the ultimate mark of degradation and emasculation.[69] According to perceptions of the time, it meant he was a pet or plaything for other men and no longer a man. The shame extended not just to him but to his family.[70] From the case record, it is clear that liaisons between the boys and the soldiers were a topic of public gossip. Francisco de León and Nicholas Dimarachi, were deported to Havana, in part to get them away from the scandal. As for Archer Stone and Timothy Clavería, they apparently remained in St. Augustine. It is easy to imagine the open taunts and behind-the-back comments Stone and Clavería had to endure from the eighty or more boys who lived in town and probably heard the gossip about the case at school. Compared to this, the two years of hard labor given to the soldiers may have been a light punishment.

These cases serve to demonstrate some of the richness of the criminal court records of St. Augustine. The application of law in this borderland capital was consistent with legal procedures used throughout the Spanish empire. The *asesor general,* the *fiscal,* the notaries, the military officers, and the governors showed professional commitment to following regulations for investigating crime, conducting proceedings, and rendering verdicts. Whether their judgments were swayed by issues of poverty or wealth, slave or free, or other social statuses requires a more in-depth study encompassing a greater number and variety of cases then those presented here. What is clear, however, is that established legal rights—the right to a guardian for underage defendants, the right to confront witnesses through the *careo,* the requirements that a complaint be substantiated by reliable witnesses—were all diligently followed. The application of "frontier justice," in this case, does not seem to have differed significantly from justice elsewhere.

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69 ". . . passive sodomy emerged as a symbol of the vanquished, the weak, the unmasculine. Beyond the sexual act itself, the language of sodomy—shared by defendants, witnesses, and even magistrates—equated sexual passivity with a shameful emasculation." Berco, "Producing Patriarchy," discussed 357-358, quote from 360.

70 Ibid., 366-367.

Mayhem and Murder in the East Florida Frontier 1783 to 1789

by Diane Boucher

Historians of late eighteenth-century Florida usually distinguish between the British period (1763-1783) and the second Spanish period (1783-1821), a distinction that sometimes obscures the permanence of inhabitants interacting in the region. U.S. historians tend to view Florida history within the context of national politics and the inevitable U.S. acquisition of the territory, a perspective that underplays the importance of the region to frontier and Atlantic world history and minimizes the interpretation that throughout the British and Spanish periods (1763-1821) East Florida was embroiled in regional and Atlantic conflicts. More recently, historians have re-envisioned East Florida history as a sustained struggle for dominance of the frontier among Native Americans, Spanish, British, and U.S. settlers. In East Florida, indigenous and settler communities played a dynamic role in challenging Native American, British, Spanish and U.S. attempts to maintain order along the northeast border of the East Florida frontier.[1]

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1 William S. Belko, "Introduction" in *America's Hundred Years' War: U.S. Expansion to the Gulf Coast and the Fate of the Seminoles, 1763-1858,* ed. William S. Belko (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011), 5-8; Susan Richbourg Parker, "So In Fear of Both the Indians and the Americans" in *America's Hundred Years War,* 25-40. Parker presents an overview of numerous volatile interactions among

This article offers insights into the flows of people, goods, and ideas across and beyond the political boundaries of East Florida in the Second Spanish Period (1783-1789) that threatened the stability and security of inhabitants as well as the imperatives of empires and nations. In examining the complex interactions among these peoples and polities, this paper contributes to recent studies that argue erasing traditional historical compartmentalization expands conventional U.S. history to highlight the lasting impact of interpersonal rivalries and associations of late eighteenth-century East Florida.[2]

Diverse, multiethnic groups of frontier inhabitants utilized regional networks to negotiate, protect, and advance their legal and extralegal interests amid inter-imperial and international rivalries. East Florida inhabitants might have sworn loyalty oaths to British and Spanish sovereigns to gain land grants and royal protection, but in many circumstances, frontier society conformed to royal decrees only when policies aligned with individual and community interests. When royal and national authorities were unable to meet inhabitants' needs and expectations, inhabitants broke their oaths and acted outside the constraints of imperial and national governments.

Defining Frontier and Community

North American frontiers were overlapping zones of political, economic, social, military, and cultural influence.[3] Despite imperial

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Native Americans, British, Spanish, and Georgia inhabitants in East Florida from 1763 to 1790. This article is focused on transnational exchange networks that influenced imperial and national policies. A few recent studies that consider the dynamic regional activity amid inter-imperial struggles include: Faren R. Seminoff, *Crossing the Sound: The Rise of Atlantic American Communities in Seventeenth Century Eastern Long Island* (New York: New York University Press, 2004); Gene Allen Smith and Sylvia L. Hinton, eds., *Nexus of Empire Negotiating Loyalty and Identity in the Revolutionary Borderlands, 1760s-1820s,* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010); and *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

2 Some historians, ethnohistorians, and anthropologists that examine frontiers within a broader framework are: Kathryn E. Holland Braund, *Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993); Daniel H. Usner Jr. *Indians, Settlers & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); David J. Webber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992): Jane Landers, "The Spanish Florida Frontier" in *Beyond Black and Red: African-Native Relations in Colonial Latin America,* ed. Matthew Restall (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2005); and Paul Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).

3 Weber, *The Spanish Frontier,* 12.

intentions to control colonial territories, frontier borders were porous regions where Native Americans and settler communities were more fully engaged in regional networks than responsive to European imperial prerogatives.[4] Nowhere is this frontier approach more applicable than in East Florida in the transitional period immediately following the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to Spain in 1783.

Numerous communities resided within the northeast Florida frontier society. Native Americans, settlers, and slaves integrated into frontier communities primarily through land use and ownership, real and fictive kin relationships, performance of civic duties, and economic ties. Frontier disturbances contributed to social, economic, and demographic disruptions that impacted developing networks and political institutions. The survival of indigenous and settler societies required cooperation and accommodation, but interpersonal relationships also "found expression in violence and brutality."[5]

Integration into military and family networks conveyed the shared sense of belonging that defined community, more so than traditional social markers such as race, religion, ethnicity, slave and free status.[6] Individuals maintained community membership as long as their actions upheld the shared sense of duty and common interests. When individuals altered their perceptions of mutual interest or individual interests changed, members redefined their commitment to community, society, and authority. Transitioning out of an existing community meant individuals were free to join new or competing communities that offered better protection of individual interests.

Transfer of Sovereignty (1783-1785)

Twenty years after the British acquisition of the Floridas, British Secretary of State Lord Thomas Townshend notified Governor Patrick Tonyn of the retrocession of the territory to Spain in

4 J.H. Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 274.

5 Elliot, *Empires of the Atlantic*, 274. See also Hal Langfur, *The Forbidden Lands: Colonial Identity, Frontier Violence, and the Persistance of Brazil's Eastern Indians, 1750-1830* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

6 Sherry Johnson, "The Spanish St. Augustine Community, 1784-1795: A Reevaluation," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 68, no. 1 (July 1989): 33-34, 42-44, 47, 52-53.

February 1783.[7] Tonyn estimated that nearly twelve thousand Loyalists had cleared land and built homes extending 100 miles north and south of Saint Augustine and he had to inform them to settle their affairs if they chose to leave.[8] The decision surprised Loyalists who had invested considerable effort and money in developing and defending the region. The announcement of the retrocession gave rise to lawlessness in the territory. As British troops left the province, Tonyn feared that the "lower sort" would take advantage of the government's weakened condition to ravage the province. By the lower sort, Tonyn meant impoverished inhabitants, disbanded soldiers, and Patriots coming into the province to reclaim fugitive and stolen slaves.[9]

Inhabitants feared for their lives and property. Royalist troops sought discharges in Saint Augustine rather than transfer with the military to Nova Scotia or the West Indies. British regulars claimed they would rather die than be discharged in Halifax and Tonyn had soldiers killed for planning an insurrection against the fort.[10] When a sergeant and eight men mutinied at the Mosquito blockhouse in May, the governor rewarded the militiamen who captured them.[11] In a separate case in July, British soldiers captured six deserters from the Royal North Carolina Regiment.[12] Mutiny among the troops only amplified residents' doubts about the British government's ability to protect them. Over eighty inhabitants from the northern frontier pleaded with Tonyn to post additional guards to protect all moveable property until the evacuation was completed.[13]

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7 Thomas Townshend to Patrick Tonyn, February 28, 1783, Joseph Byrne Lockey, *East Florida 1783-1785: A File of Documents Assembled, and Many of Them Translated* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), 59.

8 Wilbur Henry Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida 1774 to 1785: The Most Important Documents Pertaining Thereto, Edited with an Accompanying Narrative* 2 vols. (Boston: Gregg Press, 1972), I: 140; Tonyn to Townshend, May 15, 1783, Lockey, *East Florida,* 97. See also: Governor Tonyn, "A Proclamation," *East Florida Gazette,* May 10, 1783, American Antiquarian Society (hereafter AAS), 1.

9 Tonyn to Sir Guy Carleton, September 11, 1783, British National Archives (hereafter BNA), the Colonial Office Records (hereafter CO) 5/560, f. 351-354, also in Lockey, *East Florida,* 154-156.

10 Extract from a letter received by Captain Bissett in London from his correspondent in Saint Augustine, May 20, 1783, BNA, CO, 5/560, f. 423. See also: Carole Watterson Troxler "Loyalist Refugees and the British Evacuation of East Florida, 1783-1785," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (July 1981): 7.

11 Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida,* I: 144.

12 Ibid., 153.

13 Tonyn to Carleton, September 11, 1783, BNA, CO 5/560, f. 351-354; Memorial and Petition of Inhabitants to Tonyn, September 11, 1783, enclosure, BNA, CO 5/560, f. 355; also in Lockey, *East Florida,* 154-156.

One month after British authorities announced retrocession, an informant claimed the province was in utter confusion. Seminole and Creek chiefs had come to Saint Augustine threatening to kill every Spaniard that stepped over the boundaries and swearing vengeance against Britain's King for giving away their country.[14] Large numbers of Indians traveled to the city to speak with British officials concerning the retrocession expecting to receive diplomatic gifts and provisions for their allied service during the Revolutionary War.[15] East Florida Ranger companies with Creek and Seminole allies had been integral in preventing Patriot forces from overrunning the colony.[16]

British emigration from East Florida began in June 1783, thirteen months before the arrival of Spanish Governor Vicente Manuel de Zéspedes.[17] The maintenance of law and order and administration of justice caused contentious relations between the British and Spanish officials. Tonyn transferred authority to Zéspedes on July 12, 1784, but he had orders to remain in the province to assist with Loyalists' evacuations and to reconcile Indians to the British departure.[18] The concurrent eighteen-month presence of Spanish and British officials led to many disputes over proper jurisdiction. Tonyn warned Zéspedes that *banditti,* outlaw bands of discharged British and Patriot soldiers including whites, blacks and Indians led by Daniel McGirtt, and others had beleaguered the country since the conclusion of the peace treaty.[19] McGirtt's militia experience in the East Florida Rangers during the British period and his territorial knowledge made him an

14 Extract from a letter received by Captain Bissett, May 20, 1783, CO 5/560, f. 423.

15 Ibid. Tonyn to Carleton, September 11, 1783, BNA, CO 5/560, f. 351-354.

16 Tonyn to Colonel Prevost, January 12, 1777, BNA, CO 5/546, f. 139; Tonyn Talk to Chief Perryman and all the Creek Indians in the Scouting Party with the Rangers, January 12, 1777, BNA, CO 5/557, f. 141-42; Lt. Colonel Thomas Brown to Tonyn, February 20, 1777, BNA, CO 5/557, f. 173-75; James Leitch Wright Jr., *Florida in the American Revolution* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975), 18-19; Gary D. Olson, "Thomas Brown, the East Florida Rangers, and the Defense of East Florida" in *Eighteenth-Century Florida and the Revolutionary South,* ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978), 19.

17 Lockey, *East Florida,* 7.

18 Introduction, Lockey, *East Florida,* 14; Vicente Manuel de Zéspedes to Bernardo de Gálvez, July 16, 1784, Lockey, *East Florida,* 230; Helen Hornbeck Tanner, *Zéspedes in East Florida 1784-1790* (Jacksonville: University of North Florida Press, 1989), 33; Seibert, *Loyalists in East Florida,* I: 138-139 and 155.

19 Tonyn to Governor Vincent Emmanuel de Zéspedes, July 5, 1784, East Florida Papers (hereafter EFP), Reel 16. Also in Lockey, *East Florida,* 214.

apt choice to become leader of a marauding community of war veterans, refugees, vagrants, and social outcasts.[20]

Tonyn had attempted to halt McGirtt's criminal activity. He appointed two light horse troops to protect the people and property of the province while Senior Justice Samuel Farley issued warrants for McGirtt's arrest.[21] McGirtt eluded capture with the assistance of his family and community networks. He concealed himself in the swamp near his family home to waylay unsuspecting travelers and stopped over at the homes of various friends and accomplices in the region.[22]

While Zéspedes offered clemency to marauders, McGirtt and his gang deprived the departing British subjects, particularly officials, of property. In one instance, McGirtt's crew stole four horses from Chief Justice James Hume's black servants along the Cowford road.[23] In response to his actions, authorities seized some of McGirtt's slaves and sold them at auction. Justice Farley purchased at least eight of the confiscated slaves but on the evening of Zéspedes' inaugural ball, July 15, 1784, thieves stole the newly purchased slaves.[24] When charged with the crime, McGirtt feigned innocence and blamed two members of Lower Creek communities, Philatouche and John Kinnard, for the thefts. Apparently, Kinnard, a *mestizo* (mixed race progeny of European and Native Americans) and Philatouche (of mixed Indian and African American heritage) abetted McGirtt in recovering his slaves.[25]

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20 Lockey, *East Florida*, 14-15; Jane G. Landers, "Francisco Xavier Sánchez, *Floridano* Planter and Merchant" in *Colonial Plantations and Economy in Florida*, ed. Landers (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), 86.

21 Seibert, *Loyalists in East Florida*, I: 153; Tonyn to Zéspedes, July 5, 1784, EFP, Reel 16; Samuel Farley to Keeper of Common Gaol of Saint Augustine, February 18 and 25, 1784, BNA, T 77/23.

22 Complaint of James Hume, July 16, 1784, BNA, T 77/23; Lockey, *East Florida*, 14-17.

23 Affidavit, James Hume, July 16, 1784, BNA, T 77/23; Seibert, *Loyalists in East Florida*, I: 66.

24 Petition of Samuel Farley, August 16, 1784, BNA, CO 5 561/80; Tanner, *Zéspedes*, 40.

25 Petition of Samuel Farley, August 16, 1784, BNA, CO 5 561/80; Caleb Swan Journal Extracts, 1790-1791, "Notes on the Seminoles," American Philosophical Society (hereafter APS), 22-23. Swan, deputy agent to the Creeks in 1791, claimed Jack Kinnard, also referred to as John K. Kinnard, was a rich "Scotch half-breed." Kinnard belonged to the Hitchiti speaking Creek communities and was a warrior and later a chief of the Lower Creeks. The Hitchiti fought with the Rangers in January and February 1777. See Talk from Tonyn to Perryman and the Creek Indians, January 31, 1777, BNA, CO/5/557, f. 167. Kinnard is spelled various ways in British, Spanish, and U.S. documents, alternatively as Kannard, Kinnard, Kinnaird, Canard, Cainard and Kanard. Kinnard signed

Native Americans, as well as settlers, experienced the loss and frustration of the territorial cession to the Spanish government. Many long-term inhabitants involved in military expeditions and multidimensional frontier exchanges now had to reconsider their options. Without the option of evacuation, British-allied Creek and Seminole Indians confronted an unknown future among former enemies. An estimated three thousand former British subjects returned to U.S. states.[26] Others determined to stay, and some, like McGirtt, Kinnard, and Philatouche, developed new networks that ostracized them from the outgoing British.

