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SOVIET POLICY TOWARD DISARMAMENT

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PREFACE

The question of disarmament, which was so long a matter of major discussion in the League of Nations, was brought before the United Nations by the proposal made by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, in the General Assembly on October 29, 1946. The proposal was supported by the chief delegate of the United States, Mr. Warren R. Austin, on the following day and was finally adopted by the General Assembly on December 14. The General Assembly recommended "that the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures according to their priority which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction will be generally observed by all participants, and not unilaterally by only some of the participants." The terms of this resolution are of especial interest because of the point of view of the United States on the question of the priority of the control of atomic energy. While Mr. Molotov's proposal accepted "as primary object the prohibition to produce and use atomic energy for military purposes," he extended the scope of action to include the whole field of armament regulation.

As a contribution to the study of this problem, Miss Marina Salvin, research assistant in the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment and instructor in government at Columbia University, has prepared for this issue of *International Conciliation* a survey of Soviet disarmament policy, with the pertinent texts that are available on this subject indicating the continuity of policy of the Soviet Union toward disarmament through its entire history. The documentary collection also includes the United Nations resolution on disarmament and statements made before the Assembly by the Soviet and other delegation heads.

In connection with this study reference may be made to *International Conciliation* Document No. 252 (September, 1929) on the Soviet Security System [1920-1929] by Professor Malbone W. Graham.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

New York, January 21, 1947.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD DISARMAMENT

BY MARINA SALVIN

“... the Soviet delegation wishes to express its satisfaction . . . for the cooperation which we achieved in submitting this (disarmament) resolution to the General Assembly. . . .”

VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV, December 13, 1946

I—THE INTERWAR PERIOD

From its inception, the Soviet Union has been a vocal advocate of disarmament. The early years of foreign intervention, the continued ideological hostility, combined to emphasize the extent of Soviet weakness and developed a bitter, wide-awake and realistic foreign policy. Russian diplomats welcomed any measure which would lessen the danger of a hostile combination or reduce the gap between Soviet manpower and the mechanized armies of others.

At first, living in virtual excommunication, Soviet Russia had no opportunity for positive contribution. No Soviet delegation was invited to the Washington Conference on Disarmament of 1921, although its decisions were to alter the balance of power in an area of peculiar interest to Russia for many years. In his telegram of protest, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Tchitcherin stated that his government could not take into consideration any decisions arrived at without its participation, but laid down the general principle that the Russian Government “would be happy to welcome any disarmament or reduction of the military charges which burden the workers of all countries.”

Its first invitation to a large-scale European conference came the next year. At the instance of Great Britain, the Soviet Union attended the Genoa Conference, which dealt with European postwar problems. In his speech at the opening session Mr. Tchitcherin lost no time in raising the issue of disarmament when he announced it to be the intention of the Russian delegation “to propose the general reduction of armaments and to support every proposition which tends to lighten the burden of militarism, on the condition that this reduction is applied to the armies of all

countries, . . ." Also characteristic of later Soviet proposals was his emphasis on the "absolute prohibition of the most barbarous forms of warfare," such as gas, aerial warfare, and other weapons aimed primarily at the civilian population. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, commenting on the eighteenth of May, 1922, on the report of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa Conference had the following to say: "It [is] peculiarly just and timely that the delegation, when it first took part in the Conference, proposed general disarmament." The Soviet Government had taken the lead but there was none to follow and the motion was not even discussed.

During the early 'twenties the breach between the Soviet Union and the League of Nations made cooperation difficult upon the one major project which the League had then undertaken—the reduction and limitation of armaments. Nevertheless during this period there were some actions by the Soviet Government which should not be lost sight of. In December, 1922, a conference was held at Moscow on Soviet initiative at which Maxim Litvinov proposed to the delegations of Estonia, Finland, and Poland that they "establish a definite plan for the reciprocal reduction of military effectives, a plan based on the reduction of its army to 200,000 men on the condition that there be a reciprocal reduction of the armies of the States on the western boundary of Russia." The draft convention on nonaggression and arbitration which the Soviet submitted was, however, rejected by the other States, which held that "moral disarmament" should precede material disarmament. Also in December, 1922, the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets appealed to all the peoples of the world for peace and pointed to the reduction of Russian military forces from 5,000,000 to 800,000 and from 800,000 to 600,000 as proof of its sincerity. "Not in words, not in resolutions, not in promises, but in fact," the Congress stated, has the Soviet evidenced its "attachment to the cause of peace."

In 1923 the Soviet Government also accepted an invitation, resulting from a League of Nations Council resolution, to send a naval expert to a committee which was to consider the possibility of applying the Washington Treaty to States not originally parties

to it. Mr. Berens, the Russian delegate, attended the sessions of the subcommittee which met at Rome and there supported the reciprocal limitation of tonnage, the neutralization of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the prohibition of the entry into the Baltic of war vessels of nonriparian States, and the demilitarization of the Straits of Korea.¹ However, the Russian delegation refused to accept the League of Nations as the executor of any treaty which might be drafted and demanded that the Council of the League be replaced in the draft by another organization similar to the one established to carry out the Washington Treaty.

It was, however, a League Draft Treaty which called forth a significant statement on the Soviet disarmament position. In September, 1923, the Temporary Mixed Commission, appointed by the Assembly in 1920, submitted to its parent body a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Instructed by the Assembly "to make proposals on general lines for the reduction of national armaments," the Temporary Mixed Commission gradually found its way to a compromise text. In very brief summary, the Commission had concluded that the mere reduction of armaments could not relax those political tensions which were the root causes of armaments races. On the other hand, enjoyment of security should lead to a proportionate reduction of weapons. Therefore, the Draft Treaty proclaimed aggressive war to be a crime and proposed common action against an aggressor nation, to be so declared by the League Council after a brief period of consultation. The parties to the Treaty were later to inform the Council of "the reduction or limitation of armaments which they considered proportionate to the security furnished by the general treaty or by defensive agreements," and also to cooperate in the preparation of any general plan for armament reduction which the Council would propose in the future. The reactions of the governments ranged from the determined optimism of the French to the unqualified disapproval of the British. Ramsay MacDonald wrote

¹ The two preceding paragraphs are based on the summary written by Eugene Korovine, Professor of International Law at the Institute of Soviet Law in Moscow, for *International Conciliation*, entitled "The U.S.S.R. and Disarmament," at pp. 12 and 13. (No. 292, September, 1933).

that the "guarantee offered by the Draft Treaty is so precarious that no responsible Government will feel justified in consenting to any material reduction of its armaments in return."² General criticism centered on the difficulties, admitted by the Temporary Mixed Commission itself, of defining aggression, and on the added powers proposed for the League Council.

