THE SPANISH CONQUEST OF BRITISH WEST FLORIDA, 1779-1781 [1]

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FLORIDA PASSED TO British control in 1763 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris. A Royal Proclamation on October 7 of that year established West Florida as a colony and Pensacola was designated as its capital.

West Florida was roughly rectangular in shape and included portions of the present day states of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Its eastern boundary was the Chattahoochee and Appalachicola Rivers. To the west, Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Maurepas, the Iberville River, and the Mississippi River defined the limits of British territory. The northern boundary was a line at approximately 32 degrees 28 minutes North, running east from the confluence of the Yazoo and the Mississippi Rivers to the Chattahoochee. To the south, of course, was the Gulf of Mexico. [2] Pensacola and Mobile were the most important towns, but other settlements later gained in importance, especially when Loyalist refugees resettled in this province at the outbreak of the Revolution.

Spanish territorial losses in the Seven Year's War had created considerable animosity in Spain towards Great Britain, and had left a strong desire to retaliate. The goal of King Carlos III and his ministers was to safeguard Spanish colonies in America, to regain Gibraltar and Minorca, and to obtain revenge.

The French, after signing their treaty with the Americans in 1778, exerted considerable diplomatic effort to bring Spain into active participation in the war. Extracting a heavy price for their military assistance, the Spanish agreed to the secret convention of Aranjuez on April 12, 1779. The Spanish ambassador to the Court of St. James delivered a note on June 16 offering mediation between Britain and America on terms which the British were certain to reject. When these terms were turned down,

1. An excellent source and guide in the preparation of this paper has been John Walton Caughey's *Bernardo de Galvez in Louisiana, 1776-1783* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1934); hereafter cited as Caughey.
2. James Truslow Adams, ed., *Atlas of American History* (New York: Scribners, 1943), Plate 50.

Spain entered the war in accordance with the terms of their agreement with France.

The Treaty of Aranjuez was a Spanish diplomatic victory. Though the French achieved their long-sought goal of active Spanish participation, they bought it dearly. France was compelled to pledge that she would fight until Gibraltar was restored to Spain. In addition, France pledged all possible aid to Spain to wrest Minorca, Mobile, and other areas from Britain. There were other terms in the treaty, but in the main these did not affect the American scene. Perhaps the most important aspect of the treaty was that it did not make Spain an ally of the United States. She did not even recognize them. The treaty was at odds with the previous agreement of France and the United States and the French were hard put to reconcile the two. Thus the relationship of the Americans and the Spanish was that of co-belligerents rather than allies. [3]

The Spanish conquest was conducted in three separate campaigns. Overall objectives were defined in a confidential letter of August 29, 1779, to the Captain General of Cuba from the Minister of the Indies:

> The King has decided that the principal objective of his arms in America during the war with the English is to drive them from the Gulf of Mexico and the banks of the Mississippi, where their settlements are so prejudicial to our commerce, as well as to the security of our richest possessions. . . . His Majesty desires that an expedition be organized without delay, composed of whatever land and sea forces it is possible to assemble in those dominions, and that an attack be made on Mobile and Pensacola, the keys to the Gulf of Mexico, sending detachments before or afterwards to attack and clear the English from the banks of the Mississippi, which should be considered as the bulwark of the vast empire of New Spain. [4]

On January 1, 1777, a youthful soldier, Don Bernardo de Galvez, became acting governor of Spanish Louisiana. This brilliant and dynamic officer, only thirty at the time, promptly addressed himself to the tasks at hand.

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3. John Richard Alden, *The American Revolution, 1775-1783,* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 178-193.
4. Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., *Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794, Annual Report of the American Historical Association (1945),* II (Washington, 1949), p. 355. Hereafter cited as Kinnaird.

Galvez was the scion of a powerful family; his father was Viceroy of New Spain (Mexico) and his uncle, Jose, was the Minister of the Indies, one of the most important Spanish ministerial posts. He won his spurs as a lieutenant fighting the Portuguese. Later, he fought the Apaches on the Pecos River. After he returned to Spain, he took a leave of absence and entered the French army for further training. In 1775, he served in North Africa under General Alexandra O'Reilly, a former governor of Louisiana. Promoted to lieutenant colonel and given command of the fixed regiment of Louisiana, he was sent to America in 1776.

Once Galvez succeeded to the governorship, he endeavored to strengthen the security of Louisiana. Indian friendship was sought and gifts were distributed. Both trade and aid to the American revolutionists was permitted. Immigration was encouraged and the colonists received governmental assistance. The commerce of the colony was strengthened. As war with Britain became more imminent, the size of the small garrison was increased and militia companies were raised, equipped, and trained.

Galvez sent one of his officers to Mobile and Pensacola in 1778. The ostensible purpose of the mission was an attempt to secure Spain's rights as a neutral in the war between England and her colonies. Secretly this officer was instructed to obtain intelligence on fortifications, their garrisons, and other useful information. [5]

The Spanish court sent notice to her colonial officials on May 18, 1779, that war was to be declared, although the formal declaration was not made until June 21. News of the declaration reached Havana on July 17. Before Galvez received the declaration of war from Havana, he intercepted two letters outlining the possibility of British attacks upon Spanish Louisiana. [6]

With all the signs pointing to a war with England, Galvez called his officers together to draw up a plan of action. All the officers, except one, agreed that the defense of New Orleans was of first importance and that all effort should be expended in strengthening its defenses. The young commander did not agree with his staff, but he kept his own counsel. Outwardly he agreed

5. Caughey, pp. 140-146. See also the letter of April 29, 1779, from Captain Jacinto Panis to Galvez on the defense of Pensacola, in Kinnaird, pp. 336-338.
6. Caughey, pp. 149-150.

with them; secretly he believed the best defense to be an immediate attack upon the British posts on the Mississippi while their forces were still scattered. Using the defense of New Orleans as a cover, he laid his plans for an expedition against nearby British posts. The commissary of war was taken into his confidence and made responsible for the preparations. Supplies were collected and boats were commandeered. When Galvez received news of the declaration of war, he kept it a secret. The boats were loaded in preparation for the expedition and by mid-August all was in readiness for the first campaign. On the eve of the expedition's departure, a severe hurricane battered New Orleans, sinking the vessels, destroying houses, and ruining crops. At an assembly of the populace, Galvez announced the English declaration of war on Spain as a result of the recognition of American independence. Then quite dramatically he announced his appointment as governor-up to now he had been acting governor only-and sought public support. An enthusiastic crowd pledged its support to help defend the threatened and now battered city, and preparations for the attack were pushed again. Undamaged vessels were brought into New Orleans and pressed into transport duty. Several sunken boats were raised and soon made serviceable. Within a week after the storm, arrangements were complete. Supplies and ten cannon were loaded aboard and the vessels went up the river.

On August 27, 1779, a small expedition left New Orleans. It consisted of 170 veteran soldiers, 330 recruits from Mexico and the Canary Islands, 20 carabiniers, 60 militiamen, 80 free blacks and mulattoes, and 7 American volunteers. Galvez had no engineer and his artillery officer was sick. The column had to march through thick woods and over difficult trails. On the German and Arcadian Coasts Galvez succeeded in raising 600 men of every class and color and 160 Indians. His force now totaled 1,427 combatants. Galvez made a forced march, covering 115 miles in eleven days. [7]

Rapid marching reduced Galvez' effective strength. One-third of the column was lost to sickness, straggling, or desertion, but the element of surprise remained as an advantage for the Spanish. As late as the second of September the English were still unsure of their intentions. Not only did Galvez conceal his designs from

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.

the English, but his own men were not told the true purpose of their expedition until they were in sight of Manchac. Then, on September 6, Galvez told his command that Spain had declared war and his orders were to take the posts on the Mississippi.

Manchac was a trading post defended by a backwoods fortification of log houses and a stockade. The post had been built in 1765 and was named Fort Bute in honor of the prime minister. This fort had been the main British post on the Mississippi until late July, 1779, when it was condemned as indefensible against cannon, and it was decided to build another stronghold at Baton Rouge. During the first days of September the English evacuated the post except for a small force to put up a token resistance. [8]

On the night of the sixth Galvez deployed his troops. The regulars were posted to meet any English force that might come downriver to aid the forlorn garrison, while the militia were to carry the fort by assault. At dawn the attacking militiamen were led through an embrasure and carried the post without a loss. The little garrison surrendered; their loss was one enlisted man killed. The Spanish reported the capture of two officers and eighteen soldiers, while one officer and five men are reported to have escaped in the confusion. [9]

The taking of this post was a minor affair, but it gave the untried militia experience and bolstered their confidence. Galvez remained at Manchac for a few days to allow his sick to recover before he set out for Baton Rouge.

Baton Rouge was the strongest post on the Mississippi. As previously stated, this post was recently constructed. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Dickson of the 16th Regiment, the commander of the English posts along the Mississippi, had apparently reliable reports that the Americans were preparing for a descent down the Mississippi to take the British posts in that region. Dickson, after consultation with his engineer and other officers, decided to build a work at Baton Rouge, as the post at Manchac had been condemned as indefensible. On July 30, 1779, it was decided to build a redoubt on the plantation of Messrs. Watts and Flower

8. "The Capture of Baton Rouge by Galvez, September 21st, 1779," *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XII (April, 1929), 263. This article is a reprint of the London *Morning Chronicle*, April 3, 1780, that had quoted the original reports from the London *Gazette*, April 1, 1780; hereafter cited as *Gazette*.
9. Caughey, p. 155.

because this site had a large area of cleared ground. The engineer was sent to the area with a letter requesting the assistance of the local inhabitants and they are described as having cheerfully complied with the request. [10]

The redoubt was built in six weeks. It was surrounded by a ditch eighteen feet wide and nine feet deep. Inside the ditch was an earthen wall and outside a circle of palisades in the form of a chevaux-de-frise. Thirteen cannon were mounted within this work. [11] The artillery, supplies, and troops had moved into this work during the first days of September.

Almost four hundred regulars were in the garrison; the troops were from the Royal Artillery, the English 16th and 60th (Royal Americans) Regiments, Germans from the 3rd Waldeck Regiment, and a small independent company. The regulars were augmented by 150 settlers and armed Negroes. [12]

On September 12 the redoubt was invested. Galvez realized that an assault would be too costly and therefore decided to lay siege to the works. The proper emplacement of his artillery was the key to his problem. A grove of trees near the post was the obvious place to begin throwing up earthworks for a siege. To deceive the garrison, Galvez sent the militia, colored troops, and Indians to that quarter on the night of the twentieth with orders to cut down trees, construct earthworks, and keep up a blaze of musketry. The besieged were fooled by the feint and kept up a heavy cannonade on this party, but with little effect.

The Spanish, meanwhile, were constructing a battery on the opposite side of the redoubt, behind a garden wall. Although within small arms range of the works, Galvez' men worked without being observed or molested. The battery was not discovered until the next morning, but by then both guns and their crews were well protected. Galvez' ruse had worked.

Early on the morning of the twenty-first, the Spanish battery opened a concentrated fire that soon breached the walls. The British gun crews served their pieces well and replied vigorously, but after an incessant exchange of fire, Dickson was obliged to yield to the superior Spanish artillery fire. [13]

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10. *Gazette,* pp. 263-264.
11. Caughey, p. 155.
12. *Gazette,* pp. 264-265.
13. *Ibid.,* p. 263; Caughey, pp. 156-157.

The garrison submitted to terms. Galvez not only sought the surrender of Baton Rouge but wanted the garrison of Fort Panmure at Natchez, eighty grenadiers, to capitulate too. Colonel Dickson agreed. The garrison was permitted to bury its dead before it marched out of the redoubt with all the honors of war and gave up its arms. All the regulars, 17 officers and 358 men, became prisoners. The enlisted settlers and free Negroes were released. Spanish losses during the siege were one killed and two wounded. The vanquished suffered two officers and two men killed, two men wounded, and one officer and 29 men later died of wounds while in captivity. [14]

A small force of fifty men were sent to Fort Panmure to take the surrender of that post. The English officer in command, Captain Forster, surrendered on October 5. [15]

In addition to the three posts previously mentioned, the Spanish militia seized small outposts at Thompson's Creek and on the Amite River. These bloodless coups added more than a score of men to the bag of prisoners.

Besides their victories on land, the Spaniards seized or captured eight vessels on the rivers and lakes. Perhaps the most spectacular feat was the capture of an English transport on its way to Manchac. Vizente Rillieux, of New Orleans, was in command of a sloop of war that had been cruising the lakes. He had ventured up the Amite River as far as Bayou Manchac, when he learned of the approach of a heavily laden barque. Rillieux landed his crew, fourteen men, and a few small guns. Ashore, the men constructed a masked battery and concealed themselves, awaiting the oncoming transport. As the vessel drew abreast of their position, they opened fire and started to yell. The English sailors were taken by surprise and, convinced that they were met by an overwhelming force, they rushed below deck. Rillieux and his men boarded the barque and sealed the hatches, making everyone aboard a prisoner. This bold action added to the growing list of captives; on board the barque were 12 sailors and 56 Weldeckers, a force that outnumbered Rillieux's crew by almost five to one. [16]

14. *Gazette*, pp. 264-265.
15. Caughey, p. 158.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

In a campaign that barely lasted a month, the victorious Galvez achieved startling results with the limited resources at his command. His polygot army took three forts, about 550 British and German regulars prisoner, and eight vessels with their crews. Another 500 armed settlers and Negroes were taken, but they were later released upon taking an oath of allegiance. Their victories gave the Spanish control of the lower Mississippi Valley and the western part of the British province.

The most important aspect of this short campaign was the improved defensive position of Spanish Louisiana. Although Galvez seized the initiative and took the offensive against the British, his action was primarily defensive and limited to the immediate area. No longer did the colony lay open to a down river attack; the taking of the British posts in the Baton Rouge-Natchez area removed an immediate threat; while the Spanish garrisons established in their stead guarded against any potential threat from British posts in the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley region. [17]

The well planned campaign did credit to the youthful general. He demonstrated unusual leadership ability at the head of a motley army. The untried militia rendered yeoman service and was well behaved, while the Negroes and mulattoes served equally well, especially as scouts and skirmishers. Contrary to their usual practices, the Indians refrained from cruelties and excesses. Perhaps the best summation of Galvez' abilities during this campaign comes from his biographer: "Galvez should . . . be recognized; not for the brilliance of his military maneuvers, though he demonstrated his capability as a general; but rather for his vision in planning the campaign, for his disregard of timid advisors, for his courage in the face of disconcerting disaster, and, most of all, for the enthusiasm with which he inspired the creoles to wholehearted participation in the expedition." [18]

The news of the fall of British posts on the Mississippi reached Mobile in October. This intelligence was passed on to Pensacola, but the commander there, General John Campbell, did not believe the report and considered it a Spanish ruse to draw him out into the open. Later the same month, another report reached

17. Galvez' campaign was conducted at an opportune time; the British, with their Loyalist and Indian allies, in western New York and the Ohio Valley were confronted by various expeditions fielded by the Americans in an effort to destroy the Indian threat to the frontier.
18. Caughey, p. 163.

Pensacola, but once again the general refused to believe the report. After issuing several conflicting orders, he decided to strengthen his position at Pensacola while it was further decided that Mobile would have to make do with what it had. [19] With his base now secure, Galvez was free to direct his attention towards Mobile and Pensacola.

Galvez encountered considerable opposition from the authorities in Havana on the method of conducting the forthcoming campaign. The Captain General of Cuba wanted a primarily naval campaign against Pensacola, whereas Galvez favored the taking of Mobile first, both to deny Pensacola a source of supply and to control the Indians in that district. Galvez was confronted with other problems too; he needed more troops, artillery, supplies, and ships. Havana refused to give him what he wanted. [20] Despite the lack of support, Galvez decided to proceed with an attack upon Mobile.

Mobile was situated at the head of a large bay, approximately thirty miles long and six miles wide. The spacious harbor was considered a very good anchorage, although the Royal Navy never did take advantage of it. The town was located on the west bank of the Mobile River, extending nearly a half mile back on a plain above the river and almost a mile along its bank. Fort Charlotte stood near the bay at the lower end of town. [21]

The fort was a square, solid masonry structure with four bastions and embrasures for thirty-eight guns. From bastion to bastion it measured 300 feet. Within the fort were barracks, a powder magazine, a bakery, and several wells. The fort had been built by the French about 1717 of locally-made brick and oyster-shell lime and was known as Fort Conde de la Mobile. When their troops took over the post in 1763 upon the completion of the Seven Year's War, the British renamed it Fort Charlotte in honor of the queen of the young king of England. It had fallen into disrepair by 1779 but necessary repairs were ordered when hostilities became apparent. [22]

19. Peter J. Hamilton, *Colonial Mobile* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1910), p. 312. Hereafter cited as Hamilton.
20. Kinnaird, pp. 364-373, cites several letters relative to the forthcoming campaign.
21. Hamilton, pp. 223, 298.
22. The description of the fort is based on several bits of information contained in the Hamilton book.

The garrison at Mobile numbered more than 300 men. It was a mixed force drawn from the 4th Battalion of the 60th Regiment, the Royal Artillery, engineers, small detachments from the Pennsylvania and Maryland Loyalists, volunteers from amongst the local inhabitants, and artificers. A number of Negroes were employed as servants and in other tasks. [23]

Captain Elias Durnford, a British army engineer and a veteran of the Seven Year's War, was in command at Mobile. He had distinguished himself during the siege of Havana. In 1763 he had been appointed Commanding Engineer and Surveyor General for the newly created province of West Florida. For a time he had served as Lieutenant Governor of the province. [24]

The expedition against Mobile did not begin auspiciously. Galvez sailed on January 28, 1780, with a force of 745 men, regulars from the Regiments of the Prince, Havana, and Louisiana, the Royal Artillery Corps, and militiamen, whites, free blacks, and mulattoes. [25] While at sea the eleven ship squadron was struck by a hurricane that separated the ships. By February 10 the expeditionary force had reassembled and lay off the entrance to Mobile Bay. Strong winds and a heavy sea made Galvez determined to enter the bay at once. Six vessels ran aground during the attempt but three were soon afloat. The continuing bad weather hindered the landing of troops and supplies and their efforts to refloat the other three vessels. Men and supplies were unloaded from the grounded vessels and two smaller craft were floated again. The remaining ship, a frigate, was hard aground and was later abandoned. The ravages of the sea took a toll of supplies and ammunition; they had been lost or ruined during the storm, the grounding of the vessels, and the transfer of the cargo ashore.

Everything ashore was in a state of confusion. The landings were made in such disorder that Galvez considered abandoning his artillery and baggage and retreating overland; however, he soon learned that he was not expected so he decided to press the siege of Mobile.

A emissary previously sent to Havana meanwhile had convinced the authorities in that quarter that Galvez needed rein-

23. Hamilton, pp. 312-313.
24. *Ibid.,* pp. 534-535.
25. Caughey, p. 174.

forcements. They finally relented and sent 567 men of the Regiment of Navarra. This force set out in several transports on the tenth of February and reached Mobile on the 20th, where they entered the bay and landed their troops without incident.

The appearance of the Spanish expeditionary force created considerable confusion in Mobile and Galvez was able to assemble and reorganize his forces without interference from the British. Despite the losses suffered on account of the weather, Galvez was able to report excellent morale amongst his troops,

The last days of February were spent in final preparations for the siege and ferrying troops to a point closer to Mobile. On the 28th the troops crossed the Dog River and established a camp. The Spanish had their first encounter with the English on the 29th when a scouting party of four companies was fired upon by the fort. [26]

On the following day the Spanish general, aware of his superior forces, summoned Durnford to surrender. The British commander declined, stating that his forces were larger than Galvez imagined, and that his love of king and country and of his own honor directed him to refuse any offer of surrender until he was convinced that resistance was futile. Gifts were exchanged and proper concern was expressed for prisoners in Spanish hands. With this observance of the amenities of formal eighteenth-century warfare, the adversaries got down to the business at hand. [27]

Durnford sent a dispatch to his superior in Pensacola on March 2, giving a full report on his situation. He related that as soon as the Spanish flag left the fort, he drew his troops up in the square and read Galvez' summons to them. The men were told if any were afraid to stand by him, that he would open the gates and let that man pass from the fort. "This had the desired effect, and not a man moved. I then read to them my answer to the summons, in which they all joined in three cheers and then went to our necessary work like good men." [28]

On the fifth and sixth there were further exchanges of letters. This time the topic was the burning of the town. Many houses had been set afire by the English to deny shelter to their besiegers. Galvez in turn had offered not to set up his batteries behind any

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-177.
27. Hamilton, pp. 313-314.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 315.

house if Durnford would stay his incendiarism. The English commander declined, stating that he must do everything in his power to defend his post, and if it included burning houses, he would do so. That ended the affair. [29]

Meanwhile Durnford had received word from Campbell concerning a relief column from Pensacola. He welcomed the news and promised to defend the fort to the last. [30]

While the exchange of letters had been going on between Galvez and Durnford, the Spanish were making further preparations for the siege and the troops worked with a will. They hauled cannon and prepared fascines and other material for the attack. By March 9 they were ready to open their trench.

The trench was opened on the night of the ninth by a work party of 300 men protected by 200 armed men. Galvez made a speech to raise their morale and the work went well all night. At dawn English fire forced the Spanish to stop their work after they had suffered six killed and five wounded. Bad weather interrupted the work for a day but by the morning of the 12th the Spanish had a battery of eight 18-pounders and one of 24 in position. [31]

Scouting parties returned to the Spanish camp on the 11th and reporting sighting two English camps near Tensa. [32] This was the relief column that Campbell had promised Durnford.