Under Spanish Authority

After July 1784, Spanish Governor Zéspedes' chief concerns were crime, punishment, and the inhabitants' legal status. To establish his authority, Zéspedes began his tenure by issuing proclamations concerning residency and criminal activity. Residents who wished to remain in the province under Spanish protection had twenty days to register.[27] Additionally, Zéspedes offered clemency to outlaws who had been plundering British plantations.[28] In direct opposition to Tonyn's initiative to arrest *banditti*, Zéspedes attempted to coax the outlaws out of hiding for safe conduct outside the province.[29] Zéspedes' act infuriated Tonyn who complained that McGirtt had found a secure sanctuary for committing the "most horrid crimes."[30]

For McGirtt and those like him, instabilities caused by war and the imperial transfer of authority provided ideal circumstances for a lawless career. McGirtt and other outlaws accepted Zéspedes'

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correspondence written by an interpreter with the letter K. Philatouche was a prominent Lower Creek leader of the Chiaja and slave trader. Philatouche is alternatively spelled Filatuchi. For information on Philatouche see: Claudio Saunt, "The English Has Now a Mind to Make Slaves of Them All: Creeks, Seminoles, and the Problem of Slavery" *American Indian Quarterly* 22, no. 1/2 (Winter-Spring 1998): 167; Christina Snyder, "Conquered Enemies, Adopted Kin, and Owned People: The Creek Indians and their Captives," *Journal of Southern History* 73, no. 2 (May 2007): 34.

26 Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida*, I: 174; Carole Watterson Troxler, "Refuge, Resistance, and Reward: The Southern Loyalists' Claim on East Florida," *Journal of Southern History* 55, no.4 (November 1989): 566-567.

27 Affidavit, James Hume, July 16, 1784, BNA, T 77/23.

28 Proclamation of Governor Zéspedes, July 14, 1784 Lockey, *East Florida*, 233-234; Tonyn to Zéspedes, August 7, 1784, Lockey, *East Florida*, 342-345.

29 Proclamation of Governor Zéspedes, July 14, 1784, Lockey, *East Florida*, 233-234.

30 Tonyn to Zéspedes, September 24, 1784, Lockey, *East Florida*, 359.

offer of clemency though they continued to harass the province. Spanish troops finally arrested and confined McGirtt in February 1785.[31] McGirtt's imprisonment did not end the violence or spate of robberies.[32] Violence and raiding begun in wartime persisted as inhabitants continued to subvert justice and flee across porous political boundaries.

Throughout the transition the legal status of slaves and free blacks remained in doubt. Blacks entered the region as fugitives, as prisoners of war, and as slaves freed by military service and they could be found working in many professions as skilled and unskilled labor. Georgia and South Carolina residents demanded the return of fugitive slaves who had fled to East Florida during the Revolution. Since free blacks did not always have the credentials to prove their status, unscrupulous Floridians attempted to re-enslave them, steal slaves, or inveigle slaves to flee from their owners.[33] In an attempt to bring order to the situation, Zéspedes ordered all blacks or mulattos, slave or free, to register within twenty days of the proclamation.[34] When British officials protested that Zéspedes had no right to detain inhabitants, the Spanish official offered assurances that the registration requirement protected British rights. Registering free blacks and slaves enabled British slaveowners to verify their claims, while Spanish laws protected free blacks from being sold or transported back into slavery.[35] After publication of the proclamation, Spanish officials acknowledged that as many as 250 free blacks produced certificates signed by

31 Lockey, *East Florida*, 17.

32 Zéspedes to Bernardo de Gálvez, February 9, 1785, Lockey *East Florida* 456-459; The Inhabitants of St. Johns to Zéspedes, January 25, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida*, 470-471; Tonyn to Lord Sydney, April 1785, BNA, CO 5/561, f.175-82, also in Lockey, *East Florida*, 496-501.

33 Evidence of British inhabitants' attempts to enslave blacks can be found in: Memorial of William Williams, December 1784, EFP Reel 148; Jane Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 78-79; Jane Landers, "Spanish Sanctuary: Fugitives in Florida, 1687-1790," *Florida Historical Quarterly*, 62, no. 3 (January 1984): 309-310; Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida*, II: 124-128; Complaint by Alexander Paterson, April 24, 1783, BNA, T 77/26; Chancery Court Summons for John Wood, May 24, 1779, BNA, T 77/26; Petition of John McKenzie on behalf of Limus, March 16, 1784, BNA T 77/26; Petition of Zachariah Bryan, March 22 and 23, 1784, BNA, T 77/23/457; and Slave certifications, BNA, T 77.

34 Proclamation of Governor Zéspedes, St Augustine, July 26, 1784, Lockey, *East Florida*, 240-241.

35 Zéspedes' Remarks on James Hume›s Opinion, enclosure December 6, 1784, Lockey, *East Florida*, 340-341.

British military officers or submitted statements explaining their fugitive or free status.[36]

Under Spanish Protection

Three men represented Spanish authority in the northeast region: local magistrate Henry O'Neill, military commander Captain Carlos Howard, and commander of the Spanish naval squadron that accompanied Zéspedes to East Florida, Captain Pedro Vásquez. In addition to their other duties, all three reported the movements of Indians, residents, evacuees, and ships in the St. Marys River and Amelia Island vicinity.[37] O'Neill was a Loyalist refugee from Virginia whose plantation had been confiscated by Patriots.[38] He, his wife and seven children came to the province from Laurens, South Carolina in 1775 and settled on a peninsula near the mouth of the St. Marys River at a plantation called New Hope.[39] Zéspedes appointed O'Neill to regulate peace within the St. Johns to St. Marys Rivers corridor.[40] Captain Howard began his career in the Spanish military as a cadet in 1761 and came to East Florida as the commander of the Hibernian Regiment.[41] Howard also acted as Zéspedes' secretary and translator.[42] Vásquez was the captain and

36 Ibid., 338-339; Statements submitted by various individuals, EFP Reel 148; Landers, *Black Society,* 76-77.

37 Zéspedes to Bernardo de Gálvez, July 16, 1784 and Zéspedes to Pedro Vásquez, July 6, 1784, Lockey, *East Florida,* 226-228. In his letter to Gálvez, Zéspedes lists the vessels of the convoy and their captains. Vásquez is noted as military commandant.

38 Sherry Johnson, *The Social Transformation of Eighteenth-Century Cuba* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 117; Robert S. Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 261.

39 Spanish Census of 1784, EFP, Reel 148; Notes of Isabel Barnwell, James Thomas O'Neill Papers, Special and Area Studies Collection, P. K. Yonge Library (hereafter PKY), University of Florida, Gainesville; Johnson, *Social Transformation,* 117; Carlos Howard to James Seagrove, June 3, 1788, EFP, Reel 82; Zéspedes to Spanish Minister Diego de Gardoqui, August 2, 1788 and enclosure Margaret O'Neill to Zéspedes, June 1, 1788, EFP, Reel 8; Spanish Census of 1787, EFP Reel 148; Donna Rachel Mills, *Florida's First Families Translated Abstracts of pre-1821 Spanish Census* (Tuscaloosa, AL: Mills Historical Press, 1992), 63.

40 Zéspedes to Pedro Vásquez, March 16, 1785, EFP, Reel 44; Alexander Semple to Samuel Elbert, May 18, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida,* 543; Howard to Henry O'Neill, May 23, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida,* 548; Enclosure, O'Neill to Tonyn, n.d., Lockey, *East Florida,* 565-567.

41 Carlos Howard Service Record, Joseph Byrne Lockey Papers, 1877-1946, Box 1, PKY; Johnson, *Social Transformation,* 160.

42 Introduction, Lockey, *East Florida,* 34-35; Zéspedes to José de Gálvez, March 3, 1784, Lockey, *East Florida,* 183-185; Luis de Unzaga to Zéspedes, July 17, 1784, Lockey, *East Florida,* 236.

commander of the Spanish brigantine *San Mateo* stationed in the St. Marys harbor off the western shore of Amelia Island.[43]

During the period of overlapping authority, regular contact occurred between men stationed on board Spanish and British vessels and residents of the St. Marys and St. Johns Rivers region. Spanish officials, sailors, and soldiers who rotated through the region became familiar with local residents. Spanish military personnel purchased goods from local farmers and ranchers including Alexander Semple at Cumberland Island, Georgia.[44] This was a matter of necessity in a poorly provisioned region without access to regular Spanish supply shipments. At times the blurring of the line between official duty and friendly relations muddied the enforcement of royal orders.[45]

The official records document numerous examples of conflicts large and small between officials in the transition period. In the northeast region, magistrate O'Neill transported prisoners to Vásquez to be shipped to Saint Augustine on the *San Mateo* for prosecution by Zéspedes.[46] In one case, O'Neill arrested a British subject in the company of a black man and woman who insisted they were free. Vásquez attempted to take all three to the governor in Saint Augustine for his determination.[47] Governor Tonyn claimed the arrest was groundless and a result of O'Neill's ire because Tonyn had refused to evacuate the O'Neill family.[48]

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43 Zéspedes to Bernardo de Gálvez, July 16, 1784 and enclosure, Vessels of the Convoy, July 16, 1784 Lockey, *East Florida,* 223-226; Howard to O'Neill, May 2, 1785, in Lockey, *East Florida,* 539.

44 Vásquez to Zéspedes, July 4, 1785, EFP, Reel 44.

45 Landers, *Black Society,* 73-74; Sherry Johnson, "Climate, Community and Commerce among Florida, Cuba, and the Atlantic World, 1784-1800," *Florida Historical Quarterly* 80, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 463-465. Johnson notes that coastal hurricanes reduced the Spanish empire's ability to provision East Florida in 1784. The additional expenses caused by storm-related damages, droughts in Mexico, and reduced colonial subsidy convinced Zéspedes to allow "Spanish ships to travel to foreign ports to purchase provisions and foreign ships were allowed to enter Saint Augustine if they carried food." This was before the 1793 *cédula* that allowed free trade in East Florida. See also James Cusick, "Spanish East Florida in the Atlantic Economy of the Late Eighteenth Century" in *Colonial Plantations,* 172-175. Cusick and Johnson agree that Spanish governors were willing to circumvent official Spanish policies to trade with the United States to protect and promote the colony, a practice that began with Zéspedes and was based on the Cuban model of trade with the United States in the 1780s.

46 Howard to O'Neill, May 23, 1785, EFP, Reel 44.

47 Vásquez to Tonyn, June 13, 1785, EFP, Reel 44; Vásquez to Zéspedes, June 14, 1785, EFP, Reel 44.

48 Tonyn to Vásquez, June 12, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida,* 555-556; Vásquez to Zéspedes, June 14, 1785, EFP, reel 44.

Conversely, settlers, like O'Neill, who chose to remain under Spanish jurisdiction, believed Tonyn harbored considerable enmity for residents remaining in East Florida whom he considered to be traitors to the British crown.[49]

Relations along the St. Marys River grew more strained when Tonyn, acting on his own authority, arrested George Arons. Arons had fled to East Florida in 1776 with five slaves he had stolen from his employer, Henry Laurens, in South Carolina.[50] Arons had served in the East Florida Rangers and had been captured during raids in South Carolina.[51] He knew many of the men who decided to stay and those who left. As a Catholic and native of Alsace, France, Arons easily transferred his political allegiance from the British to Spanish sovereignty. Tonyn suspected Vásquez and Arons were stealing or hiding British slaves and demanded their return.[52] Six slaves belonging to British slaveowner John Fox had absconded while being transported to the St. Marys River for evacuation. Fox blamed Arons, Vásquez, and others for illegal slave trafficking. A black witness told Fox he had conversed with the slaves on the *San Mateo* and Fox himself declared he had seen his female slave aboard the brigantine. Still, Vásquez denied any knowledge of the blacks.[53] According to Fox, the networks created among Spanish officials and inhabitants inhibited the retrieval of his slaves. He was convinced that Arons and others stole the slaves, and O'Neill was reluctant to interfere because Arons and Vásquez had become close friends.[54]

Stationed for more than a year in the St. Marys River region, Vásquez and the Spanish military had formed exchange networks with local residents, particularly those who planned to remain. O'Neill, a civilian magistrate, may have been uncertain about challenging a Spanish military commander upon whose assistance

49 O'Neill to Howard, July 3, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida*, 565-566.

50 Lachlan McIntosh Jr. to Lachlan McIntosh Sr., August 14, 1776, *The Papers of Henry Laurens Volume Eleven: January 5 1776-November 1, 1777*, ed. David R Chesnutt and C. James Taylor, et al (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 224n.

51 John Lewis Gervais to Henry Laurens, September 21, 1778, *The Papers of Henry Laurens Volume Fourteen: July 7, 1778-December 9, 1778*, ed. David R. Chesnutt and C. James Taylor, et al (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 330.

52 O'Neill to Howard, July 3, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida*, 565-566; Memorial of John Fox, July 25, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida*, 668-670; Tonyn to Zéspedes, July 25, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida*, 667-668.

53 Memorial of John Fox, July 25, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida*, 669.

54 Affidavit of John Fox, July 25, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida*, 671.

he relied. Having entered the territory as a Loyalist refugee, O'Neill also had to contend with animosity directed at him by Tonyn, departing Loyalists, and former British subjects. In the end, the governor defended the blacks' freedom, partially based on the proclamation issued to determine the status of free blacks and slaves in the province.[55]

Like the British, the Spanish government depended on the inhabitants' cooperation to maintain law, order and neutrality in interregional and inter-imperial conflicts.[56] Even after the formal establishment of Spanish authority and Tonyn's departure in November 1785, the frontier environment made it easy to commit crimes such as theft, illicit commerce, and murder. Criminals simply crossed the St. Marys River into Georgia to avoid prosecution. Native American lands beyond Spanish, British, and U.S. jurisdiction also provided criminals with cover. Suspected criminals who found sanctuary outside the province continued exchanges with East Florida inhabitants connected by family, social, military, and economic networks.[57]

Another factor influencing regional crime patterns was the presence of opportunistic former British subjects who relocated to nearby Georgia and the Carolinas where they used their networks to influence events in East Florida. Many of these former subjects, referred to as Loyalists by both Spanish and American authorities, remained in the region to undermine Spanish possession of the province. In April 1785, O'Neill reported thefts of slaves and horses along the St. Marys River by border-crossing Georgians. Spanish officials had no power to pursue criminals into Georgia or Indian territory to recover property.[58] The delicate nature of Indian relations posed additional threats when Georgians stole from Indians who, in turn, sought retribution. Officials, Indians, and residents could not always distinguish between law-abiding settlers and those who committed crimes, which led to seemingly unprovoked Indian attacks against outlying East Florida and Georgia settlements.[59]

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55 Zéspedes to Tonyn, August 4, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida,* 698-701.

56 Parker, "So In Fear of Both," 28-30.

57 Alexander Semple to Georgia Governor Samuel Elbert, May 18, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida,* 543-544.

58 O'Neill to Howard, April 17, 1785, EFP, Reel 44.

59 O'Neill to Howard, April 17 and May 10, 1785, EFP, Reel 44; Vásquez to Zéspedes, July 13, 1785, EFP Reel 44; O'Neill to Howard, June 1 and 15, 1786, EFP Reel 45; O'Neill to Howard, Oct 21, 1787, EFP, Reel 45.

In May 1785, O'Neill reported that law-abiding residents in Georgia were willing to take up arms against border-crossing villains for their own security and requested permission to cooperate with those Georgians willing to break the connections between outlaws on the north and south sides of the river.[60] Semple, the merchant on Cumberland Island who had frequent interaction with East Florida residents, echoed O'Neill's concerns to Georgia Governor Samuel Elbert. Semple requested government aid to rout the thieves endangering Georgia and East Florida residents.[61] In response to O'Neill's inquiry, Governor Zéspedes replied that he did not have the authority to approve cooperation among nations. Instead, Zéspedes attempted to control the movement of goods and people in and out of the province. He required that any persons entering or leaving East Florida request an official pass signed by him. Officials were to arrest persons without passes, those suspected of regional crimes, or anyone attempting to bring in stolen goods and escort them to the governor in Saint Augustine for interrogation.[62]

The Volatile Border

The encroachment of Georgia settlers on Creek lands led to escalating frontier hostilities in 1785. As various Native American towns negotiated treaties with the Spanish and United States agents, Creek representative Alexander McGillivray requested that the Spanish government make no boundary concessions to the United States that would encroach upon Native American lands.[63] When McGillivray and other Creek chiefs chose not to attend a federally sponsored treaty conference, the congressionally appointed negotiators refused to treat with the Creek representatives.[64] Georgia state commissioners seized the opportunity to conclude an agreement with the few attending Creek leaders who assumed the authority to cede Creek lands between the Altamaha and St. Marys

60 O'Neill to Howard, May 10, 1785, EFP, Reel 44.

61 Semple to Elbert, May 18, 1785, Lockey, *East Florida*, 543-544.

62 Zéspedes to Howard and O'Neill, May 23, 1785, EFP, Reel 44; Howard to O'Neill, May 23, 1785, Reel 44.

63 McGillivray for the Chiefs of the Creek, Chickasaw, and Cherokee Nations, July 10, 1785, John Walton Caughey, *McGillivray and the Creeks* (1938; reprint, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 27-29, 90-93. The U. S. Congress appointed Benjamin Hawkins, Daniel Carroll, and William Perry to treat with the Cherokees and all Southern Indians.