In its reply of March 12, 1924,³ the Soviet emphatically declared that an international dictatorship would result from the granting of power to the Council to decide the identity of the aggressor and also questioned the possibility of determining such identity in every instance. To Soviet eyes all attempts to link reduction of arms to the broader problems of security have seemed as so many evasions by imperialist States seeking to mask their true intentions. The Soviet Government, wrote Tchitcherin, "regards the adoption of measures by all Governments for the limitation of armaments as so grave and urgent a task that it is imperative that the question should be raised immediately, independently of other problems which are more difficult to solve." The only article of the Draft Treaty of which the Soviet definitely approved was Article Nine, which dealt with controlled frontier zones. The reply was outstanding, however, for the concrete proposals which it presented.

Striving toward its goal of simple, direct reduction of armaments, the Soviet proposed that States fix their war budgets, simultaneously disband irregular military forces, and set the maximum strengths of their standing armies and navies without further delay. Soviet policy toward international organization and conference was however dominated by a caution somewhat comparable to the attitude of the United States of America at the time. In his letter Tchitcherin rejected any plan for an international organization which would "imply the possibility of measures of constraint being exercised by any international authority whatsoever against a particular State." The parts of a familiar Soviet pattern were beginning to fall into place.

² Reduction of Armaments, Treaty of Mutual Assistance, *Replies from Governments*. A. 35. 1924. IX, p. 16. A League of Nations publication.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 9 to 11.

Naturally shunning the League from which it was excluded, the Russian Government proposed the convening of a general congress which would appoint its own executive organs for the purpose of carrying out, through voluntary agreements, the specific suggestions which the Soviet had already entered.⁴ Calls for a special conference to consider the reduction of armaments began to be heard also from Britain and the United States and in December, 1925, the Soviet Government was invited by the Secretary General of the League of Nations to take part in the Disarmament Conference and in the work of the preparatory commissions.

In spite of rapid Soviet acceptance of the invitation, its actual participation was delayed for almost two years by the ill feeling which existed between the Soviet and Swiss Governments. In 1923 the murder of the chief Soviet delegate to the Lausanne Conference, Vorovsky, had been followed by the acquittal of his assassin, a Russian emigré of Swiss descent. In a crescendo of recrimination, both governments had excluded the nationals of the other from their territories, and it was only in April, 1927, that this dispute was settled.

On taking his place at the fourth session of the preparatory commission in October, Maxim Litvinov was met with frigid correctness and an acidity of criticism which seemed to confirm the hostility the Soviet had come to expect from earlier years. The almost unquestioning acceptance in 1924 of the forged "Zinoviev letter" and the murder in 1927 of the Soviet Minister at Warsaw, Voykov, were only among the more sensational

⁴ It is startling to note the similarities which the "American Plan" bore to some of the Russian suggestions. In 1923 Colonel Requin, one of the leading members of the Temporary Mixed Commission, had asked Dr. James T. Shotwell to redraft his proposals so as to insure a more favorable reception in England and in the United States. The work of the group brought together resulted in a series of proposals known as the "American Plan." Although the "Plan" approved of the joining of disarmament to problems of security, it resembled the Russian proposals in that it supported the demilitarized zones article and very significantly suggested a Permanent Advisory Conference on Disarmament, to be called every three years if not more frequently, independently of the League. The powers of the Conference were limited to (1) advice and (2) the preparation of treaties for the consideration of the High Contracting Parties. Provision was also made for international inspection, under the guidance of the Council of the League.

examples of an enmity which to Soviet eyes was manifested at every point of contact. Faced with an unceasing barrage of criticism, Litvinov soon showed himself to be the equal of all other delegates, both in criticism and in defense. In answer to a bitter attack by Lord Cushendun, Maxim Litvinov said:

I will not ask the honorable delegate for the British Empire by what right he puts such questions to me, whether he recognizes my own right to cross-examine him as to the sincerity of his Government, whether the British Government has sent its delegation here from sheer love of peace or for any other motives, . . . and whether he would stigmatize as sabotage the fact that his and other Governments have so far done nothing to solve a series of questions and discussions arising in the Commission, thus making it impossible for it to . . . get on with its labours. . . .⁵

Into such a setting, playing almost the role of an *enfant terrible*, Litvinov hurled the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament, including "the complete abolition of all armed forces on land, on the sea and in the air." The detailed draft for the convention for immediate, complete and general disarmament,⁶ submitted on February 15, 1928, was dismissed by most delegates as misleadingly simple and superficially practical but it contained certain features which might well repay a glance at this time. The draft detailed the order in which the technical operation of disarmament should be carried out and then made a proposal for the international supervision of this process which is provocative and interesting but which was largely overlooked in the storm aroused by the principle of complete disarmament itself.

Chapter Four of the Draft Treaty provided that, within three months of the coming into force of the Convention, a system of Control Commissions was to be set up on the international, State, and local levels. The Permanent International Commission of Control was to be entrusted with the "supervision and control of the normal and proportional progress of disarmament," the State commissions with the coordination of the work of the local commissions, and the local commissions directly with the "work

⁵ *Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*, Series VI, Minutes of the Fifth Session. IX. Disarmament, 1928. IX. 6, p. 268.

⁶ See Appendix C.

of disarmament within the radius of their activities." The membership provisions were unorthodox. In conformity with its ideology and in an effort to draw on "those classes of the population which are most interested in the speedy completion of disarmament," the Soviet proposed that the Permanent International Commission of Control, for example, be made up of an equal number of representatives of legislative bodies and "of the trade unions and other workmen's organizations of all the States participating in the present Convention." There was no provision for the traditional diplomatic representative and only an indirect reference to the League of Nations in the statement that the Permanent International Commission of Control may be supplemented at a later date by representatives of international associations which aim to establish pacific relations between States "and which have pursued this aim with success."(!) In the State and local commissions the membership was to include, in addition to representatives of trade unions and workmen's organizations, representatives of public associations and "of the peasants and of the rank and file of the armed forces of the State in question." Specifically excluded from membership were professional ex-soldiers and officials of the ministries of war, who might be presumed to love war as a craft and art, and all those whose economic gain was rooted in the production of munitions.

At the apex of this proposed pyramid of control stood the Permanent International Commission of Control, charged with the overall supervision and general coordination of the process of disarmament. The Permanent International Commission of Control also had the responsibility of deciding on the method of destruction of material, on the volume and location of future arms manufacturing, and on the regulation of trade in arms. These were the appointed tasks. Some of the responsibilities were apportioned to the States themselves; they were to give the widest publicity to the progress of disarmament and also to enact legislation translating breaches of the Convention into domestic law. But much more provocative for present-day thought were the powers assigned—or not assigned—to the international commission. Article 55 of the Draft is important enough to quote at length:

All the contracting States . . . shall afford the organs of the Permanent International Commission of Control every facility for the full investigation of all activities of the State, of public associations and of private persons which are connected with the application of disarmament, or which, in the view of the Permanent International Commission of Control or its organs, give rise to doubts concerning the observance of the undertakings solemnly entered into with regard to disarmament and the discontinuance of all military preparations.