On March 5 the 60th Foot from the Pensacola garrison set out on the 72-mile march to Mobile. The next day the remainder of the Waldeckers marched out. Campbell himself followed with the Pennsylvania Loyalists and artillery. All told, the column numbered 522 men. The relief column marched through a wilderness devoid of a single human dwelling. Campbell's force reached Tensa, a point about thirty miles above Mobile on the eastern channel of the Mobile River, on the tenth, but lost valuable time building rafts to transport the men and their equipment downstream. [33]

As soon as the Spanish finished their battery, they opened fire upon Fort Charlotte. The English replied and a vigorous exchange ensued. Spanish guns were played upon the walls of the fort and

29. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 315.
31. Caughey, pp. 180-181.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Hamilton, p. 315.

managed to make breeches in two places. Whenever one of the fort's guns was dismounted, another soon took its place; true to the traditions of their corps, the Royal Artillerymen served their pieces until all shot was expended. At sundown the English raised the white flag and asked for terms. [34]

Fort Charlotte was surrendered on March 14. Captain Durnford capitulated on much the same terms that Galvez granted Dickson at Baton Rouge. The small garrison marched out with colors flying and drums beating. Once outside the fort, the men grounded their arms but the officers were permitted to retain their swords. [35]

Accounts differ, but one, perhaps final, Spanish report listed 13 officers, 113 soldiers, 56 sailors, 70 militiamen, and 55 armed Negroes in the surrendered garrison. [36] The booty included 35 cannon and 8 mortars. [37] During the siege the garrison had only one man killed outright and eleven wounded, two of whom subsequently died. The bombardment of the fort was decisive but hunger and the lack of reinforcements from Pensacola were important factors.

Galvez kept the relief column at Tensa under observation. On the 17th Spanish scouting parties brought in the news that Campbell was returning to Pensacola. Waldecker accounts of the return journey describe it as a trying march. It rained continuously and the route of march was a quagmire. Swollen streams could only be crossed single file by using fallen trees, and men who fell into the water were lost. The bedraggled column reached Pensacola on the 19th. [38]

With the surrender of the fort and the return to Pensacola of the unsuccessful relief column, active campaigning for 1780 came to a close.

Now that Mobile was captured, Galvez turned his attention to the operations against Pensacola. His force included almost as many troops as Campbell had in his regular garrison, although

34. Caughey, p. 181.
35. Hamilton, p. 315.
36. Caughey, p. 182 and footnote 33.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
38. Hamilton, p. 315. For a Waldeck account, see Max von Eelking, *The German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence,* translated from the German & abridged by J. D. Rosengarten (Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1893), pp. 218-225; hereafter cited as Eelking.

the British commander had numerous Indian allies. Galvez had hoped for further reinforcements from Havana but wavering officials there ruined any hopes for immediate action. A fruitless exchange of correspondence ensued and Galvez failed to wring any further assistance from Havana. Finally a garrison was left at Mobile under the command of Colonel Josef de Ezpeleta while the greater part of the troops returned to either New Orleans or Havana. Galvez went to Havana to plead for men and supplies.

In recognition for his services to the crown, Galvez was made field marshal in command of Spanish operations in America and granted the augmented title of Governor of Louisiana and Mobile. These were well deserved honors. In the face of all sorts of odds-lack of support from Cuba, the elements, the near-disastrous landings, and the threat of a British relief column from Pensacola-he did well. Once established ashore, he managed the operation with alacrity and chivalry. Galvez maintained the morale of his troops and conducted the siege in a commendable manner.

In January, 1781, General Campbell decided upon an attack upon Mobile. On the third he sent Colonel Von Hanxleden of the Waldeck Regiment with 60 men of his own corps, 100 men of the 60th Regiment, provincials of the Pennsylvania and Maryland Loyalists, a few militia calvarymen, and about 300 Indians to conduct the attack.

The German colonel was ordered to take an outpost on the east shore of Mobile Bay known as the Village or Frenchtown. He was to delay the attack until the seventh when a pair of frigates would be on station in the bay to cooperate with him and cut communications with Mobile. This outpost was held by 150 men commanded by Lieutenant Ramon del Castro of the Regiment of the Prince.

A bayonet attack at dawn had actually penetrated the Spanish works before they recovered and repulsed the attackers in some bitter hand to hand fighting. When their commander fell, the assaulting party gave up the attack and subsequently returned to Pensacola. Besides their commander, the attackers had 2 officers and 13 men killed and 3 officers and 19 men wounded. The gallant defenders suffered almost equal losses, 14 were killed and 23 wounded.

The failure to carry the post has been variously placed on the Waldeckers and the Indians. In view of their known casual-

ties and comparatively small numbers, the onus for the failure probably cannot be placed upon the Germans. The Indians, with their decisive strength and known lack of propensity for attacking fixed fortifications, undoubtedly must be considered the responsible party. [39]

In August, 1780, Galvez went to Havana personally to see to the arrangements for the campaign against Pensacola. When he sailed on October 16, he headed an expedition that included 4,000 troops and a fleet of 64 warships and transports. Once again nature intervened. While at sea, the fleet was struck and dispersed by a hurricane. Galvez was forced to return to Havana, arriving there on November 17, where he learned that the ships had been scattered to ports about the Gulf of Mexico and at least one vessel had been lost at sea. [40]

Undaunted by this reverse, Galvez made preparations for another expedition. Once again he encountered delays as the officials in Havana dragged their feet. Meanwhile, at his insistence, 500 men were sent to reinforce Mobile on December 6. The commander of the small convoy transporting these troops later reported that his ships could not negotiate the channel at Mobile, so he sailed on to Balize on the Mississippi, where the troops were landed. He then returned to Havana. However, just a few days after the unsuccessful attempt upon the channel at Mobile, two English frigates penetrated the bay and played their part in the unsuccessful attack of January 7. [41]

As preparations were being pushed for the forthcoming expedition, other commanders received their instructions. Word was sent to Louisiana for the troops there to embark and join Galvez' squadron. The troops at Mobile were ordered to march by an overland route. [42]

About 1,300 troops were embarked aboard the ships and the squadron set sail again on February 28, 1781. At sea Galvez in-

39. Information on this raid is based upon Caughey, pp. 194-195; Eelking, p. 223; Hamilton, pp. 316-317; and Buckingham Smith, editor, "Robert Farmar's Journal of the Siege of Pensacola, 1781," *Historical Magazine and Notes and Queries* (June, 1860), p. 171; hereafter cited as Farmar.
40. Bernardo de Galvez, "Diary of the Operations Against Pensacola, *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, I (January, 1917), 44. Hereafter cited as Galvez.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-47.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.

formed his commanders that once they arrived off Pensacola he planned to land on Santa Rosa Island and secure the east side of the passage into the bay in order that the fleet could enter the harbor without the risk of a crossfire. Once in the harbor, he planned to await reinforcements from Louisiana and Mobile. [43]

The Bay of Pensacola angled to the northeast and was shielded by Santa Rosa Island, a sandspit of an island on a east-west axis. About nine miles up the bay, on the north shore, lay the town proper. At this time Pensacola was a town of about 200 frame houses. The town occupied about a mile of bay shore and was approximately a quarter of a mile in depth. Its east and west boundaries were set by curving arroyos. In the center of the town was a large plaza, largely occupied by a stockade with several batteries on the waterfront. About 1,200 yards north of the plaza rose Gage Hill. The hill was 300 yards in width and extended to the northwest. On the southeast end of the hill the British had erected Fort George with its outworks in a position that dominated the town. The hill continued to slope upward, about *22* feet in 900 yards. This point was too far away to protect the town but it did overlook the work of the fort. To protect the fort, the British erected two redoubts. The most advanced, known as the Queen's, was a circular battery with wings, built on the high ground some 900 yards from Fort George. About 300 yards below this work as the second redoubt, known as the Prince of Wales'. This redoubt was oblate in shape and served principally to protect communications between the fort and the advanced redoubt.

At the entrance to the bay, opposite Santa Rosa Island, on the heights overlooking the passage into the harbor, was the Red Cliffs Fort, also known as Barrancas Colorados by the Spanish. This fort mounted eleven guns, five of which were 32-pounders, and was garrisoned by approximately 140 officers and men. About a mile to the east and near the water level, was a blockhouse at a place known as Tartar Point, which the Spanish called Aguero. Opposite these works lay Point Siguenza, the western tip of Santa Rosa Island. This point had been fortified at one time but when the Spanish arrived, all they found were a few dismounted guns and a burnt stockade. [44]

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43. *Ibid.*
44. For an excellent article on Pensacola's defenses, see Stanley Faye, "British and Spanish Fortifications of Pensacola, 1781-1821," *Florida*

A British army return of March 15, 1781, gave the strength of their forces in West Florida as 750 fit for duty with a total of 1,193 effectives. [45] This force was almost exclusively in the garrison at Pensacola. The troops were from the 16th and 60th Regiments, the Maryland Loyalists and the Pennsylvania Loyalists, both Provincial units, and the Waldeck Regiment. Despite the mixed background of the defenders, they were fairly well trained and experienced soldiers. To these must be added the sailors from Royal Navy vessels in the harbor and Indians who later joined the besieged garrison. [46]

On March 9, 1781, the fleet arrived off Santa Rosa and made immediate preparations to land. A force of grenadiers and light infantry under the command of Colonel Francisco Longoria was put ashore that evening. Soon after they landed, the troops started marching to the west to secure the works at Point Siguenza. Marching all that night, they reached their destination early the next morning. Instead of encountering the defended works they expected, all they found was a demolished work and three dismounted cannon. Shortly after their arrival the light infantry captured some men from the British frigate *Port* Royal who had come ashore to take off some cattle. The Spanish were soon sighted and the fort at Red Cliffs and two English frigates opened fire upon them but with little effect. To protect his squadron and make the English ships keep their distance, Galvez selected a site and ordered the construction of a battery. During the afternoon an English schooner entered the harbor, bearing booty, including Galvez' dinner service, taken from a Spanish vessel. The captured foodstuffs provided some welcome supplies for the Pensacola garrison. [47]

The Spanish started to work on their battery early on the 11th and in the afternoon they were able to open fire upon the frigates *Mentor* and *Port Royal*, forcing them to change stations. Meanwhile the entrance to the harbor had been sounded and the

Historical Quarterly, XX (January, 1942), 277-292. Also extant are two contemporary maps by Captain-Lieutenant Henry Heldring of the Waldeck Regiment and Acting Engineer at Pensacola in 1781. These maps are in the General Clinton Papers at the William L. Clements Library of Americana, the University of Michigan.

45. *Diary of Frederick Mackenzie* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), II, 412. Hereafter cited as Mackenzie.
46. The composition of the Pensacola garrison is based on entries in Farmar's Journal.
47. Galvez, pp. 48-49; Farmar, p. 166.

squadron attempted to enter the port. When the Largest Spanish ship touched bottom, the whole squadron came about and returned to their former anchorage. During the evening the weather turned. [48]

On the following day the weather was still bad and Galvez became concerned for the safety of the ships and the ultimate success of the operation. As he did not have command of the Spanish naval vessels, he tried to convince the naval commander that if the ship of the line *San Ramon*, a 64, could not enter the bay, at least the smaller ships should try to enter the port where they would be protected in the event of another storm. The naval commander complained about the lack of information on the depth of the water, the channel, and the lack of pilots. He was also worried about the possibility of cannon fire from the Red Cliffs raking his ships. Realizing that the naval commander was reluctant to act, and being without any authority over the naval forces, Galvez finally decided to act on his own. On the 14th he ordered one of his vessels from Louisiana, the brig *Galveztown*, to sound the passage into the harbor that night. [49]

A sloop from Mobile joined the squadron on the morning of the 16th and informed them that Colonel Ezpeleta would march to the shores of the Perdido River with 900 men. A request was made for boats to make the crossing. The squadron commander ordered the provisioning of small boats and sent a small armed vessel to cover the crossing. [50]

Tired of waiting and armed with information from the sounding of the passage into the harbor, Galvez decided to enter the bay with the *Galveztown* and three row galleys, vessels that were under his control. He still entertained fears that a storm might disperse or wreck the fleet. He hoisted a broad pennant on his flagship and led the four-ship flotilla into the harbor under heavy fire from the guns atop Barrancas Colorados. The vessels suffered some damage to their rigging but no personnel casualties. Men aboard the remaining ships in the squadron cheered his successful entrance into the harbor. [51]

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48. Galvez, p. 49.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 51. Although it is stated in Farmar's Journal, p. 166, that Indians prevented this river crossing, Ezpeleta's column did join up with Galvez on the 22nd.
51. Galvez, p. 52.

On the following day, the 19th, fired by Galvez' example, the rest of the fleet was determined to enter the harbor that day. Early that afternoon the ships set sail and within an hour they were safely over the bar and inside the harbor. Despite another heavy cannonade from the guns of the Red Cliffs Fort, the ships suffered only superficial damage and no personnel losses. During the squadron's entrance into the bay, Galvez sailed about in a gig, offering assistance, and incidentally setting a fine example, to any vessel that might require it. [52]

With his fleet in a protected anchorage, Galvez could now act with more certainty. He entered into an exchange of correspondence with General Campbell concerning the destruction of property and the lines along which the siege would be fought. Although the garrison commander rejected Galvez' proposals, he was willing to negotiate for the safety of the town and the noncombatants. During this exchange the blockhouse at Tartar Point and some buildings at the Cliffs were set afire by troops as they withdrew to the Red Cliffs Fort. This, plus reports of ill-treatment of Spanish prisoners by the English, angered Galvez and he broke off negotiations with Campbell's envoy.

At mid-morning of the 22nd, the force that had marched overland from Mobile was sighted along the opposite shore inside the harbor. Galvez immediately crossed the bay with 500 men to reinforce Ezpeleta's column and permit them to rest. Meanwhile, other troops prepared for a crossing of the bay. [53]

On the 23rd a convoy of 16 ships arrived from New Orleans. [54] The ships had sailed on February 28 and had on board 1,400 troops, including contingents of regulars from the Regiments of Navarra, the King, Soria, Louisiana, and other regiments of the line, over 100 dragoons, and militia, both white and colored, plus cannon, ammunition, and other supplies. [55] Within the town of Pensacola, where the reinforcements had been sighted, orders were given to men of the 16th and 60th Regiments to take up stations in the redoubts above Fort George. [56]

52. *Ibid.* All the ships entered the bay except the *San Ramon,* which returned to Havana on March 29th.
53. Galvez, pp. 53-56.
54. *Ibid.,* p. 58.
55. Kinnaird, pp. 421-423.
56. Farmar, p. 167.

The Spanish, meanwhile, were making a reconnaissance of the harbor area to select a suitable campsite close to town.

The Spanish commander realized that a direct assault upon Pensacola's defenses would only result in prohibitive casualties. A siege, therefore, was his only recourse. First he had to select a suitable campsite, then open trenches and approaches, and finally emplace his artillery in positions to batter the British works and bring about the reduction of the fortifications.

With the exception of 200 men left in garrison on Santa Rosa, all Spanish troops were ferried across the bay on the 24th and moved into the first of several camps. Although the new sites provided the Spanish with a better base for their operations, they were immediately exposed to attacks, especially those harassing raids that favored Indian open order tactics. During the last week in March and throughout April, the Indians carried the attack to the Spanish, keeping them on a constant alert and hindering their preparations for the siege. Spanish outposts and stragglers were attacked both day and night. These were usually small scale hit and run raids, although on several occasions the Indians were out in strength and were supported by a few fieldpieces and a company or two from the garrison. Many of the Spanish casualties during this period were due to these Indian raids. In his journal, Major Farmar makes frequent references to Indians returning from a foray with their grisly trophies. [57]

The Indians were from the southeastern tribes; Choctaws, Creeks, and Chickasaws, usually led by white men or half-breeds. [58] Perhaps the most noted of the Indian chieftains was the Creek, Alexander McGillivray. He had tremendous influence amongst the Creeks and was a staunch friend of the English. Later he was wooed by Spain, successfully, and by the United States, rather unsuccessfully. [59]

It was during this period of skirmishing that the Spanish commander himself was wounded. On the tenth the Quartermaster had been sent out to select a new campsite in the hills northwest of Pensacola. Two days later the Spanish moved to the new site and started to entrench their camp. Guns were set up cover-

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-170; Galvez, pp. 58-71.
58. These are entries throughout Farmar's Journal relative to the arrival of parties of Indians.
59. "McGillivray, Alexander," *Encyclopaedia Brittannica*, XIV, p. 573.

ing avenues of approach and work on a redoubt was started to cover the ground about the camp. At first the English did nothing, but late in the day parties of Indians and a small number of the garrison came out to skirmish with the Spanish. Light infantry was sent out to oppose these parties but they had orders not to enter the woods where the Indian had the advantage. While the Spanish stood their ground and fired their volleys, it was with little effect. Realizing that nothing could be accomplished with this manner of fighting, Galvez ordered his light infantry to retire to the protection of the nearest battery. Gunners were given orders to fire grape at any party of the enemy that approached too closely to the Spanish works. Not long after he gave this order, the Spanish commander was advised that several parties of the enemy with two small cannon were advancing from different points. He went out to one of the advanced batteries to survey the situation. While at the battery, he was struck by a bullet in the left hand which went on to furrow his abdomen. Although he was obliged to retire to his quarters and undergo treatment, he was at the active head of his army within ten days. During his recuperation, Ezpeleta commanded the troops. [60]

At the end of March two events occurred that soon galvanized the Havana authorities into action. First, the *San Ramon*, the most powerful ship on the Pensacola expedition, returned to Havana on the 29th and her captain was under a cloud for his failure to enter Pensacola Bay and return there. Then, on April 7, it was reported that a strong nine ship English squadron had been sighted on March 31. This latest bit of information caused the Captain General to call a council of war. It was decided to send all available warships under the orders of Chief of Squadron Don Josef Solano and a reinforcement of 1,600 troops commanded by Field Marshal Don Juan Manuel de Cagigal. With surprising haste the troops were embarked and the artillery, munitions, and other stores were loaded aboard more than a score of vessels. [61]

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60. Galvez, pp. 64-65.
61. Francisco de Miranda, "Miranda's Diary of the Siege of Pensacola, 1781," translated from the Spanish by Donald E. Worcester, *Florida Historical Quarterly*, XXIX (January, 1951), 164-165. Hereafter cited as Miranda.

Although it had been decided at the council of war that a French squadron then at Havana would not accompany the Pensacola relief expedition, a later conference of the French captains decided in favor of joining their Spanish allies. The French squadron was commanded by M. de Montelle and included four ships of the line and four frigates. On board were 800 troops of the Agenois Regiment. [62]

The ships sailed from Havana on April 9 [63] and arrived off Pensacola on the 19th. [64] While at sea the Spanish crews were canvassed to find out how many men from the fleet could be used ashore. The Spanish admiral was most cooperative. It was found that at least 1,400 men could be withdrawn from the vessels to assist in the operations ashore. [65]

The squadron from Havana was cautious in its approach to Pensacola until it was learned that Galvez controlled the port. Representatives from the newly arrived squadron met with him and offered to serve under his command. Arrangements were soon made to put the men ashore.

Perhaps the words of a member of the expedition can best sum up the reaction of Galvez' command:

> General Galvez received us with many expressions of pleasure and friendship toward our General Cagigal. All the army welcomed us with infinite joy, for not only were they fatigued with the endless and not well-combined marches they had made in the 42 days since they had disembarked at the island of Santa Rosa, but by the various camps which they occupied, the entrenchments and so forth (seven counting this one), the construction of revetments, fascines, and other defenses. Besides this they considered all their work useless, and were in despair of the enterprise. The army numbered, including militia and Negroes, 3,701 men. Of these 500 were out of action, and so they were able to count on only 2,000 regulars for the attack. The garrison numbered 800 regular troops, 200 seamen, and 1,000 savage Indians for the woods. Thus their conjecture was not unfounded. With the consolidation of our detachment, 1,504 troops of our navy, and 725 French, the army amounted to 7,803 effectives. [66]

62. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

The reinforced Spanish army, and their French allies, set themselves to two tasks, reconnaissance and reorganization. Galvez and his staff reconnoitred the high ground about the Queen's Redoubt and the other defenses of Pensacola. The besieging army was reorganized into four brigades, to be commanded by Brigadier Don Geronimo Giron, Colonel Don Manuel Pineda, Colonel Don Francisco Longoria, and Captain of Ship Don Felipe Lopez Carrizosa, respectively. Captain of Ship M. de Boiderout commanded the French contingent. [67]

The last week in April saw the beginning of the more formal aspects of the siege. Engineers and artillerists selected sites for the trenches and batteries. Quite often these parties were fired upon by the cannon of the fort or harassed by parties of Indians and troops from the garrison. After several attempts to open the trenches had been frustrated, they were finally started on the night of the 28th.

Once the work began, it went forward with a will. Working parties numbered over 600 men and were supported by 800 men at arms. It was necessary to relieve these details under the cover of darkness as they were exposed to a heavy cannonade from the British artillery during the hours of daylight. As the work progressed, small batteries of four and eight pounders were set up to protect the working parties. Until the Spanish could mount heavier artillery, they had to endure the fire from the well-served artillery of the garrison. [68]

Despite the heavy English fire, The Spanish were able to emplace a battery of six 24-pounders and a few mortars on the night of May first. [69] Early the next morning the British resumed their bombardment of the lines. At nine o'clock the Spanish unfurled flags over their batteries and began to reply to the enemy fire. [70] The exchange of fire continued throughout the day and only slackened towards nightfall. Despite the day-long exchange, casualties were light on both sides. The Pensacola garrison lost one man killed and five wounded. Spanish casualties were eight wounded. There was no material damage to the British works and during the night they strengthened the exposed side of the

67. Galvez, p. 67.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
70. Farmar, p. 170.

Queen's Redoubt. Spanish working parties continued to extend the trenches towards the advanced redoubt.

May third was a repetition of the previous day. British artillery commenced to fire upon the large Spanish working parties and soon brought down counter-battery fire upon themselves. Once again both sides suffered slight casualties. In his journal, Farmar records that the besiegers fired 534 shot and 186 shells during the day and that the garrison lost one man killed and two wounded.[71] Certainly a small casualty rate for that expenditure of shot and shell.