64 Benjamin Hawkins to Alexander McGillivray, January 8, 1786, Caughey, *McGillivray and the Creeks*, 101-102.

Rivers. The agreement transferring territory to Georgia was the Treaty of Galphinton signed on November 12, 1785.[65] McGillivray denounced the treaty, and after a Creek congress in March 1786, the Indians commenced hostilities against the settlements that encroached on Indian lands.[66]

Ultimately, no Creek, Spanish, or Georgia officials had control over the various factions acting along the contested frontier. In early June, O'Neill reported that violent interactions jeopardized East Florida as much as Georgia.[67] A few weeks later, three Indian warriors attacked a settlement on the Florida side of the St Marys River and brutally scalped William Cain's young daughter.[68] O'Neill told residents of the northeast region to prepare to move their families and property to Amelia Island to avoid further Indian attacks.[69] Though O'Neill believed the scalping of Cain's daughter to be the independent action of a few rogue Indians, the presence of large numbers of Indians on the Georgia side of the St. Marys River induced him to request military assistance and permission to transfer residents and their belongings to Amelia Island.[70]

On the Georgia side of the St. Marys River, settlers relocated to Cumberland Island for safety. William Pengree, a former East Florida resident now living in Georgia, described the Cain scalping as a wanton act that had occurred without the consent or knowledge of Native American chiefs.[71] Colonel Jacob Weed, commander of the federal troops at Cumberland Island, along with Pengree and an interpreter, met several Creek chiefs to demand the apprehension and punishment of the three young warriors responsible for the scalping. In the talk, the Americans presented themselves in the most favorable light and impugned Creek honor, questioning why a defenseless female child should be attacked while asserting that white men fought only men and protected all women and

65 William S. Coker and Thomas D. Watson, *Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, Panton, Leslie, & Company and John Forbes & Company, 1783-1847* (Pensacola: University of West Florida Press, 1986), 79-80; Gilbert Din, *War on the Gulf Coast: The Spanish Fight Against William Augustus Bowles* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 14.

66 Tanner, *Zéspedes*, 96.

67 O'Neill to Howard, June 1, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.

68 O'Neill to Howard, June 9, 1786, EFP, Reel 45; Martin Armassa to Zéspedes, June 9, 1786, Reel 45; Governor Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada to Kinnard, January 1794, EFP, Reel 43.

69 O'Neill to Howard, June 4, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.

70 Ibid.; Armassa to Zéspedes, June 9, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.

71 William Pengree to Zéspedes, June 28, 1786, EFP, Reel 42.

children.[72] The Americans disingenuously claimed that they did not want to trespass on, or interfere with, Indian sovereignty but confirmed they were prepared to defend themselves.[73]

In a plea to Zéspedes, Pengree stated the determination of settlers on both sides of the St. Marys River to protect themselves and their crops from Indian raids and proposed a mutual defense pact with Spanish Florida. He requested that Zéspedes provide arms and munitions to Georgia residents and Pengree provided assurances that the arms would only be used for the safety and defense of settlers on both sides of the St. Marys border and not for offensive operations against the Creeks.[74] Once again, Zéspedes explained that East Florida could not cooperate with Georgians as it would cause a breach between the Spaniards and Indians.[75]

In June 1786, Zéspedes notified his subordinates that the Upper and Lower Creeks had officially declared war on Georgia to remove settlers from the land usurped by the Treaty of Galphinton.[76] Zéspedes warned Martin Armassa, the commander of the detachment at Amelia Island, not to offer any assistance to either side that might be construed as alliance with Americans or Indians in the conflict.[77] Troubled East Florida residents watched as Americans prepared to defend against Indian attacks. They did not want to be caught in a war between the Creeks and the United States. Following a visit to the northern region, O'Neill described the inhabitants as very uneasy and apprehending more danger from the Americans than from the Indians.[78]

In light of the scalping incident and with war imminent, Zéspedes sent Indian trader and interpreter Joab Wiggins to meet with the Indian chiefs to reaffirm Spanish amity and to clarify the boundaries between Spanish and Georgia territory in order to protect innocent East Florida inhabitants.[79] Spanish officials placed great faith in Wiggins' mission to the Creeks. Once the

72 Colonol Jacob Weed and Inhabitants to the Chiefs of the Creek Indians, June 8, 1786, EFP, Reel 42. Langley Bryandt acted as interpreter for Weed and Pengree.
73 Ibid.
74 Pengree to Zéspedes, June 28, 1786, EFP, Reel 42; O'Neill to Howard, July 1, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.
75 Zéspedes to Howard and O'Neill, June 28, 1786 EFP, Reel 45; O'Neill to Howard, July 1, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.
76 Zéspedes to Subordinates, June 11, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.
77 Zéspedes to Armassa, June 12, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.
78 O'Neill to Howard, June 15 and 22, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.
79 Howard to O'Neill, June 12 and 14, 1786, EFP, Reel 45; O'Neill to Howard, June 15, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.

Creeks understood the distinction between the Georgia and Florida provinces, officials assured inhabitants near the St Marys River that they would be safe from Indian attacks.[80] Zéspedes was far more cognizant of Creek activity than he relayed to his subordinates and Georgia officials. Creek representative McGillivray had been corresponding with Zéspedes as well as with Spanish officials in West Florida to stockpile guns and ammunition throughout May and June. Zéspedes assured McGillivray he would provide generous supplies to the Creeks.[81] True to his word, Indians carried away an estimated 5,000 pounds of powder, balls and flints to assist the Creeks in fighting the Georgians.[82]

Meanwhile, East Florida residents deemed Amelia Island and the region south of the St. Johns River to be safer than the northern border.[83] Zéspedes ordered O'Neill to convince them to remain at home and refrain from any hostility towards Indians or Georgians. Zéspedes also informed Armassa that settlers of the northeast region were not to be relocated unless Indians or Georgians had assaulted them.[84] He reminded Armassa that no person could enter the province without a signed pass from the governor and that all suspicious persons were to be arrested.[85] In his communications with subordinates and residents, the governor stuck to his professed policy of neutrality and nonintervention in the Creek-Georgia war, even though he had supplied the Creeks with weapons and ammunition.[86] Zéspedes' policies alienated northeast regional inhabitants who feared for their lives and property and had little confidence in his declarations of peace and amity with the Indians and Georgia or the practicality of remaining impartial while residing within the volatile region.

Illicit Regional Exchanges

The unstable circumstances of the Creek – Georgia War created opportunities for inhabitants to freely conduct illicit activities across established boundaries. A considerable percentage of the criminal activity emerged out of the animosity that existed

80 Howard to O'Neill, June 28, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.
81 Tanner, *Zéspedes*, 96.
82 Ibid., 96-97; Coker, *Indian Traders*, 81.
83 O'Neill to Howard, June 22, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.
84 Zéspedes to Armassa, June 30, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.
85 Zéspedes to Detachment at Amelia Island, September 19, 1786, EFP, Reel 85.
86 Zéspedes to Armassa, June 11, 1786 EFP, Reel 45; Zéspedes to Howard and O'Neill, June 12, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.

among border residents since the American Revolution and the British evacuation. One core group united by militia experience and kinship networks participated in horse stealing and cattle rustling schemes.[87] Among the conspirators were three men from Maryland, Joseph and Cornelius Rain, and John Bailey. During the Revolution, Joseph Rain served in the British army as an assistant commissary agent.[88] After the transfer of authority, Joseph requested to remain in the territory with his family, slaves, horses, and twenty head of cattle.[89] Cornelius Rain, a butcher and possible relative of Joseph, also remained with a wife, child, horses and cows.[90] Bailey farmed property between the St. Marys and Nassau Rivers with his family and four slaves and raised horses and cattle.[91] Their Georgia accomplice, Nathaniel Ashley, came to the British province from Virginia, but chose to move his wife, seven children, slaves and horses across the St. Marys River to Camden County when Spanish authorities arrived.[92] After the retrocession of East Florida, the Ashleys and their in-laws, the Williams family, illegally drove cattle across the border from Georgia to the Rains, Baileys, and Richard Lang, another holdover from the British retrocession in northeast Florida.[93]

Just as hostilities broke out between the Creeks and Georgians in June 1786, Ashley and his brother-in-law Wilson Williams accused

87 For the importance of the cattle trade to East Florida see Susan R. Parker, "The Cattle Trade in East Florida, 1784-1821" in *Colonial Plantations,* 150-167.

88 "Claim of William and John Lofton," *Spanish Land Gants,* IV, 65; Spanish Census of 1784, EFP Reel 148; East Florida Claims, BNA, T 77.

89 Spanish Census of 1784, EFP, Reel 148; Mills, *Florida's First Families,* 63. Rain is alternatively spelled Rains or Raines.

90 East Florida Claims, BNA, T 77.

91 Spanish Census of 1784.

92 Zéspedes to Gardoqui, August 2, 1788, EFP Reel 8; Spanish Census of 1784, EFP, Reel 148.

93 Ibid.; Howard to Lang, August 20, 1793, EFP, Reel 48; Howard to Quesada, August 22, 1793, EFP, Reel 48; Howard to Quesada, February 24, 1794, EFP, Reel 49; Siebert, *Loyalists in East Florida,* II: 366-367; Spanish Census of 1784, EFP, Reel 148. These letters give numerous accounts of suspected cattle and horse thefts and illicit border crossings. Howard questioned Lang about regional thefts and murder including O'Neill's death and the close family relations among the Ashleys, Williams and inhabitants in East Florida, and accused Lang of being duplicitous in the crimes. In Howard's letter to Quesada he explains that Richard Lang's daughter married John Bailey's son David. Seibert's biography of Samuel and Henry Williams notes that the family was from Anson County, N.C. and that during the Revolution, Samuel and his sons Henry, Wilson and Abner were at Lt. Col. Thomas Brown's garrison in Georgia and later in East Florida. Nathaniel Ashley, who was born in Anson County, NC, married Jane Williams, the sister of Abner and Wilson Williams.

East Florida resident John Hartley of being an accomplice in the theft of their horses. Originally from South Carolina, John Hartley occupied ten acres of land at the time of the transfer, where he farmed and raised livestock.[94] A search party that included Ashley pursued the thieves to Hartley's farm where they found the horses concealed in a nearby swamp. Hartley claimed he had traded for the horses and was not involved in the theft.[95] Hartley then intentionally misled the search party by indicating the thieves had returned to Georgia to continue plundering. In diverting the search party, the thieves were able to escape. Aggravated by Hartley's subterfuge, Ashley shot at, but missed him. O'Neill remonstrated Ashley for his rash behavior, reminding him that he was a Georgia citizen on Spanish soil. He then arrested Hartley for collusion with the thieves and warned military commander Howard that regional inhabitants' smoldering animosity from the American Revolution and the British evacuation and border crossing criminals placed innocent inhabitants in harm's way.[96]

In October 1787, O'Neill sought advice from Zéspedes concerning the unsettling frontier situation with renewed Creek and Georgia hostilities, frontier tensions, and the illicit movement of goods and people to and from the province.[97] Inhabitants petitioned Zéspedes to protect their lives and property or transport them to a safe place.[98] Signing the petition were some of the very men causing friction, including Joseph Rain, Richard Lang, George Arons, John Hartley, and others, like William Cain, who had been victims of Indian atrocities. In response, Zéspedes reiterated the Spanish policy of non-intervention to Howard and directed him to refer residents to a letter written to O'Neill the previous year. The letter assured residents that Spanish East Florida was at perfect peace and friendship with the United States and Indian nations.

94 Spanish Census of 1784, EFP, Reel 148; Mills, *Florida's First Families*, 63. The Spanish Census of 1787 listed Hartley, Joseph Rain, George Arons, and Henry O'Neill on Amelia Island. It is unclear if the men lived on Amelia Island; more likely they lived in the vicinity and census takers recorded their presence on Amelia Island at the time.

95 O'Neill to Howard, June 1 and 3, 1786, Zéspedes to Howard, June 9, 1786, EFP, Reel 45. The thieves' names were Jacob Riburn and John Hage, also called Savanna Jack.

96 O'Neill to Howard, June 1, 3, and 15, 1786, EFP, Reel 45.

97 O'Neill to Howard, September 10, and October 21, 1787, Reel 45.

98 O'Neill to Howard, October 21, 1787, EFP, Reel 45; Inhabitants to Zéspedes, October 24, 1787, EFP, Reel 45.

Howard stated firmly that residents must act with prudence and remain neutral in all Creek and United States hostilities.[99]

The letter became yet another point of contention between northeast inhabitants and O'Neill, and as the winter wore on, the antagonists became more aggressive in their actions against the magistrate. Lang and others sent a second letter to Zéspedes asserting that O'Neill refused to show the inhabitants the letter with the governor's orders and in a direct affront to his honor, Lang called O'Neill a dishonest man.[100] As dissatisfaction with regional protection intensified, eighteen men petitioned to have Lang replace O'Neill as magistrate.[101] In a conciliatory gesture, O'Neill traveled to the region to read the letter to residents, and promised the letter would be read to any who applied at his house. As for Lang, O'Neill sarcastically thanked him for his efforts to preserve the peace, but stated he doubted honest men were unhappy with his actions on behalf of the residents. Yet again, O'Neill reminded Lang that no one was to enter or leave the province without a pass and friendly relations were to be maintained between inhabitants and Georgians.[102]

Death of O'Neill

Events came to an ugly climax in the spring. In March 1788, various officials received unexpected news that Daniel McGirtt had returned to East Florida.[103] James Kennedy, master of the sloop *Mayflower*, testified that McGirtt had been aboard his ship. McGirtt demanded Kennedy stop on the St. Johns River to retrieve some cattle, but Kennedy refused. McGirtt then forced Kennedy to land him on the Florida side of the St. Marys River.[104] From there, a second witness claimed McGirtt planned to travel down the St. Johns River to collect his property.[105] O'Neill captured McGirtt and returned him to Kennedy's ship as a prisoner. Kennedy posted a bond guaranteeing to remove McGirtt from the province and

99 O'Neill to Richard Lang, December 24, 1787, EFP, Reel 45.
100 Inhabitants to Zéspedes, December 24, 1787, EFP, Reel 45. For the importance of honor in Saint Augustine see James G. Cusick's article in this issue.
101 Inhabitants to Zéspedes, December 24, 1787, EFP, Reel 45.
102 O'Neill to Richard Lang, December 24, 1787, EFP, Reel 45.
103 Testimony of Daniel Hogan, March 27, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.
104 Testimony of James Kennedy, March 27, 1788, EFP, Reel 45; O'Neill to Howard, April 4, 1788, EFP, Reel 45. Kennedy is noted as Kanaday in several documents.
105 O'Neill to Howard, April 5, 1788, EFP, Reel 45; Testimony of Daniel Hogans, March 27, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.

departed with an official warning to prevent McGirtt from landing anywhere south of the St. Marys River.[106] Soon thereafter, McGirtt was on the American side of the St. Marys and still considered a threat to the province.[107]

McGirtt's return put additional stress on Spanish officials. Zéspedes ordered Lt. Jayme MacTernan, who had replaced Armassa on Amelia Island, and O'Neill to use all possible resources to apprehend McGirtt or anyone who aided him.[108] O'Neill alerted all residents in his jurisdiction that no one should help McGirtt. Anyone aware of McGirtt's whereabouts or any other unwanted or unknown persons in the province was to apprehend and detain them.[109] Anyone who assisted McGirtt would be prosecuted.

The protracted threat of violence posed by Creek and Georgia hostilities, the atrocity of Cain's daughter's scalping, McGirtt's presence, and illicit cross-border activity that antagonized former British subjects and neighboring East Florida residents created an atmosphere of fear and discontent. Along the southern shores of the St. Marys River, anxious inhabitants were frustrated with Spanish policies that restricted individual movement and authorities' seeming unwillingness to effectively defend the region. Time and again, residents turned to Spanish authorities for protection only to be told that they had no reason for concern because East Florida was at peace with the Indians and the United States.