This Soviet proposal was not as novel as may seem at first, for it was after all but a more definite application of the principle of international investigation as set forth in the Protocol of Geneva of 1924, which called for international investigation of any incident in which a nation was accused of violating the provisions for the reduction of armaments as provided for in the Protocol. In spite of this precedent, however, and of the work then being done by the Preparatory Commission, there was little serious discussion of this proposal for full-fledged international inspection. Doubt was expressed as to the sincerity of the Soviet representative and many critics felt that the purpose of the proposal was simply to relieve the Soviet Government of a sense of insecurity and to permit it to develop its inherent strength.

The mere fact of international inspection would probably have insured wide publicity to its findings. However, to be really effective, inspection—whether on an international, national or local basis—must be backed by strong measures of enforcement. And, revolutionary as its proposals for the inauguration of international inspection were, the Soviet plan lacked those strong measures of enforcement. Indeed, the measures were anticlimactic, providing only that in the case of a direct breach of the Convention by one of the contracting States, “an extraordinary assembly” of their representatives “shall be summoned as expeditiously as possible by the Permanent International Commission of Control to decide upon the steps to be taken. The steps taken to exercise pressure must not be of a military nature.” Faced with the open opposition of the whole of the rest of the world, the Soviet did not feel it could make any stronger proposals.

This project was rejected by the Preparatory Commission but Litvinov met the charge of insincerity and unreality by present-

ing almost immediately, in March, 1928, a new draft convention conceived in more limited terms. It provided for partial disarmament as the first step to complete disarmament.⁷ Detailed articles provided for the division of States into groups and the reduction of their armaments according to a fixed proportion. The Soviet also proposed the prohibition of all preparation for chemical warfare and for bombing. The provisions for control were very similar to those made earlier. This proposal also met with a rebuff. "Of all the countries represented here," said Litvinov, "the Soviet is the most threatened. It is the object of hostility and ill feeling on the part of the whole bourgeois world. Its enemies are legion, its friends few. . . . Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation has not put forward the insecurity of the U.S.S.R. . . . it has demanded no exception from the general rule; on the contrary, it has itself proposed the most radical forms of disarmament."

In 1932 the General Conference for Disarmament finally opened its long-delayed sessions. There was little to distinguish the tone of its meetings from those of the Preparatory Commission. Again the Soviet made its suggestions and again they were knocked down like a row of kingpins in the General Commission of the Conference. Litvinov however was not daunted by this opposition and, both to emphasize the good faith of the Soviet Government and to keep the issue before the Conference, proposed that it "base its work on the principle of general and complete disarmament." He later also called for the reduction of armaments on the progressive-proportional principle and for partial disarmament according to the outline which had been rejected, as well as for a measure of qualitative disarmament.

Conducted in the full glare of open diplomacy, the Conference at least gave wide publicity to the differences of opinion which split its membership but it could do little to bring them together. To the French, living with the nightmare of a reviving Germany constantly before them, the Soviet proposals seemed ridiculously inadequate and introduced mainly for their embarrassment value.

⁷ See Appendix E.

To them and to many others, disarmament without a corresponding gain in security was out of the question, and it was the "subjective principle" of an "armament consistent with national security" that received their support. To the Soviet, the involved distinctions and counter-distinctions which followed from this approach meant only one thing:

It is essential to remember that with the aid of "problems of disarmament" postwar imperialism has created one of the most subtle . . . instruments for distracting the attention of the masses from the diabolic work of the general staffs and diplomatic cabinets.⁸

After the rejection of a Soviet proposal prohibiting the use of bombing planes and calling for the immediate application by all States of the Protocol of Geneva of 1925, which prohibited chemical and bacteriological warfare, the Soviet delegation felt itself obliged to vote against the final Resolution of the General Commission, considering it in every way defective.

While the Disarmament Conference continued its studies and progressed in the analysis of its problem and in plans for the reduction of armaments, Germany began to prepare for its rearmament by the mobilization of finance and industry and then by practical armaments measures. Under these conditions the policy of Soviet Russia with reference to disarmament followed the same pattern as that of the other powers.

II—AT THE UNITED NATIONS

On October 23, 1946, the United Nations met in General Assembly for the purpose of discussing "any questions or any matters within the scope of the . . . Charter,"⁹ and making recommendations thereon to its full membership or to the Security Council or to both. The agenda contained no item on disarmament until October 29, when Soviet initiative led to the inclusion of an additional paragraph calling for a discussion of the general reduction of all weapons. "The time has come," said Molotov, "to carry

⁸ Korovine, E. A., and Egorov, V. V., *Disarmament* (in Russian), page 41 of the Introduction by B. Stein. (Government Publishing House, Moscow, 1930).

⁹ Article 10 of the Charter of the United Nations.

out a general restriction of armaments (including) atomic energy.”¹⁰ The United States welcomed this proposal but cautioned that disarmament must include effective safeguards by way of inspection.

There was also the question of the “principle of unanimity.” Alone among the great powers the Soviet Union has consistently refused to admit of any modification whatsoever of this principle, although it can also be said that some others gave only lukewarm support to Mr. Baruch’s plans for a partial abolition of the veto power. Certainly a Charter without the veto power and safeguard would not have received approval in the Senate any more than in the Kremlin, but American representatives had since tried to work their way to its limitation through practice. In the Assembly Senator Connally said that “We insist that the question of effective safeguards, . . . must not be blocked and destroyed by any State . . . through the veto. . . .”¹¹ Positive accomplishment seemed unlikely on this background of fundamental divergence.

On November 28 Mr. Molotov touched off the discussions, which were to become highly involved and dramatic and which, at the end, led to an outburst of optimism perhaps greater than justified by the scope of actual achievement. Before an attentive Political and Security Committee, Molotov summarized the ill effects of two world wars and then called on all to work toward fortifying trust and friendly relations between peoples. For the purpose of developing international cooperation in the interest of general peace he proposed a general reduction of armaments, embracing all countries and covering all forms of armaments. The widest hope and speculation were aroused when, in an apparent about-face of the Russian stand in the Atomic Energy Commission, Molotov declared that “international control . . . should provide for . . . special organs of inspection.”¹² This statement was so electrifying in itself that few stopped to consider the fact that the two Commissions—for the reduction of armaments and for the control of atomic energy—proposed by the Russian

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, October 30, 1946.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, December 3, 1946.

¹² See Appendix F.

representative were to be "established within the framework of the Security Council" and that the confines of this framework had not been indicated.