Combat on the fourth began as on previous days; British guns opened fire early in the morning. They kept it up until ten o'clock that morning. Meanwhile parties of troops had been observed coming out of the town and infiltrating towards the Spanish lines. This movement was reported to the commander of the trenches, Don Pablo Figuerola, who ignored the information. The British had collected about 200 troops on the low lying ground before the redoubt on the Spanish left. Ninety-four Provincials, commanded by Major McDonald, were formed to make a direct attack upon the Spanish works. Over a hundred Waldeckers under their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Albrecht von Horn, would support the attack.

At 12:30 the British mortars, howitzers, and cannon opened fire again. The rapidity and accuracy of the barrage forced those in the trenches to seek cover. Despite the cannonade and the unusual signals that were observed between the garrison and its field force, the Spanish in the trenches sat down to their noon meal. Only a pair of sentries were exposed to the fire to observe enemy movements in the direction of the fort. When they had completed the barrage, the garrison artillery signaled that the following salvos would be without shot. At that, the Provincials went over to the attack.

The Spanish in the trenches, grenadiers from the Irish and Mallorca Regiments and three companies of marines, were completely surprised. When their commander sat down to lunch, they relaxed their vigilance and stacked their arms. Only the guard observed the fort, but he was so inexperienced that the British signals were ignored. The attackers did their deadly work

71. *Ibid.*

with bayonets. The grenadiers felt the first blows of the attack and took flight, screaming, "We are lost! We are bayoneted!" [72] They spread disorder to the nearby companies of marines. Many of the grenadier officers and non-commissioned officers had stood their ground and fell in the attack and were later buried with honors for their bravery. The Provincials, having driven off the Spanish, spiked several guns, set fire to all combustibles, and returned to their own lines. Galvez reported 19 killed and a like amount wounded. One Provincial was killed and a trooper wounded. A Spanish relief column arrived too late to interfere with the withdrawing attackers. [73]

Although the garrison achieved a minor tactical success in the only hand to hand fighting of the siege, it did not affect the outcome nor did it seriously delay the plans of the Spanish. The commander of the trench was later arrested and put on trial for his part in the trenches that day. [74]

Following the sally, the Spanish resumed their siege operations. The work was hindered by a heavy rainfall and the trenches were flooded. The continued exchange of artillery fire inflicted some casualties on both sides.

On the night of the sixth preparations were made for an attack upon the Queen's Redoubt by 700 grenadiers and light infantry. The columns were underway shortly after midnight, but some troops arrived at their positions too late, and with a bright moon above, it was decided to cancel the attack and return to the lines. The Spanish later learned that the English were particularly vigilant that night and any attacks would have probably ended in a costly repulse. [75]

Early on the morning of May 8 the British resumed their bombardment of the Spanish works. The Spanish replied with a howitzer set up in one of the redoubts. Farmar reported:

> About 9 o'clock, A.M., a shell from the enemy's front battery was thrown in at the door of the magazine, at the advanced redoubt, as the men were receiving powder, which blew it up and killed forty seamen belonging to H.M. ships the Mentor and Port Royal; and forty-five men of the Penn-

72. Miranda, p. 187.
73. Accounts of this sally are in *ibid.*, pp. 185-188; Galvez, pp. 72-73; Farmar, p. 170.
74. Miranda, p. 188.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190; Galvez, pp. 73-74.

> sylvania Loyalists were killed by the same explosion; there were a number of men wounded, besides. Capt. Byrd, with seventy men of the 60th Regiment, immediately went up to the advanced redoubt and brought off 2 field-pieces and one howitzer, and a number of the wounded men; but was obliged to retire, as a great quantity of shell was lying about filled. [76]

The explosion at first alarmed the Spanish camp, but once it was learned that the Queen's Redoubt has been blasted and that the works were on fire, Brigadier Giron was ordered to take over the damaged redoubt. The Spanish troops moved forward under the cover of the burning redoubt and soon poured a heavy blaze of small arms fire down upon the Prince of Wales' Redoubt. This musketry was supported by the Spanish artillery. Within the middle redoubt, an officer and thirty soldiers and sailors were soon wounded by the fusillade from the Spanish-occupied advance redoubt. [77]

The loss of the advanced redoubt made Fort George untenable. Early that afternoon a flag of truce was raised over the fort and the British offered to surrender. The commanders and their staffs met and soon agreed to the articles of capitulation and arrangements for the surrender.

Pensacola was occupied by two companies of grenadiers on the ninth. The surrender of Fort George took place the following day. General Campbell led his troops out of the fort with drums beating and colors flying; in keeping with the capitulation, the garrison was accorded the honors of war. The defeated garrison marched to a point some 500 yards from the fort where they surrendered their flags and laid down their arms, the officers being permitted to retain their swords. Two companies of Spanish grenadiers were detailed to garrison the fort and the French light infantry occupied the middle redoubt. The surrender of the Red Cliffs Fort, which was included in the capitulation, took place on the 11th.

With the siege over, the Spanish sang a *Te Deum* for their victory and many of the troops began to re-embark for an immediate return to Havana. [78]

In a return of prisoners a few days after the surrender, Gal-

76. Farmar, p. 171.
77. *Ibid.*; Miranda, pp. 191-192; Galvez, p. 74.
78. Galvez, p. 75; Miranda, p. 192.

vez reported 1,113 men as captives. This figure did not include Negroes or the 56 deserters that went over to the Spanish during the siege. Besides the prisoners, there were 224 women and children dependent upon the garrison. The Indians who had helped in the defense of Pensacola made off during the negotiations for the surrender. [79]

During the siege, the garrison had suffered casualties of more than a hundred killed plus scores of wounded. Most were inflicted by the explosion in the advance redoubt. Spanish army losses were 75 killed and 198 wounded, while the navy had 21 killed and 4 wounded. [80]

Considerable booty was captured at Pensacola. In a letter of May 26, 1781, Galvez reported the taking of 143 cannon, 6 howitzers, 4 mortars, and 40 swivel guns. Over 2,000 muskets and numerous other weapons and tons of military supplies fell into Spanish hands. [81]

The British garrison embarked on board Spanish transports on June first and sailed for Havana a few days later. This was the first step in the repatriation of these troops. One of the articles of capitulation provided for the prompt return of the garrison to a British port and an exchange of prisoners. The only restriction was that these troops could not serve against Spain or her allies until exchanged, which in accordance with the Treaty of Aranjuez, did not include the Americans. This later caused some bad feelings amongst the Americans towards Spain. However, once the Pensacola garrison was landed at New York, although British command opinion was divided on this issue, General Sir Henry Clinton ruled against their employment until exchanged. [82]

With the surrender of Pensacola, the whole province of West Florida was in Spanish hands. England later confirmed the Spanish victory at the peace table; not only did she give up West Florida, but she ceded East Florida as well.

In recognition for his services to the crown, Galvez was promoted to lieutenant general, raised to the nobility, being titled the Conde de Galvez, and granted a coat of arms that bore the outline of the brig *Galveztown* and the motto, "Yo Solo," for his

79. Galvez, p. 75.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.,* p. 84.
82. Farmar, p. 171; Mackenzie, pp. 560-564, 566-567, 574, 578.

forcing of the entrance to Pensacola Bay. There were other emoluments for his victory. He was appointed Viceroy of New Spain, the highest post in Spanish America, in 1784. Galvez died at the age of thirty-eight, the victim of a fever, shortly after he took up his appointment.[83]

Galvez's victories gained for Spain all the objectives she had sought in America at the outset of the war. The Spanish had wanted the English driven from their posts on the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico. The protection of her commerce and the security of her colonies further south were the prime considerations for the Spanish operations in America.

83. Caughey, pp. 213-214.

ANDREW RANSON: SEVENTEENTH CENTURY PIRATE?

by J. LEITCH WRIGHT, JR.

THE LATTER HALF of the seventeenth century saw the swashbuckling heyday of piracy in the West Indies. Here, English, French, and Dutch buccaneers, and audacious seafarers claiming no nation, roamed the seas almost at will, delighting particularly in preying on galleons flying the Spanish flag and in sacking and ransoming cities along the Spanish Main. It is true that the policy of European nations was changing from encouraging or winking at buccaneer activities to supporting legitimate trade with Spanish America, and some serious efforts were made to curb these seagoing marauders. Nevertheless, this was of little consolation to the inhabitants of Panama, which was ravished by the Englishman Henry Morgan in 1671, or to those of Maracaibo, which was destroyed by the Dutchman l'Olonnais in 1667, or to those of Vera Cruz, which was surprised by the Frenchman the Sieur de Grammont in 1683. In this same period similar fates befell many other cities, and their hapless residents endured unspeakable indignities.

St. Augustine, though not so promising a prize as many other Spanish cities, was not overlooked by the buccaneers. Florida's principal city, situated athwart the Bahama Channel, was little more than a military outpost, guarding the return route of the annual plate fleet, and denying this strategic peninsular region to any foreign nation. Here agriculture did not flourish, no valuable metals or raw materials were produced or exported, and commerce was at a minimum. In fact, Florida was dependent on an annual subsidy or *situado* sent from Mexico to help defray the cost of government and to pay the permanently undermanned garrison. But because this city of about one thousand inhabitants with its stores, churches, and fort offered some chance for plunder, and because the city did not appear to be too difficult to surprise and overpower, the buccaneers several times included it on their pillaging itineraries.

The most devastating attack since the time of Sir Francis Drake was the raid by Robert Searles in 1668. Using pirate-infested Jamaica as a base, he and fellow Jamaicans had captured

Spanish supply vessels bound for St. Augustine. With their Spanish crews at pistol point still manning the ships, Searles and his men, safely hidden below deck, were able to slip into St. Augustine unnoticed. Florida's capital was completely surprised when Jamaican pirates emerged from these floating Trojan horses, and its inhabitants-men, women, and children-were killed indiscriminately. Some of the more fortunate escaped to the woods while even fewer made it to the fort. Though Searles lacked the heavy artillery to batter the fort, the town itself was at his mercy. House, churches, and public storehouses were looted, even sails were stripped from vessels in the harbor. At length, after loading their plunder and vowing to return, the unwanted guests departed. [1]

As it turned out, Searles' men did not carry out this threat, but other corsairs of various nationalities continued to prey on both the Atlantic and the Gulf coasts of Florida. In 1683 the resourceful French buccaneer Grammont, with three French and as many English warships, caught the sentinels napping at Matanzas-the back door to St. Augustine-and barely missed surprising the city itself. Thwarted here, Grammont headed for Guale, where he terrorized Indian missions while refitting and revictualing his ships. [2] Here the ships parted company, some returning to the West Indies, and at least one English vessel sailing to newly-founded Charleston. [3] The threat to St. Augustine from this budding English colony in Carolina was as serious and, in the long run, more deadly than that of pirates.

Unquestionably this was a critical time for Spanish Florida. The decline of Spanish might and prestige in Europe was graphically portrayed in this remote province by a chronic lack of troops, munitions, and funds and frequently by the appointment of less able officials. Piratical raids and an aggressive English colony in Carolina contributed to Spain's misfortunes. And, as if to rub salt into an open wound, there was the attempted raid by Andrew Ranson, an English pirate-at least the Spanish Governor

1. Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega to Charles II, St. Augustine, Aug. 8, 1668, AGI 54-5-18, Connor Col., Library of Congress. Searles' alias was John Davis.
2. Juan Marques Cabrera to Charles II, St. Augustine, Apr. 8, 1683, Brooks Col., L. C.; *ibid.*, June 28, 1683, Sp. transcripts, L. C. Guale is the coastal region of Georgia.
3. Auto de Ruego y Encargo . . . , St. Augustine, Oct. 23, 1684, AGI 58-2-6/5, Connor Col.

considered him so-which failed but which caused much excitement and bitterness.

Ranson, who added to the already considerable woes of Florida governors, was born in Newcastle, England, around 1650, the son of Edward and Barbara Ranson. Relatively little is known of his early life. He came to the West Indies in his early twenties. Either in England or in the West Indies he married and lived sometimes at New Providence Island, sometimes at Jamaica, and possibly elsewhere. Ranson was a seaman, but whether he was merely an honest mariner conscientiously plying his trade or a ruthless and experienced pirate would be a matter of heated controversy in the future. Ranson had made voyages to the Spanish Main, to Spanish West Indian islands, and in the late 1670's had been captured and imprisoned at Havana. [4] The offense no doubt was smuggling. As will be seen, his subsequent career in Florida gives a rather curious twist to the pirate history of that province.

During the several years preceding 1684, Ranson and his wife were living at New Providence Island in the Bahamas. In that year, however, the Islands governor supposedly granted Captam Thomas Jingle of New England a letter of marque to raid Spanish possessions in retaliation for the recent Spanish attack on New Providence. At the last minute, Jingle's five vessels were joined by a recent arrival from Charleston, one of those which had participated in the attack on St. Augustine the preceding year. [5] Then, with Ranson as steward aboard one of the vessels, [6] all six set sail for the west coast of the Florida peninsula. It is impossible to trace their exact course, but while cruising they captured off the Florida Keys the Spanish frigate *Plantanera* sent from St. Augustine to Vera Crux to collect the *situado;* [7] they surprised a Spanish scout vessel sent out from Havana to seek information about pirates, perhaps themselves; and part of Jingle's party, led by Indians, marched inland on the Gulf Coast unsuc-

4. Testimonio de auto fhos sobre si debe o no gocar de la ymmunidad eclasiastica Andres Ranson . . . , AGI 58-2-6/30, St. Augustine, June 1, 1696, Connor Col.
5. Auto de Ruego y Encargo . . . , *op. cit.*
6. Declaracion de Miguel Ramon, St. Augustine, Nov. 6, 1684, AGI 58-2-6, Sp. transcripts, L. C.
7. Auto de Pedro de Aranda y Cebellaneda, St. Augustine, Oct. 26, 1684, AGI 58-2-6, Sp. transcripts, L. C.

cessfully trying to surprise a nearby Spanish city. [8] Five additional corsairs joined Jingle at Apalachee Bay, and it was quickly decided that their joint force was enough to overpower St. Augustine. Those Englishmen who had participated in the fruitless attack in 1683 undoubtedly helped formulate plans for this more ambitious raid. Even so, the elements did not favor the new design. A turbulent storm came up, scattering five vessels, and though the remainder were not far from St. Augustine, the diminished forces were reluctant to attack. At least for the time being they resolved to by-pass Florida's capital and to land elsewhere to procure desperately needed provisions. [9]

Therefore, about twenty-five miles north of St. Augustine, Ranson and his companions deftly put ashore in a small pirogue to secure meat and water and to glean any useful information about St. Augustine while the larger ships remained offshore to the north. These larger vessels were not unnoticed, however. Vigilant Spanish sentinels at the mouth of the St. Johns River had seen the six sails and hurriedly dispatched a messenger southward to warn their Governor. The messenger was intercepted by Ranson and his companions, and, with his arms tied behind him and a gun at his chest, questioned about obtaining provisions and about St. Augustine's defenses and resources. [10]

Unfortunately for Ranson and his companions, they had been seen landing by several Negroes tending cattle nearby. These Negroes found the deserted, camouflaged pirogue, removed the branches, smashed it with their hatchets, and stole the oars. [11] Although the Englishmen bemoaned the loss of their pirogue and naively believed a storm had battered it to bits, even worse things were in store. Over fifty soldiers sent out from St. Augustine arrived on the scene, and the English intruders had no choice but to surrender meekly. After having received rough treatment from the Spaniards, Ranson and the others were taken north to the mouth of the St. Johns where it was hoped they could lure ashore fellow shipmates. The ruse almost worked. With Ranson standing alone on the shore beckoning his comrades to land, and with

8. Declaracion de Arsencio de Sora, Havana, Apr. 1, 1685, AGI 58-2-6, Sp. transcripts, L. C.
9. Auto de Ruego de Encargo . . . , *op. cit.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. Auto de Cabrera, St. Augustine, Oct. 3, 1684, AGI 58-2-6, Sp. transcripts, L. C.

Spanish soldiers hidden nearby, a small English vessel came within "half a shot" of the awaiting Spaniards. But at the last moment, suspecting an ambush, it darted back to the larger ships awaiting offshore, and they promptly sailed away. [12] However, because of the swift approach of the Spanish infantry, other English seamen from the same group of ships who had landed around the mouth of the St. Johns, and had seized large amounts of maize and meat from the Indians, were forced to abandon their plunder and board their ships. [13]

The threat to St. Augustine had now abated. Her residents were able to breathe more freely and to dig up their buried silver. The Indians, hurriedly called in from St. Marks to aid in the defense, were no longer needed.[14] The captured Englishmen were led back to the capital, and under intensive interrogation, freely supplemented by a few good turns on the rack, gave incriminating testimony. They readily disclosed that the eleven vessels gathered at Apalachee Bay had planned a descent on St. Augustine and that only a storm had thwarted their design-at least temporarily. A few admitted that they had participated in the unsuccessful attack on St. Augustine the previous year, others told what they knew of the newly-founded Scottish settlement of Stewarts Town, south of Charleston, many revealed the plans and whereabouts of notable pirates, and almost all named Ranson as their leader. [15]

Even without the damning indictments of his fellow crewmen, evidence against Ranson as an experienced pirate leader, and a rather brutal one at that, was overwhelming. The Spanish mariner, Miguel Ramon, now in St. Augustine after an arduous journey, furnished additional proof at the trial. He had been ordered, he said, by the Governor of Havana to reconnoiter the Florida coast beginning with the Keys and to be on the lookout for pirates who had recently passed Havana. Near Key Biscayne Ramon sighted pirate vessels, but in the resulting engagement Ramon himself was captured, and he and his crew were tortured for information about nearby towns, how much gold and silver they had, etc. While Ramon was being thus ill-used, another ship,

12. Testimonio de autos . . . sobre . . . Ranson, *op. cit.*
13. Declaracion de Alfonso Pedro de Ojeda, Havana, Apr. 21, 1685, AGI 58-2-6, Sp. transcripts, L. C.
14. Joseph Fernandez de Cordova Ponce de Leon to Charles II, Havana, May 20, 1685, AGI 58-2-6, Sp. transcripts, L. C.
15. Auto de Ruego y Encargo . . . , *op. cit.*

piloted by Ranson, had come alongside, and Ranson had joined in the sport by repeatedly hitting Ramon with a stick until he was stunned and, for good measure, had threatened to cut his head off. Ramon, who was finally set free on the Keys and by a circuitous route made his way to St. Augustine, accused Ranson of being one of the most dangerous and experienced pirates in these parts. [16] In addition to Ramon's testimony, Spanish crewmen of the *Plantanera* asserted that Ranson was one of those who robbed their ship and who in multifarious ways mistreated its crew. [17]

Governor Juan Marques Cabrera considered the evidence conclusive. Ranson's companions were sentenced to perpetual hard labor (later reduced to ten years) while Ranson as ringleader was condemned to be publicly garroted at the base of the gallows. [18] Before the scheduled date of execution, he was confined in the chapel of the new and only partially completed Castillo de San Marcos. Despite his repeated protestations that he had been convicted unjustly, that he had come ashore under orders to kill merely a few wild cattle and to obtain water, and that he had surrendered willingly, preparations for the execution were methodically continued. In the short time remaining, Ranson, who was a Catholic, sought consolation from the Virgin Mary and from Perez de la Mota, chaplain at the castillo and Commissary of the Inquisition.

But the denials and beseechings of Ranson were to no avail; in October or early November, 1684, Spanish soldiers solemnly escorted him from the chapel to the gallows. Placed conspicuously at the foot of the gallows was the garrote, made even more forbidding by a silently awaiting executioner. A mixed gathering of soldiers from the presidio, Franciscan friars from the nearby convent, and inhabitants of the city mutely gazed with mixed emotions as the executioner, flanked by twelve soldiers, dexterously fitted the noose around this arch-pirate's neck and slowly began to twist the rope. One turn, two, three, four, five, six-the cords relentlessly tightened about Ranson's neck, his writhing body twisted and then slumped. In the background friars began to

16. Declaracion de Ramon, *op. cit.*
17. Auto de Pedro de Aranda, *op. cit.*
18. Auto y sentencias . . . , St. Augustine, Oct. 21, 1684, AGI 58-2-6, Sp. transcripts, L. C.

chant and church bells began to toll for the departed soul. The work of the executioner had been well done, but, to make doubly sure, he gave the rope an additional turn-and it snapped! Ranson's limp body fell to the ground, and la Mota and other Franciscans quickly rushed to the scene. They examined Ranson and made the astonishing discovery that the chanting for his soul was premature: he was breathing!