As the search for McGirtt widened and the Creek-Georgia war persisted, O'Neill had a violent confrontation with Nathaniel Ashley on Cumberland Island. On April 24, 1788, O'Neill and his son, James, crossed the St. Marys River to gather news and provisions at James Cashen's home on the southern point of Cumberland Island.[110] The first report of trouble came from Spanish gunboat Captain Joseph Tasso. Tasso informed MacTernan that an American on Cumberland Island had shot O'Neill.[111] According to federal commander Weed, stationed at Cumberland, witnesses said Ashley and O'Neill engaged in an argument over a simple greeting. That morning, O'Neill greeted Ashley with "how do you

106 O'Neill to Howard, April 5, 1788, EFP, Reel 45; MacTernan to Zéspedes, April 11, 1788, EFP, Reel 45; Tanner, *Zéspedes*, 189.
107 MacTernan to Zéspedes, April 11, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.
108 Zéspedes to Howard and O'Neill, April 14, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.
109 Howard to O'Neill, April 14, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.
110 Extract from the Minutes of Camden County Georgia Grand Jury, James O'Neill Papers, N.D. Box 1, Clay Adams Transcription, 2006, PKY.
111 Joseph Tasso to Zéspedes, April 24, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.

do?" Ashley retorted O'Neill was "a dam'd rascal" and asked him not to speak to him.[112] O'Neill claimed he had the right to speak to anyone. This exchange prompted Ashley to run home and return with a cavalry sword. Ashley then taunted O'Neill to speak to him again while raising the sword over O'Neill's head. The argument escalated into a scuffle over the sword until bystanders pulled the two men apart.[113]

During the fray, Ashley's son Lodwick appeared with a gun, threatening to kill O'Neill. As O'Neill attempted to depart, Nathaniel Ashley, now holding the gun, called for the crowd to clear. John Fleming, an eyewitness and friend of O'Neill's, described the occurrence, "The crowd parted immediately - Major O'Neill was then in the center turning himself round to face the sound of the voice. I then saw Ashley discharge a gun. Major O'Neill immediately fell to the ground."[114] The following day, a surgeon removed O'Neill's right leg from the thigh down as a result of the extensive damage caused by the buckshot. O'Neill died at his home on May 1st.[115]

O'Neill's death created two problems. First, it left inhabitants without a magistrate to maintain law and order at a time when McGirtt and other bandits roamed the region and the Creek nation battled with Georgia settlers. Second, the murder threatened to become an international incident as the United States and the state of Georgia had to respond to the killing of an unarmed Spanish official on Georgia soil.[116] In response to the murder, Zéspedes informed Spanish Minister Diego de Gardoqui in Philadelphia that he attributed O'Neill's death to the "old rancor" between British Loyalists and American independents in the recent war.[117] Zéspedes referred to Ashley as an "extreme Royalist" but Ashley was more likely an opportunist hoping that Spanish sovereignty would be fleeting.[118] From Georgia, Ashley continued to trade with accomplices on the Spanish side of the river. Zéspedes suggested

112 MacTernan to Zéspedes, April 25, 1788, EFP, Reel 25; John Fleming testimony before Howard, Cumberland Island, Georgia, May 14, 1788, EFP, Reel 82; Minutes of Camden County Georgia Grand Jury, April 28, 1788, PKY.
113 Fleming testimony, May 14, 1788, EFP, Reel 82.
114 Ibid.
115 Zéspedes to MacTernan, April 27, 1788, Reel 45; Margaret O›Neill to Howard, May 4, 1788; MacTernan to Zéspedes, May 2, 1788, EFP, Reel 45; Minutes of Camden County Georgia Grand Jury, April 28, 1788, PKY.
116 Howard to James Seagrove, June 3, 1788, EFP, Reel 82.
117 Zéspedes to Gardoqui, August 2, 1788, EFP Reel 8.
118 Ibid.

O'Neill had uncovered Ashley's plot to undermine Florida settlers' in the cattle trade by introducing illicit cattle into the province through Joseph Rain. It was also known that Ashley had stolen Indian horses in Georgia and brought them to Florida regardless of Spanish territorial laws, similar to what Hartley had done to him in 1786. Zéspedes believed O'Neill had confronted Ashley or Rain, and that caused the fatal assault.[119]

At the time of the murder, Colonel Weed promised Spanish officials that Ashley would be dealt with according to the law.[120] The unanswered question, however, was which law would prevail. At the time of O'Neill's murder, the question of states' rights versus federal government authority still hung in the balance. In the previous summer, 1787, delegates met in Philadelphia to revise the Articles of Confederation, but decided to scrap the old system and craft a new governing document – the Constitution. The relationship between state and federal government was still undecided when Ashley shot O'Neill on Cumberland Island. An uneasy tension pervaded the American side of the St. Marys River as Georgia state officials and federal officials wrangled over appropriate enforcement of law and order along the border.[121]

Weed and federal troops operated with little to no assistance from Georgia authorities. With the uncertainties surrounding the success of ratification, federal forces had little if any recourse for dealing with recalcitrant Georgians. Even before events in April 1788, Weed complained to superiors that he was "surrounded by Enemies both redd [sic] and white who threaten an Attack upon this Island."[122] Weed was well aware of the border animosities since he had served in Georgia's Patriot forces against Loyalists in the American Revolution and resented the British who remained on both sides of the St. Marys River.[123] Weed feared that the constant interaction between inhabitants of southern Georgia and particular

119 Zéspedes to Gardoqui, August 2, 1788, EFP, Reel 8; Zéspedes to Josef de Espeleta, September 30, 1788 and enclosure, Memorial of Margaret O'Neill, June 1, 1788, EFP, Reel 8.

120 MacTernan to Zéspedes, April 25, 1788, EFP, Reel 25.

121 Howard to Seagrove June 3, 1788, EFP, Reel 82; Seagrove to Howard, June 27, 1788, EFP, Reel 82; Gardoqui to Zéspedes, September 25, 1788, EFP, Reel 38.

122 Correspondence 1788 April 20-1788 May 27 [Georgia to] General James Jackson / Colonel Jacob Weed, Colonel James Maxwell, James Dunwoody ... [et al.], Digital Library of Georgia, http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/meta/html/dlg/zlna/meta_dlg_zlna_tcc929.html (accessed October 15, 2012).

123 Jane G. Landers, *Atlantic Creoles in the Age of Revolutions* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) 34-35; 265, fn. 69; Weed to Jackson, April 20 1788, Digital Library of GA.

characters in East Florida meant that internal enemies plotted with Spanish inhabitants and Native Americans against Georgia.[124] He bemoaned the traffic that passed back and forth across the St. Marys River, but his power did not extend to eradicating this activity nor did state authorities allow him to take action.

This uncertainty about the extent of his authority may explain why Weed did not arrest Ashley immediately after the shooting. Weed had already been named in a lawsuit for illegally detaining a local storeowner as a suspicious character in an unrelated case.[125] At the same time, Indian agent James Seagrove proceeded to Cumberland Island to investigate the circumstances of O'Neill's death. Seagrove promised Howard that federal troops would be stationed along the river, and all efforts would be made to bring the perpetrators to justice. Serving as foreman for the Camden County grand jury, Seagrove issued a bench warrant for the arrest of Nathaniel Ashley for mortally wounding O'Neill.[126]

In June, Weed arrested Ashley's son, Lodwick, for his part in O'Neill's death.[127] Authorities also captured Nathaniel Ashley, however, the person charged with detaining the senior Ashley allowed him to escape.[128] Although Ashley escaped, Seagrove pledged the U.S. government would exert every effort to recapture and imprison him.[129] Howard confided to Seagrove that he hoped Ashley's unprovoked attack against the unarmed O'Neill would not ruin the friendly relations between Spain and the United States.[130]

O'Neill had served loyally to restrain the criminal ambitions of men on both sides of the St. Marys River, and with his murder, these unscrupulous characters were free to violate national and imperial laws unchecked. While O'Neill lay dying at New Hope, twenty residents of the St. Marys region, many who had signed the original petition, reiterated their plea for Richard Lang to become magistrate. Horse thieves and cattle rustlers Joseph Rain, John Bailey, and John Hartley were part of this group, as well as George

124 Weed to Jackson, April 20 1788, Digital Library of GA.
125 Ibid.
126 Minutes of Camden County Georgia Grand Jury, April 28, 1788, PKY.
127 Richard Lang to Howard, June 27, 1788, EFP, Reel 45; Tasso to Zéspedes, June 21, 1788, EFP, Reel 45; Lang to Howard, June 27, 1788, EFP, Reel 45. Ashley's son William was also arrested to keep the men from assisting their father in his escape.
128 Seagrove to Howard, June 27, 1788, EFP, Reel 82.
129 Ibid.
130 Howard to Seagrove, June 3, 1788, EFP, Reel 82.

Arons who had stolen slaves.[131] Arons was also implicated in a plot to kill O'Neill for his interference in border activities.[132] The ties among these men, O'Neill, the Ashleys, Rains, Arons, Williams, and Hartley stretched back to the time of British sovereignty in East Florida.

So, in early May 1788, Zéspedes was confronted with two equally undesirable choices. With O'Neill's death, a vacuum in authority would promote further lawlessness, but to do nothing was unacceptable. On the other hand, Lang, the man being promoted for the position, was of dubious loyalty and most likely complicit in criminal activity and violence. Zéspedes notified MacTernan that the residents could elect the new magistrate.[133] Meanwhile, MacTernan received word that McGirtt and Ashley had crossed into East Florida. Justifiably, Spanish and U.S. officials worried that regional inhabitants were harboring or aiding the fugitives.[134] At the end of May, MacTernan went to the St. Marys to gather votes, and to no one's surprise, residents elected Richard Lang as magistrate.[135] Following his swearing in, Lang received orders consistent with those of O'Neill's. In the case of any violence, whether by Indians or Georgians, inhabitants were to abstain from any counterattack so that Spain could remain on friendly terms with both nations.

The election of a new magistrate effected little change to local conditions. If anything, illegal activity on the frontier became more widespread and profitable as the theft of horses and cattle resumed, involving both new and old players.[136] On the Spanish side of the frontier, Lang, Rain, Bailey, and Arons directed the unauthorized movement of goods and people through networks with the Ashleys and others in Georgia. The East Florida men must have thanked Ashley and his sons for accomplishing what they had hoped to achieve all along: the removal of O'Neill by one means or another. By 1793, Carlos Howard, still striving to maintain order

131 Inhabitants to Quesada, May 29, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.
132 MacTernan to Zéspedes, May 25, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.
133 Zéspedes to MacTernan, May 5, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.
134 MacTernan to Zéspedes, May 18 and 25, 1788, EFP, Reel 45; Zéspedes to MacTernan, May 19, 1788, EFP Reel 45; Seagrove to Howard, June 27, 1788, EFP, Reel 82.
135 MacTernan to Zéspedes, May 11, EFP, Reel 45; Howard to Lang, May 19, 1788, EFP, Reel 45.
136 Lang to Howard, April 30, 1788, June 7 and 27, 1788, EFP, Reel 45; Howard to Lang, May 2, 1789, EFP, Reel 46; Lang to Zéspedes, November 14, 1789, and April 19, 1793, EFP, Reel 46.

on the frontier, estimated that Lang had smuggled at least 400 head of cattle into the province through his connections with the Ashley, Bailey, and Williams' families.[137]

Despite assurances that they would bring the murderers to justice neither the United States nor Georgia authorities ever prosecuted O'Neill's murderers. Disputes over federal and state jurisdiction and the willingness of regional inhabitants to harbor criminals hindered the apprehension of Ashley. U.S. and Spanish officials had valid reasons to distrust local inhabitants who were involved in enduring border-crossing networks that protected illicit behavior, endangered regional inhabitants, and threatened international relations. In August, Zéspedes commended O'Neill's four years of service to the Crown, without consideration or remuneration, to clear the northeast district of wrongdoers.[138] Howard described O'Neill as honorable, valorous, zealous, a good husband and father to nine children.[139] On Zéspedes' recommendation, O'Neill's widow Margaret (Margarita) received a lifetime pension and a land grant from the Spanish government for her husband's sacrifice.[140]

Conclusion

East Florida's inhabitants found numerous opportunities to defy Native American, imperial, and national authorities during the transformative period of 1783 to 1793. While empires and nations sought to control land and resources, inhabitants forged networks based on military and family connections prior to and after the transfer to Spanish rule. The demographic, economic, and social changes caused by imperial wars, the American Revolution, and Creek and Georgia hostilities provided openings for like-minded individuals to sustain or create networks that operated at the expense of British, Spanish, U.S., and Native American communities. Settlers near Georgia and Native American borders participated in legal and extralegal cross-border exchanges within these wide-ranging networks. Their knowledge of the territory, settlements, and moveable property supplied ample fodder for

137 Howard to Quesada, August 22, 1793, EFP, Reel 48.
138 Zéspedes to Gardoqui, August 2, 1788, EFP, Reel 8.
139 Howard to Seagrove, June 3, 1788, EFP, Reel 82.
140 Zéspedes to Espeleta, September 30, 1788, Reel 8; Johnson, *Social Transformation*, 117.

conducting raids, illicit trade, and murder to further their own pursuits.

British and Spanish authorities in East Florida shared similar hurdles. Imperial policies relied on the cooperation of inhabitants to reap the benefits of the land and to defend the province. Land grants and imperial protection of property drew settlers to East Florida, but in the contentious frontier environment imperial promises of perfect peace and friendship with rivals did not meet inhabitants' expectations for security and prosperity. Lingering, unresolved interpersonal animosities from the American Revolution and British evacuation sparked antagonistic exchanges that often led to vengeful crimes and violence. At the moment when inhabitants' compliance was essential to frontier law and order, imperial policies restricted individual movement, prohibited cross-border cooperation, and demanded inhabitants' neutrality in inter-imperial and international conflicts. Volatile circumstances involving transnational and cross-cultural activity threatened to harm the innocent and disrupt international relations. In the end, neither Native American, British, Spanish, nor U.S. authorities were able to control cooperative and contentious interactions that triggered mayhem and murder on the volatile Florida frontier.

Book Reviews

Daniel Murphree, Book Review Editor

Early and Middle Woodland Landscapes of the Southeast. Edited by Alice P. Wright and Edward R. Henry. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2013. Acknowledgements, figures, tables, references, index. Pp. xiv, 313. $79.95 cloth.)

"Landscape" is a concept that has seen widespread adoption in archaeology in recent years, and has been applied to a wide range of archaeological sites at various scales of analysis, and under any number of theoretical frameworks. One potential pitfall in assembling a volume around the topic is in its malleability, resulting in a volume that is either so deliberately narrow in scope or focus, or so very wide ranging, as to muddy the reader's understanding of the usefulness of the concept. The editors of this volume have amassed seventeen chapters, including their introduction and two concluding chapters, that do well to illustrate how landscape perspectives are leading to new insights into the past lifeways that created newly discovered and several quite well known archaeological sites across the southeastern United States. The introductory chapter presents a succinct but not overly simplistic discussion of the earliest British and Americanist uses of the concept, dovetailing neatly into current approaches to landscape archaeology. Where this introduction really shines is in the overview of the succeeding chapters, where the underlying themes of the volume are married to current perspectives and the contributions the authors make in each area. The thrust of the introduction is mirrored, but not in a redundant way, by Anderson in the concluding commentary chapter (Ch. 17) where he simultaneously provides brief histories of how the

themes developed and where they seem to be going next. Chapters are subsequently organized under three headings: extensive landscapes (those encompassing larger scales of analysis), monumental landscapes (the settings of earthen mounds, enclosures, and other earthworks), and landscapes of interaction (focusing on sociopolitical elements of past societies).

The large number of contributions prohibits a chapter-by-chapter review, but several key themes and examples can serve to demonstrate the success of this volume and its many contributions to the field. The first element that stands out considerably is the quantity of data found in any number of the chapters. From chronometric dates for large numbers of sites (ex., Applegate, Ch. 2; Franklin et al., Ch. 5; Pluckhahn and Thompson; Ch. 12), to structural (Applegate) and monumental data (Henry, Ch. 15), to tables summarizing the material contents of mounds and features (ex., Franklin et al.; Kimball et al., Ch. 8), a respectable number of the contributors provide the information upon which their analyses and interpretations are based. Particularly when interpretive frameworks are rooted in post-processual, phenomenological, or experiential theories, having the data to evaluate for oneself lessens the feeling of taking a "leap of faith" with the authors. When the authors are themselves critically examining past interpretations that have perhaps become easy or pat conclusions now offered uncritically, their datasets bolster their counterarguments and new considerations substantially (ex., Kimball et al.).