On the very next day, however, high hopes gave way to a sense of bewilderment when Mr. Vishinsky rose to say that the first step in a general disarmament must be the outlawing of the atomic bomb—"a sword of Damocles suspended over our heads by a single thread." He then went on to serve notice that the Soviet would retain its veto right in the operation of the two commissions Molotov had proposed the previous day: "We uphold the unanimity of the great powers and we do not mean to renounce this principle."¹³ On December 2, Senator Connally voiced the bitter disappointment and concern of many delegations when he reminded the world that only a few days before Mr. Molotov had accepted the principle of international control and inspection. Yet how, asked Connally, "can there be international control and inspection if any member of the Security Council can rise in his seat and interpose a veto at any stage of the inspection and control? That is not international; that is individual."¹⁴ The British on their side intensified support of a Canadian-sponsored commission of control to be entirely separated from the Security Council.^{14a}

An authoritative explanation of Molotov's speech of December fourth will probably be a long time in coming. Certainly the pleasing progress of the satellite peace treaties as well as the firmness of British and American attitude would seem to serve as partial explanation of his surprisingly conciliatory tone. The speech began with a blast at those who persist in linking disarmament with the establishment of collective security, a statement much in the same vein that Tchitcherin had followed almost a quarter of a century earlier. This is a fact not to be ignored in itself because of the continuity in Soviet foreign policy to which it bears witness. Then, passing to the substance of the Soviet Government's proposals, Molotov said that the Soviet had hoped for a firm declaration from the Assembly that "the time has come to set about the

¹³ *The New York Times*, November 30, 1946.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, December 3, 1946.

^{14a} See Appendix G.

general reduction of armaments,"¹⁵ an expression on the question of the prohibition of atomic energy and, finally, a recognition of the "necessity of establishing reliable international control over the execution of the decision for a general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. . . ." In order to accomplish these purposes the Soviet was willing to take the American draft as a basis of discussion.

The heart of the speech lay in Molotov's discussion of the scope of the veto power. In a realistic defense with which few would quarrel he stated that "only the attainment of unanimity in the Security Council and, above all, of unanimity between the five permanent members can guarantee the adoption of the decision to reduce armaments." Throughout history the equality of States has been more of a legal dogma than a political reality and the approval of the great powers has been essential for effective action. However, it was not the basic decision of reducing arms that was here at stake but the method by which the decision was to be carried out. Was the day-to-day operation of the disarmament and atomic energy commissions to be subject to the veto power? On November 29 Vishinsky had indicated that it would be. Six days later, however, in an entirely different tone, Molotov chided his listeners for talking so much about the veto in connection with inspection and control; such talk, he said, is "an attempt to evade a straight answer to the question raised regarding the general reduction of armaments." "It should be quite obvious that the question of the well-known principle of unanimity operating in the Security Council has no relation at all to the work of the commissions themselves. Consequently, it is entirely wrong to consider the matter in the light that any government possessing the 'right of veto' will be in a position to hinder the fulfilment of the control and inspections."

This dramatic shift in mid-battle opened the way to compromise. British support of the Canadian draft was withdrawn, while the Soviet accepted the American suggestion that the Security Council, instead of drawing up the rules of operation itself, prepare

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, December 5, 1946. See Appendix I.

draft conventions of those rules for the approval of all States. The sharp relief which followed Molotov's speech obscured somewhat the nature of the Soviet concession, which did not in fact involve any fundamental departure from traditional Soviet policy. An acute fear of hostile combination has always tempered Soviet participation in international organization and at least partially explains the tenacity of the Soviet grip on the veto power. The fact that in their day-to-day operations the commissions will be independent of the veto power gives them a chance of success. However, this detracts little from the protective power of the veto because the basic decisions concerning the range of their powers will be reached in the Security Council. The lasting importance of the Soviet concession will probably result as much from the fact that it was offered and accepted as from its substance. Without Molotov's speech of "clarification" the road to agreement on a disarmament resolution would have been blocked. And the United Nations could not afford such a staggering failure.

On other disarmament issues the Soviet made its share of compromises and suffered one major defeat. In paragraph two of the final Resolution, Molotov accepted a specific statement endorsing international control and inspection which had not been included in the original Russian Draft and also agreed to a clause in paragraph four calling for the creation of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter. On the other hand, he carried his point concerning the withdrawal of troops from territories of Members where they were stationed without consent freely expressed in agreements consistent with the Charter.

The one major defeat was occasioned by the sensitive issue of troop strength. With Greece and China clearly in the back of his mind, Molotov proposed a census of troops stationed in friendly territory; on November 20 he accepted an American suggestion for a census as well of troops stationed in former enemy territories but rejected another calling for information on forces at home. These data, together with information on bases and their garrisons outside of home territory were to be made available within a month after the decision of the Security Council. Parallel to this discussion ran a British proposal for on-the-spot verifica-

tion of reports of troop strength and a Russian desire for immediate information on armaments installations, both of which had been rejected in committee.

On December 10 Andrei Vishinsky, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, dramatically offered to accept international inspection of troop strength "on the spot in the territory of any member"¹⁶ if Great Britain and the United States of America would agree to broaden the resolution to include armaments. While the translation of this unexpected offer was still being read Sir Hartley Shawcross hurriedly scribbled a draft resolution on a sheet of note paper and rushed down with it to the speaker's podium. In this "Gentlemen's Agreement" Sir Hartley succeeded in braiding together the two aspects of Vishinsky's proposals with a provision that the international supervisory agency be free of the veto, a point for which the British had been consistently pressing. After a spirited verbal duel between Molotov and Sir Hartley, which brought cheers from the spectators, Molotov agreed to the resolution "in principle."

However, the hastily-constructed resolution called forth the opposition of the American delegation as it came to recognize that it would require all Members of the United Nations to report their troop strengths by January first and, more important, to allow the inspection of all arms installations, including atomic installations, by January fifteenth. Even an amendment introduced on the following day by Sir Hartley, stating that no inspection of armaments was to take place till an adequate international control and inspection system had been devised, did not satisfy the American delegation, which supported the creation of the international system envisaged in the Baruch Plan.

The deadlock which threatened to block the passage of the Disarmament Resolution itself was averted through the action of Paul-Henri Spaak, who separated the two sections which Sir Hartley had so sensationally united on December 10, and put them to individual vote. The troop census resolution was defeated. A mild substitute resolution was passed which merely asked the

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, December 11, 1946. The Soviet objection to inspection of home troops had been relinquished somewhere along the line.

Security Council to define as soon as possible the type of information¹⁷ that members of the United Nations must submit to the Council to implement the Disarmament Resolution. The Disarmament Resolution itself was adopted by acclamation on December 14.¹⁸

The General Assembly ended its sessions in a spirit of amiability and hope. Although the decision reached on disarmament was couched in the form of a resolution calling on the Security Council to make the specific plans, and was therefore only a preliminary step, the mere fact that unanimity could be reached was significant.

III—CONCLUSION

From the beginning the Soviet Union has been a consistent leader in disarmament plans. Many factors, among them fear, suspicion and a genuine concern for peace and security, have combined to forge this attitude. Consistently Soviet representatives have opposed all attempts to view disarmament only as a correlative of security. "It is sometimes hinted," said Molotov, "that we should first insure collective security and only after that has been done should we set about disarming. It is quite easy to perceive the falseness of this argument."¹⁹ Impatiently the Russians have advocated the immediate reduction of armaments and the prohibition of certain particularly dangerous weapons, such as gas and atomic energy weapons, as well as bacteriological warfare. Soviet emphasis on the simpler, quicker methods of disarmament does not, however, arise from a belief in disarmament as a panacea but, quite on the contrary, from a suspicion that the capitalist-imperialist nations have little interest in disarming and that only the simplest methods have any chance of success: ". . . the history of the discussions concerning disarmament, is the history of the struggle for hegemony within the imperialist camp."²⁰

¹⁷ In a speech before the Assembly on December 13, Secretary Byrnes unexpectedly disclosed the number of American troops stationed abroad.