This startling news spread quickly through the onlooking crowd, and above excited murmurings was heard an articulate cry, "a la iglesia," to the church. La Mota, believing a miracle had saved Ranson, nimbly climbed to the top of the gallows, exhorted three of his Franciscan companions to pick up the limp body and to take it to the nearby convent, and threatened the Spanish guard with God's wrath should they interfere. [19] Before Governor Cabrera and the other dumbfounded spectators fully realized what was happening, Ranson was safely within the convent walls, fervently clutching a rosary, tears streaming down his cheeks. [20]

There now began an acrimonious controversy, lasting many years, between Florida governors and church officials, as to whether Ranson was entitled to ecclesiastical immunity or whether he should be turned over to civil authorities who would carry out the death sentence or enforce some lesser penalty. Immediately after Ranson was carried to the convent, an official sent by Governor Cabrera appeared at the entrance where he was unequivocally denied custody of Ranson or, for that matter, even admittance to the convent itself. [21] The Governor was threatened with excommunication should he in any way violate the immunity of the convent. [22] Instead, Cabrera, venting his spleen where he unquestionably had authority, summarily discharged some of the soldiers who had been Ranson's execution guard and stationed others at the most distant and unpleasant posts. [23] He then pointed out to his superiors that this experienced and notorious pirate

19. Perez de la Mota to Charles II, 1692, AGI 58-2-6/23, Connor Col.
20. Testimonio de autos . . . sobre . . . Ranson, *op. cit.*
21. Memorial of la Mota, Madrid, June 8, 1692, AGI 58-2-6, Stetson Col., University of Florida Library.
22. Auto de Ruego y Encargo . . . , *op. cit.*
23. Charles II to Diego de Quiroga y Losada, Buen Retiro, June 10, 1688, AGI 58-2-6/13, Connor Col.; Auto de Cabrera, St. Augustine, Nov. 16, 1684, AGI 58-2-6, Sp. transcripts, L. C,

might flee the convent at a moment's notice and disclose to his nefarious comrades in Carolina how to seize St. Augustine. In reality, Cabrera intimated, Ranson was not a Catholic-had not his companions defamed the mission at the mouth of the St. Johns River and violated the images by cutting off their heads, hands, and feet? This heretic was not worthy of ecclesiastical immunity! [24] But the Governor was frustrated at every turn in trying to have Ranson released, and when Cabrera left Florida for good in 1687, the fugitive was still safely within the convent walls. After the new Governor, Diego de Quiroga y Losada, took office and after heated tempers bad partially cooled, a somewhat more satisfactory agreement was reached. Work on the new stone Castillo de San Marcos had been going on since 1672, but still there was much to be done, and, as usual, materials and skilled artisans were scarce. Among his other talents, the resourceful Ranson was trained as a carpenter and an engineer. Quiroga was more than willing to grant Ranson safe conduct if he would live and work in the castillo as the other English prisoners had done before being sent to Spain. In the late 1680's, therefore, Ranson moved his residence from the convent to the castillo, the interior of which he had not seen since the trying days before his execution. [25]

While Ranson was faring reasonably well and was successfully evading every attempt to have his sentence carried out, his benefactors, la Mota and the Franciscan friars, were deeply immersed in religious controversy still unsuccessfully trying to prove Ranson's deliverance a miracle. In fact, la Mota was summoned to Spain to present his case personally and no doubt to relieve tensions at St. Augustine as well. After a tempestuous voyage, the testy prelate reached Madrid in 1692. Here he presented a lengthy and, at times, moving, memorial to the Crown, maintaining that Ranson had landed not as a pirate but merely to procure provisions, that he was a devout Catholic who had zealously implored the protection of the Virgin Mary before his execution, and that the sound rope had miraculously broken when the sentence was being carried out. As material evidence la Mota produced the twisted, severed cord. [26] But all to no avail. He was unable to convince civil or religious authorities that Ranson's

24. Auto de Ruego y Encargo . . . , *op. cit.*
25. Quiroga to Charles II, St. Augustine, Apr. 1, 1688, AGI 58-2-6/6, Connor Col.
26. La Mota to Charles II, 1692, *op. cit.*

exceptional deliverance was divinely inspired. Though it cost them dearly, [27] the efforts of la Mota and his Franciscan cohorts did save Ranson's life. During the decade of the 1690's Ranson alternated between the castillo and the convent, but never again was he forced to look the silent executioner in the eye.

After 1700 there were far more pressing problems for Florida officials than who would have jurisdiction over the vexatious Ranson. True, there were no more pirate raids, and in reality the colorful age of piracy was rapidly coming to a close. The most threatening menace was the fact that once again Spain was at war with England, and once again Spanish possessions and shipping in the New World were subject to attack at a moment's notice. This was painfully verified in Florida when Governor Moore of South Carolina, with a combined force of militia and Indians, swept down on the peninsula, captured the city of St. Augustine, and then laid siege to the more formidable castillo. Sickness, lack of sufficient artillery, dissension in his command, and Spanish reinforcements, however, all proved the Carolinians' undoing. After burning the city, Moore and his disgruntled troops retreated northward.

During the crucial two-months siege of the castillo, Ranson, certainly no stranger there, once again lived within its massive cocina walls. Because the undermanned Spanish garrison was hard pressed merely to defend the castillo, there were no extra soldiers to guard Ranson and the other prisoners. To serve a double purpose-that of relieving Spanish troops from guard duty and of providing more manpower for the common defense-Governor Jose de Zuniga y Cerda held out the prospect of freedom to prisoners who acquitted themselves honorably against the enemy. Ranson, along with others, willingly accepted the offer, and he served as interpreter, interrogating captured prisoners and in other ways aiding Zuniga. Shortly after the siege was broken, the Governor acknowledged and praised the conduct of the prisoners and recommended that Ranson and others be granted their freedom. [28]

27. At least two and probably more Franciscan friars were exiled from Florida because of their defense of Ranson. Memorandum for Franciscan Commissary, Madrid, Aug. 12, 1693, Stetson Col.
28. Auto de Zuniga, St. Augustine, Nov. 10, 1702, AGI 58-2-8, Stetson Col.

Now the controversial, complicated career of Andrew Ranson, the last English buccaneer to plague St. Augustine, becomes hazy to the historian. It is probable that the King, in his relief over the deliverance of St. Augustine, approved granting the prisoners their liberty. Then Ranson, now in his fifties, perhaps returned to his wife in the West Indies, or possibly decided to spend his remaining days in Florida. All this, of course, is conjecture.

But one thing is certain. Ranson, who for almost two decades had been living in dread of having his death sentence carried out, by one means or another had escaped execution. On the other hand, la Mota never was able to convince authorities that Ranson's deliverance was a wondrous miracle wrought by divine hands. Indeed the evidence seems logical and conclusive that the rope used in the garrote was worn and defective and for this reason broke when too much tension was applied. Even so, one wonders whether Ranson, who had experienced hearing his death sentence pronounced, who had actually been escorted to his public place of execution, and who had felt the rope tighten around his neck until he lost consciousness, would concur in such a rational explanation.

FLORIDA ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR AS SEEN BY A SOUTHERN REPORTER

edited by WILLIAM WARREN ROGERS

IN THE DAYS PRIOR to the firing on Fort Sumter, readers of the Charleston *Daily Courier* were kept well informed on current events by its various correspondents. [1] No paper in the South was better supplied with journalists, who sent in weekly, and often daily, reports from centers of interest. One of these reporters styled himself "Batchelor," and he made a tour of Florida for the *Courier.*

Like "Leo" from Washington, "Pink" from New York, and "Sigma" from Montgomery, Batchelor did not reveal his real name. Nor did his newspaper identify him, although it is clear that he was a native South Carolinian. Batchelor resembled his fellow journalists in that he had considerable literary ability, with a style both interesting and witty. With a good eye for detail, his descriptive skill was several levels above the average reportorial competence. His Florida impressions deal with the landscape and various forms of plant and animal life. Included are descriptions of the towns he visited and the activities he found within them. The letters are, in effect, a report by a cultured writer to an older, settled part of the South about a new and largely unexploited region.

In all there were six, although the letter of March 28 was dated first from Jacksonville and then continued from Lake City. Batchelor obviously enjoyed his Florida excursion and much of his exuberance comes through in his prose. [2]

Jacksonville, Fla., March 27, 1861

At 7 o'clock, A.M., on the 26th inst., we were on board the good steamer Carolina, Capt. T. J. Lockwood, for a first visit to

1 This newspaper was established as the Charleston *Courier* in 1830 and became the Charleston *Daily Courier* in 1852. In 1873 it assumed its present name by merging with the Charleston *Daily News* and becoming *The News and Courier.*

2. The letters appear in Charleston *Daily Courier,* April 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 8, 1861.

Florida. [3] The romantic anticipations of the land of flowers and evergreens,' with which we embarked, were soon temporarily dispelled, for no sooner had our good ship crossed the bar of Charleston harbor, than that abominable accompaniment of the ocean - sea sickness - beset us. Most of the passengers were on a first trip, and of course the ocean demanded tribute of us all, which was paid, however, under protest. The Captain said we were 'feeding fish' handsomely, a joke which we considered decidedly in bad taste at such a time; yet we all afterwards forgave him the remark.

Three o'clock in the afternoon brought us to the entrance of the Savannah River. As we passed up its dotted waters, Fort Pulaski, near the bar, and further up Fort Jackson, showed, by the pacing sentry and pointed guns, that their garrisons were on the alert, and ready to dispute the entry off unwelcome visitors. Two hours were spent in strolling through the streets of our pretty little neighbor-Savannah, and looking at the still prettier faces that graced them. At six o'clock the bell summoned us back, and our boat, winding its way among the Cotton and lumber ships that lined the river, were *[sic]* soon on the billows again, on the outside route to Fernandina. Night and distance soon closed in upon the landscape beauty, and we retired, to be rocked into dreams by the eternal tossing and rolling of the ocean.

It is sunrise, and we have crossed the bar of the St. Mary's, and are steaming up its placid waters. The broad and beautiful bay is dotted with waterfowl, and bouncing fish, and frowning guns, at intervals, overlooking high headlands. Just to our left, a battery of thirty-two pounders, grinning from behind a sand-bank, is seen, while far up in the distance, a flag designates the locality of Fort Clinch. We pass safely under its guns, and then turning a curve in the river find ourselves in view of the new and enterprising town of Fernandina. We stroll through the shelled streets, and see several new and pretty residences, with occasionally an orange grove or fig tree veiling their front. Here spring was just bursting forth in romantic beauty. The headlands

3. The *Carolina* was added to a line of steamers in service between Palatka, Jacksonville, and Charleston in 1853. See Thomas Frederick Davis, *History of Early Jacksonville, Florida* (Jacksonville: H. & W. B. Drew, 1911), pp. 99-100. See also Branch Cabell and A. J. Hanna, *The St. Johns: A Parade Of Diversities* (New York: Rinehart, 1943), *passim*.

along the St. Mary's, and in the suburbs of the town, were radiant with flowery verdure and fragrant evergreen. You are just reminded at this point, that you are visiting the land of flowers, and the very waters seem to have caught the glow of spring, and shine with something more than natural beauty.

Two hours more and we have gone to sea again, and are now crossing the bar at the entrance of the St. John's River. The lead is carried in the fore chains, and the seaman calls out *'eight and a half feet,'* which warns us that we are rather uncomfortably near the bottom, as our steamer is drawing seven feet of water. Safely we pass the net work of buoys, and enter into the broad and beautiful St. John's. Another battery of these ominous thirty-two pounders looks over a sand bank, grinning fiercely under the feet of the weary sentry. Up the beautiful river among the water-fowl we go, and seeing fish leap out of the deep, flounce about in the air and then disappear again. Some of our party are now on the poop deck with fowling pieces, but the birds are used to being shot at, and experience is always wisdom, even with birds.

Close ahead of our prow, a discreet and dignified pelican sits calmly on the water. Whiz, goes a rifle ball just over its back, and carefully unfolding its huge pinions, the sober bird gathers itself up, and wings away to a more hospitable part of its native element. Now, we are passing a Cotton plantation, with its pretty mansion and whitewashed negro cottages in the background. As I sit in the purser's office writing, the river opens out into a broad lake on either side, the shores of which are acrowned with laurels, magnolia and orange. Now we are in view of a pine forest on one side, and a myrtle grove on the other. Far up the river a forest of stately palmettos rises to view, and an unconscious glow of pride, at the sight of our native tree, changes the current of our meditations; we forget the perennial beauty of the river and evergreen and thought wanders homeward again.

BATCHELOR

Jacksonville, Fla., March 28, 186l

At two o'clock, P.M., to-day, our boat lay alongside the wharf at Jacksonville, and regretfully we took leave of her polite and gentlemanly officers. To all persons desirous of visiting East Florida, we would suggest the steamer *Carolina,* under the com-

mand of Captain THOMAS J. LOCKWOOD, assured that you are to receive all the courtesy and attention you merit.

Jacksonville lies on the banks of the St. John's, and is a place of some pretensions. An inquiry as to its population, elicited a result of from 2500 to 6000. Consulting the United States census returns, we find that in 1850 it contained a population of about 850. Its inhabitants are now estimated at about 3500. [4] Two newspapers are published here, the St. John's *Mirror* and the *Southern Confederacy*. The latter journal was established by Messrs. SADDLER and THEO. S. GOURDIN, of Charleston. [5] The *Courier,* a few weeks since, contained a notice of the decease of Mr. GOURDIN. His name is spoken of reverently yet, and an appreciative community seem to lament deeply his premature and untimely loss.

One of the pastimes of the people here, and the one most in vogue, is fishing. You find fish, of all kinds, at all hours, in all places. As I sit at my window writing, a score of rods are being piled at a pier in front of the hotel, and numerous boats skim the surface of the river, clipping out its unsuspecting inhabitants. The town wears an enterprising and pleasing aspect. The business houses are large and well built, and the private dwellings prettily veiled in orange and live-oak trees . . . [are] everywhere apparent. Everything appears new to you-even the birds seem to have improvised as they warble strangely sweet notes from the orange blossoms and evergreens of the beautiful city. The greatest objection we found to it was its sandy streets, in which you were sure to sink shoe-deep at every step.

Lake City, March 28, 1861

At two o'clock this afternoon, we took the train on the Atlantic and Gulf Central Rail Road for Lake City. [6] Passing through

4. The 1860 census returns listed Jacksonville as having 1,133 white persons, 87 free Negroes, and 898 slaves for a total of 2,118. See *Population of the United States in 1860,* I (Washington, 1864), 54.
5. T. Frederick Davis, *History of Jacksonville, Florida and Vicinity 1513 to 1924* (St. Augustine: The Florida Historical Society, 1925), pp. 449-450, mentions that the *Republican,* a Whig paper begun in 1848, burned in 1854 and about 1858 was renamed the St. Johns *Mirror*. Supposedly there was another paper called the *Southern Rights.* The similarity of names suggests that this was the same paper as the *Southern Confederacy*.
6. This road was first organized in 1851. Aided by federal and state land grants the controlling company began work in 1857 and the

the subberbs *[sic]* of Jacksonville the iron track led us into a pine forest, from which we emerged, just at this place-a distance of sixty miles. On, through the interminable forest, our train whizzed at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour; yet nothing but an occasional saw-mill, or turpentine manufactory, relieved the monotony, until we came to the pretty lakes near this place. The Atlantic and Gulf Central Road is one of the best in the State. The trains make excellent time, and run without jolt or jostle.

Lake City takes its name from a number of limpid basins that glisten like pearls around the suburbs. It numbers 800 inhabitants, possesses a mild and healthy climate, and good sociality. It wears above all an air of sociality and refinement not always found in a new country, newly peopled. The adjacent country, judging from the part we saw along the rail road, is not so wealthy as other portions, and consequently offers fewer inducements to planters. For health and happiness, however, it can be safely recommended. It has, too, its pretty faces, and in numbers sufficient to almost dissipate the quiet reverie resolves of a bachelor, even. A fairy form has just flitted past my window now, and I watch after the half bonneted face until she approaches the lake. How pretty! She has turned, and is coming back up the street again, and, I declare, she is beautiful, and-

BATCHELOR

Tallahassee, Fla., March 29, 1861

We left the orange groves and beautiful City of Lakes at five this morning, taking the Pensacola and Georgia Rail Road, for Tallahassee. [7] The grey of morning was just opening up as we passed out through the chain of lakes surrounding the village-our train skirting along their borders and on the intervening slopes. These lakes, in some respects, remind me much of our na-

road from Jacksonville to Lake City was completed in March 1860. See George W. Pettengill, Jr., *The Story of the Florida Railroads 1834-1903* (Boston: Railway & Locomotive Historical Society, 1952), pp. 20-21.

7. Incorporated in 1853 with federal and state land grants, this road, which abandoned its plan of erecting a line from Pensacola to a point on the Georgia-Florida line, was not finished from Lake City to Tallahassee until 1861. See Pettengill, *Florida Railroads,* pp. 24-25.

tive Carolina. The same high, knotty trunk Cypress, with the pendant drapery of white moss, and the myrtle and bay, scattered at intervals on their borders, are here, but, in addition, you have a sheet of water of silvery whiteness, with the proud and prominent magnolia erect at its shore, and gentle eminences cloaked with verdue, undulating and receding from it. The jessamine and woodbine clamber along the borders, too, and drop their red and yellow petals upon the white surface below. Occasionally a symetrical swan, disturbed by the rattling train, lifts its white plumage from the surface, and soars away in the distance. At one place no less than twenty of these beautiful birds rose up from a little lake near the track.

At a rapid speed our iron horse flew on, presenting a panoramic view of swamp, forest, lake and village. Houston is a new county seat, recently located, twenty miles from Lake City. [8] It has about a dozen houses, apparently about a half dozen months old. We wish it as many more in half the time.

'What stream is that, Mr. Conductor?'

'That's *Swawnee* river, sir.'

How our heart and memory leaped back to the old Carolina negro melody 'Way down upon the *Swawnee River,'* at the sight of the Suwanee *[sic].* It is a dark, deep, sluggish stream, with high banks, and tall cypress trees along them, hung with the ever mournful moss drapery. It is the first river we have passed that empties into the Gulf of Mexico.

Our locomotive has given its shrill whistle, and a Church spire and white cottages open to view from among the trees ahead of us. It is the village of Madison, and county seat of the county of that name. We have friends here and spare the place our relentless pen until another time. [9]

A brief stop for breakfast, and we are again speeding on over the ever interesting landscape-We are now approaching a magnificent agricultural country and plantation cottages, and ma-

8. Suwannee County was formed in 1858. Despite its location on the railroad, Houston lost out to the more enterprising town of Live Oak, which became the county seat in 1868. An excellent review of the county's history may be seen in the seventy-fifth anniversary edition of Live Oak *Suwannee Democrat,* October [no day] 1959.

9. Undoubtedly Batchelor knew people here because many South Carolinians had settled in the county. See Dorothy Dodd, "Some Florida Secession History," *Tallahassee Historical Society Annual,* III (1937), 4.

chinery fly past us with the rapidity of our motion. Again we come to the forest, and now a magnificent Florida swamp. The wild and dismal haunt of the Indian is before us, and we look more reverently to that God who has touched even the frightful wilderness with a perennial beauty that disarms it of its loveliness, as we view this wonderful production. Nature has, indeed, in these fastnesses, mingled her purest elements, producing an effect beautiful beyond the reach of thought or power of earthly description. She has brought here her garlands and strewed them munificently within the reach of man, yet proclaiming to him in meaning accents *noli me tangere.* The tall cypress lets fall its mourning drapery, low over the matted vine and gorgeous floweret, in indication of the dissolution of all things beautiful and earthly.

These swamps exhale a deadly miasma, in the summer season, under which almost any constitution will fall, if exposed to it for a night only. Yet they are so *naturally* beautiful, that you would think Raphael had painted one of them. It is a sunny morning, and as our train rushes through this wild, the green water in the side ditches is occasionally circled by a lazy moccasin dropping its slick coils off a log, or cross tie, where it has been taking a siesta. 'Ugh-ugh,' - said a Dutchman on the next seat to me, as a big fellow tumbled off, just under the window from which he was looking - 'It ish von dam schnake - *ugh* !' and the poor fellow shuddered with real fright at the idea of being within five feet of such a venomous reptile.

But we have sped nearly a hundred miles since morning, and our locomotive has begun to clamber the slopes in the vicinity of the Capital of Florida. Up a steep grade, and down into the valley again, and then upon the shore of Lake-Leman, I had almost said-but properly Lafayette. Byron, poor fellow, never saw this place, or he might have added another and brighter laurel to his brow, than the inspiration of Lake Leman gave it. A clear sheet of silvery water, six or seven miles in length, and varying from a half mile to a mile in width, winds between hills and forests, up to the Capital itself. Its shores are skirted by a narrow belt of live oak and green sward, and without this a more delicate border of Cherokee Rose, matted and interlaced among the intervening shrubbery, wearing its grandest attire of blossoms and fragrance. Are we really in the wilds of Florida?

Or are we not looking upon the garden and pool of another Babylonian monarch? But yonder rise the spires of Tallahassee, and this is not a dream.

BATCHELOR

Tallahassee, Fla., March 30, 1861

We are in Flora's Capital, and a pet it is, worthy of Flora. With a population of only 2000, [10] and destitute withal of commercial advantages, beyond its local trade, it is, nevertheless, one of the most refined and elegant cities of the South. Here are gathered many retired business men, merchants and planters, bringing with them all the wealth, luxury and taste of many years garnering up. Style predominates to a great extent. Handsome equipages, with liveried servants, and elegantly dressed occupants, meet you at every turn, and you wonder at seeing all this in the bosom of a country not yet developed, and scarcely known to the world.

Tallahassee is seated upon an undulating ridge, running North and South, about a mile and a half in length. It is the most elevated point to be found so far South. To the Westward stretches a beautiful meadow, far as the eye can reach, with its gardens, herds and limpid water, while in the right and left, and in the background, are elevated forest slopes, now as green as in midsummer.

The residences here are mostly wooden buildings, of pretty architecture, with elegant gardens, and evergreens, shaded by the stately natural oak. The visitor is reminded of Washington City frequently as he passes along the streets. The residences are similarly scattered along the broad avenues, and much of its elegance, *ruralized,* and modified, is manifest among the citizens. The State Capitol is a plain, pretty building, of red stucco, without ornament, but sufficiently capacious for its purposes. Notwithstanding the delicious atmosphere of the place, we doubt much its salubrity. Many of the citizens spend the summer season at Belle Air - a little town in the pine lands, some fifteen miles South of this.

The city is all excitement to-day. President Davis has just sent

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10. *Population . . . In 1860,* I, 54, lists 997 whites, 46 free Negroes, and 889 slaves. The total population was 1,932.

a requisition for 500 men to be furnished by the State for Pensacola. A Battalion of Volunteers is now parading the streets, in fatigue uniform, ready for service. Two Companies leave here three days hence for Pensacola, by way of Montgomery. The troops from other portions of the State will join them before leaving. We noticed, yesterday, several pieces of heavy artillery on the trains for Cedar Keys and St. Marks, two points on the Gulf. The military spirit of the people seems to be fully awakened, and orders for the attack of Fort Pickens are impatiently expected. One of the two Companies to leave here is commanded by Captain P. A. Amaker, formerly of Orangeburg District, S. C., but now Judge of Probate in Tallahassee. [11]

We were well pleased with the hotel system here. You are not met at the depot by runners as at other places, but quietly tell the hackman where you wish to go, deliver him your checks, and off you drive. The City Hotel, at which we are stopping, may be taken as a fair sample, and is quiet, well ordered, kept by gentlemanly proprietors, and equal to any in the State. The hackman that drives you from the depot-three fourths of a mile or more-taking your baggage at the same time, charges you twenty-five cents only.