Another area where this volume stands out is in presenting new interpretations of "classic" sites in the Southeast. Dekle's (Ch. 13) reconsideration of Tunacunnhee and Keith's (Ch. 9) update on recent work at Leake, two well-known sites in northwest Georgia, as well as Boudreaux's (Ch. 10) recent work at Jackson Landing in Mississippi and Wright's (Ch. 7) new examination of Garden Creek in North Carolina demonstrate our continuing need to revisit sites, datasets, and especially interpretations, particularly as paradigmatic shifts in perspectives and theories leave the readers and consumers of many a previous interpretation wanting. That the reinterpretations offered here are respectful and acknowledge the importance of the earlier work moves the discussion quickly and appropriately away from issues of personalities and histories to one of excitement about seemingly outlier sites and places now "fitting" within our newest understandings of the Early and Middle Woodland Southeast.

A third but by no means final thread I find particularly well done in several chapters is the presentation of interpretations that link rather heady theoretical constructs solidly to archaeologically-derived expressions of material culture. From the layouts and specific architectural features of central places (ex., Pluckhahn and Thompson's [Ch. 12] comparison of Crystal River and Fort Center in Florida to Kolomoki in southern Georgia) to the exchange and ceremonial deposition of vessels that were once clearly part of more mundane, domestic contexts (Wallis's [Ch. 14] multi-scalar and diachronic examination of mortuary practices in Florida and Georgia), landscape perspectives are used to contextualize and draw connections between ideas and artifacts in ways that professional archaeologists can discuss and debate, and avocational and non-professionals can engage and understand.

This thread begins in earlier chapters, building from the largest scales of analysis to explorations of social interactions in ritual spaces or local ritualistic manifestations of larger scale ideologies mentioned above. Even at the site or subregional level, the authors in this volume stay anchored to the archaeology. Clay's (Ch. 4) offering reads like a pre-commentary on the marriage of ritual and landscape, wherein he outlines a striking ethnographic example from New Guinea that well illustrates how mortuary ritual can be more about the future rather than a memorial to the past. Landscapes of memory or ownership (i.e., territoriality marked by placement of one's dead), while certainly a secure Western notion, may not be the best analogy for Woodland mortuary monuments and features. Brown (Ch. 16) provides an essay that is the least rooted in specific sites or datasets, but, like Clay, provides insights through a contextualization of the practice of archaeology and interpretation building in ways only a senior scholar in the field can, and in ways that should be very informative and enlightening to the non-professional archaeology enthusiast as well.

This is a very well edited and presented volume. The University Press of Florida is to be commended for the high quality of their printed books, particularly in an increasingly digital age. I highly encourage those scholars and lay persons to explore this volume for themselves, as this work is likely to be an oft-referenced "monument" on the landscape of Southeastern archaeological literature for years to come.

Ramie A. Gougeon *University of West Florida*

Everyday Life in the Early English Caribbean: Irish, Africans, and the Construction of Difference. By Jenny Shaw, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013. Acknowledgements, illustrations, notes, map, bibliography, index. Pp. xv, 256. $24.95 paper.)

In asking how identities came to be defined in estate villages, Jenny Shaw looks at the divergent experiences of enslaved African and indentured European laborers in mid- and late seventeenth-century Barbados as the island transitioned into its profit-generating sugar planting regime. Discussions of Barbados's experiences are extended by select comparisons with the late seventeenth-century English colonies in Montserrat and St. Christopher's. These allow Shaw to consider how Barbados's workers made societies for themselves, how these were seen and then how the island's residents came to view themselves. The result is a thoughtful and imaginative study which anyone trying to comprehend the experiences of slave yards and indentured barracks should find illuminating.

The book employs "difference" as a wedge to expose particular aspects of individual groups' practices. Investigations of foodways, of religion, and of dreams of rebellion each start with comparisons and then highlight specific distinctions between the responses made by the enforced immigrants from West Africa and those from Ireland, the island's "white slaves." Shaw's comments on the different ways that Africans and Irish cooked their meagre rations show considerable empathy, noting contrasts between the Africans' tendency to prepare maize by toasting the cobs in the fire, while the Irish, more used to oatmeal porridge, boiled the grain to a mush. In questions of religion, where both African and Roman Catholic religious traditions were viewed with deep suspicion by the island's English elites, Shaw offers suggestive comparisons between the roles that processions played in both Akan and Irish Catholic funerals. She also explores the very different opportunities available for Irish Catholics to survive by paying lip service to Protestant practices—burying family members on private land rather than in Anglican graveyards—and for individual enslaved Africans to transform their social status by conversion to Protestant Christianity and then making sure that their children received Anglican baptisms. Here Shaw's success in tracing individual families of free people of color and of Irish origin through two generations allows her to consider the footprints they could make in the colony's official records, along with some of the cultural markers they sought to employ.

A further chapter explores the possibilities for resistance primarily through the records of unsuccessful uprisings. Evidence derived from the torture of alleged conspirators and published in England to demonstrate the colony's providential escape is prone to mirror the interrogators' presuppositions as much as the hopes of the interrogated. Shaw's comparative readings draw out the contrasts between a 1675 plot by a group of "Gold Coast Negroes" who apparently sought to reconstruct a West African "Coromantee" kingdom on the island after they set fire to the cane fields and cut their white oppressors' throats, and another plot in 1692 led by skilled island-born slaves, who would not only have left the island's African-born "saltwater slaves" in slavery but also planned to employ some Irish Catholics to get the English garrison at Needham's Fort, a key stronghold near Bridgetown, drunk and then open its gates to the rebels. A third alleged plan by Roman Catholics in 1688 to betray the island to the French was not written up in a pamphlet. The descriptions in official reports of this last conspiracy still reflected island prejudices by downplaying the well-connected English Catholic converts who were to have led the coup and foregrounding the bloodthirsty Irish Catholics who had joined them at their plantation great houses for Mass. Other English islands faced, and would continue to face, threats of each type. By distinguishing the emphases offered in the accounts of various threats that terrified Barbados's white Protestants over a nervous quarter century, Shaw's analysis highlights where each feared threat diverged.

Alongside strategies to shape communal identities, the book also considers the various efforts by the colonial administrators, both in the Caribbean and back in London, to impose categories onto the comingled populations they ruled. Data was always read differently on either side of the Atlantic, but even as wars with Catholic France threatened all the English colonies in the Eastern Caribbean, the old-world divisions of "Catholic" and "Protestant" were increasingly subsumed into "white," while the potent local divisions and status of not only "mulattos" but also "island born" creoles and "saltwater" Africans all came to be wedged into "slave." In the process female-led households and "free negroes" were increasingly buried within official list-making. The process was never complete, but these chapters offer a persuasive case for analytical frameworks that would shape island societies until emancipation in the early eighteenth century.

The book draws on extensive research in manuscript collections in Barbados, the United Kingdom and the United States, which has allowed Shaw to trace some very obscure people and use their experiences to flesh out some of their opportunities. This work is integrated with material from contemporary descriptions of the island, particularly Robert Ligon's 1657 *True and Exact History of Barbados* and two generations of scholarship on the early Eastern Caribbean, on British North America and on Ireland. Good use is made of studies by Barbadian researchers. In the resulting book incidents and texts that have been discussed in earlier accounts are juxtaposed with fresh instances. A short book has some gaps—with little consideration offered of the colonial elite's equally fearful responses towards the Quakers as another indigestible element within the island's late seventeenth-century white population—while readers of this journal will regret the absence of comparisons with any of the other slaveholding societies in the region (so Florida does not even achieve an index entry), but it is always perceptive and clearly argued. Shaw's *Everyday Life* is a fascinating study that specialists in West Indian and neighboring fields will find thought provoking and instructors can assign to students as an introduction to a slaveholding social system.

James Robertson *University of the West Indies, Mona*

Making Freedom: The Underground Railroad and the Politics of Slavery. By R.J.M. Blackett. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013. Preface, notes index. Pp. xii, 136. 27.95 cloth.)

In this slim, three-chapter volume, a revision of The Steven and Janice Brose Lectures in the Civil War Era delivered at Penn State University in March 2012, Richard Blackett examines slave efforts to escape via the Underground Railroad in the decade following passage of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Like other recent work on the Underground Railroad and slave flight, Blackett treats the Underground Railroad as a vast and largely informal network of blacks and whites who assisted slaves seeking freedom, and emphasizes the collaboration of sympathetic whites, free blacks, and those who remained in slavery in assisting individuals who sought to escape to the northern states or Canada. Rather than providing a broad overview of the Underground Railroad, Blackett focuses

on the means by which slaves and their allies plotted and executed escapes, how escaped slaves sought to secure their freedom in the North, and the efforts of slaveholders and authorities to thwart slave escapes and to return free and runaway slaves to bondage.

Chapter one begins with the escape of Henry W. Banks, a slave who fled from Virginia's Shenandoah Valley to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Canada. Banks mailed a series of letters to his former master along the way, allowing Blackett to construct a detailed account of Banks's flight from slavery to freedom. Blackett uses Banks's escape—and the flight of dozens of other slaves—to examine the motivations that inspired slaves to flee, the extraordinary measures involved in planning and executing an escape, and the efforts of fleeing slaves to elude would-be captors. Slaves made the decision to flee for freedom for a variety of reasons. Some sought to reconnect with a spouse or children in the North. Others fled because of especially cruel or unfair masters. Others simply sought freedom when an opportunity presented itself. Whatever the case, Blackett makes clear that slaves themselves were the primary agents of their emancipation. What allowed slaves to flee more frequently in the1850s? Literacy, the growing number of free blacks in the Upper South, and the widespread practice of allowing slaves to hire themselves out allowed self-emancipating slaves to forge passes, to pass themselves off as free, or to provide themselves with cover as they made their way out of border slave states. The informal network of free and enslaved blacks and white abolitionists who made up the Underground Railroad aided and sheltered slaves as they fled to the North. Chapter one also includes an account of the less frequent but politically important flight of slaves to the British Caribbean.

Chapter two examines the efforts of black communities in the North to protect their freedom. The chapter consists of richly documented and detailed accounts of northern black communities and their white allies assisting runaway slaves and fighting off slave catchers and kidnappers in Pennsylvania's border counties. Included are detailed accounts of the routes and methods used by slaves to flee to Pennsylvania; white and black Pennsylvanians' efforts to foil kidnappers, fugitive slave agents, and authorities who sought to return blacks to slavery; and the ingenious methods used by Fugitive Slave Law officials, agents, and criminal gangs to capture free blacks and alleged fugitives and then spirit them out of Pennsylvania, into Maryland, and then on to the slave markets of

New Orleans. Blackett also examines the trials of alleged kidnappers and the farcical hearings put on by notoriously pro-slavery Fugitive Slave Law agents. Chapter two demonstrates that slave flight proved incredibly difficult and risky, and that black freedom was anything but secure, especially in border states such as Pennsylvania.

Chapter three returns to the slave states. Here, Blackett examines how sympathetic white northerners, escaped slaves, and free blacks worked with enslaved blacks to plot and execute escapes in the slave states. As in the volume's other chapters, these tales of plotting and escape are both compelling and richly detailed and documented. Not only do these stories document the efforts of whites and blacks to free slaves, they also detail the laws and practices employed by southern whites to foil escapes. As Blackett demonstrates, the informal network of blacks and whites who made up the Underground Railroad faced an even vaster network of informants and agents, laws and public officials, and unsympathetic whites who sought to counter slave escapes. Despite the best efforts of slaveholders and authorities to deter slave flight and to capture runaways, the number of slaves seeking escape only seemed to increase in the 1850s.

Historians seeking to catch up on the now extensive body of literature on slave flight, along with the free and enslaved black communities who aided their escapees in the 1850s, will find this volume especially useful. Though a thin volume, its narrative and analysis rests on an extensive collection of primary sources, including manuscripts and newspaper accounts of slave escapes, failed and successful slave renditions, and public reactions to these incidents. This volume should prove particularly useful in the classroom, especially in research and methods courses. Many of the letters used by Blackett to piece together his stories of flight and resistance are available online through the digital edition of the "records of the Ante-Bellum Southern Plantations from the Revolution through the Civil War." Likewise, most of the newspaper accounts and runaway slave advertisements cited in the volume are available through multiple historical newspaper databases commonly available through university libraries. Adding to the book's value in the classroom, Blackett's careful use of evidence provides students with a valuable example of how historians use evidence to construct narratives and interpretations. Finally, *Making Freedom* will especially appeal to non-historians seeking a readable and

compelling narrative on slaves who sought freedom through the Underground Railroad.

John Craig Hammond *Penn State University*

Mr. Flagler's St. Augustine. By Thomas Graham. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014. Preface, acknowledgments, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. Pp. xi, 563. $29.95 cloth.)

Thomas Graham, the author of several books and articles on Henry Flagler and on St. Augustine, has produced a thoroughly researched and finely detailed study of the Standard Oil magnate's development of that city—and, more broadly, of the east coast of Florida—from the 1880s to his death in 1913. While Flagler has been the subject of various biographies of uneven quality, *Mr. Flagler's St. Augustine* is more than just a treatment of one of the "great men" of Florida history—or of the latter third of his life, at least, when Flagler first became interested in Florida and then used his wealth to try to transform the state; it is also the biography of a city that briefly became the resort destination of choice for many affluent Americans in the Gilded Age—before, ironically, as the author shows, Flagler's new luxuriant attractions at Palm Beach superseded it in the mid-1890s.

In addition to the author's lucid exposition, the book's greatest strength is its detailed and evocative description of the winter season in late nineteenth-century Florida. Based on extensive archival research in the manuscript collections of Flagler and "other people in the Flagler orbit" (xi), as well as state and national newspapers and magazines, the book demonstrates in graphic depth the developer's many influences on St. Augustine, from the planning, construction, and interior design of his hotels (the flagship being the famous Ponce de Leon) to his tireless commitment to urban improvements, including churches and hospitals, roads, drainage, and disease control. Flagler's love affair with Florida is charted year-by-year, the story culminating in the epic Key West railroad, while Graham deploys a large cast of historical characters—among them St. Augustine booster Dr. Andrew Anderson and the renowned architects John Carrère and Thomas Hastings—all of whom contributed to the city's emergence as a leisure capital of America.

While certain aspects of this story will be familiar to scholars who have read recent scholarship on tourism in Gilded Age Florida—such as Susan Braden's *The Architecture of Leisure: The Florida Resort Hotels of Henry Flagler and Henry Plant* (2002)—Graham provides a sharp insight into the daily tourist experience in St. Augustine. Chapter 11, "Opening Day, 1888," skillfully traces the opening of the Ponce de Leon in January of that year, showing how it represented "the long-awaited dawning of a new epoch in the history of the Ancient City" (141). Graham's narrative captures the historical moment: the tourists' first arrival in the city, the last-minute in-house decorations and improvements, the season's extravagant balls and lavish menus (opening night *hors d' oeuvres* included Blue Point oysters and shrimp croquets) and the visits of VIPs like President Grover Cleveland. The Tropical Tennis Championship, black-versus-white baseball games, and later the popularity of automobile racing at sites like Ormond, meanwhile, all attest to the appeal and pulling power of sport. The book vividly captures the excitement and energy of those winters, before Flagler's railroad pushed southward, fickle visitors sought out newer diversions farther down the peninsula, and St. Augustine settled into life as a slightly faded star in Florida's growing firmament of coastal resorts.

The architect of so much of this development, Flagler himself remains something of a puzzle: an astute, self-made businessman who then doled out millions of his own money on the Everglade state; a deeply private and seemingly austere man, whose hotels hosted a winter scene of ostentatious parties and expensive leisure. Graham does illuminate and challenge some of the mythology surrounding Flagler's personal life and troubled marriages, while largely defending the developer's business dealings. The book, the author states at the start, "explores sympathetically the personal story of a great enigmatic man" (ix). There are, nonetheless, intriguing glimpses into shadier goings-on behind the scenes: Flagler's purchase and then closing down of Florida newspapers that dared criticize him and bribes given to legislators to halt anti-monopoly legislation. "I have found the men who say the least do the most," one contemporary states approvingly of the oilman, and certainly Flagler had very little to say when under cross-examination regarding Standard Oil's alleged monopolizing tactics (35-36, 336). Also illuminating is Flagler's dim view of advertising as a means of attracting visitors and generating revenue—which is ironic, given the key role his companies and publications played in marketing the

peninsula as a tropical fantasyland for white Americans (353-354).