¹⁸ For text, see Appendix J.

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, December 5, 1946.

²⁰ Korovine, E. A., and Egorov, V. V., *Disarmament* (in Russian), Introduction by B. Stein, page 42. In the third volume of the *History of Diplomacy*,

Fear and suspicion have played their role also. All Soviet leaders share an almost traditional fear of hostile encirclement. Insistently they have asked for information on the armaments of others: in participating in the "Gentlemen's Agreement" Molotov was following in the path outlined by earlier Soviet representatives. Fear and suspicion have also been responsible in part for the hesitant attitude maintained by the Soviet toward any effective international common power. Even Litvinov at Geneva stopped short of an effective international sanction; the attitude of Molotov on the veto power is well known.

The broad outlines of Soviet policy toward disarmament have remained fairly constant, but as the Union evolved to its present strength and influence, the aggressive badgering of early years yielded to a more moderate tone of leadership. At first Soviet representatives seemed to go out of their way to emphasize the revolutionary character of their leadership: in 1927 Lounatcharsky said that "this is the first time that a proposal has been made by a workers' Government on this great question which interests all humanity. This fact will perhaps provide us with new hope."²¹ At the present time the Soviet, now one of the leading members of the United Nations instead of an outsider, seems to see its role in a different light. In taking credit for some of the achievements of the General Assembly, particularly in relation to the Disarmament Resolution, the Soviet discloses that it considers itself the leader not so much of the workers alone as of all progressive forces throughout the world.²² The greater the identification of the Soviet Government, in its own eyes, with the structure of the United Nations, the greater the hope for their future. Without the increasing participation of the Soviet Union little can be done in common effort.

(in Russian), published under the direction of V. P. Potemkin, in 1945, disarmament is characterized as aimed solely at the appeasement of the restless masses. (p. 397).

²¹ Lounatcharsky at the Preparatory Commission, November 30, 1927. Documents, Series V, IX. Disarmament, 1928. IX. 2.

²² *The New York Times*, December 2, 1946, Excerpts from the Russian Press.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A—CONSENT OF GOVERNMENT OF R.S.F.S.R. TO ATTEND CONFERENCE ON REDUCTION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS. NOTE SENT BY PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO GENERAL SECRETARY OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS, MARCH 15TH, 1923¹

. . . The attitude of the Soviet Government to the so-called League of Nations has frequently been expressed in the declarations of its responsible representatives. The Soviet Government's attitude to the so-called League of Nations remains unaltered. It regards it as a coalition of certain States, endeavouring to usurp the power over other States and masking their attempts on the rights and independence of other nations by a false appearance of groundless legality and in the form of the mandates issued by the Council or . . . Assembly of the League of Nations, etc. The Soviet Government maintains its conviction that this pseudo-international body really serves as a mere mask to conceal from the broad masses the aggressive aims of the imperialist policy of certain Great Powers or their vassals. The Soviet Government finds confirmation for its convictions every time that a State assuming the leading role in the League of Nations makes a decision on international questions, touching the interests of the Soviet Republic.

The Soviet Government cannot, however, sacrifice to such conceptions its constant aspirations to afford, by every means at its disposal, all possible assistance in the task of easing the burden of militarism lying upon all peoples, the task of preventing armed conflicts and the consolidation of general peace. Weak as are the hopes of the Soviet Government for the achievement of these aims in the present world situation, it would consider it out of the question to refrain from taking the least possible opportunity for doing something, however little, to assist the matter of the reduction of armaments. The Soviet Government, as the interpreter of the will of the toiling masses, has determined never to let slip a single opportunity for easing in any way the burden of armaments and world conflicts pressing upon the toiling masses the world over. Taking this stand, the Soviet Government endeavoured at the Genoa Conference to bring forward the question of general disarmament. At the Lausanne Conference it defended the principle of closing the Straits for warships, the result of which would have been a diminution of the chances of armed conflicts at sea and the reduction of naval armaments. A special conference was convoked at

¹ From *The Soviet Union and Peace*, pp. 126-128. International Publishers, New York, 1929.

Moscow by the Soviet Government with neighbouring States for the purpose of simultaneous mutual reduction of armaments, and the responsibility for the failure of this conference lies in its entirety at the doors of the other participants.

While in no degree going back upon its expressed attitude to the League of Nations, the Soviet Government is ready to regard the proposed conference as a meeting of representatives of individual States, despite the fact that certain of these States composed a hypothetical League of Nations. The Soviet Government therefore expresses its entire readiness to take part in the aforesaid conference, independent of whether it is called by the Government of the United States of America, the initiators of the first conference on naval disarmament, or by any other group of powers. The Soviet Government, moreover, considers that without the participation of Russia and her allies the before-mentioned conference will be meaningless, since the measures proposed by its initiators can only be carried out with the participation of all States without exception. Therefore, although the agenda of the above-mentioned conference only mentions members of the so-called League of Nations, the Soviet Government considers that the participation of Russia and her allies, like that of all other States at the above-mentioned conference, is desirable and essential.

APPENDIX B—RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF NOVEMBER 30, 1927²

. . . . The Soviet Government has systematically endeavoured to get the question of disarmament definitely and practically formulated. Its endeavours have, however, always encountered determined resistance from other States. The Soviet Government—the only one to show in deeds its will to peace and disarmament—was not admitted to the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, devoted to questions of the curtailment of naval armaments. The proposal of general disarmament made by the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference on April 10th, 1922, was rejected by the Conference. Despite this opposition, the Soviet Government has never relaxed in its determined endeavours with regard to disarmament. In December 1922 a Conference was called in Moscow, by the Soviet Government, of representatives of the border States for the joint discussion of the problem of proportional curtailment of armaments. The Soviet Govern-

² League of Nations, *Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference entrusted with the Preparation for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments*, Series V. Publications of the League of Nations, IX. Disarmament, 1928. IX. 2), Geneva. C.667.M.225.1927.IX. . pp. 9–12.

ment agreed to a considerable diminution of its armaments despite the fact that this would not affect many great Powers always ready, whether under the obligation of treaties or not, to come to the assistance of the other countries represented at the Moscow Conference should these be involved in conflicts with the Soviet State. A definite scheme for the limitation of armaments was proposed at that Conference by the Soviet Government. This scheme was, however, rejected.

Despite the sceptical attitude of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics towards the labours of the League of Nations, it accepted the invitation of December 12th, 1925, to attend the coming Disarmament Conference, and only the Soviet-Swiss conflict, evoked by the assassination of M. Vorovsky, Minister Plenipotentiary, and the subsequent acquittal of the assassins by the Swiss Court, prevented the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics from attending the previous sessions of the Preparatory Commission.