We leave Tallahassee-the City of Oaks and 'magnificent distances'-and run down, by rail road, to St. Mark's, on the Gulf. It is just twenty-two miles, and you are only a few minutes on the way. But the car window is left up notwithstanding the dust and smoke, and cinders, for you are speeding over the loveliest portion of the State of Florida, and every glance thrown away is a feast lost. Again comes the chain of lakes, with their gorgeous borders, and one by one they seemingly flit past you, as you are whirled down towards the Mexican Gulf. Lake Bradford, the largest of the kind we have seen in Florida, is a beautiful sheet of water, along the shores of which you see a duplicate forest belt, both above and below the water. Just below here is the famous Wakulla Spring. Here a large stream of water bursts up in clear limpid bubbles, and edging around, finally passes off forming the Wakulla river. Nothing astonishes the visitor more than the wonderful transparency of these streams.

11. Amaker was a leading lawyer in partnership with D. P. Hogue. In addition, Amaker commanded the Leon Rifles. See Tallahassee *Floridan and Journal*, June 2, 1860.

Dropping a dime into the Wakulla is the customary tax upon the hidden mysteries. The little coin twirls about as it descends, and down, down into the unfathomable it continues to go-yet for seconds you watch its descent through the crystal fluid. Ours, we suppose, [must] have gone to China, for we never saw it stop.

St. Mark's lies upon the Gulf, just where the Peninsular Coast has made the circuit of Florida, and is wending off to the South again. Its shallow harbor will keep away a trade which its favorable locality would otherwise give it. It is nevertheless a port of entry, and preparations are rapidly making to place it in a posture of defence. Some big thirty-two's bear upon the Spanish Hole-the anchorage ground for large vessels-as well as protect the entrance to the St. Mark's River.

We reached here a few hours too late for the steamer to Pensacola, and will have to retrace our course or remain here a week before another opportunity offers us a visit to the seat of war. Perhaps time will thus be afforded us to collect further curiosities from this inexhaustible fund to the unexplored.

BATCHELOR

Madison, Fla., April 2, 1861

No State in the old Union, comparing their several resources, has made more vigorous efforts towards internal improvements than Florida. With a population of only 47,003 white inhabitants and 39,310 slaves in 1850, [12] she has built lines of rail roads of an aggregate length of over 400 miles, and has under process of construction nearly 300 miles more-being an average of *one mile of road to every sixty-seven white inhabitants.* These roads are all built upon the most approved plans, of the best material, and traverse sections of country of inexhaustible agricultural wealth. The through line of road from Jacksonville to Tallahassee is superior, we candidly believe, to any we have ever traveled over. The trains run at a rate of from twenty-five to forty miles per hour, and accidents very rarely, if ever, occur. A route is here opened to travel from Charleston to the South, comparatively unknown as yet, but which must eventually be appreciated. Leaving

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12. *Population . . . In 1860,* I, 54, lists Florida as having 140,424 persons. This figure was broken down into 77,747 whites, 932 free Negroes, and 61,745 slaves.

Charleston by steamer to Fernandina or Jacksonville, you take the train through to Tallahassee, thence to St. Marks, and by steamer to Mobile or New Orleans. A road will soon be complete from Tallahassee to Pensacola direct, thus offering a rapid and easy means of communication to all the Gulf cities by land. These roads run along the parallels of latitude directly South, and a discerning public will eventually learn to estimate their worth.

The grant of alternate sections of land to rail road Companies in the State, will, in all probability, have an injurious effect upon the rapid settlement of the country. Instead of offering these lands for sale, they have issued paper currency to meet their expenses, and the immense land grants give this paper a circulation in the State, at once dangerous to its credit and financial interests. All of these bills promise to pay in transportation, and of course, are not redeemable in specie. The results will be that the rail road Companies will speculate to a dangerous extent upon the privileges thus granted them by the State, and hold these lands until an exorbitant price can be obtained for them.

Among the many Carolinians we have met in Florida, who will look back with pride upon their descent from the Palmetto State, we are pleased to mention the name of the Hon. John C. McGhee, a native of Edgefield District, and now President of the Florida State Convention. Vigorous, erect and manly, with the silver hairs scattered under his wig, the Carolinian at once recognizes in him a genial and familiar presence. [13]

To-day is all excitement in Madison. The volunteers for Pensacola leave in a few hours, and all the country is here to witness their departure. The company from this place numbers 80 men, 24 of whom are native Carolinians. . . .

A beautiful Confederate flag was this evening presented to the Company, from the young Ladies of the Madison Female College. There was something so touchingly beautiful and tender in this offering of childhood purity, and woman's faithful and devoted trust to patriotic valor, that we cannot forbear a quotation from the address of Miss Sallie Partridge, a native of Charleston, but resident in Florida, accompanying the gift.

13. The correct spelling of the secession convention chairman is "McGehee." He had lived in Madison County for thirty years. A devout Christian and large slaveowner, McGehee believed in the moral correctness of slavery. See Dodd, "Some Florida Secession History," 4.

> As we look upon your faces and reflect upon the circumstances under which we meet, our hearts fill with intermingled emotions of sadness and admiration. The separation soon to take place between friend and friend, and the possibility of its being, with some, a final one, claims all that woman can give-a tear and prayer. The exchange you are about to make, of happy homes and pleasure for the perils and hardships of a soldier's life, demands our sympathy, while it challenges our gratitude and highest admiration. . . .

It would be difficult to depict de enthusiastic excitement this little episode produced. The address was elegantly and appropriately responded to by W. H. Whitman, Esq., and proudly unfurling their flag to the breeze, the brave fellow brushed away the tear that manhood even cannot restrain, and a few minutes afterward [they] were hopefully on their way to the scene of contemplated conflict.

BATCHELOR

St. John's River, Fla., April 5, 1861

We are back on the noble St. John's once more, and the same good steamer, Carolina, is puffing majestically along its bosom, with her decks full of passengers, anxiously feasting on the wonders and beauty of nature here developed.

Leaving Jacksonville, the steamer changes its course, and differing from the entire tribe of rivers in this respect, flows from South to North. Here it widens out into that beautiful body of water, which derived for it, from the Indian, the name of *Wee Laka,* or Chain Lake. Its shores at this point, twenty miles from its mouth, are from three to five miles apart, and for a distance of seventy-five miles our steamer seemed to be traversing what might as appropriately be named an ocean as a river. Like the Sewanee *[sic],* its waters are dark and turbid, and an ordinary breeze lashes it into quite respectable billows.

But the imperishable beauty of its shores attracts the eye of the stranger from all else, and rivits it there for the remainder of the passage. You are done with the myrtle and laurel, and the more hardy evergreen of the North; but in its place you find the orange, lemon, citron, vine banana, and other tropical trees in increasing numbers as you advance upwards. Our eager desire to see a natural orange grove, with the fruit all hanging to the branches, was fully gratified here. Just before reaching Picolata,

and at an abrupt angle of the river, a light green forest, interspersed with an occasional heavy live oak, was pointed out to us. It was our long looked for wild orange grove, and we gazed longingly at its tempting shades, under which the spring birds were chirping their first notes, and wished ourselves there forever.

Picolata is the name of an intended town on the St. John's, but the name has existed for some years, and the town has thus far passed only to its second house. A hotel for invalids is established here, and in the winter season is much frequented. These invalid hotels, or more properly, hospitals, are scattered at intervals all along the river, and half the passengers on our boat, at times, were Northerners who had been inmates of these hospitals for the winter. Many of them, dissatisfied with the climate, or impatient under the rapid advance of the insatiate disease, were returning home to die. Others were still hopeful; but the hectic cough, the hollow cheek, the inelastic step and whispering articulation, showed too well their hope was deceptive, and that the conqueror had almost grasped the coveted spoil.

Among the list of passengers on our return was a fragile and intellectual boy of apparently sixteen winters. Alas! to him they had been rude ones indeed. The flesh of manhood all gone, and its aspirations and pride thus foiled in the hopeful bud, was indeed a sad contemplation. Five weeks of the balmy air of Florida had only hastened the progress of the destroyer, and unable to speak above a hoarse whisper, with a tottering step, it was evident that his last chaplet of summer flowers had already bloomed.

Palatka, situated on the St. John's, is a promising little town, with its hotels, saloons, and steam boats, as practical evidences of its prosperity. It has about 800 inhabitants, with a wealthy back country to support it, and may some day become a place of importance. Here the river becomes too shallow for heavy vessels, and the navigation beyond this is carried on by small river steamers. Here, too, our navigation ended, and regretfully re-embarking we prepared to leave this home of beauty, prosperity and hope, for one less beautiful, but our own.

It is a matter of regret that the St. John's Bar affords so little water. Here is a river unsurpassed by none in the world in the advantages for navigation, after once getting upon it; but vessels drawing over eight feet of water enter it with difficulty. A channel of from twenty-five to thirty feet, we were told, can be obtained

for nearly one hundred miles from its mouth, deep enough to float the navies of the world. Add to this the fact that its source is in a land of inexhaustible wealth, where the planter can select at pleasure whether he grows Cotton, Sugar, Rice or Tropical Fruits, and you find still further reason for regret.

It is rather singular to observe how little is known of the wealth, resources and advantages of Florida. With a sufficiency of labor, and a litttle more capital, its knotty cypress and pine would give place to the richer products for which it is so well adapted, and the wild forest blossom like a garden under the touch of civilization. We have seldom seen a place where labor was more wasted, or could produce a richer result, if expanded. A new source of wealth recently opened to enterprise, is in the lumber and turpentine business. Vast quantities of this are coming into market, but as nothing compared to what the resources of the country can supply.

We hope the day is not far off when with wealth and resources fully appreciated, Florida will attain a population and wealth commensurate with her merits.

BATCHELOR

ASBOTH'S EXPEDITION UP THE ALABAMA AND FLORIDA RAILROAD

by EDWIN L. BEARSS

DURING THE FIRST WEEK of July, 1864, the powerful "Army Group" commanded by Major General William T. Sherman slowly closed in on Atlanta, Georgia. To help loosen the grip of the Confederate Army of Tennessee on Atlanta, Sherman planned to send a fast moving cavalry force, about 3,000 strong, to smash the Montgomery and West Point Railroad. (This railroad linked the defenders of Atlanta with the magazines and supply depots of central Alabama.) Leaving Decatur, Alabama, on July 9, these raiders were expected to strike the vital railroad near Opelika. After tearing up the track and burning the trestles and bridges, the Union cavalry would have to escape the clutches of the aroused Confederates. If the raiders found that it was impossible to rendezvous with Sherman's "Army Group" before Atlanta, they were to head for Pensacola, Florida, which had been occupied by the Union forces since May, 1862.

If the Federal cavalry were to head for Pensacola after wrecking the railroad, the commander at that point, Brigadier General Alexander Asboth, must be alerted. Accordingly, Sherman on July 7 addressed a letter to Major General Edward R. S. Canby, Asboth's superior. Canby, who was commander of the Military Division of West Mississippi, maintained his headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana. After informing Canby of the projected raid, Sherman asked him to have Asboth look out between July 20 and *25* for the Union cavalry. [1]

Since there were no direct communications between Sherman's and Canby's headquarters, Sherman's letter did not reach New Orleans until the 17th. After perusing the message, Canby incorporated it into a dispatch of his own. This letter Canby then forwarded to General Asboth.

The staff officer bearing Canby's message took passage aboard the steamer *Clyde* from New Orleans for Fort Barrancas where

1. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,* Series I, Vol. XXXVIII, pt. V, 84-85. (Cited hereafter as O. R.) General Asboth commanded the District of West Florida.

Asboth maintained his headquarters. The transport entered Pensacola Bay on the 20th and tied up at the navy yard. After he went ashore, the courier delivered the dispatch to Asboth.

Once Asboth had studied Canby's message, which contained the excerpts from Sherman's letter, Asboth decided to organize a strong task force. The next morning this force would move out of the Pensacola perimeter to establish contact with the Union raiders in case they were beading for the Gulf Coast. Simultaneously, orders were issued by the general to have the steamer *Hudson* loaded with commissary stores and forage. As soon as the ship had taken aboard the designated cargo, she would be moored off Pensacola. She would stand ready to proceed at an instant's notice to any point on the coast where Sherman's cavalry might put in an appearance. [2]

After Asboth had issued the instructions for the provisioning of the supply ship, he drafted orders designating the units that would constitute his task force. Following a conference with his staff, Asboth determined to divide his task force into two combat teams - one to be commanded by Colonel William C. Holbrook and the other by Colonel Eugene von Kielmansegge. Holbrook's command would consist of four companies of the 7th Vermont, the 82d U. S. Colored Infantry, and six companies of the 86th U. S. Colored Infantry; Kiehnansegge's included four companies of the 1st Florida Cavalry (dismounted), one section of the 1st Florida Battery, and Company M, 14th New York Cavalry. Before they departed from the Fort Barrancas staging area, Asboth told his subordinates to see that their combat teams were provided with eight days' rations. Two would be carried in haversacks and the rest in the wagons which would accompany the combat team on its projected foray. In addition, the troops would be provided with eighty rounds of ammunition. Forty of these were to be carried in their cartridge-boxes and the remainder in the wheeled vehicles. [3]

By the afternoon of the 21st the men of Asboth's task force, 1,100 strong, had drawn their stipulated rations and ammunition, squared their gear away, and had been mustered in their respective cantonments. As soon as Asboth was informed by Colonels

2. *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. XXXV, pt. II, 181.
3. *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 569-570. A total of nine wagons were allotted by Asboth for the purpose of transporting the task force's rations and ammunition.

Holbrook and von Kielmansegge that their combat teams were ready to march, he gave the order to move out. Departing from the Fort Barrancas staging area, the task force separated into two columns. The infantry marched along the road flanking Pensacola Bay to Bragg's Bridge. Here they were embarked in scows and ferried across Bayou Grande. The artillery and the wagon train escorted by the cavalry circled the head of the bayou. About dark the two columns rendezvoused at Jackson's Bridge. This structure spanned one of the tributaries of Bayou Chico, two miles north of Bayou Grande. [4]

Following a brief halt, during which the men prepared and consumed their evening meal, the bluecoats again took up the march. Bypassing Pensacola, the Yankees gained the road which paralleled the Alabama and Florida Railroad north of the city. Wanting to take by surprise the Confederate patrols reported to be operating in the Gonzales sector, Asboth had decided to execute a night march. Throughout the short summer night the general, by dint of his constant urging, kept the column on the move. Asboth's strategy apparently paid off when the Federals passed through Gonzales without being challenged. Daybreak found the Federals near Fifteen-Mile Station. The column had marched 30 miles since leaving Fort Barrancas the previous afternoon.

As Asboth's vanguard probed its way cautiously forward toward Fifteen-Mile Station, it was greeted by a brisk fire from an undisclosed number of greyclads. The Southerners were occupying an outpost at the station. After diving for cover, the Yankees deployed as skirmishers and returned the Confederates' fire. While his advance guard and the Rebel pickets banged away harmlessly at one another, Asboth rode forward to make a personal reconnaissance. It was apparent to the general that the Confederate vedettes were retiring upon their main encampment. Consequently, Asboth decided to deploy his entire task force, preparatory to launching an attack on the Southerners' cantonment.

In response to Asboth's instructions, Colonels Holbrook and von Kielmansegge quickly formed their troops for battle. Directly in front of the Rebels' camp and to the right of the railroad, Holbrook massed his combat team in double line of battle. The 7th Vermont and the 82d U. S. Colored Infantry were in advance and

4. *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. XXXV, pt. I, 413-414, 416-417.

the 86th U. S. Colored Infantry in support. After seeing that the two cannons of the 1st Florida Battery were emplaced on the crest of a hill next to the road, von Kielmansegge formed his command into single line of battle on Holbrook's left. Both the colonels covered their fronts with a strong line of skirmishers. Then they waited for Asboth's signal to advance. [5]

The Confederate force occupying the encampment at Fifteen-Mile Station consisted of Companies E, G, and I, 7th Alabama Cavalry, 360 strong, commanded by Colonel Joseph Hodgson. In anticipation of an early advance by the Yankees, Hodgson had put his men to work throwing up an earthen fort one mile north of his encampment. Hodgson, realizing the urgency of the situation, had instituted round the clock fatigue parties. When completed on the afternoon of the 21st, the fortifications, to honor the colonel, were dubbed Fort Hodgson. [6]

Once Asboth learned that his subordinates had completed their dispositions, he ordered the advance to begin. Pressing forward, the Union skirmishers, closely supported by the bluecoated line of battle, drove the greyclads from their encampment. Colonel Hodgson, taking cognizance of the overwhelming strength of the Yankees, covered his retreat with a few selected snipers. The remainder of Hodgson's small command took refuge in the fortifications.

After quickly and methodically mopping up the Confederate rear guard, the Federals closed in on the fort. Here their advance was brought to an abrupt halt by the vigorous small arms fire delivered by the Alabamans. The Southerners were sheltered, in turn, from the Yankees' fire by their earthworks. To overcome this obstacle, Asboth called for artillery support. In response to the general's summons, the gunners of the 1st Florida Battery hurriedly manhandled their two guns into position. They then began to hammer the fort with shot and shell. Once the artillery had softened up the Rebels' position, the blueclad battle line again surged to the attack. The badly outnumbered defenders of Fort Hodgson realized that if they remained where they were, they would be

5. *Ibid.* Holbrook covered his front with four companies of skimishers; von Kielmansegge covered his with two.
6. *Ibid.,* 413-414, 417. The fortifications had been completed concurrent with the departure of Asboth's task force from Fort Barrancas.

killed or captured. Therefore, when Hodgson gave the word, they vaulted into their saddles and made a hasty retreat.

Since he had only one company of mounted troops (Company M, 14th New York Cavalry), Asboth was unable to make a vigorous pursuit of the fleeing Rebels. After following the greyclads for about three miles, the Yankees gave up the chase and returned to the captured fort. [7]

In the meantime, Asboth's provost marshal had provided a guard for the seven Rebels (one lieutenant and six enlisted men) captured in the engagement. Next he made an inventory of the public property seized by the bluecoats in the attack on the Confederate camp and fort. Examining this list, Asboth discovered that his task force had captured, in addition to a considerable supply of commissary and quartermaster stores, Colonel Hodgson's papers, a large battle flag, 17 horses with equipment, 18 sabers, 23 carbines, a large supply of ammunition, and 23 head of cattle.

What especially pleased the general was that he had scored this success at the cost of only one man wounded. The Confederates for their part made no report of their losses in this engagement. Asboth was informed by the inhabitants that the greyclads had taken over 30 wounded with them when they had retreated toward Pollard. In addition, the bluecoats found one 40-day substitute near the fort mortally wounded. After a Union surgeon had dressed his injuries, the prisoner was parolled and left at the nearest farm house. [8]

Questioning one of the prisoners, Private H. L. Knox of Company G, 7th Alabama Cavalry, Asboth was informed that Brigadier General James H. Clanton had engaged the Federal raiding force sent out by Sherman on the 16th at Talladega. After two days' fighting, Knox stated, Clanton had been defeated with the loss of 500 men. Three days later this same force of bluecoats had met and defeated the Alabama militia at Loachapoka and Chehaw on the railroad 40 miles east of Montgomery. After wreaking havoc on the Montgomery and West Point Railroad between Chehaw and Opelika and burning the depots and tax-in-kind warehouses at Loachapoka, Auburn and Opelika, the raiders had

7. *Ibid.*, 417.
8. *Ibid.* The wounded bluecoat, an enlisted man in the 82d U. S. Colored Infantry, had been shot in the right arm.

rejoined Sherman before Atlanta. [9] (In general, the story told by Private Knox concerning the successes scored by the Union raiding force led by Major General Lovell H. Rousseau was correct.)

Although this intelligence scuttled Asboth's plan to co-operate with the raiders sent out by Sherman, the general decided to push on toward the important railroad junction of Pollard. Asboth had been told by the talkative Private Knox that Pollard was garrisoned by two Confederate regiments - one of infantry and the other artillery. Preparatory to resuming the advance in the morning, Asboth desiring that his troops be allowed to get a good rest permitted them to retire early on the 22d. [10]

At dawn the next day, reveille sounded and the eager troops were mustered. As the first order of business, Asboth detailed a guard to escort a wagon loaded with the sick and wounded and the captured ordnance back to Fort Barrancas. As the next item on his program, Asboth put his troops to work leveling Fort Hodgson. A demolition team then applied the torch to the captured commissary and quartermaster stores and the numerous buildings that comprised the captured Confederate encampment. By 8 A.M. the officers in charge of the demolition squads reported their work completed. The troops were then fallen in and the advance northward renewed. [11]

For the first six miles, the march of the task force was uneventful. But as the Union vanguard neared Cooper's, the bluecoats learned from the inhabitants that a strong Confederate outpost was stationed at the forks of the Pollard and Perdido Railroad Station roads. In response to this information, Asboth sent Lieutenant Herman Karber with a detachment from Company M, 14th New York Cavalry, to eliminate the Rebels. Sweeping forward, the New Yorkers, in a wild charge, scattered the greyclads, capturing three members of the 7th Alabama Cavalry-a sergeant and two privates.