Flagler is aptly portrayed as a moderate segregationist who opposed black suffrage while maintaining a paternalistic attitude to his many black employees. On race and class, however, the book could do more to locate Florida's resort towns within the wider Jim Crow South. A reliance on black labor lay at the heart of Flagler's economic empire, and African Americans featured regularly—as servants, caddies, and porters—in the promotional material which Flagler himself disdained. Yet the ways in which black performance—like the pervasive "cake walk"—created an appealingly sanitized racialized experience for affluent whites in Florida is touched upon only briefly. To what extent did Flagler's resorts mimic practices popular elsewhere in the South and/or the North? And, reversing the causal arrow, how important were St. Augustine and Palm Beach—with their promise of environmental exoticism, racial recreation, and tropical leisure—in fashioning a new and distinctive identity for Florida?

While these questions go largely unanswered, *Mr. Flagler's St. Augustine* provides a rich and nuanced account of how modern tourism first discovered the United States' oldest continuously inhabited city. Graham, a fine writer and accomplished biographer, has meticulously provided dozens of informative photographs, maps, and illustrations. The book will appeal to those interested in Gilded Age Florida and, in particular, its rapid development into a leading winter resort. Readers interested in vicariously reliving the hectic social whirl of travel, sport, dance, fine dining, and urban development that characterized turn-of-the-century Florida will also find much to enjoy here.

Henry Knight Lozano *Northumbria University, UK*

The Kidnapping and Murder of Little Skeegie Cash: J. Edgar Hoover and Florida's Lindbergh Case. By Robert A. Waters and Zack C. Waters. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2014. Preface, acknowledgements, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. Pp. xv, 189. $29.95 cloth.)

This book is about the kidnapping and murder in Florida of five-year-old Skeegie Cash—one of several prominent child kidnapping cases of the 1930s—and J. Edgar Hoover's response. While

the authors' accounting of the case's day-to-day details are adequately researched and described, their core thesis about the FBI's role is deeply flawed and thinly researched.

The authors contend that the Cash case, and solving it quickly, was central not only to J. Edgar Hoover's public relations efforts, but vital to save the FBI from a funding disaster. They argue that the FBI in 1938 was "struggling" and "Hoover desperately needed a sensational (and successful) case" to restore vital funding because "the FBI had almost run out of money" (26). They further describe the case's importance to Hoover as determining "the very survival of the FBI itself," (43) and one he used in "plotting a course that would right the FBI" (47). Even worse, according to the authors, if Hoover failed to solve this case "his days at the FBI would have been in jeopardy" (77), particularly as he "had gambled his reputation and the prestige of his agency on solving the Cash kidnapping" (78). The authors also attribute Hoover's personal appearance in Florida as representative of the "importance of the case to the future of the bureau" (116). Their argument, to say the least, is overblown.

The authors list three academic studies of the FBI in their bibliography, for example, yet cite only one in their endnotes (while incorrectly listing the editor of the volume). Otherwise, the authors primarily rely upon unsatisfactory journalistic accounts of Hoover and the FBI. Why they list Professor Richard Powers, a major FBI scholar, in their bibliography but fail to reference him in the endnotes is bizarre, because unlike the authors, he accurately describes the FBI of the 1930s.

Hoover's job and the FBI's future did not hinge on this case, nor was Hoover "gambling" with the bureau, nor was his FBI almost out of money. The authors, though, point to a 1938 Deficiency Bill passed through Congress at the time that allotted the FBI $308,000. This amount, however, did not determine the FBI's future. This was merely supplemental funding earmarked for kidnapping cases and FBI agent salaries. The FBI's actual budget in 1938 was $6.2 million, as listed in a book the authors cite. The $308,000 supplement constituted only 5% of this, hardly an amount leaving Hoover in financial straits. The Cash case, furthermore, was not central to the FBI's future or appropriations. After 1936 criminal cases had become secondary to FBI intelligence and domestic security ones. Yet the authors suggest that FBI agents' sluggish success damaged the FBI's image and threatened its funding. The reality is they

solved the case in ten days — a remarkably quick achievement the authors fail to mention.

In chapter 10, "Politics and Peccadillos," the authors lay out their core argument. They contend that Hoover knew about President Roosevelt's sexual affairs and knew Eleanor Roosevelt was a lesbian. Having this information, the authors contend, "meant job security" for Hoover and it meant "the FBI invariably received special treatment from President Roosevelt." "In fact," they write, "just the knowledge that Hoover had proof of certain secrets that could have ruined his political career certainly made FDR more likely to grant favors to Hoover" (105). There is nothing certain about this whatsoever. The problem is the authors have it exactly backwards. During FDR's presidency, J. Edgar Hoover was not yet the feared bureaucrat who could threaten nearly anyone, including presidents, with his vaunted files; that would come only with the Cold War and only after Roosevelt. Hoover, in fact, as a conservative among liberals, relied upon Roosevelt's beneficence to retain his job. Hoover never blackmailed FDR. Quite the contrary, in fact. Time and again, Hoover bent over backwards to ingratiate himself with the president, sending him one effusive message after another, providing FDR with valuable political intelligence on his opponents, and catering to the president's every whim all to keep his job and expand his FBI. It's this relationship, actually, that explains Hoover's deep interest in solving the Cash case. In 1935 Hoover had declared child kidnappings a thing of the past, but in December 1936 another child, Charles Mattson, was kidnapped and brutally murdered. This case became a national *cause célèbre*, leading FDR to promise publicly that the FBI would never stop until the murderer was apprehended. The case was never solved, and it remained open until the 1980s. It was FDR's public promise, compounded by Hoover's now-embarrassing public statement about kidnappings and his failure with the Mattson case, plus Hoover's ingratiating himself with the president that actually explains Hoover's deep interest in the Cash case. In no way could he allow another case to go unsolved lest the close relationship he cultivated with FDR and his carefully crafted FBI image be damaged. Even then it didn't mean he would be fired or defunded over one case.

Lastly, the authors occasionally try to explain some of Hoover's behavior with oblique and progressively brazen references to his presumed sexuality. They refer to Hoover's second in command,

and alleged lover, Clyde Tolson, as "Hoover's special friend" (119). They over-interpret Hoover's petty response to the killer's wife's request for food (he gave her too much) as somehow Hoover's "irrational hatred" for the woman (132). When describing the post-case careers of those involved with the investigation, the authors unnecessarily but clearly with animus describe Hoover, by quoting Richard Nixon, as an "old cock-sucker" who stayed in power thanks to his files (157). As a decade's worth of scholarly literature on Hoover demonstrates, no evidence exists to prove his sexuality one way or another, so its inclusion and presumed effects are at best questionable. But it's also one last example, among many, of this book's interpretive and evidential flaws.

Douglas M. Charles *Penn State University*

The Irony of the Solid South: Democrats, Republicans, and Race, 1865-1944. By Glenn Feldman. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013. Acknowledgements, notes, bibliography, index. Pp. xix, 352. $49.95 cloth.)

The prolific Glenn Feldman has added another title to his body of work on southern politics. In *The Irony of the Solid South: Democrats, Republicans, and Race, 1865-1944*, he analyzes the ways in which race has determined southern political affiliation since Reconstruction. Through a series of at least three ironies and two meldings (see the introduction), Feldman chronicles the South's longstanding affinity for a socially, economically, and culturally conservative form of political action built on a legacy of white racial supremacy. Feldman's book reads like a tragedy, replete with a cadre of master manipulators and sheep-like supplicants who allowed their prejudices to govern their political choices and beliefs. Indeed, little promise but much peril exists in the author's Solid South as Feldman blames its proponents for a series of political choices from massive resistance to the onset of Tea Party politics.

Feldman focuses—*a la* C. Vann Woodward—on three ironies of the Solid South. First, the book analyzes how the South's commitment to the white racial order and socioeconomic conservatism drew voters to the Democratic Party after the Civil War, but also drew them away from the party by the New Deal era as the Republicans became a more faithful exemplar of these beliefs. Historians

have long looked at 1968 as the year in which the Democratic version of the Solid South imploded. Feldman's research confirms and builds on the work of scholars such as Michael Perman, who have argued that the southern vote for the Republicans had been building for at least a generation. The changes wrought by Franklin Roosevelt and the New Dealers alarmed the Solid South and its static political order. "Confronted by a flood of their own emotions—fear, rage, envy, worry, insecurity," Feldman argues, "white Alabamians of various social and economic ranks locked arms in a pan-white alliance against change—any kind of change" during the 1930s (205).

Feldman's second irony—that the parties, not the Solid South, changed positions on issues concerning race and sociocultural issues, also stems from changes in the political system during the New Deal era. For a time southerners, who suffered mightily from the Great Depression, set aside their traditional politics in favor of economic reform. But southern participation in the New Deal could not last beyond World War II because the New Deal coalition and the Democratic Party had become tinctured with northern views of race and culture. This is the third irony of the Solid South: the coalition could not hold as it brought forth a broader and more inclusive Democratic Party. "Somehow during the tumult and confusion of the Depression and world war, when southerners were busy doing something else, the party had become the party *of the North*—including Northern blacks to boot" (229).

By the 1930s, then, the South experienced two "Great Meldings." First, in the wake of the New Deal southern leaders reoriented politics within a fusion of white supremacy and conservative economic policy. This program, according to Feldman, allowed southern elites—from Reconstruction-era planters to World War II-era businessmen—to solidify their power and protect their economically privileged status. They did so by appealing to popular support for a white racial order. They also co-opted the political system. Feldman reveals how politicians—even mildly progressive leaders like Alabama governor Chauncey Sparks—inevitably bent the knee to the planter/industrial class and to the white supremacists.

The second melding, according to Feldman, came with the fusion of economic conservatism and religious fundamentalism. Though Feldman argues that the ramifications of this second melding would not fully materialize until the 1970s and 1980s with the rise of a so-called Moral Majority, he notes that the South's

religious culture reinforced the prevailing regime. And, inasmuch as Feldman's interests in the subject seem to lie in recent southern politics, he argues that the South's religious and economic conservatism undergird the Republican ascendancy of the Reagan era.

Several aspects of *The Irony of the Solid South* merit notice. First, though the title does not indicate it, most of Feldman's research comes from Alabama sources and therefore the book itself is a case study of Alabama's turn from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. Some scholars may repeat the familiar quibble of whether Alabama constitutes a representative state, but Feldman makes a reasonable argument in support of his decision to focus on the state. Nevertheless, one wonders how the patterns Feldman has found in Alabama compare with the Upper South states, which participated in the Solid South regime, but with varying levels of intensity. Second, over two-thirds of the book address the New Deal era and its aftermath in the South. In a similar vein, the introduction and epilogue reveal Feldman's keen interest in explaining Republican supremacy in recent southern politics. Finally, Feldman unmistakably laments the recent trajectory of southern politics and strives mightily to link the present political regime with the pre-1960s conservative Solid South. Though readers may well enjoy Feldman's opinionated—even pugnacious—writing style, his narrative in places approaches the polemical.

Feldman's desire to explain the South's troubled relationship with white supremacy and an entrenched socioeconomic oligarchy sometimes comes at the expense of objectivity. Nevertheless, historians and political observers should not ignore Feldman's thoroughly researched narrative of the South's relationship with America's two-party system.

Christopher Childers *Benedictine College*

Ain't Scared of Your Jail: Arrest, Imprisonment, and the Civil Rights Movement. By Zoe A. Colley. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012. Acknowledgments, notes, bibliography, index. Pp. x, 160. $69.95 cloth.)

In the fifty years after the March on Washington, the Civil Rights Act, and the Voting Rights Act, scholars have explored numerous facets of the Civil Rights Movement. Zoe A. Colley's *Ain't*

Scared of Your Jail: Arrest, Imprisonment, and the Civil Rights Movement examines the more familiar moments of the Civil Rights Movement, but places them in a larger examination of the changing view of imprisonment and the criminal justice system among black activists in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the 1960s, black activists, according to Colley, "turned the jail into a physical and symbolic battleground for the movement" (4). Activists' jail-time experiences became a kind of initiation into the movement for many and radicalized most. More importantly, Colley contends, imprisonment facilitated the creation of a broad, collective critique of the American criminal justice system by the late 1960s.

Four main themes drive the narrative: the changing view of imprisonment, the transformative experience of jail for the individual, the development of a larger protest strategy of the criminal justice system, and southern whites' use of the criminal justice system as a tool to quash black activism and enforce segregation. Colley is at her strongest when she discusses the changing view of imprisonment among black activists. The thousands of cases of lynchings, police brutality against African-Americans, and the feared prison farms solidified the jail and county courthouse as symbols of "white power and a site of black repression" for decades in the black community (30). Going to jail was something to be feared and avoided at all costs. Despite the power of these symbols, during the 1960s black activists embraced the idea of imprisonment as "a symbol of black protest." Black newspapers and non-violent organizations like SNCC, CORE, and the SCLC drove this transformation and advocated for the use of mass incarceration as a legitimate form of protest. Colley emphasizes the importance of imprisonment, known as "jail-ins" or the "jail-no-bail" movements in the larger history of the Civil Rights Movement. Mass incarceration of activists began with the sit-in movement of the early 1960s, when activists in Greensboro, North Carolina; Albany, Georgia; Rockhill, South Carolina; Nashville, Tennessee; and cities across the South got arrested en masse in a demonstration of black protest politics. These mass arrests emphasized the illegitimacy of the southern legal apparatus that the white power structure had used to thwart black protest for centuries.

Colley's assertion that the mass incarceration movement fostered a larger critique of the criminal justice system is plausible, but needed to be more fully developed. She makes the case that mass imprisonment promoted a relationship between the "black criminal class" and activists based on their shared jail experiences.

As they languished in jail and became acquainted with other inmates, imprisoned activists undoubtedly realized the arbitrary and unjust nature of the southern legal system; yet they probably were aware of this prior to their arrest. African-Americans criticized the Jim Crow justice system for decades. As early as the 1890s, Ida B. Wells lambasted the southern criminal justice system for its failure to protect black lynch victims or punish lynch mob participants, black women in the National Association of Colored Women spoke out against the convict lease system, and the NAACP began an anti-lynching campaign in the 1910s. African-Americans' critiques of the criminal justice system had deep roots, and Colley needed to demonstrate how the activism of the 1960s built upon and differed from the earlier black criticisms of the criminal justice system.

Ain't Scared of Your Jail presents the reader with an interesting new take on the Civil Rights Movement. Although Colley's approach does not fundamentally change our understanding of the Civil Rights Movement, her argument is novel in that it incorporates well-known stories and actors of the Civil Rights Movement with lesser-known events and people into a cohesive narrative that centers on the idea of imprisonment. The criminal justice system maintained and perpetuated Jim Crow for decades. White police officers, the county courthouse, and the jail were potent symbols of the injustices faced by African-Americans and the depth of institutional racism that permeated southern society. For these very reasons, Colley argues, the criminal justice system played a central role in the efforts of black activists who attempted to highlight the horrors of Jim Crow to a wider audience and eventually toppled the entire system.

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Power and Paradise in Walt Disney's World. By Cher Krause Knight. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2014. Acknowledgments, figures, bibliography, index. Pp. xii, 222. $39.95 cloth)

While the Disney theme parks have been pretty well covered by scholars over the years—in fields ranging from media studies to architecture to critical theory—less work has been done from the overt perspective of the kind of fandom (from rabid to ambivalent)

which no doubt has motivated much of that work. It is this distinctive intersection within the emerging field of Disney Studies that Cher Krause Knight attempts to situate her new book, *Power and Paradise in Walt Disney's World* (2014)—an admirable, but ultimately flawed, effort to reconcile her own obsessive fascination with the Disney theme parks in Florida with a broader account of their aesthetic power and cultural appeal. "Despite our best intentions," she writes, academics "do not always do the best job of communicating passion for our given fields, or we forget why we had fallen in love with these in the first place" (8). Certainly, few topics intersect with this touchy question more than Disney.

The book is very well-researched and thoughtful on a number of levels. The author cites an impressively wide range of theories on subjects such as cultural studies, art history, sociology, tourism, theology, urban design, media studies, and Disney—though they are not always, in the last instance anyway, effectively utilized. Knight sets out to "better understand why [she] was drawn to the place, how it works in the ways that it does, and why so many people also have deeply emotional responses to it" (2-3), later adding that "my purpose is to provide analysis of anecdotes describing the experience of being at Disney World in all its complexities" (3). As this broad thesis would suggest, however, the specific intervention that Knight is attempting into the rich field of studies on Disney parks is not always entirely clear.