In now sending its delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has authorised it to present a scheme for general and complete disarmament.

II. The delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is authorised by its Government to propose the complete abolition of all land, naval and air forces.

The Government of the Union suggests the following measures for the realisation of this proposal:

(a) The dissolution of all land, sea and air forces and the nonadmittance of their existence in any concealed form whatsoever.

(b) The destruction of all weapons, military supplies, means for chemical warfare and all other forms of armament and means of destruction in the possession of troops or in military or general stores.

(c) The scrapping of all warships and military air vessels.

(d) The discontinuance of calling up citizens for military training either in armies or public bodies.

(e) Legislation for the abolition of military service, either compulsory, voluntary or recruited.

(f) Legislation prohibiting the calling up of trained reserves.

(g) The destruction of fortresses and naval and air bases.

(h) The scrapping of military plants and factories and of war industry equipment in general industrial works.

(i) The discontinuance of assigning funds for military purposes both on State budgets and those of public bodies.

(k) The abolition of military, naval and air ministries, and the dissolu-

tion of general staffs and military administrations, departments and institutions of every kind.

(l) The legislative prohibition of military propaganda and military training of the population and of military education both in State and public bodies.

(m) The legislative prohibition of the patenting of all kinds of armaments and means of destruction with a view to the removal of incentives to the invention of the same.

(n) Legislation making the infringement of any of the above stipulations a grave crime against the State.

(o) The withdrawal or corresponding alteration of all legislative acts, both of national or international scope, infringing the above stipulations.

III. The delegation of the Union is empowered to propose the execution of the above programme of complete disarmament as soon as the Convention in question comes into force, in order that all the necessary measures for the destruction of military stores be completed in a year's time.

The Soviet Government considers that the above scheme for the execution of complete disarmament is the simplest and the most conducive to peace.

In the case, however, of capitalist States rejecting immediate actual abolition of standing armies, the Soviet Government, in its desire to facilitate the achievement of a practical agreement on complete disarmament, is prepared to make a proposal for complete disarmament to be carried out simultaneously by all contracting States, by gradual stages, during a period of four years, the first stage to be accomplished in the course of the coming year.

National funds, freed from war expenditure, to be employed by each State at its own discretion, but exclusively for productive and cultural purposes.

IV. Whilst insisting upon the views just stated, the delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is nevertheless ready to participate in any and every discussion of the question of the limitation of armaments whenever practical measures really leading to disarmament are proposed.

V. The delegation declares that the Government of the Union fully subscribes to the Convention on the prohibition of the application to military purposes of chemical and bacteriological substances and processes, expresses its readiness to sign the Convention immediately while insisting on an early date being fixed for its ratification by all States, and considers that, in order to ensure the practicability of the Convention, it would be necessary to raise the question of the establishment of workers' control

over those chemical industries susceptible of being rapidly converted to war purposes in States having a highly developed chemical industry.

We have laid before you our programme of disarmament, but realise that its radical and exhaustive nature may make it appear at the first glance complex, difficult of realisation and perhaps even Utopian. This, however, is merely because the problem of complete disarmament has always been treated as a forbidden subject and never yet thoroughly dealt with. We understand perfectly that the realisation of this programme may not be compatible with certain political interests, chiefly those of the great Powers, the interests of war industries or those of the numerous groups of speculators, but I contend that in itself the problem of complete disarmament presents no difficulties and is capable of rapid and easy solution.

It is in any case a great deal simpler, and would require far less time to work out in detail, than the schemes which have so far been used as a basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission. I confess that, on acquainting myself with the findings of this Commission, I was aghast at the complexity, confusion and multiplicity of the questions with which that of disarmament had become involved. The Commission has, in effect, devoted several sessions to the discussion of the enumeration and headings of the clauses to make up an international Convention for limitation of armaments. Unanimity has only been achieved with regard to certain trivial and common points. The overwhelming majority of the clauses—or rather their headings—evoked dissensions which have so far failed to be reconciled either by the Commission itself or by private negotiations between the Governments concerned. If and when, however, these dissensions have been reconciled, the Commission will still only be at the threshold of its real difficulties. The Commission will have to agree to the satisfaction of all as to what constitutes security for each country and, individually, the extent and importance of its international obligations, its geographical peculiarities and other special features, before the level of its effectives, technical armaments, military and air vessels, etc., can be established.

The mere enumeration of these questions will suffice to bring before us the utter hopelessness—more, the Utopianism—of expecting this question to be solved within any imaginable period.

The latest manifestations of international life, various international treaties recently concluded, lead not to the unification but rather to the still further division of the European and non-European countries into political groupings, and to the intensification of their mutual antagonisms, and do not afford the slightest grounds for optimism as to the outcome of the questions before the Preparatory Commission.

To crown all, attempts are still being made to delay for a long time to come the work of the Preparatory Commission pending the solution of a series of political questions not less confused and complex than those I have already mentioned.

One thing is certain: if the present basis of the Preparatory Commission's work is not changed, it is—even if not exploded by the abundance and weight of its own internal differences—condemned to years, if not decades, of work either completely sterile or productive of quite intangible results.

We live in a time in which the outbreak of fresh wars is no mere theoretical danger. This is not merely our opinion; many responsible statesmen in capitalist countries have expressed the same fears quite recently. The imminence of war is making itself felt everywhere. If it is to be averted, something will have to be done. In our opinion, the best guarantee of security for all peoples and all countries is immediate complete disarmament. This problem should be faced immediately and solved in the shortest possible time. Those countries postponing the solution of this problem are taking upon themselves an enormous responsibility. I therefore beg to move on behalf of the Soviet delegation the following resolution:

Whereas the existence of armaments and the tendency they show to growth by their very nature inevitably lead to armed conflicts between nations, diverting the workers and peasants from peaceful productive labour and bringing in its train countless disasters;

Whereas armed force is a weapon in the hands of great Powers for the oppression of peoples in small and colonial countries; and

Whereas the complete abolition of armaments is at present the only real means of guaranteeing security and affording a guarantee against the outbreak of war;

The Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference resolves:

(1) To proceed immediately to the working out in detail of a draft Convention for complete and general disarmament on the principles proposed by the Delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics;

(2) To propose the convocation, not later than March 1928, of a Disarmament Conference for the discussion and confirmation of the proposals provided for in paragraph (1).

We are fully aware that certain circles will endeavour to stigmatise our programme and resolution as propaganda. We are quite ready to accept this challenge and declare that we are making propaganda for peace and shall continue to do so. If the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference is not a suitable place in which to make peace propaganda, then apparently we are here under a misunderstanding. The Soviet

Government pursues, and has always pursued, a resolute peace policy which it has always shown, and is still showing, in deeds as well as in words. Only a few days ago, when the clouds of war seemed to be darkening the horizon on the east of Europe more ominously than ever, everything in its power was done by the Soviet Government to avert a calamity. It brought all possible arguments to bear upon the Lithuanian Government to persuade it immediately to declare the cessation of the state of war between Lithuania and Poland. The Soviet Government was also instrumental in persuading Lithuania's other two neighbours to offer the same advice, and steps were also taken by it in Warsaw tending towards the maintenance of peace. This peace policy of my Government gives us a special right to declare that we shall not let a single opportunity slip for making the most intensive propaganda for peace and disarmament.