Like Private Knox, these Alabamans proved to be quite talkative. Besides corroborating Knox's statement regarding Rousseau's raiders, they told Asboth that Hodgson, to check the bluecoats' advance, had destroyed the bridge across Pine Barren Creek. After wrecking the bridge, Colonel Hodgson had deployed his command,

9. *Ibid.,* 414, 417.
10. *Ibid.,* 417.
11. *Ibid.*

reinforced by a four gun battery, behind the creek. The Confederates, the prisoners stated, were ready to dispute the crossing and were confident that the impassable swamps on either side of their position would prevent the Federals from flanking their position. [12]

This information caused Asboth to change his plan of operations. While Captain Adolph Schmidt took Company M, 14th New York Cavalry and demonstrated in the direction of the burned Pine Barren bridge, Asboth with the remainder of his task force turned into the Perdido Station road. Asboth's objective was to cut the telegraph and break the Mobile and Great Northern Railroad below Perdido Station. After destroying the trestle near Perdido Station, Asboth planned to move into the country between Mobile Bay and the Perdido River. Here, the Federals proposed to smash the salt works located on Bon Secour Bay and burn the two Rebel cantonments (Powell and Withers) located in that area. Following the successful completion of this sweep, Asboth was prepared to recross the Perdido at Nuenece's Ferry and return to his Fort Barrancas base. To facilitate the crossing of the Perdido at Nuenece's Ferry, Asboth sent a dispatch to Captain Benjamin J. F. Hanna, the district quartermaster. Hanna was instructed to have the necessary boats at the ferry on the 26th. [13]

As soon as the courier had departed for Fort Barrancas with the message for Captain Hanna, the march for Perdido Station was commenced. Hardly had the troops hit the road before the rain started to pour in torrents. After a trying seven mile march over roads that were churned into liquid mud, the column reached the Levin farm.

At this point, Asboth learned from what he considered to be an unimpeachable source that the Rebel brass in Mobile, alarmed by his rapid thrust up the Alabama and Florida Railroad, were rushing all their available reserves to the threatened area to intercept his task force. These sources indicated that Colonel Henry Maury with his hard riding regiment - the 15th Confederate Cavalry (1,300 strong) reinforced by a light six gun battery had already reached Pollard from Mobile. Upon evaluating this information, Asboth decided that, since it was no longer possible to effect a junction with Rousseau's raiders, and with his task force

12. *Ibid.,* 415, 417-418.
13. *Ibid.,* 415, 418.

being closely observed by a foe with a decided superiority in cavalry, it would be best to return to his base immediately. Retracing their steps, the Federals spent the night of the 23d bivouacked on the Swan Plantation which was located at the junction of the Pollard and Perdido Station roads. [14]

In response to Colonel Hodgson's plea for reinforcements on the 22d, the Rebel command at Mobile had issued instructions for Colonel Maury to proceed to Pollard. Long before daybreak on the 23d, Maury had succeeded in ferrying his command (the 15th Confederate Cavalry and Tobin's Tennessee Battery) from Mobile to Tensas Station. Next, Maury entrained his men on waiting cars of the Mobile and Great Northern Railroad. By dusk all of Maury's striking force had reached Pollard. Maury spent the next day (the 25th) organizing a strong punitive column totalling about 2,000 officers and men with which to give battle to the foe.

At dawn on the 25th Maury, satisfied with his preparations, rode out of Pollard. The colonel held high hopes of overtaking and destroying Asboth's task force. At Fifteen-Mile Station the Confederates, to their disgust, learned from the inhabitants that the bluecoats had fallen back toward Fort Barrancas on the previous day. Maury remained at Fifteen-Mile Station until the next morning. At that time the Confederate authorities at Mobile, having received reports that a strong Union amphibious force had gone ashore at Pascagoula, Mississippi, recalled Maury's command. Leaving three companies of the 7th Alabama Cavalry to hold Fifteen-Mile Station, Maury returned to Pollard on the 26th. [15]

On the 24th, while Maury was organizing his command, Asboth's task force evacuated Swain's plantation at an early hour. After a rugged march in the hot Florida sun, the Federals camped for the night on the north shore of Bayou Grande near Jones Point. The next morning the bluecoats forded the bayou near its mouth and returned to the Fort Barrancas staging area. Asboth could well afford to be satisfied with the conduct of his command. In less than four days it had marched 72 miles and engaged in two brisk skirmishes with the Confederates. During the expedition, the Federals had only one combat casualty. More remarkable, not a single soldier had been lost as a result of straggling. [16]

14. *Ibid*.
15. *Ibid.*, 416, 418; *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. XXXIX, pt. II, 703.
16. *O. R.*, Series I, Vol. XXXV, pt. I, 418.

THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND NEGRO LABOR IN FLORIDA

by JOE M. RICHARDSON

ONE OF THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS encountered immediately after the emancipation of the Negro was that of labor. The Negro had been the chief source of labor in Florida, as well as in the rest of the South, and the breakdown of slavery necessitated the contrivance of a new system. Many of the white planters wanted to keep the Negro on the plantation on terms that were similar to slavery.[1] The whites accepted the fact that the colored man had ceased to be property, but many wanted to believe that he still existed specifically to produce cotton, sugar, and rice for his "superiors;" and that it was "illegitimate" for him to do as he pleased.[2] A Northern correspondent reported in June, 1865, that the late masters in Florida had little conception of the colored man as anything other than a slave, and that severe beating with the whip and paddle had not completely disappeared.[3]

A "literary gentleman" of Florida expressed his view of the Negro as follows: "There is now nothing between me and the nigger but the dollar-the almighty dollar-and I shall make out of him the most I can at the least expense." This lingering and gnawing desire for unrequited or poorly paid Negro labor was widespread.[4] Furthermore, the prevailing sentiment in the South was that the freedmen would not work without physical compulsion. An observer reported that the Tallahassee planters were "generally irreconciled to the new order of things, and believe that it is impossible to succeed by free labor."[5]

The desire of many of the planters to establish a modified system of slave labor was far from palatable to the ex-slave, who had recently tasted freedom. Many Florida Negroes believed that freedom consisted of having their wants supplied without the necessity of labor, and they tended to rove over the State seeking

1. New-York *Tribune,* September 5, 1865.
2. U. S. Congress, *Senate Executive Documents,* 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1865-66, Rept. 2, p. 21.
3. New-York *Tribune,* September 5, 1865.
4. *Ibid.*
5. New-York *Times,* August 1, 1865.

what they thought to be liberty. [6] Stephen Power, a newspaper correspondent, wrote that the freedmen were "generally drifting about the country, doing nothing, gay, improvident, and thoughtless in regard to the future."[7] In writing about the Negro during Reconstruction, a colored man, John Shuften, said that "in thousands of instances, it was their solemn belief that freedom meant a total exemption from toil, the hardships of life and every kind of responsibility." [8] In addition to this peculiar concept of freedom, it was observed that laziness was a characteristic of the freedmen. Even the Radical Carl Schurz said that "the propensity to idleness" seemed well developed in the Southern Negro, though it was by no means confined to the ex-slaves. [9]

Another thing which caused the freedmen to hesitate to toil on the plantations was the false rumor that the lands of their former masters would be divided among them. Schurz, for example, stated that he found the opinion prevailing among the blacks that the great change would occur around Christmas. This pernicious rumor was so widely believed that it was considered necessary to send Freedmen's Bureau agents around to enlighten the Negroes. [10]

The planter's preconceived notion that the free Negro would not work, the Negroes' conception of liberty, and the results of the unfortunate forty-acre-and-a-mule myth, all combined to convince many of the Florida whites that they must look elsewhere for their labor supply. But, by 1866 a large majority of the ex-slaves were back on the plantations. This was true not only because the Negro realized the necessity of laboring, but also because of the Freedmen's Bureau policy of forcing the freedmen to make contracts to work for the whites.

Immediately after its organization, the Freedmen's Bureau attempted to remove the distrust between the ex-slaves and ex-masters, and the Florida agents made many speeches in addition to sending out printed circulars to inspire mutual confidence. The

6. Jacksonville *Florida Union*, September 9, 1865.
7. U. S. Congress, *House Reports*, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1865-66, Rept. 30, pt. 4, pp. 146-147.
8. John T. Shuften, *A Colored Man's Exposition of the Acts and Doings of the Radical Party South From 1865-1876* (Jacksonville, Florida: Gibson and Dennis, 1877), p. 7.
9. *Senate Executive Documents*, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1865-66, Rept. 2, pp. 27-28.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

agents insisted that the freedmen must be free to choose their own employers, and that substitute slavery would not be tolerated; but at the same time they told the Negro that he must fulfill his duties as a citizen, that he must work and not be idle. [11] In his first instructions on labor, the Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau, General Oliver Otis Howard, said that no agent was to "tolerate compulsory, unpaid labor, except for the legal punishment of crime." [12] In a circular of July, 1865, he ordered that written agreements be negotiated stating wages or interest in land or crop. The agreements were to be approved by a Bureau agent who would keep duplicate copies so as to make enforcement possible. No fixed wage was set by Howard, who left the matter to the discretion of the individual agents. [13]

Colonel Thomas W. Osborn, Assistant Commissioner for Florida, was also opposed to a fixed wage. Therefore, in Florida the wages stipulated by the contracts were determined by the law of supply and demand, [14] which sometimes contributed to the low pay for the freedmen. Colonel Osborn did insist that a minimum of food be advanced by the employer. The minimum consisted of four pounds of bacon, a peck of meal, and a pint of syrup, or the equivalent, per week for each laborer. In addition, the number of hours of work to be performed, days of labor, and the wage was to be designated by the contracts. The male head of each Negro family could make a contract binding his wife and his children who were old enough to work but were still legally under age. [15]

11. *House Reports*, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867-68, Rept. 30, p. 6.
12. Oliver Otis Howard, *Autobiography* (2 Vols., New York: The Baker and Taylor Company, 1907), II, 225.
13. Walter Lynwood Fleming, *Documentary History of Reconstruction* (2 vols., Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1906), I, 330-31.
14. Osborn was born in New Jersey in 1836, and earned a degree from Madison University in New York. He later took up the study of law, which he dropped to become an artillery officer in the Union Army, and was seriously wounded several times. Osborn had been General Oliver O. Howard's Chief of Artillery at Gettysburg and was described by his superior as "a quiet unobstrusive officer of quick decision and pure life." Howard, *op. cit.*, II, 218.; Rowland H. Rerick, *Memoirs of Florida* (2 Vols.; Atlanta: The Southern Historical Association, 1902), I, 306.; William Watson Davis, *The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida* (New York: Columbia University, 1913), p. 393.
15. Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 393.

The introduction of the contract system by the Freedmen's Bureau did not prevent idleness among the Negroes. A Florida citizen complaining about the Negro vagrants in Tallahassee unkindly said that "you can tell how near you are to the city better by the smell than by the mile post." [16] Every stable and outhouse was filled with people who did not work. In the face of this continued slothfulness, Commissioner Howard urged the use of vagrancy laws which would be applicable to whites and Negroes alike. "A little wholesome constraint could not in many cases be avoided," Howard said. [17]

In keeping with the suggestion of his superior, Osborn, on November 15, 1865, ordered that "the usual remedies for vagrancy, breaking of contracts, and other crimes, will be resorted to, the freedmen and other persons of African descent having the same rights and privileges before military and civil courts as the white citizens have." [18] Osborn even threatened to send all indolent Negroes residing in Jacksonville to Tallahassee to work on the plantations, which frightened many of them into seeking employment. [19] The attitude of the Bureau resulted in nine-tenths of the former bondsmen being back on the plantations by 1866. [20] In spite of the great amount of inactivity among the Florida Negroes, a Northern observer reported in December, 1865, that "nowhere in this State is to be seen that staggering indolence and filth which is so painfully noticeable in portions of Georgia and Alabama. On the contrary, there is a manifest disposition among the freedmen to work and to faithfully carry out their part of the terms of the contracts." [21]

There were many complaints by the planters at the interference of the Freedmen's Bureau in their affairs, but the compulsory contract system was probably as beneficial to the planters as to the freedmen. In fact, the Bureau literally forced the Negroes to work for the planters, and the contracts approved by the agents often specified inadequate payment to the worker. The average wages in

16. Tallahassee *Semi-Weekly Floridian*, November 7, 1865.
17. Howard, *op. cit.*, II, 247.
18. Tallahassee *Semi-Weekly Floridian*, November 21, 1865.
19. George R. Bentley, *A History of the Freedmen's Bureau* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1955), p. 84.
20. Stetson Kennedy, *Palmetto Country* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), p. 93.
21. New-York *Times*, December 25, 1865.

1866 were about twelve dollars a month for first-class males, nine dollars for women, and five dollars for children. Many of the freedmen worked for a division of the crop, usually one-third. However, their earnings were sometimes paid in neither money nor a share of the crop. Several of them were forced "to take the orders of their employers upon stores for such necessaries as they required." [22]

The Bureau agents not only approved contracts stipulating low wages, but tolerated contracts worded in such a manner that in the event of a poor harvest the Negro would get nothing. For example, a contract in Leon County approved by the Bureau provided that the laborers would mortgage the entire crop for security for the payment of the rent of land and any advance provisions; and they pledged themselves to dispose of no part of the crop until four hundred pounds of lint cotton for each ten acres of land, and four hundred pounds for each mule used had been given to the owners. [23] In the event of a poor crop year, such a contract could easily have left the Negroes with nothing.

Another contract signed in Leon County promised four pounds of pork to each man per week and to each woman three pounds, and to each man and woman one peck of meal or its equivalent in potatoes. The Negroes were to receive one-fourth of the crop. They agreed to work diligently, paying for all lost time at the rate of forty cents per day, which together with all advances made by the employer would be taken out of their share of the crop. In addition, the workers agreed to comply with all orders and begin work not later than sunrise, taking no unnecessary time for meals. [24] The above contracts tend to corroborate the report of Generals James B. Steedman and Joseph S. Fullerton, in which they said that the contract system in the South was slavery in a modified form, enforced by the Freedmen's Bureau. [25]

The freedmen frequently suffered from unfair contracts, but they would undoubtedly have fared even more badly if the contracts had not been supervised by the Freedmen's Bureau. By 1866 the Bureau was becoming more unpopular with Florida whites,

22. *Senate Executive Documents,* 39th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1866-67, Rept. 6, pp. 43-44.
23. *Records of Deeds,* Leon County, Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Leon County Court House (Tallahassee, Florida)
24. *Ibid.*
25. Tallahassee *Semi-Weekly Floridian,* August 27, 1866.

testified Reverend L. M. Hobbs, State Superintendent of Freedmen's Schools, because the agents had been obliged to restrain the white Floridians from perpetrating injustice on the Negroes by "cheating them of their wages, and witholding remuneration from them." During the summer of 1865 the planters had made a great number of unjust contracts. For example, several contracts were brought to the office of agent Hobbs, in which a first-class laborer was to receive one hundred pounds of meat and thirteen bushels of corn in return for seven and one-half months work. The lower class laborers were paid even less. [26] General Howard talked to a freedman in the vicinity of Tallahassee, who informed him that he had received fifteen bushels of corn, one hundred pounds of pork, and a few peas for one year of labor. His family had cultivated a small garden, but they had not been permitted to utilize the produce. [27] Charles M. Hamilton, Commander of the Western District of Florida, also forced the revision of some contracts in 1866 because he felt that the existing ones were "outrageous." [28] Between 1865 and 1868 the Bureau supervised thousands of contracts in Florida. One agent said that during the season that labor contracts were made, his office was crowded from early morning until late at night, while another agent approved 237 contracts in 1867 alone. [29]

Not only did the Bureau supervise the making of contracts, but they forced the planters to make a settlement in accordance with the terms of the original agreement. An agent in Marianna once requested and received soldiers to force the planters to make just settlement with their employees. In order to insure an equitable division of the crop, the Assistant Commissioner in 1867 ordered that all labor contracts provide for a board of arbitration to settle the disputes arising between the employer and employee. [30]

Unfortunately the Bureau was obligated to force not only the planter to adhere to the terms of the contract, but also the freedmen. Many of the ex-slaves did not yet appreciate the necessity

26. *House Reports,* 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1865-66, Rept. 30, pt. 4, p. 8.
27. *House Executive Documents,* 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1865-66, Rept. 70, p. 355.
28. *House Reports,* 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1872, Rept. 22, pt. 13, p. 281.
29. Bentley, *op. cit.,* pp. 137, 150.
30. *Ibid.,* p. 149.

of keeping their contracts. Furthermore, a considerable number of the freedmen saw no need of working more than necessary. If three or four days work would provide the immediate needs of themselves and their family, why, they wondered, should they labor six or seven? [31] In the opinion of Assistant Commissioner General John G. Foster, the contract system was necessary not to protect the Negroes, but to keep them from deserting their employers "at a critical time" and causing the crop to fail. Another Florida agent said, in May, 1866, that there were some "welgrounded complaints" made often against the former slaves for breaking contracts, idleness, and disregard of the interest of their white employers. [32] One Floridian complained that he employed sixteen Negroes in a business which his predecessor, during slavery, could operate with nine, and his forerunner was able to do twice as much work with the nine slaves. [33] "Wages are very high. Common, poor, unreliable, lazy Negroes have to be paid $1 per day and *found,"* wrote a New Yorker turned Florida lumberman, and "just about the time I can get a man thoroughly acquainted with his duties he wants to go home." [34]

On the other hand, an observer reported that "we suspect the chief reason why the Negro is loth to labor is the uncertainty of his wages." [35] John W. Recks, Collector of Customs at Pensacola, said that the freedmen were perfectly willing to work for a reasonable wage, and Ben. C. Truman, correspondent on the New York *Times,* reported in June, 1866, that the Florida freedmen were doing "first-rate." [36] In October, 1866, General Howard wrote that the Florida Negroes were working well except in a few cases, and when their work was not satisfactory the cause could usually be traced to the oppression of the employer. "Their general industry, quiet and orderly habits and efforts to please their employers is seldom disputed," he said. [37] Even the farmers

31. Oliver Marvin Crosby, *Florida Facts* (New York, 1877), p. 21.
32. *House Executive Documents,* 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1867-68, Rept. 57, p. 77.
33. Tallahassee *Semi-Weekly Floridian* March 12, 1867.
34. Junius E. Dovell, *Florida: Historic, Dramatic, Contemporary* (4 Vols.; New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, Inc., 1952), II, 545.
35. Ledyard Bill, *A Winter in Florida* (New York: Wood and Hollbrook, 1869), p. 217.
36. *House Reports,* 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1865-66, Rept. 30, pt. 4, p. 2; New York *Times,* June 11, 1866.
37. Tallahassee *Semi-Weekly Floridian,* October 30, 1866.

admitted, in 1867, that the colored laborers were doing as well as expected, and were probably the best labor supply that the South could obtain. [38]

The Freedmen's Bureau did a great deal for the Negro laborer; however, it aided not only the ex-slave, but also the planter, for the agents were as vigorous in forcing the Negroes to adhere to the terms on their contracts as they were in compelling the planters to keep their part of the bargain. In fact, if the planter broke a contract he was subject only to a civil suit, whereas, the Negro was faced with the strict vagrancy laws which existed for the express purpose of controlling him as a laborer. One authority on the Bureau wrote that "on the whole its policies, both in the administration of relief and in the supervision of labor, had been those that the planter . . . desired." Its greatest weakness, he continued, was the "lack of a minimum wage rule and the frequent failure of the Bureau officials to require the planters to pay a fair wage." [39]

The federal agency established to safeguard the Negroes actually extended a great deal of protection to the supposed oppressor at the expense of the freedmen. However, the supervision of contracts was of benefit to the ex-slaves. The agents tolerated inadequate payments and forced the Negroes to work, but they also protected them from the whites. Semi-peonage would have been more prevalent if the Freedmen's Bureau or some federal agency had not supervised the Negroes' relations with the Southern whites.

38. *Ibid.*, April 30, 1867.
39. Bentley, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

FLORIDA AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, 1895-1898

by WILLIAM J. SCHELLINGS

THE CUBAN REVOLT against Spanish rule in 1895 and the possibility that this might lead to war between Spain and the United States placed Florida in a dilemma. There were a number of reasons for the state's rejoicing at the prospect of Cuban independence, and for many individual Floridians to want to aid the rebels. Against this, however, was the fear that if the United States went to war against Spain it could end only in disaster for Florida. As a result, an attempt was made to walk a middle path, to encourage the giving of private aid to the rebels, and yet to strongly oppose any official action that might lead to intervention and war. During this period, Florida presented the unique picture of being the only state in which all important newspapers were united in opposition to war. [1] The journals continued to oppose it right up to the day on which President McKinley signed the joint resolution of Congress that, in effect, placed the country in a state of war. Then and only then did the press of Florida capitulate and begin to display any enthusiasm for war.

While the Spanish American War has recently been termed a "popular crusade," [2] presumably with William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer acting the parts of Pope Urban II and Peter the Hermit, it can be seen that if it was a crusade, Florida was certainly a last minute recruit.

In opposing the war, the editors were concerned with the danger of possible attack by the Spanish fleet, and with compensation for the losses they feared would come as a result of the war. In these matters Florida was not alone. Every city and state on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts feared attack, and a number of other states sought to gain some material benefit from the prospective war.

1. The following newspapers were examined for the period under consideration: the Jacksonville *Times Union and Citizen,* the Tampa *Tribune,* the Tampa *Times,* the Ocala *Banner,* the Ft. Myers *Press,* the Miami *Metropolis,* the Pensacola *Daily News,* and the Pensacola *Daily Journal.* Scattered issues of other papers were also scanned.
2. Frank Freidel, *The Splendid Little War* (New York, 1958), p. 3.

The attitude of the state towards the Cuban revolution as here depicted from the leading newspapers in Florida may not reflect the opinion of all Floridians, but it was undoubtedly the opinion and attitude of a large and influential group in the state, the business interests. In the 1890's especially, the newspapers of the entire state, while showing occasional political enmity toward each other, did present a united front in all matters economic. They read almost like the broadsides of an optimistic Chamber of Commerce for Florida. On the subjects of business, industry, tourism, agriculture, etc., editors became eloquent over the future prospects for the state, picturing a Florida that would soon be one of the leading centers of industry, an area where wealth and population would grow more rapidly than in any other state. While there was no Henry Grady in Florida, each editor probably imagined himself to be a second Grady, and his paper a second Atlanta *Constitution.* Differing politically at times, the papers were as one in economic matters, and in their handling of the Cuban question.