One glaring issue, in addition to the inattention to class issues which shapes how people can and cannot engage with the parks (related to this is the importance of Disney as a "private" space radically different from the kinds of historical antecedents she brings in), is how much credit is repeatedly given to Walt Disney personally, despite the fact that the object of her study opened five years after his death and bore only a passing resemblance to the World he originally envisioned—to say nothing of the many people and changes that have been involved in the forty years since. In this regard, *Power and Paradise* is guilty of a fallacy that has for far too long marred discussions of the company—the "Great Man" Myth of history, wherein Walt single-handedly built the massive empire which bears his name.

The book is at its strongest, though, when attempting to give more theoretical and historical heft to ideas long assumed, but rarely articulated—such as the oft-stated idea of Disney vacations as some kind of "pilgrimage" on par with a religious experience. "Pil-

grimage centers," she writes, "share several distinguishing qualities, including an arrangement of space that promotes ritual movement and circulation through the site; the use of shrines and symbols that draw upon knowledge gathered prior to visiting the center; and the ability to inspire intense devotion among visitors" (29). Also, provocative and insightful are moments throughout where the author draws parallels between the theme parks and sometimes unexpected, historically significant achievements in architecture and landscaping design, such as Santiago de Compostela or the Boboli Gardens. In these passages, Knight's scholarly background in Art History and personal fandom find an effective co-existence.

The extremely narrow focus on simply exploring how the Florida parks work to construct the distinctive Disney "experience" is rife with issues, however. For one, there doesn't really seem to be enough material on Disney's distinctive forms of control and magic in the Sunshine State alone to fill an entire book, especially when the author seems so resistant to, or disinterested in, most other readings of the parks—and thus it quickly becomes repetitive, and filled with potentially arbitrary digressions (such as an extensive discussion of Las Vegas). For another, without any self-reflexivity that would allow the author to challenge, but also strengthen her own fandom, much of the discussion comes across as indistinguishable from the company's own existing rhetoric about itself. Too often Knight takes at face value Disney's own descriptions of what a special, magical place it is—often then accompanied by her own nostalgic anecdotes. This then speaks to another, related, problem—most of this ground has already been covered, both by those deeply sympathetic to Disney, those adamantly resistant to it, and those everywhere in between.

On that note, the simplistic binary the author posits between pro- and anti-Disney crowds is perhaps another issue, as is the quick and superficial dismissal of numerous legitimate criticisms of the parks. Knight makes a point to suggest early on that a more balanced account of Disney is needed, saying that she "will consciously avoid aligning [herself] with either" of the "polarized views" (4) which she feels dominates discussions of the company—an admirable goal, but one quickly undermined by the continual resistance, which at times borders on condescending, to even the most modest critiques of the Disney parks. Thoughtful accounts of Disney World are often unfairly dismissed as cynical and never addressed again, such as *Inside the Mouse: Work and Play at Disney World* (1995), which

is quickly tossed aside because of what the author feels is its "predisposition to dislike the company" (14)—which is a shame, since that piece in particular could have been a much better-utilized model for the type of auto-ethnographic work Knight is attempting. When paired with the author's overt, unapologetic celebration of her own fandom, this largely one-sided account of ideas about Disney quickly challenges the author's credibility far more than it needed to.

The book is stronger in the conclusion, though, when the author eases back from the tight focus on Walt Disney World's design and on Walt's assumed intention to explore some of the more unexpected and unplanned responses to, and appropriations, of the theme parks. Knight is right to note that visitors do not necessarily respond to Disney's tight emphasis on planning and control in passive, manipulated, and other predictable kinds of ways, though she may be selling Disney scholarship a bit short in this regard—as several writers (this one included) have recently made the claim that Disney audiences are much more active and complicated than earlier generations of scholars may have assumed.

Still, *Power and Paradise* does benefit from Knight's self-admitted passion, which will undoubtedly engage many audiences who are mostly otherwise resistant to academic accounts of Walt Disney World. In this regard, the book will probably be most useful to undergraduates studying the aesthetic and commercial workings of Walt Disney World for the very first time—as it does offer a fairly comprehensive but accessible overview of how Disney imagines its "magic" to work.

Jason Sperb *Northwestern University*

The Structure of Cuban History: Meanings and Purpose of the Past. By Louis A. Pérez Jr. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2013. Acknowledgements, illustrations, notes, index. Pp. xv, 352. $39.95 cloth.)

In this most recent work, Louis Pérez Jr., a prolific and long established scholar on Cuba, analyzes the construction of Cuban history as a cyclical and self-defining process by which the country and its people find themselves in a process of self-prophecy and attempted fulfillment. The narrative of Cuban history, Pérez argues,

emerged with a dual purpose. While historical truth and memory both influenced and was influenced by national formation, it profoundly affected collective and individual actions under the guise of what the author refers to as the island's "popular imagination"(1). Cuba's struggle for sovereignty and the historical narrative that was subsequently created, Pérez asserts, provided the impetus for independence as well as a defining feature of who would and would not constitute a true Cuban.

Those who at the beginning of the Wars for Independence sought to define a space worthy of the lives that would be lost and the long struggle that awaited the survivors created a history to fight for. Egalitarianism and abolitionism were linked to independence and Cuban sovereignty stood above all else, producing autochthonous power formed of the people for the people of a free Cuba. Pérez argues that the intervention of the United States in 1898 and the subsequent Platt Amendment categorically denied Cuban sovereignty, which had acted as the principle impetus for participation in the Wars for Cuban Independence. Pérez writes, "The 'problem' of Cuban history after 1902 was very much about reconciling the moral content of nationality with the political character of the republic" (12). As Pérez convincingly demonstrates, the principle actors of Cuban history were the same individuals who wrote and disseminated that history upon Cuba's independence from Spain. The cyclical nature of the actors/producers of the Cuban national narrative rendered historical knowledge a thing of myth, heritage, legacy, and most importantly, purpose. Pérez defined this process as one by which "Cubans dwelled in the past as a place of moral clarity, a past structured as a point of departure from which aspirations of national fulfillment necessarily obtained orientation" (150). Cuban national history was "an interrupted history," and as such full sovereignty was not an impossibility, but rather a goal yet to be achieved. This national narrative of a path interrupted relegated only those who sought to fulfill the early promises of Cuban history as *verdadero cubanos*. Nationalism was equated to an investment in Cuban history and an expressed need to procure the sovereignty that was denied principally in 1898 and again in 1902.

While many historians have analyzed the ways Fidel Castro and the 26 of July Movement positioned themselves as the continuation of Martí and the *mambises*, Pérez argues that it was not only the 26 of July Movement but rather the nation that was indoctrinated into a rhetoric of resistance and fulfillment through the construction

of Cuba's historical narrative. Pérez argues, "[t]he master narrative of the nation [...] readily drew Cubans into the plausibility of revolution as remedy, largely as a matter of culturally determined dispositions" (194). The leaders of the 26 of July Movement, then, did not mastermind a means by which to invest themselves or place themselves into Cuban history, but rather were apt students of the national narrative that had long been disseminated. With the success of the Cuban Revolution, and the framing of this success in terms of a prophecy fulfilled—that of Cuban sovereignty—those who stood in opposition to the Revolution were framed in opposition to Cuba itself.

This evocative exploration of the power of history constitutes one of Pérez' most innovative contributions to the historiography on modern Cuba. Pérez pushes the idea of historical continuity past the existing work on the Cuban Revolution and its contrived or conceived connections to the Wars for Independence. Instead, Pérez' analysis of the ways in which Cuban history acted as an individualistic myth and methodology for inspiring story and action, defining and defined by attempts at sovereignty, broadens the possibilities of Cuban continuity and ruptures existing temporal framings prevalent in the field. Pérez creates a narrative that flows seamlessly from the colonial to the Republic to the Revolutionary periods along a path of what remained ideologically or emphatically consistent: the use and creation of a national narrative that emphasized history as a means of achieving sovereignty. As with Pérez' earlier works, this book demonstrates the power of language and the potential of historical study.

Kaitlyn D. Henderson *Tulane University*

The New Encyclopedia of Southern Culture. Volume 23: Folk Art. Edited by Carol Crown and Cheryl Rivers. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013. General introduction, illustrations, list of contributors, index. Pp. xx, 520. $49.95 cloth.)

One of 24 volumes in *The New Encyclopedia of Southern Culture*, this book on folk art is a superb resource. It is organized in sections. An excellent overview essay discusses major issues in the field, including the rocky history of the term "folk art;" Holger Cahill's relationship to the South; an overview of the scholarship on

southern folk art; and aesthetic approaches to the category. Following this essay are approximately 160 pages of thematic articles on topics such as bottle trees, decoys, roadside art, and toys. The last half of the book focuses on biographical information on artists with a smattering of shorter subject topics such as limners, the National Society of the Colonial Dames of America, and New Market, Virginia, Painted Boxes. Black and white photos are interspersed throughout the book, and a 16 page color insert gives the book more visual appeal.

Folk art scholars, collectors, and art lovers will find much to like in this anthology. For example, there is a good discussion of the term "vernacular" in relationship to furniture and photography, a broad overview of Jewish ceremonial and decorative arts, and an insight into varying ways that landscape paintings were created such as through collage and ingenious methods of reproduction. The essay on Latino Folk Art gives visibility to a group that has been little studied as a whole, and readers have the opportunity to explore the history of the questionable term "outsider art."

The last half of the book addresses, in alphabetical order, individual artists and groups of artists, such as the Gee's Bend quilters and the Highwaymen, along with varied topics related to understanding folk art. Some of the artists are little known outside their regional area like Linvel Barker, a Kentucky woodcarver, or Jorko Voronovsky, a solitary Miami artist from the Ukraine whose work was not shared during his lifetime.

The authors of this encyclopedic volume were carefully selected to write to their individual expertise. (Full disclosure: I wrote two of the entries.) They come from large and small universities, arts councils, museums, and historical societies. In spite of the many authors included in this volume, the essays have a consistent approach, thereby forming a volume that is coherent and well organized in its readability.

The General Editor for the 24 volumes, Charles Reagan Wilson, was smart in making a publication for each topic of southern culture, such as Law and Politics, Literature, Media, and Music. The approach makes sense with an encyclopedic topic (southern culture) that demands analysis in so many areas. The first *Encyclopedia of Southern Culture*, published in 1989, also by the University of North Carolina Press, was 1634 pages long. Each time I removed it from my bookcase for use, it took a bit of effort and it swallowed up my research space. Separate volumes on various topics allow for

more in-depth coverage from different disciplinary perspectives. The new format also makes using the work a more pleasant experience.

The 23rd volume is unique in the field of folk art. While several authors, including myself, have attempted to give the field of folk art an encyclopedic overview, no one publication has focused so well on the South. The beauty of the Crown and Rivers' work is that it covers the South from a historical vantage point. Most of the few encyclopedic efforts focus on the 20th century, and rarely do we see entries on artists such as Mark Catesby (1683-1749), Jacob Frymire (b. 1765-1777; d. 1822), or John Hesselius (ca. 1726-1778) in other anthologies. Furthermore, this volume embraces varying definitions of folk art. Some entries in the artists' biographical section, such as John James Audubon, may come as a surprise. This kind of playful inclusion makes this encyclopedic volume more than a publication of facts, as it leads the reader to question and engage with the editors on their decision making process. We recognize with them that deconstructing the field and its weak definers is as much a part of the scholarly process as pulling it together as a cohesive whole.

The kinds of media used by artists and covered in this volume are also wide ranging. They include wool for rug hooking, soap for carving, beer cans for covering a house, and a wide array of cast off objects.

For readers focusing on Florida folk artists, the most popular artists, such as Purvis Young, Nicario Jiménez, Earl Cunningham, Mary Proctor, Robert Roberg, and the Highwaymen are fully covered. Other, more obscure Florida artists like Milton Ellis and Peter James Minchell (Isenberg) are also included.

Most folk art enthusiasts will use this publication as a reference book. But I encourage all those interested in folk art to read the entries in the first half of the book. While intended to be overview essays, there is a lot that can be learned from them. I especially enjoyed the articles on African American Expression, the essays on Furniture (of which I know very little), and the two sections on Landscape Painting. An enormous amount of information can be found in this well edited, easy to handle book on southern folk art.

Kristin G. Congdon *University of Central Florida*

End Notes

Annual Meeting and Symposium of the Florida Historical Society
May 22-24, 2015
World Golf Village Resort, St. Augustine, Fla.

THEME: ***Subjects, Citizens, and Civil Rights: 450 Years of Florida History***

The Florida Historical Society announces its Annual Meeting & Symposium to be held May 22-24, 2015 in St. Augustine, Fla. *Please note: The conference will run on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.* The conference hotel will be the Renaissance World Golf Village Resort. Information about conference registration and hotel reservations can be found at http://myfloridahistory.org/annualmeeting.

FHS Acquires the Brevard Museum of History and Natural Science

A new era begins for both the Florida Historical Society and the Brevard Museum of History and Natural Science as the oldest cultural organization in the state takes ownership of an outstanding museum.

The facility is now also the home of the Florida Historical Society Archaeological Institute.

"I've been connected with the Florida Historical Society for almost twenty years now, and this is the most exciting event I've seen happen," says FHS President Leonard Lempel. "This museum is a tremendous new edition to the Florida Historical Society. I'm just real excited about all the opportunities it presents."

The Brevard Museum of History and Natural Science was established in 1969. The nearly 15,000 square foot facility sits on a

20-acre nature preserve with walking trails through three Florida ecosystems. The museum is adjacent to Eastern Florida State College and the University of Central Florida Cocoa campus.

The change in ownership from Brevard Museum, Inc. to the Florida Historical Society was amicable and even welcomed. With a passionate and emotionally invested Museum Guild already in place, the addition of Florida Historical Society personnel and resources will allow the museum to become even better than it already is.

"There certainly is a passion," says Lee Bailey, president of the outgoing Brevard Museum Board of Trustees. "Unfortunately it takes more than just passion. It has to have really good, solid understanding and knowing how to run a museum. I think with this in place, we're going to see it thrive."

The centerpiece of the Brevard Museum of History and Natural Science is an exhibition on the amazing Windover Archaeological Dig. In 1982, an ancient pond cemetery was discovered near Titusville. Hundreds of ritualistically buried bodies were remarkably well preserved, wrapped in the oldest woven fabric found in North America. Ninety-one skulls even contained intact brain matter.

The Windover people were between 7,000 and 8,000 years old, making them 2,000 years older than the Great Pyramids and 3,200 years older than King Tutankhamen.

The Florida Historical Society Board of Directors, made up of educators, historians, business people, and museum professionals from throughout the state, is the new governing body of the Brevard Museum of History and Natural Science.

The museum also features exhibits on other native peoples, the Spanish Colonial period, pioneer culture, and has numerous archaeological artifacts.

Many improvements were made to the Brevard Museum of History and Natural Science under the leadership of outgoing executive director Nancy Rader. She refreshed exhibits, improved the museum branding, and increased attendance. Her proudest achievement was adding a mastodon skeleton that joined the bones of a giant ground sloth and a saber tooth cat on display.

Rader is very supportive of the changes happening at the museum. "I feel like the Brevard Museum is a real treasure and I really want the community to jump on board and support it," Rader says.

The museum's mission to educate the public about local history compliments the Florida Historical Society's statewide focus. From the prehistoric era to pioneer settlement to the launching of America's space program, Brevard County serves as a microcosm of Florida history.

Established in 1856, the Florida Historical Society maintains an extensive archive at the Library of Florida History in Cocoa, publishes books and periodicals, produces radio and television programs, operates the Florida Historical Society Archaeological Institute, and manages the Historic Rossetter House Museum in Eau Gallie. Our Annual Meeting and Symposium is held in a different Florida city each May, and we participate in festivals, events, and educational outreach throughout the state.

Bruce Piatek is the new Director of the Florida Historical Society Archaeological Institute and the Brevard Museum of History and Natural Science. Piatek has an extensive background as both a professional archaeologist and a museum administrator. He was City Archaeologist in St. Augustine where he also ran a successful museum. For 20 years, Piatek was executive director of the Florida Agricultural Museum, building it into the most popular tourist destination in Flagler County.

"I think the Brevard Museum is great. It's got tremendous potential," says Piatek. "There's been 45 years of hard work by the folks who put the museum together, got it operating, and have continued to operate it. I think it's exciting what the Florida Historical Society has planned for coming into the museum and making it a more vibrant and viable operation."

THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL SOCIETY ARCHAEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE (FHSAI)

The Florida Historical Society (FHS) has established a new department focusing on the intersection of history and archaeology. FHS launched the Florida Historical Society Archaeological Institute (FHSAI) on March 4, 2014.

Established in 1856, the Florida Historical Society has been supporting archaeology in the state for more than a century.