APPENDIX C—DRAFT DISARMAMENT CONVENTION SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS [FEBRUARY 15, 1928]³

DRAFT CONVENTION FOR IMMEDIATE, COMPLETE AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT

Being animated by the firm desire to safeguard general peace;

Considering that the existence and increase of armed forces constitute an immense danger, and must inevitably lead to further armed conflicts;

Considering that attempts to go too deeply into the question and to examine in detail every factor relating to the existence and increase of armaments have ended in failure or have retarded the solution of disarmament questions:

The Contracting States

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Solemnly acknowledge that the only true method which can contribute to the safeguarding of peace is the general and complete abolition of all

³ From League of Nations. *Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference entrusted with the Preparation for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments*, Series V, Minutes of the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference and of the First Session of the Committee on Arbitration and Security' (Publications of the League of Nations, IX. Disarmament, 1928.IX.2), Geneva, January 16th, 1928 C.667.M.225. 1927 IX, (C.P.D.1 (d).), pp. 324-330, 334-339.

armed forces, and conclude the present Convention, having for this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

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Who, having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed that complete disarmament shall be undertaken, as from the date of entry into force of the present Convention, and shall be terminated within a period of four years so as to restrict the possibility of armed conflicts from the first year onwards.

CHAPTER I

EFFECTIVES OF THE ARMED FORCES

Article 1. All military units and formations, as well as all the effectives of the land, naval and air forces, whether of the home country or of its oversea possessions, shall be disbanded within four years as from the entry into force of the present Convention, and shall not in future be allowed in any form, whether open or secret.

The disbandment of the effectives shall be carried out in four successive stages:

(a) In the first year, as from the entry into force of the present Convention, one half of the effectives in service, whether officials, officers, or other ranks, shall be disbanded, and

(b) In the following years the remaining effectives in equal parts.

Remark.—By effectives of the armed forces is meant effectives serving with the colours in the active army, as well as the trained military reserves in each of the Contracting States entered on the muster-rolls of the various military and public organisations.

Article 2. The Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation, as well as general staffs, all military schools and all kinds of military commands, institutions and establishments shall be abolished, except as provided for in Article 5 of the present Convention, within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, and may not be reconstituted.

Article 3. Within a period of one year as from the entry into force of the present Convention, all returns and documents relating to military trained reserves, and kept by Government institutions and public organisations, shall be destroyed.

Within the same period, all laws concerning the organisation of recruitment shall be repealed.

Article 4. Within one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, all documents relating to the mobilisation of armed forces shall be destroyed; all mobilisation measures shall be prohibited in future.

Article 5. For four years as from the entry into force of the present Convention, it shall be permissible, in accordance with a special convention, to maintain staffs, commands, institutions and establishments to the extent strictly necessary for the application of the technical measures required by the disbandment of the armed forces, and by the performance of the necessary administrative and economic work relating to disarmament.

Article 6. All the files concerning the disbandment of the armed forces shall be forwarded to the civilian Ministries within four years as from the entry into force of the present Convention.

All the files and archives of the Ministries of War, Marine and Aviation, of the Army units and of the staffs, commands, institutions and establishments, shall be destroyed within the same period.

Article 7. The personnel of the disbanded armed forces shall be provided with employment in other spheres of social and economic work.

Until they are provided with employment, they may be provisionally maintained at the expense of the general State budget.

When the aforesaid persons are awarded pensions based on the number of years of service, the years spent in military service shall be reckoned as spent in the service of the State.

Article 8. The credits assigned for the upkeep of the armed forces, either in the State budget or out of the funds of the various associations, must be confined to the sums strictly necessary for the upkeep of the armed forces remaining in actual military service in accordance with a special convention.

Within four years, the budget for the upkeep of the armed forces must be abolished, and may not figure under any heading in the State budget.

Article 9. Within a period of one year from the entry into force of the present Convention, all laws concerning military service, whether compulsory, voluntary or by recruiting, shall be abrogated.

The conditions of service in the armed forces until the completion of total disarmament shall be laid down in special regulations by each of the contracting States.

Article 10. Immediately after the entry into force of the present Convention the following shall be prohibited by law:

1. Special military publications:
 - (a) Scientific research and theoretical treatises;

- (b) Works on military history;
- (c) Manuals of military training;
- (d) Military regulations;
- (e) Manuals of all kinds for the study of the technical implements of war.

2. The military training of the population, including the calling up of trained reserves, and military propaganda among the population.

3. The military training of young people, either by the State or by public associations.

CHAPTER II

MATERIAL

Part 1.—Land Armaments

Article 11. Within one year of the entry into force of the present Convention, the reserves of arms, ammunition and other instruments of armament and destruction enumerated below and at the disposal of the Ministry of War shall be destroyed. Tanks, poisonous war materials and the appliances by which these materials are diffused (gas projectors, pulverisers, balloons and other apparatus), whether in service or in reserve, shall first be destroyed.

The arms strictly necessary for the effectives remaining with the colours may be retained by the armed forces of each of the contracting States. The proportion between the armed forces of each State and the quantity of technical implements of war . . . shall be determined in a special convention.

In the second, third and fourth years as from the entry into force of the present Convention, the destruction of all the types of armament shall be carried out by consecutive stages in proportion to the limitation of personnel.

After the completion of disarmament in each of the contracting States, the minimum quantity of arms and ammunition required for all kinds of police forces and for personal use may be retained in accordance with Articles 39, 43 and 44.

Part 2.—Naval Armaments

Article 17. Within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention, all capital ships, cruisers, aircraft-carriers and submarines shall be withdrawn from the naval establishments.

Article 18. All other vessels and floating material constructed for the special purpose of war . . . together with naval aircraft, shall be withdrawn from the naval establishments within four years, withdrawal proceeding in equal parts each year, in conformity with a special convention.

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Part 3.—Air Armaments

Article 23. During the first year of the coming into force of the present Convention, heavy bombing aircraft, torpedo-carriers and dirigibles shall be removed from the air force lists.

Article 24. All other military aircraft not mentioned in Article 23 above and which, by reason of their specifically military properties, cannot be used for social or economic purposes shall be destroyed within four years, destruction proceeding in equal parts each year, in conformity with special technical arrangements.

Article 25. Within one year of the coming into force of the present Convention, all stocks of aircraft bombs and other weapons intended to be discharged from aircraft shall be destroyed.

Article 26. The whole of the armament of military aircraft which are to be preserved for social or economic uses must be removed and destroyed at the end of three months from the time of their withdrawal from the air force effectives. Such aircraft shall then be handed over to the respective civil organisations.