In fact, it was this very concentration on the future economic welfare of the state that occasioned a fear of any type of American intervention that might lead to war. The editors represented a group which saw in war an interruption of business, a halt in expansion and growth, and the seeds of virtual ruin in a struggle between the United States and Spain. In their minds, war meant victory, victory meant the annexation of Cuba, and a Cuba within the tariff walls of the United States meant competition that could not be met.

In spite of the threat to business from a war with Spain, Floridians had enough common interests with the Cubans to make them favor Cuban independence. Historically, the two shared a common past of Spanish rule. Geographically, the proximity of Cuba to the mainland made Florida seem a second home to many Cubans, who found it easier for themselves to reach the Keys than it was for many Floridians. Too, the climate is similar, and many of the same crops could be raised on both the island and the peninsula.

Economically, apart from agriculture, Florida in normal times enjoyed good trade relations with Cuba. In return for cattle, fish, and timber, the state imported large quantities of Cuban tobacco. Tampa alone received more Havana leaf than any other American

city except New York. It was confidently expected that this trade would expand tremendously if the island became independent.

Finally, close ties with Cuba were ensured by the presence in Florida of some eight thousand Cubans. These people were almost all living in Tampa and Key West, and formed the bulk of the labor for the cigar industry. That industry, paying wages annually in the neighborhood of $3,000,000, and producing nearly $10,000,000 worth of cigars, was one of the largest and most important in the state. [3]

The effort of the newspapers to steer a middle course, to avoid war and yet give no impression of supporting Spain, clearly did place local interests above what many regarded as national interests. But those local interests were, in their eyes, the paramount issues for Florida. Convinced as they were of the results of a war for the state, it is hard to see how they could have acted otherwise.

When Florida first heard about the revolt, on February 25, 1895, the Cubans in Tampa and Key West were probably the only ones to give the event much attention. In Tampa, a thousand Cubans danced in the streets to celebrate, but elsewhere, apart from noting the outbreak, few paid it much heed. The state was just beginning to recover from the effects of the terrible freeze of that winter and was still adding up the estimated losses of from fifty to seventy-five million dollars. Citrus groves throughout the northern and central part of the state had been destroyed, and the future appeared bleak indeed for many thousands of Floridians. [4]

With its perennial optimism, the state began a remarkable recovery. Henry Flagler pushed his railroad down the east coast. A city sprang up at the southern end of the rails, quickly adopting the ways that have marked Miami since then. New lands were opened for development, both for citrus fruits and truck farming. New towns appeared, with full facilities for tourists, on both the east and west coasts. The census of 1900 was to show that population had continued its rate of increase. The state had counted 391,422 citizens in 1890, and it added 137,122 more in the

3. *Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900* (Washington, 1902), Vol. VIII, Mfg., pt. 2, p. 124.
4. J. E. Dovell, *Florida, Historic, Dramatic, Contemporary* (New York, 1952), p. 631.

next ten years. [5] The continued growth and development of the state seemed assured, and all attention was concentrated on it. The only cloud on the horizon was the Cuban revolution, and the increasingly warlike attitude of some of the newspapers to the north.

It became impossible to ignore the revolt, especially with the Cuban junta in full operation. Reorganized by Jose Marti and Tomas Estrada Palma in 1891, the junta had established over two hundred political clubs. Seventy-six of those clubs were in Florida, all of them devoted to aiding the revolution. The junta collected ten per cent of the wages of the cigar workers, and used the money to finance the shipment of arms and ammunition to the rebel forces. [6]

Many Floridians participated in this activity, and profited greatly thereby. Among others were the future governor of Florida, Napoleon P. Broward, with his tug *The Three Friends*, and Captain "Dynamite" Johnny O'Brien with *The Dauntless*. Such filibustering expeditions were illegal, but many people cooperated in aiding the ships to escape detection. Business firms as well as venturesome individuals took part. Finlayson and Cottrell of Cedar Key, Knight and Wall of Tampa, and others, were known to have acted as purchasing agents or receiving agents for shipments of arms for the Cuban rebels. [7] The revolutionary work of the junta was so effective that the Spaniard, Captain General Salamanca was reported to have exclaimed that if he could destroy the Cuban centers of Tampa and Key West the rebel organization would collapse. [8]

Be that as it may, the junta did aid in keeping the revolution on the front page of the newspapers. In addition to the sending of arms to Cuba, the junta saw to it that a sufficient number of stories designed to stimulate sympathy for the Cubans reached the newspapers in all parts of the United States. Many of the stories may well have been true, but there can be no doubt that many also were manufactured, particularly in Key West. General "Butcher" Weyler and his *reconcentrado* policy received perhaps

5. *Twelfth Census*, VoI. I, Population, pt. 1, p. lxxxii.
6. George M. Auxier, "Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the Spanish American War, 1895-1898," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XIX (August 1939), 285-384.
7. Richard Vernon Rickenbach, "A History of Filibustering from Florida to Cuba, 1895-l898" (Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Florida, 1948), 53-55.
8. Fernando Ortiz, *Cuban Counterpoint* (New York, 1947) p. 88.

more than his share of attention. His acts, and those of the Spanish generally, were depicted as needlessly and deliberately cruel and barbaric. While the Florida papers did not publish quite as many of this type of story as appeared in the northern journals, some were printed. They acted as stimulants for fund raising drives for the relief of the *reconcentrados,* an activity that was nationwide. In this Florida joined wholeheartedly and contributed her share.

In the north, the deluge of such tales of cruelty and barbarity hastened the appearance of demands for intervention by the United States. No such demand emanated from any Florida newspaper. Instead, the editors condemned such acts as those charged to the Spaniards. They expressed their sympathy, contributed to funds for Cuban relief, and wished the rebels good luck in their endeavors. One paper, however, went even further. The Tampa *Tribune,* a journal owned in part by a group of Cuban cigar manufacturers, pointed out that cruelty and terror were used by both the Spaniards and Cubans.[9] The paper showed no desire for direct American intervention.

From the beginning of the revolt in February, 1895, until the end of 1897, the Florida papers gave little heed to the Hearst-Pulitzer demands for such intervention. Apart from occasionally rebuking the northern journals for their jingoistic tendencies, the peninsula editors apparently felt that there was little danger of any such action. As long as Grover Cleveland remained in the White House, they were correct. Cleveland was just as convinced as they were that intervention was both unnecessary and undesirable. Although he offered to mediate between Spain and the rebels, and used diplomatic pressure to try to secure a compromise, he gave every indication of being firmly opposed to actual intervention by the use of force. But when William McKinley was inaugurated as President, an element of doubt appeared. The Republican platform had contained a plank calling for the recognition of Cuban independence, and that was too close to intervention to suit the Floridians. However, even McKinley made it clear that he opposed the use of anything other than the weapons of diplomacy, and as a result he was applauded for his statesmanship.

In December, 1897, Spain finally promised what seemed to be adequate concessions of self-government to offer at least a hope

9. Tampa *Tribune,* December 28, 1897.

that the struggle could be ended. When McKinley announced the concessions promised, he asked that all Americans and Cubans grant the Spanish sufficient time to carry out their pledges, and at the same time he again repudiated the idea of using force to aid the Cubans. Again the Florida press applauded. The Jacksonville *Times Union and Citizen* took the occasion to warn the Cubans that if they were intent on full independence, they must not look to the United States for aid, but must accomplish the task by themselves. The editor wished them good luck, but no more. The same idea was echoed in the other state papers.

In the ensuing months, the state press continued to allot adequate space to the revolt, but gave most of its attention to local matters. In addition, there now began to appear a rather surprising amount of news that represented the Spanish side of the story. The Ocala *Banner* and the Tampa *Tribune* in particular were more impartial as far as the news stories were concerned than most other newspapers. News about the revolt seemed to decrease, and even filibuster activities were on the decline. Until February, 1898, a peaceful settlement, or at least an end to the conflict without the United States being involved, appeared possible.

In February, however, two events occurred that changed the picture abruptly. The publication of the famous DeLome letter and the sinking of the battleship *U. S. S. Maine* in the harbor at Havana brought demands in the national press and in Congress for war. The demands were expressed most forcefully and immediately by the New York *Journal* and the New York *World,* the Hearst and Pulitzer papers respectively. The *Journal* charged that the explosion that sank the *Maine* had been set off by the Spaniards deliberately, and it even published a diagram, an "artist's conception," showing how the mine had been placed. [10]

Compared to the warlike stand taken in that paper, the Florida press was most conservative. It might be added that their stand on both the DeLome letter and the Maine explosion was more realistic than that of the northern papers. Instead of viewing the DeLome letter as an unforgiveable insult, the Jacksonville *Times Union and Citizen,* in common with other state papers, saw it as a regrettable, somewhat stupid error, but one that should cause no difficulty. As for the *Maine,* most of the Florida editors gave

10. New York *Journal,* February 17, 1898.

the story full coverage, but cautioned their readers that no judgment should be passed until the Navy had made its investigation.

Several papers, including the Tampa *Tribune*, offered the theory that the explosion had been an accident. The Tampa editor also declared that if it had not been an accident, then he tended to believe that the rebels were the ones to be suspected. His reasoning was plain. He realized that the destruction of the ship might well cause the United States to take stronger steps, and that the rebels were the only ones likely to benefit should those steps include war. [11]

By the time the first excitement over the sinking had subsided, signs began to appear that the editors were now becoming aware that they were fighting a losing battle even among their own readers. On February 3 the Miami *Metropolis* commented on the prevalence of war talk in Key West, declaring that people in that city were predicting war in sixty days. The following day the *Times Union and Citizen* joined in, denouncing talk designed to hasten war. Shortly afterward, the letters-to-the-editor column in the Ocala *Banner* began to reflect the fact that many people in Florida now believed war was both necessary and desirable. Soon the editors themselves began to admit that war was probably going to come, even though they still maintained their attitude of opposition to it.

With that admission, a subtle change took place in the news and editorial columns. While continuing to denounce the jingoes, the editors began casting about to see if there was some way in which the state could benefit. Their speculations about the nature of the war, and the observation of increased activity at Key West gave them both a ray of hope and a new headache. Trainloads of ammunition began to pass through Jacksonville, headed for Key West via Tampa. While rejoicing in the additional railroad business, both the Jacksonville and the Tampa papers saw that the greatest benefit would accrue to Key West. That sparked some hope that the Navy would require another base to keep Key West supplied, and claims for both Miami and Tampa were advanced, with nothing more in mind at the moment than their service as subsidiary supply bases.

The Florida East Coast Railroad, on the other hand, felt capable of handling the supply problem. J. P. Beckwith, Passenger

11. Tampa *Tribune*, February 17, 1898.

Agent for the railroad, wired Secretary of War Alger on March 1, offering the service of his road. The telegram was published in the *Times Union and Citizen*, and read as follows:

> In the event of war should you need quick movement of troops to Key West, the FEC Railway, from Jacksonville to Miami, 367 miles, and the FEC Steamship Company, Miami to Key West, 135 miles, are in a position to give 20 hours time between Jacksonville and Key West and have equipment to handle 3,000 troops daily and can add more if desired. [12]

The wire was typical of the thinking that was to continue to be evident for some time. Thoughts of the war concentrated on the fact that it would be a naval war, and, if the Army entered into it at all, it would be based on Key West. Not even in the business-minded Jacksonville paper did any thought appear that there might be other aspects of the military activity that would be of advantage to Florida. Even after publishing the Beckwith telegram on March 2, the editor accompanied it with an article that was gloomy in the extreme. Saying that activity that might be helpful to the railroads would not compensate for the war, he outlined what he believed would happen. War would shut down the lumber shipping trade; lumber mills and camps would have to close; the tourist trade would halt; and the coastal cities would be subject to attack by the Spanish fleet.

While the editor was obviously worried, and still detested the thought of war, other Floridians saw more than a ray of hope. As early as February 16, the Tampa *Tribune* let its guard down momentarily, and proclaimed :

> If Uncle Sam does decide to give Spain a slap in the face, and does not thump the pumpkins out of her too soon, then times in Tampa will certainly boom. Tom Weir and W. V. Lifsey have already made arrangements to buy all the sweet potatoes in South Florida, with expectations of making a fortune out of the speculation.

Such items tended to encourage some degree of optimism, but not nearly enough to overcome the feeling that war would be catastrophic for the state as a whole. By March 1, the probability of war had become almost a certainty, and several editors began to show concern over a naval war which might bring the Spanish

12. *Times Union and Citizen* (Jacksonville), March 2, 1898.

Navy to Florida. Although in February the editor of the Jacksonville paper had ridiculed the request of the Army Engineers for funds for the fortification of Washington, D. C., he now joined in the swelling chorus of voices rising from all the east coast cities, demanding that fortifications be built at once.

Most of the coastal cities joined the chorus. Only two, Key West and Pensacola, had no worries on this score. Possessing naval bases, their defenses were in better shape than most, and the Army had already begun strengthening the batteries at each harbor. But the truth of the matter was simply that the Army did not possess the guns, the money, or even the men that would be required to defend each city. Nor, for that matter, did it have the time, Brigadier General John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, covered the situation in a letter sent to Representative Stephen Sparkman, referring to an inquiry about plans to defend Tampa. He began by saying simply that the plans of the Army did not at that time include any provision for Tampa. He then mentioned the delays that would be encountered in such a project, touching on the problems of land to be secured, plans to be drawn up, and then the actual construction. He concluded by saying that these were insuperable obstacles barring any defense of the city in the emergency at hand. [13] Similar replies were sent in answer to inquiries from other Florida cities.

All during the month of March the cities bombarded Secretary of War Alger with insistent demands for protection. Mayors, chambers of commerce, congressmen, and many others sent off letters and telegrams. All were met with the same polite answer, but without any promise of action. Tampa was the first city to receive any action on its request. Henry B. Plant, with the extensive Plant System yards and docks at Port Tampa, took a hand. Three days after he personally wrote to Alger on March 22, Alger ordered his Chief of Engineers to prepare plans for Tampa's defense. [14]

The Florida East Coast Railroad sent J. B. Ingraham to Washington to try to get action for Jacksonville, but that city had to wait until April 5, at which time a general plan was announced by the War Department to provide batteries for a number of cities,

13. National Archives and Records Services, *Selected Records Relating to Tampa, Florida, 1896-1898* (Washington, 1934) Items 1, 2, 3. Microfilm.
14. *Ibid.,* Items 4, 5.

including Jacksonville, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Miami. Actual work was not to begin until after the President had sent his message to Congress on April 11, and as a result not one of the cities had any real protection until after the war was over. In the meantime, worry had increased to the extent that several cities, including Miami and a number of smaller communities on the coast, raised and equiped troops of Home Guards for defense, arming them with rifles secured from the state.

The last ten days before the war, the period in which Congress was debating the Presidential message, was a rather mixed-up time for the editors. Still holding on to their opposition to war, their tone gradually mellowed as they noted more and more activity taking place in Key West and in Pensacola. The constant stream of trains loaded with guns and ammunition, the work on the various defense works, and the prospect of at least an extended stay of the Fleet, had cheered Key West tremendously, and some of the excitement seeped into the other parts of Florida. Reports of prosperous and happy merchants, the recruitment of labor for the bases, and the vague sense of excitement may not have reconciled the editor of the *Times Union and Citizen* to the impending war, but they did help to alleviate his pain and ease his mind. He still continued to denounce the war, frequently observing somewhat acidly that enthusiasm for war increased the farther away one went from the scene of action. As far as he was concerned, no one in his right mind desired war.

The editor's dislike for war is not hard to understand, but his overlooking the one development that could and would bring great economic benefit to the state is. As early as the middle of March it had been announced that the War Department planned to concentrate all its available troops into several camps that were to be located in the Southeast. With the knowledge, and the repeated assertion of the fact that Florida was closest to Cuba, why did it not occur to the editor, or to anyone else, that Florida might at least secure one of the camps? As it was, no one took any more note of the announcement than merely to publish it along with other news. It required a news item in the New York *Times* of March 30 to alert the state to the possibility.

On that day, the New York *Times* carried the news that a conference had been held in Washington to determine the location of the camps. No final decision had yet been made, but, according to the *Times,* four cities were being considered. These were

New Orleans, Mobile, Tampa, and Savannah. It appeared that the city to be chosen was to act as a base of supplies and a shipping base, as well as a camp for troops. All of the cities named were ports fairly close to Cuba.

The *Times* item started a chain reaction in Florida. Tampa in particular was galvanized into action to attempt to ensure its being selected, and Jacksonville supported the claim of the West coast city. The campaign waged by Tampa to secure the nomination cannot be detailed here, but it should be noted that the prospect opened up a vista of future possibilities that soon engaged the attention of most of the towns and cities in the state. When Tampa learned, on April 16, that it had won out over the other cities on the list, the entire state rejoiced, with but a few snide remarks on the part of cities that thought their situation was better than Tampa's for the use of the Army.

However, even the rejoicing over the location of the base and the camp did not lessen the regret still being expressed by most of the editors. They would have perferred to see no war at all. The Miami *Metropolis* again denounced the "loud-talking jingoists," declaring that the very ones who demanded war would remain silent when it came time to volunteer. The editor of the *Times Union and Citizen,* just prior to the war, on April 9, finally gave a full explanation for his stand.

Convinced by then that nothing could avert war, and aware of the benefits that might be secured, the editor still had no appetite for the prospect. He firmly believed that the end of the war would see the annexation of Cuba, and it was this that underlay his opposition. He foresaw Cuban competition in the areas of citrus fruit growing, truck farming, and sugar cane. He did not think that the Florida growers could meet that competition, and he also thought that with Cuba within the tariff walls, Florida would lose its attraction for new developments and new settlers interested in any of those lines. He predicted that the cigar manufacturers and cigar workers of Tampa and Key West would return to Cuba. As for the tourist trade, he predicted that within ten years Florida would be only a way station on the road to Cuba.

He then turned to seek what cheer he could in the situation. The building of fortifications, plus the establishment of an Army camp, would rebound to the benefit of Florida business, and the editor believed that Jacksonville would share in the gain to be

made. However, once more his pessimism took over, and he warned that an upturn in business of that nature would be only temporary, and would be offset by losses in the lumber, phosphate, and tourist industries. Other editors, while not speaking as plainly, appeared to agree, and they still maintained a rather somber attitude until April 20.

On April 11, President McKinley sent to Congress a message that, in effect, asked authorization for the use of the armed forces in order to expel Spain. The House of Representatives agreed by an overwhelming vote, and by April 16, the Senate also approved a similar resolution. By April 20, the two houses had ironed out some differences in wording, and the resolution was sent to McKinley. As soon as a copy of the resolution reached Florida, one section caught the eyes of all newsmen, and the war could now be seen in a different light.

That section was what is known as the Teller Amendment. By this, the United States disclaimed any desire to add Cuba to its possessions, and pledged the nation to leave the island's future government up to the Cubans. The sigh of relief that swept the editorial offices was so deep that it might have been heard all over Florida. The Jacksonville editor threw off any restraint and plunged into the task of promoting the war effort, and, incidentally, promoting Florida for a more active part in that war. The editor of the Tampa *Times* came right out and declared that the city was now relieved of all fear for the future, that it could rest assured that the cigar manufacturers would not return to Cuba. With that off his chest, he too turned joyfully to the prospect of reaping profits from the war. As he wrote, troops were already arriving in the city, and merchants were already doing business with the Army.

The material benefits to be secured by Florida would far exceed the expectations of anyone in the state, but great as they were, they did not distract the editors from their self-imposed task of trumpeting the advantages of the state far and wide and of advertising their belief that Florida was destined to be one of the truly great states of the Union. Before the summer was more than half over, before the war was ended, the editors began to warn of the need to prepare for the resumption of normal business, the business of building a greater, more populous, and more prosperous state. The press of Florida had thus early anticipated the Chamber of Commerce in its converted promotional efforts.

BOOK REVIEWS

Los Cubanos en Tampa. By Jose Rivero Muniz. A *separata* of the *Revista Bimestre Cubana,* Vol. LXXIV (1958), (Havana, 1958. 144 pp. Bibliography.)

ALTHOUGH MY SPECIALTY IS Florida history I have failed to do research on the emergence of the Latin population of Tampa. Therefore I read this book with an amateur's point of view. Often this is a better approach in determining if the book is good and readable since the reviewer is barred from becoming pedantic and supercritical.

Mr. Jose Rivero Muniz, a dedicated Cuban intellectual, has already published vital studies about Florida history. He is extremely well versed in Tampa's development. This newest monograph sketches in a simple but scholarly vein the arrival of Cubans in Tampa in the last century. With a facile pen he develops the origins, growth, and to a lesser extent, the problems of the cigar industry in Tampa.

The author gives Tampa's Cubans, especially the various "readers" of the cigar factories, great credit for laying the basis of Cuba's independence. Another interesting point is Professor Rivero Muniz' assertion that "White and Negro Cubans lived in harmony, all being admitted without exception to the various revolutionary clubs and no one ever protested." This is in contrast to today's rigid separation of the races. While living in Tampa I often noticed that Tampa's Latin people of Cuban descent were the most outspoken segregationists. A further interesting affirmation of the author is his sketch of the Catholic church where he says that the Cubans of Tampa "were not interested in religious affairs," and consequently there were few churches for the vast number of Catholics. All these little points add color and new information to the book.

No work is ever perfect and this monograph has some apparent pitfalls. I believe that the author is somewhat too enthusiastic about his subject. He fails to tell about the more unpleasant aspects of life in Tampa. Obviously not everything was as happy and easy going as the impression we receive in reading the book. At some point the reader, impressed by Mr. Rivero Muniz' sketch, feels that of all the places in world history, he ought to have lived

in Tampa as a Cuban cigar worker at the end of the last century! I am also somewhat reluctant to accept the author's belief that the Cuban emigration to Tampa was the single most important factor in the emergence of Tampa as a city.