FHS was the first state-wide organization dedicated to the preservation of Florida history and prehistory, as stated in our 1905 constitution. We were the first state-wide organization to preserve Native American artifacts such as stone pipes, arrowheads, and pottery, and the first to actively promote and publish archaeological research dating back to the early 1900s. Archaeology enthusiast Clarence B. Moore became a Member of the Florida Historical Society in 1907, and donated his written works to the Library of Florida History.

From the early twentieth century to the present, leading Florida archaeologists have had their work published in the FHS journal, *The Florida Historical Quarterly*. The Florida Historical Society was instrumental in the creation of the position of State Archaeologist and the establishment of the Florida Anthropological Society (FAS) in the 1940s, and served as host of the Florida Public Archaeology Network (FPAN) East Central Region from 2010 through 2013. Under the direction of FHS, the East Central Region was one of FPAN's most successful.

Today, FHS is continuing our long tradition of supporting archaeology in the state with the Florida Historical Society Archaeological Institute (FHSAI). The mission statement says that FHSAI "is dedicated to educating the public about Florida archaeology through research, publication, educational outreach, and the promotion of complimentary work by other organizations."

FLORIDA FRONTIERS: THE WEEKLY RADIO MAGAZINE OF THE FLORIDA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical Society, airing on public radio stations throughout the state, continues to be one of our most successful educational outreach projects. The program is a combination of interview segments and produced features covering history-based events, exhibitions, ac-

tivities, places, and people in Florida. The program explores the relevance of Florida history to contemporary society and promotes awareness of heritage and culture tourism options in the state.

The first section of the program each week is a long-form NPR-style piece from *Florida Frontiers* producer and host Ben Brotemarkle, Executive Director of the Florida Historical Society. He talks with authors of books about Florida history and culture; takes listeners to historic sites around the state; discusses important issues dealing with education and preservation; and demonstrates how learning about our history and culture can provide a sense of community to Floridians today.

The second section of the program is a conversation between Ben Brotemarkle and FHS Educational Resources Coordinator Ben DiBiase about various items in our archive at the Library of Florida History in Cocoa. Recent discussions have focused on slave documents from the El Destino Plantation; the 1821 decree from Spain informing residents of Florida that they were now living in a territory of the United States; 19th century Florida money; and the FHS collection of Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings materials.

The third section of the program is produced by Robert Cassanello, Associate Professor of History at the University of Central Florida and an award-winning podcaster. Cassanello's segment has recently featured a look at urban planning in 1920s Jacksonville; a discussion about wooden Gothic churches in Florida; a visit with Ernest Hemingway's cats in Key West; and a conversation with Gilbert King, Pulitzer Prize winning author of *Devil in the Grove: Thurgood Marshall, the Groveland Boys, and the Dawn of a New America.*

Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical Society is currently broadcast on 90.7 WMFE Orlando, Thursdays at 6:30 pm and Sundays at 4:00 pm.; 88.1 WUWF Pensacola, Fridays at 5:30 p.m.; 89.9 WJCT Jacksonville, Mondays at 6:30 pm; 89.5 WFIT Melbourne, Sundays at 7:00 a.m.; 88.9 WQCS (HD2) Ft. Pierce, Wednesdays at 9:00 a.m.; 89.1 WUFT Gainesville, Saturdays at 6:00 am and Sundays at 7:30 a.m.; and 90.1 WJUF Inverness, Saturdays at 6:00 am and Sundays at 7:30 a.m. Check your local NPR listings for additional airings. The program is archived on the Florida Historical Society web site and accessible any time at www.myfloridahistory.org/frontiers.

Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical Society is made possible in part by the Jessie Ball duPont Fund and by Florida's Space Coast Office of Tourism, representing destinations from Titusville to Cocoa Beach to Melbourne Beach.

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY PODCASTS

The *Florida Historical Quarterly* has entered a new era of media. Dr. Robert Cassanello, Associate Professor of History at the University of Central Florida and a member of the *FHQ* editorial board, has accepted a new role as the coordinator for podcast productions. In conjunction with the Public History programs at UCF, Dr. Cassanello will produce a podcast for each issue of the *Quarterly*. Each podcast will consist of an interview with one of the authors from the most recent issue of the *Quarterly*. The podcasts are uploaded to iTunes University and are available to the public at http://publichistorypodcast.blogspot.com/.

Dr. Jack E. Davis on his article "Sharp Prose for Green: John D. MacDonald and the First Ecological Novel," which appeared in Volume 87, no. 4 (Spring 2009).

Dr. Michael D. Bowen on his article "The Strange Tale of Wesley and Florence Garrison: Racial Crosscurrents of the Postwar Florida Republican Party" appeared in Volume 88, no. 1 (Summer 2009).

Dr. Nancy J. Levine discussed the research project undertaken by her students on the Hastings Branch Library that appeared in Volume 88, no. 2 (Fall 2009).

Dr. Daniel Feller, 2009 Catherine Prescott Lecturer, on "The Seminole Controversy Revisited: A New Look at Andrew Jackson's 1819 Florida Campaign," Volume 88, no. 3 (Winter 2010).

Dr. Derrick E. White, on his article "From Desegregation to Integration: Race, Football, and 'Dixie' at the University of Florida," Volume 88, no. 4 (Spring 2010).

Dr. Gilbert Din was interviewed to discuss his article "William Augustus Bowles on the Gulf Coast, 1787-1803: Unraveling a Labyrinthine Conundrum," which appeared in Volume 89, no. 1 (Summer 2010).

Deborah L. Bauer, Nicole C. Cox, and Peter Ferdinando on graduate education in Florida and their individual articles in Volume 89, no. 2 (Fall 2010).

Jessica Clawson, "Administrative Recalcitrance and Government Intervention: Desegregation at the University of Florida, 1962-1972," which appeared in Volume 89, no. 3 (Winter 2011).

Dr. Rebecca Sharpless, "The Servants and Mrs. Rawlings: Martha Mickens and African American Life at Cross Creek," which appeared in Volume 89, no. 4 (Spring 2011).

Dr. James M. Denham, "Crime and Punishment in Antebellum Pensacola," which appeared in Volume 90, no. 1 (Summer 2011).

Dr. Samuel C. Hyde Jr., Dr. James G. Cusick, Dr. William S. Belko, and Cody Scallions in a roundtable discussion on the West Florida Rebellion of 1810, the subject of the special issue of the *Florida Historical Quarterly* Volume 90, no. 2 (Fall 2011).

Dr. Julian Chambliss and Dr. Denise K. Cummings, guest editors for "Florida: The Mediated State," special issue, *Florida Historical Quarterly* Volume 90, no. 3 (Winter 2012).

Dr. David H. Jackson, Jr., on his article "'Industrious, Thrifty and Ambitious': Jacksonville's African American Businesspeople during the Jim Crow Era," in the *Florida Historical* Quarterly Volume 90, no. 4 (Spring 2012) and Dr. Tina Bucuvalas, 2012 Jillian Prescott Memorial Lecturer and winner of the Stetson Kennedy Award for *The Florida Folklife Reader.*

Dr. Claire Strom, Rapetti-Trunzo Professor of History at Rollins College, on her article, "Controlling Venereal Disease in Orlando during World War II," *Florida Historical Quarterly* Volume 91, no. 1 (Summer 2012).

Dr. Matthew G. Hyland, on his article, "The Florida Keys Hurricane House: Post-Disaster New Deal Housing," *Florida Historical Quarterly* Volume 91, no. 2 (Fall 2012).

Dr. Paul E. Hoffman, guest editor of Volume 91, no. 3 (Winter 2013) on sixteenth century Florida.

Dr. Christopher Meindl and Andrew Fairbanks were interviewed for the Spring 2013 (Volume 91, no. 4) podcast on their article (with Jennifer Wunderlich). They talked about environmental history and the problems of garbage for Florida's environment.

Dr. Samuel Watson was interviewed about his article, "Conquerors, Peacekeepers, or Both? The U.S. Army and West Florida, 1810-1811," Volume 92, no. 1 (Summer 2013). His article challenged some of the work published in the Fall 2010 special issue on the West Florida Rebellion. In his interview Dr. Watson spoke about the discipline of history and the way in which the field advances as historians debate larger interpretative issues.

Richard S. Dellinger, Esq., attorney with the Orlando firm of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed and Vice President for the 11th Circuit Court, was interviewed for the Fall 2013 Special Issue on the 50th Anniversary of the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida.

Dr. Jane Landers, guest editor for Volume 92, no. 3 (Winter 2014) on seventeenth century Florida, the second issue in the 500 Years of Florida History series of special issues.

Dr. Matt Clavin, an Associate Professor of History at the University of Houston was interviewed for Volume 92, no. 4 (Spring 2014) on his article "An 'underground railway' to Pensacola and the Impending Crisis over Slavery."

Dr. Lisa Lindquist Dorr's article "Bootlegging Aliens: Unsanctioned Immigration and the Underground Economy of Smuggling from Cuba through Prohibition" was the topic for the podcast on Volume 93, no. 1 (Summer 2014).

Dr. C.S. Monaco was interviewed on his article "'Wishing that Right May Prevail': Ethan Allen Hitchcock and the Florida War" which appeared in Volume 93, no. 2 (Fall 2014).

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY AVAILABLE ON JSTOR

The *Florida Historical Quarterly* is available to scholars and researchers through JSTOR, a digital service for libraries, archives, and individual subscribers. JSTOR editors spent more than a year digitizing *FHQ* volumes 3-83; it became available to academic libraries and individual subscribers in August 2009. The *FHQ* has reduced the 5-year window to a 3-year window for greater access. More recent issues of the *Quarterly* are available only in print copy form. JSTOR has emerged as a leader in the field of journal digitization and the *FHQ* joins a number of prestigious journals in all disciplines. The *Florida Historical Quarterly* will continue to be available through PALMM, with a 5-year window.

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY ON FACEBOOK

Join the *Florida Historical Quarterly* on Facebook. The *FHQ* Facebook page provides an image of each issue, the table of contents of each issue, an abstract of each article. There is also a link to the *Quarterly* podcasts and the Florida Historical Society. Go to the *FHQ* to find information on recent "Calls for Papers" for conferences in Florida and the South.

The Lawton M. Chiles, Jr., Center for Florida History *presents* The Florida Lecture Series 2014-2015

Founded in 2001, the Lawton M. Chiles, Jr., Center for Florida History strives to enhance the teaching, study, and writing of Florida history. The center seeks to preserve the state's past through

cooperative efforts with historical societies, preservation groups, museums, public programs, media, and interested persons. This unique center, housed in the Sarah D. and L. Kirk McKay, Jr., Archives Center, is a source of continuing information created to increase appreciation for Florida history.

In its 18th year, the Lawton M. Chiles, Jr. Florida Lecture Series is a forum that brings speakers to the Florida Southern College campus to explore Florida life and culture from a wide range of disciplines, including history, public affairs, law, sociology, criminology, anthropology, literature, and art. The overall objective of the series is to bring members of the community, the faculty, and the student body together to interact with and learn from leading scholars in their fields.

MARCH 26

LARRY RIVERS, *Professor of History, Valdosta State University*

"Rebels and Runaways: Slave Resistance in the Nineteenth Century"

Hollis Room, Thad Buckner Building

Using a variety of sources such as slaveholders' wills and probate records, ledgers, account books, court records, oral histories, and numerous newspaper accounts, Larry Eugene Rivers discusses the historical significance of Florida as a runaway slave haven dating back to the seventeenth century and explains Florida's unique history of slave resistance and protest. Rivers argues persuasively that the size, scope, and intensity of black resistance in the Second Seminole War makes it the largest sustained slave insurrection ever to occur in American history.

Larry Rivers is professor of history at Valdosta State University and the author of *Slavery in Florida: Territorial Days to Emancipation and Rebels and Runaways: Slave Resistance in Nineteenth-Century Florida.*

Call for Papers

Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the Gulf South History and Humanities Conference
October 1-3, 2015, Natchez Grand Hotel, Natchez, Miss.

Deadline for Submissions: July 6, 2015
Send submissions to program chair James Cusick: jgcusick@ufl.edu

THEME: ***Celebrating Mississippi and Beyond— Life and Society in the Gulf South***

The Gulf South History and Humanities Conference seeks submissions for its annual conference to be held Oct. 1-3, 2015 in Natchez, Miss. The conference hotel will be the Natchez Grand Hotel overlooking the Mississippi River. For information about conference registration and hotel reservations please see http://www.usm.edu/gulfcoast/gulf-south-historical-association, the website of the Gulf South Historical Association, University of Southern Mississippi.

Submission guidelines: In anticipation of the 400th anniversary of the founding of Natchez (1716-2016) the 2015 conference takes us to the heart of the Gulf South. All topics bearing on the history, ethnography, archaeology, and development of the Gulf South and related Circum-Caribbean are welcome!

- INDIVIDUAL PAPER: send a title, 150-word abstract and one-page vita.
- THEME PANEL: send a title and brief (150 word) description of the theme; 150-word abstract for each paper, one-page vita for each presenter, suggested chair/discussant.
- ROUND TABLE FORUMS OR DISCUSSIONS: send a title and brief (150 word) description of the topic and a complete list of the participants and moderator/discussant with vitas.

Send submissions by email as an MSWord attachment to program organizer James Cusick at jgcusick@ufl.edu (*Please put "2015 Gulf South Paper" in your email heading).* Or send a paper copy to James Cusick, Special & Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Library, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611. Expect an email confirmation that your submission has been received. If you do not receive a confirmation, send an email query to James Cusick to verify receipt.

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS TO THE *FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY*

The *Florida Historical Quarterly* is a peer-refereed journal and accepts for consideration manuscripts on the history of Florida, its people, and its historical relationships to the United States, the Atlantic World, the Caribbean, or Latin America. All submissions are expected to reflect substantial research, a dedication to writing, and the scholarly rigor demanded of professionally produced historical work. Work submitted for consideration should not have been previously published, soon to be published, or under consideration by another journal or press. Authors who are engaged in open source peer review should watermark any manuscript available through an open source site as "Draft Under Consideration."

Authors should submit an electronic copy in MS Word to the *Florida Historical Quarterly*, at Connie.Lester@ucf.edu.

Manuscripts should be typed and double-spaced (excluding footnotes, block quotes, or tabular matter).

The first page should be headed by the title without the author's name. Author identification should be avoided throughout the manuscript. On a separate sheet of paper, please provide the author's name, institutional title or connection, or place of residence, and acknowledgements. Citations should be single-spaced **footnotes**, numbered consecutively, and in accordance with the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Use the reference feature to create footnotes rather than the superscript button.

Tables and illustrations should be created on separate pages, with positions in the manuscript indicated.

In a cover letter, the author should provide contact information that includes phone numbers, fax number, email address, and mailing address. The author should provide a statement of the substance and significance of the work and identify anyone who has already critiqued the manuscript.

Images or illustrations to be considered for publication with the article may be submitted in EPS or PDF electronic format at 300 dpi or higher. Xeroxed images cannot be accepted. All illustrations should include full citations and credit lines. Authors should retain letters of permission from institutions or individuals owning the originals.

Questions regarding submissions should be directed to Connie L. Lester, editor, addressed to Department of History, PO Box 161350, 12790 Acquarius Agora Dr., Suite 551, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1350, by email to Connie.Lester@ucf.edu, or by phone at 407-823-0261.

The Florida Historical Society

The Historical Society of Florida, 1856
The Florida Historical Society, successor, 1902
The Florida Historical Society, incorporated, 1905

Created in St. Augustine in 1856, The Florida Historical Society is the oldest existing cultural organization in the state, and Florida's only state-wide historical society. The Society is dedicated to preserving Florida's past through the collection and archival maintenance of historical documents and photographs, the publication of scholarly research on Florida history, and educating the public about Florida history through a variety of public history and historic preservation projects. We publish scholarly research in the *Florida Historical Quarterly* and through the Florida Historical Society Press. *Florida Frontiers: The Weekly Radio Magazine of the Florida Historical Society* is broadcast on public radio stations throughout the state and is archived on our web site. The Florida Historical Society headquarters are located at the Library of Florida History in historic Cocoa Village. The Florida Historical Society manages the Historic Rossetter House Museum and the Florida Books & Gifts.

Florida Historical Society: ⟨www.myfloridahistory.org.⟩
Rossetter House Museum: ⟨www.rossetterhousemuseum.org.⟩
Florida Historical Quarterly Podcasts: ⟨http://floridahistoricalquarterly.blogspot.com/⟩