Finally, Mr. Rivero Muniz is open to the same criticism as most Spanish American historians. They do not know or ignore American writings. In this case Rivero Muniz ought to have consulted American secondary sources such as the *Florida Historical Quarterly*, the *Hispanic American Historical Review*, and others, which do have studies or related items about Tampa and its cigar industry. His bibliography is meager. In his text the author cites the various papers and magazines that the Cubans in Tampa published in Spanish during the last century. These are vital source material for Florida history. From Mr. Rivero Muniz' monograph I fail to detect where these items (I presume rare) are located. Someone should search for and microfilm them to preserve them in a Florida library, possibly connected with a university. With the thought that some reader may know the whereabouts of some of these items they are listed here:

> *El Yara, Revista de Florida, Heraldo de Tampa, La Contienda, El Critico de Ibor City, Liceo Cubano, El Patriota, La Traduccion, La Revista de Cuba Libre, Cuba, El Eco de Cuba La Opinion, La Nueva Republica. El Expedicionario, La Libertad, El Oriente, El Mosquito, El Emigrado Cubano, El Guaimaro, Verdad, Tierra, El Esclavo, La Yaya.*

In sum, this is a good monograph distinguished by a smooth style, written with a sympathetic pen. I believe it to be one of the most welcome additions to Florida history in recent years.

CHARLES W. ARNADE

University of Florida

Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse. By Kate Cumming. Edited by Richard Barksdale Harwell. (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1959. 321 pp. Notes, illustrations, and index. $6.00.)

WHEN THE HORRORS OF WAR pass through the eyes and the mind of a dedicated woman every shred of glamour is stripped away.

Kate Cumming and some other ladies of Mobile, inspired by Florence Nightingale as were many women of the Confederacy, not only volunteered but begged for an opportunity to serve in Confederate army hospitals. Army surgeons were prejudiced against employing women and the general public felt that any woman so employed was outside the pale of respectability. Yet in four years opinions changed. Medically speaking, the Civil War has been called the end of the middle ages and the beginning of modern medicine. If in 1861 women in hospital service were disdained, by 1865 they had become indispensable.

Miss Cumming was approaching thirty when the war started. She had had no nursing experience but she had willing hands and a stalwart character. She yearned to care for the wounded and to comfort the dying. To those who tried to keep women from hospital service for reasons of propriety she replied "that a lady's respectability must be at a low ebb when it can be endangered by going into a hospital." Miss Cumming was always a lady. So secure was she in that knowledge that she wasted no time on status. With a quiet demeanor she went about doing the most menial tasks, thereby setting an example for other women and winning for herself the respect of even the most crusty surgeons and the gratitude of countless soldiers.

In September 1862, the Confederate Congress authorized army hospitals to employ women as matrons and assistant matrons. From this time on Miss Cumming was always employed in a hospital. Yet she was never a nurse in the modern sense. The nurses were all men, often those too incapacitated to return to the front. Miss Cumming had been at work for three years before she actually changed a bandage. What she and the other hospital matrons did was housekeeping- kitchen and laundry supervision, linen repairing, sewing, and bandage rolling. In the wards they comforted the men, wrote letters for them, brought their food and often fed them. On days when the wounded were streaming in the women did a hundred chores, whatever came to hand, often working day and night.

Miss Cumming's first hospital experience was in Corinth after the Battle of Shiloh. Most of her service, however, was in Chattanooga or along the path of the retreat into Georgia. Time and again the hospital drew back, each move a hasty, confused exodus.

There were never enough stoves, cooking utensils, dishes, spoons, rags, soap, medicines, or bed clothes.

Throughout the war Miss Cumming faithfully recorded her experiences in a journal. Though the journal is necessarily grim, with death on every page, the reader, like Miss Cumming, has some pleasant escapes. When Miss Cumming was frustrated by the inevitable bungling of officialdom, or bitter at the extortionists whom she called "Shylocks preying on the very heart-blood of our country," she took to the hills, usually on horseback. The view from Lookout Mountain which she called "entrancing" always restored her balance.

There are intimate glimpses of Miss Cumming decorating the wards with flowers, begging milk for the sick, taking the train to Atlanta to buy calico for a dress, singing in the church choir, clipping a lock of hair from a dying soldier to send his mother. She is always forthright, often witty, sometimes ingenuous, with a passion in her journal for accurate details, for names, places, and dates. Her book has a double appeal: it is thoroughly readable and for that quality alone deserves wide circulation, and it is also a valuable source for students of hospitals at the time of the Civil War. H. H. Cunningham in preparing his *Doctors in Gray* found it particularly useful.

Kate is not only for adults. High school librarians, always in search of books which combine readability with substance, will welcome this personal narrative to their shelves. High school history teachers will find it excellent for class assignment.

Miss Cumming's journal was obscurely published in 1866 and had long been out of print. This reprinting under the editorial pen of Richard Barksdale Harwell makes it available again. It comes at a time when the centennial years of the Civil War are focusing attention on our most tragic episode. In his introduction and in numerous footnotes the editor further identifies some of the hundreds of persons mentioned by Miss Cummings. An index includes these names for ready reference.

THELMA PETERS

University of Miami

The Circus Kings - Our Ringling Family Story. By Henry Ringling North and Alden Hatch. (Garden City, Doubleday and Company, 1960. 383 pp. Illustrations. $4.95.)

THIS STORY OF THE Ringling family comes at a dramatic and suitable moment. It marks the conclusion of an epoch, which began in 1927 when John Ringling brought Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey to Sarasota, and ends this year when John Ringling North is preparing new winter quarters for it in nearby Venice.

The book is lively, intimate, and expertly written, bearing the mark of the professional except in a few pages that may have come directly from Henry North's naturally less experienced hand.

Henry Ringling North, affectionately known to friends and associates as "Buddy," obviously had three purposes in offering the book to the public: to give the inside story of his flamboyant predecessors and colorful contemporaries, to explain the current bitter family row, and to offer an apologia for his brother John, explaining how the latter obtained control of the circus, giving an affectionate analysis of his personality, and answering criticisms of his management.

Those interested in the Ringlings' climb from obscurity to fame, and in the family's contribution toward the Greatest Show on Earth, will find here (after brief reference to European beginnings) the history of progress from "gaslit Baraboo to the atomic glare of today." Anyone looking for gossip will not be disappointed, for here are gossipy sidelights, somewhat scandalous anecdotes, and outspoken opinions, with a detailed (though one-sided) story of what lies behind the 20 million dollar suit brought by the "Forty-Niners" (those who own 49 percent of the stock).

For information on the first 20 years, the authors have checked Henry's memories of what has been told him against his Uncle Alfred's book, *The Life Story of the Ringling Brothers*, published in 1900 and long out of print. End papers carry a genealogical chart, bearing pictures of the seven brothers, their sister Ida (John and Henry North's mother) and their own father and mother.

The rest is based on personal knowledge and experience. Henry was born in Baraboo, and says that his "love affair with the circus began at the age of three." All his life he has been a

part of it. Until recently, his figure was a familiar one at Sarasota Winter Quarters, when the show was in town, and he has traveled with it whenever he could. His mother, his brother John, and he lived much of the time in the old house John Ringling built on Bird Key, which has just disappeared before the bulldozers of developers to whom John North sold the property. In the last days of John Ringling's lifetime - the brother who was "the last on the lot," and whose spectacular career ended in tragedy, illness, and desperate financial difficulties - it was Henry who stayed close by the uncle who had helped bring him up, and who had sent him and his brother to Yale.

The portrait of John Ringling is in general a sympathetic one, though it shows certain less appealing facets.

There is a great wealth of information in this book, most of which came from Henry North's own experience. We read of personal histories, family relationships, John's and Henry's marriages, intricate financial transactions, the Hartford Fire and those who went to prison after it, how John North obtained a controlling share of stock and became a multimillionaire, and an almost blow-by-blow account of how Barnum's Greatest Show on Earth has grown and changed in the hands of the Ringlings and the Norths. There are vivid pictures of great performers, and a good deal about daily life with the circus.

For any layman who has been close to the circus picture, this is a controversial book, and sometimes an annoying one. Especially on how successful it is as a vindication will opinions differ violently.

Certainly not everyone will agree with the pronouncement that John North (who, his brother admits, is a playboy) is a financial genius, an imaginative composer, and a great showman who has not only increased the efficiency of the circus but created a revival of traditional elegance, with his beauties on pink elephants, and other adaptations to the ring of Broadway "girl shows."

How the Norths, despite John Ringling's expressed desire, became his executors and collected "some $960,000" in fees is given in a good deal of detail. Uncle John, it seems, had delusions of persecution toward the end of his life, when he turned against his nearest and dearest. The estimate of 15 millions for the value of the Ringling Museum and its collection is larger by many millions than that of some authorities.

Certainly there'll be disagreement in many quarters with the manner in which the book presents, with only slightly tempered savagery, the family feud, in which the Norths have been opposed especially by Charles Ringling's wife, children and grandchildren. Those in the know may well differ with analyses of other situations and personalities.

There is little mention of the drastic changes within the circus during the mid-1950's, when numerous old-timers were discharged or left, and inexperienced men from alien fields were brought in at high salaries to run the show. High costs, the demands of labor, changing conditions, and alterations in transportation methods are blamed for the retiring of the big top. The equivocal discussion of the admittedly efficient seat-wagons gives the erroneous impression that they were designed by Arthur Concello.

No one who knows him will disagree with the picture of buddy North, himself, that emerges: of a straightforward, kind, friendly and imaginative man, who loves the circus as perhaps few persons have ever done.

The Circus Kings is by far the most complete and authoritative account of the Ringling family that has ever been written. Moreover, it is a colorful document that throws a great deal of light on one aspect of Florida's history during the past half century.

An index would be helpful.

MARIAN MURRAY

Sarasota

The Papers of John C. Calhoun. Volume I. 1801-1817. Edited by Robert L. Meriwether. (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press for the South Caroliniana Society, 1959. 499. XLII pp.)

The publication of this long-awaited initial volume of the Calhoun papers serves as a monument to the scholarship and research of Professor Meriwether who died when the present volume was in galley proof. His two assistants, E. L. Inabinett and Mrs. C. M. Jacobs, faithfully attended to subsequent editorial chores since his passing.

The project for publishing the Calhoun papers was suggested in 1951 by Dr. Philip M. Hamer, Executive Director of the National Historical Publications Committee, who delegated the location and filming of relevant papers in the National Archives and the Library of Congress to members of his staff.

Archivists, librarians, and historians in South Carolina met with Dr. Hamer in 1952 to form the Publication Committee of the Papers of John C. Calhoun. The present volume, then, is the result of a vast and widespread cooperative effort to publish all the important papers of this great southern statesman. Working closely with the South Carolina leaders in the project were Dr. Julian P. Boyd, editor of the Jefferson Papers, and Dr. Hamer of National Historical Publications Committee.

This initial volume contains introductory materials which are both necessary and illuminating to professional and lay readers alike. Included are an explanation of editorial procedure, a short list of abbreviated titles and local symbols, and a chronology of Calhoun. Following the 159 documents that comprise this volume appears a calendar of Calhoun papers not included in the period but these are dated, described, and located. There is also a genealogical table of the Calhoun family and an admirable 30-page index. Such is the physical construction of this initial volume of a set currently projected for fifteen volumes.

At the age of twenty, Calhoun began a two-year residence at Yale, graduating in 1804. He then entered Litchfield Law School to study under Judge Topping Reeve. He returned to Abbeville in 1806 where he spent another year in the law offices of Judge Henry W. DeSaussere, Timothy Ford, and George Bowie. After this state-required year of reading law before application for license, Calhoun was admitted to the bar in December, 1807. The following year Calhoun entered the legislature of South Carolina for a two-year term. Only two documents in the present volume date to this initial entry into public service and neither of these is important.

In a letter to Mrs. Floride Calhoun, his cousin and future mother-in-law, he told her that he was not planning for a long career in law. Calhoun followed his determination to desert legal practice. In 1808, he was elected to the legislature of South Carolina for a two year term. In 1810, he was elected to the national House of Representatives where he stayed until December,

1817 when he became the Secretary of War. In papers relating to this appointment, Dr. Meriwether does carry President Monroe's letter to Calhoun offering him the cabinet position. To the present reviewer's opinion, this is an error in judgment since a letter of appointment from a President of the United States to any person in public life outranks that person's acceptance of a proffered position.

The documentary record of Calhoun's six years in the House of Representatives constitutes the bulk of the documents in this first volume. Seventy-four documents attest to the prodigious record of activity for these six years in the House. These papers are roughly divided into 28 speeches, 16 "remarks," nine "comments," six debates, one report, one resolution and eight miscellaneous contributions. In addition, the calendar lists nearly fifty additional records of Congressional activity which were excluded from the present volume.

Personal and miscellaneous letters in this volume, except for those to Mrs. Floride Calhoun, are inconsequential. The letters of his days at Yale and at Litchfield are so few as to be of no importance.

Calhoun entered the House of Representatives on November 6, 1811. Six days later he was appointed to second place on the Foreign Affairs Committee and in April, 1812, became Chairman. Holding this position until 1815, he was the administration's spokesman during the whole period of the War of 1812. He defended the administration and the conflict against the "unnecessary war" arguments hurled by John Randolph and later refuted the attacks of Webster and the mercantile critics of New York and New England that the war was being mismanaged and represented a deliberate destruction of mercantile interests.

As a result of his projection into the foreground of policies and prosecution of the War of 1812, with no time being given for training, Calhoun developed into a formidible debater almost instantaneously. He was never a "freshman" Congressman. Dr. Meriwether attributes Calhoun's authorship to a committee report of November 29, 1811, because of parallel passages in it and in his first speech to the House on December 5. If this is proper deduction, then Calhoun had already completed and presented two state papers in his first month in Congress.

Most of Calhoun's speeches appeared in reported abstract form from the *National Intelligencer,* then a tri-weekly paper. Here parts of the speech would be reported as what "Mr. C." said. However, striking passages appeared in direct quotation in the first person. His second speech in Congress on the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, delivered on December 12, 1811, is presented in full first person text and reveals a remarkable oratorical power even at this early date.

As a speaker and debater, Calhoun shows a remarkable organization of his ideas and a polished delivery of them. His speeches were tightly organized as well prepared legal briefs. However this close, compact organization did not suffocate and he had the power to relax his hearers, as well as present day readers of the *Papers,* with unexpected relief by ridiculing his critics with cleverly phrased literary descriptions of their opposing views. Even these diffusions were well knit and afforded little chance for comeback. An example of this is found in his speech, "On the Dangers of Factious Opposition," delivered on January 15, 1814, when he defended the administration's request for the conversion of the twelve month enlistments into five year service.

While Calhoun's role during the war period is remarkable for his staunch defense of all measures of the war's prosecution, his activities in the period from 1815 to 1817 show him to be a leader in promoting measures for internal improvements. From his War Hawk days, he carried a deep mistrust for Great Britain and her control of the seas. In different references to bills which sought to restore peaceful and neutral commerce at the end of the war with Great Britain and the Napoleonic wars, he warned against the sinister habits and tricks of England in her struggle for worldwide trade. In his speech on the Revenue Bill, delivered on January 31, 1816, he predicted further wars with an unrepentant England.

Calhoun's postwar record on internal improvements is stupendous. He was a leader in the founding of the Second Bank of the United States. He promoted the alteration of the armed forces for peacetime and the establishment of military colleges. He was a leader in the provisions for specie in the new national bank. He supported the bill for the annual payment of salary for Congressmen and survived the voters' wrath which swept out of office three-fourths of the members for having voted for it. The

capstone of his Congressional career was his promoting a bill which would use the bonus of the bank chartering bill to secure internal improvements. He secured the support of the middle states to get his bill passed only to have President Monroe veto it. This opposition of the two men was based on Constitutional difference rather than animosity. Monroe, in October, 1817, asked Calhoun to become his Secretary of War,

As an almost incongruous part of the documents in this first volume is a group of 33 letters from Calhoun to his cousin, Mrs. Floride Calhoun, the mother of his wife, the younger Floride, and three others to Floride, betrothed and wife. These letters give us the clearest personal view of the young Calhoun. While he was in the North at college and studying law, Mrs. Floride Calhoun and her three children summered there also. The young Floride was only twelve or thirteen when Calhoun began writing letters to her mother. Most of these letters make no reference to the young Floride, whom Calhoun even at this early age had decided to marry. This correspondence finally led to Calhoun, after thirty letters, asking for the hand of Floride,

Late in his last session in the House of Representatives, Thomas P. Grosvenor of New York, an old opponent of Calhoun in many a debate, paid a spontaneous and unsolicited tribute to John C. Calhoun for his services in the House. During the debates on the Compensation Bill of 1817, Mr. Grosvenor correctly predicted for Calhoun that he would "fulfil the high destiny for which it is manifest he was born."

NATHAN D. SHAPPEE

University of Miami

NEWS AND NOTES

If You Must Dig. . . . . .

Excavation of historic sites by amateurs results in wanton waste. If you must dig, get in touch with the department of archaeology at the nearest university or with the Florida State Museum in Gainesville. Never act without the guidance of skilled technicians.

The Florida Anthropological Society, sensing the growing need to direct untrained enthusiasts and laymen in general, recently passed the following resolution prepared by Charles Fairbanks of Florida State University: "The Florida Anthropological Society considers that archeological excavations require the same specific scientific procedures as other scientific disciplines. This is particularly true because archeological excavation, in its very nature, destroys the irreplaceable archeologic or historic heritage of Florida. Thus adequate excavation techniques must be employed; narrative, photographic and scaled drawing records must be maintained; and systematic storage, labeling and protection of the material recovered must be provided if the excavation is to meet the minimum requirements of scientific work."

Local Historical Societies

The extensive research and publications programs of the *St. Augustine Historical Society* may not be within the reach of many of the societies throughout the state but its example, in one respect especially, could well be emulated by all interested in preserving the history of our state. An illustration will suffice. From "Escribano," the Society's newsletter: "Current road improvement on Anastasia Island threatened the existence of two of the Island's oldest landmarks, *i.e.,* a double coquina fireplace and chimney, and an old coquina well. The early history of these ruins is unknown, but they are believed to be the remains of a building occupied by the foreman of work crews employed in quarrying coquina blocks for construction of the Castillo. The attention of our Board of Directors was called to the plight of these relics by Mr. Milton E. Bacon, a member of the Board, and as a result of

the joint efforts of the St. Johns County Historical Commission, the Restoration Commission, and our Society, the St. Johns County Commissioners are to be congratulated for having taken steps to reroute the road in order to protect these ancient landmarks."

After some 125 years, portraits of the Seminole will again be painted. This summer the *Martin County Historical Society* made arrangements with the Seminole Council at Dania for Mr. and Mrs. James Hutchinson of Stuart to visit the reservations at Brighton, Dania and Big Cypress where they will delineate Indian life. The project has been endorsed by Dr. William Sturdevant of the Smithsonian Institute, who stated "Seminole life is undergoing a very rapid change at the present, thus illustrations made from life will document an important period in Seminole history." Governor LeRoy Collins commended the artists and stated that "such a study will contribute greatly to the history of Florida."

The museum of the *St. Petersburg Historical Society* celebrated its 40th anniversary on July 20. Over ten thousand visitors enjoyed the wide variety of exhibits housed in the museum last year.

The Polk County Historical Society has purchased microfilms of Louisiana and Texas census records. These will be added to records from other states already in the Society's library at the courthouse in Bartow. The Society's library is open to all and genealogists will find it especially helpful.

The U. S. Coast Guard, through Admiral William W. Kenner, commander of the 7th Coast Guard District, has presented a surplus Lyle gun to the *Historical Association of Southern Florida.* The gun is a smooth bore, cast bronze, muzzle loading can-

non, 24 inches long with a 2 1/2 inch bore, mounted on a carriage of oak, reinforced with iron bands, weighing 161 pounds over all.

Strangely enough the gun was invented and patented in 1877 by an Army man, Lt. David A. Lyle of the Ordnance Department. Lt. Lyle undertook the development of the gun at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury who sought to improve the life-saving equipment of the Revenue Marines, then a part of the Treasury Department. Research was done at the National Armory, Springfield, Massachusetts and is described in the inventor's book on life-saving ordnance. The gun was fired from the beach by means of a lanyard and firing lock using a .32 blank cartridge to ignite a black powder charge. When fired it threw a 20 3/4 pound shot attached to a line of a maximum length of 900 feet. The gun's function was to cast a line to the deck of a distressed ship off shore for the purpose of rigging a breeches buoy or safety car tackle to transport the crew to the beach.

Both the Revenue Marine Service and the guns were transferred to the Coast Guard in 1915. A humorous sidelight from Coast Guard history relates that some shipwrecked seamen misunderstood the purpose of the shot line and simply wrapped it around their waists and jumped into the sea expecting to be hauled to safety! At one time the gun was required aboard all merchant ships but soon proved too clumsy for effective use on deck. The Society will hold the gun for later display in its museum, now in the planning stage.

The following officers were elected to serve during the 1960-61 year: Wayne E. Withers, president; Charlton W. Tebeau, first vice president and editor of *Tequesta;* August Burghard, second vice president; Justin P. Havee, executive secretary; Miss Virginia Wilson, recording and corresponding secretary; Robert M. McKey, treasurer, and Mrs. Andrew J. Moulds, librarian.

District vice presidents are: Karl A. Bickel, Sarasota; Louis Capron, West Palm Beach; James W. Covington, Tampa; David M. Fee, Fort Pierce; Mrs. James T. Hancock, Okeechobee; Norman A. Herren, Everglades; Charles T. Thrift, Jr., Lakeland and Mrs. Louise V. White, Key West.

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