Article 27. All the aircraft belonging to the active air force must be disarmed, as well as all aircraft which are in reserve or under construction on orders given in the home country or abroad.

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Part 4.—Fortifications and Bases

Article 29. Within three years of the entry into force of the present Convention, the whole of the armament of fortresses and other fortified works and of naval and air force bases shall be rendered useless in conformity with a list contained in a special convention.

During the following year, the armament shall be removed and destroyed and the fortifications dismantled and demolished; it shall in future be forbidden to construct new fortified works of any kind.

Part 5.—Armament Industries

Article 30. With the entry into force of the present Convention, all State and private undertakings shall cease to produce any of the armaments enumerated in the list annexed to Article 11 or any of those mentioned in Article 19, 23, 24 and 25; preparations shall be made to convert these undertakings for purposes of peaceful manufacture.

Until these undertakings are re-equipped for peaceful purposes or until the workers in armament undertakings have found employment in other enterprises, these workers shall be supported by the State, which shall provide for their requirements out of the defence budget.

Article 31. During the first year following the entry into force of the present Convention, the plans, testing apparatus and models intended for armament industries shall be destroyed.

Article 32. Within two years of the coming into force of the present Convention, factories and enterprises engaged in the manufacture of war material and also arsenals shall cease to operate, except in the cases provided in Article 34 of the present Convention.

In State or private undertakings, all frames, machines, tools, and appliances intended exclusively for the manufacture of the war material enumerated in the Annex to Article 11 of the present Convention and in Articles 19, 23, 24 and 25 shall be destroyed.

Article 33. It shall be forbidden in future to restore any factories, enterprises and arsenals engaged in the manufacture of war material or to prepare any State or private productive undertakings for the manufacture of the war material enumerated in Articles 11, 19, 23, 24 and 25.

Article 34. In order to produce the minimum of arms and ammunition necessary for the police forces of all kinds provided for in Chapter III of the present Convention, and for the personal use of citizens for the purposes referred to in Article 15 of the present Convention, each contracting State shall be authorised to retain the necessary undertakings, of which the number, productive capacity and method of production, as well as the arrangements concerning the trade in arms, shall be laid down in a special convention.

Article 35. The production of the explosives required for the building and mining industries shall be regulated by the several contracting States in strict conformity with economic requirements, and shall be subject to control in virtue of a special convention.

Article 36. It shall be forbidden by law to patent any form of armament or any means of destruction.

CHAPTER III

ORGANISATION OF PROTECTION

Part 1.—Protection on Land

Article 37. The effectives of the Customs guards, local police and forest and other guards, in each of the contracting States, and the amount of their armament, shall not for a period of four years after the conclusion of the present Convention exceed the number and amount as at January 1st, 1928; these effectives shall not be organised in such a way that they can be utilised for war.

Article 38. On the expiry of the period of four years laid down in the present Convention for effecting complete and general disarmament, the maintenance of a protective and police service, the personnel of which shall be engaged by voluntary contracts of service, shall be authorised in the territory of each of the contracting States, for the purpose of Customs and revenue police supervision, internal police and the protection of State and private property; the amount of weapons and simple armament strictly necessary may also be retained.

The effectiveness of these categories of services shall be laid down in a special convention and shall be proportionate to the population of the several contracting States, the length of the means of communication, the existence of objects which are deemed by the State to require protection, the development of forestry, etc.

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Part 2.—Protection at Sea

Article 40. On the expiry of the period of four years laid down in the present Convention for effecting complete and general disarmament, a maritime police service shall be organised which shall exercise its functions in conformity with a special convention and which is intended for the necessary protection of the natural products of the sea and of submarine cables, the suppression of piracy and of the slave trade, and other objects which may in future form the subject of international protection on the high seas.

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CHAPTER IV

CONTROL

Article 45. Within three months of the coming into force of the present Convention, there shall be organised a Permanent International Commis-

sion of Control, Commissions of Control in each of the contracting States, and local Commissions of Control.

Article 46. The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be entrusted with:

(a) The Supervision and control of the normal and proportional progress of disarmament, with the general coordination of measures for carrying out the provisions of the present Convention, and with the notification to each State of offences against its stipulations;

(b) The preparation of an agreement for bringing pressure by non-military measures upon any States which disturb the normal progress of disarmament as laid down by the present Convention and conventions supplementary thereto;

(c) The selection of localities, the procedure and the technical conditions for the destruction of material, and the preparation of all the necessary supplementary technical agreements;

(d) The selection of centres for the manufacture of arms, the volume of such manufacture and the regulation of the trade in arms;

(e) The publication of information concerning progress in the work of disarmament.

Article 47. The Permanent International Commission of Control shall consist of an equal number of representatives of the legislative bodies and of the trade unions and other workmen's organisations of all the States participating in the present Convention.

Later, the Permanent International Commission of Control may be supplemented by representatives of international associations whose aim it is to establish pacific relations between States and which have pursued this aim with success, provided that these organisations express a wish to participate in the work of the Permanent International Commission of Control.

The seat of the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be at.....

Article 48. The Permanent International Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Permanent International Committee of Experts, consisting of an equal number of military, naval, air and other experts belonging to all the States acceding to the present Convention.

Article 49. The Permanent International Committee of Experts shall act under the orders of the Permanent International Commission of Control; it shall give opinions and shall deal with all especially technical questions referring to the execution of the present Convention.

Article 50. The Commission of Control in each of the States shall consist of representatives of the Permanent International Commission of

Control appointed by the Commission, representatives of public associations, trade unions and workmen's organisations, and of representatives of the peasants and of the rank and file of the armed forces of the State in question.

The appointment of members of the Commission of Control shall be confirmed by the Permanent International Commission of Control.

The seat of the Commission of Control shall be the capital of the State concerned.

Article 51. The Commissions of Control in each State shall co-ordinate the disarmament work of the local Commissions of Control in absolute conformity with the present Convention and in accordance with the instructions of the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 52. The local Commissions of Control shall consist of representatives of municipal and public organisations, trade unions and workmen's associations, and of representatives of the peasants and of the rank and file of the army.

The number of local Commissions of Control, their headquarters and the radius of their activities shall be determined by the Commission of Control of the State in question. The latter Commission shall approve the composition of the local Commissions of Control.

Article 53. The local Commissions of Control shall proceed directly with the work of disarmament within the radius of their activities, in accordance with the instructions of the Commission of Control in their country.

Article 54. The following may not be members of central or local Commissions of Control:

(a) Professional ex-soldiers and officials of the Ministries of War, Marine and Military Aviation;

(b) Owners of and large shareholders in military industrial undertakings, owners of and large shareholders in banking and commercial enterprises with interests in military undertakings and the trade in arms, and higher employees in all these undertakings.

Article 55. All the contracting States shall seek to give the widest publicity to the progress of disarmament, and shall afford the organs of the Permanent International Commission of Control every facility for the full investigation of all activities of the State, of public associations and of private persons which are connected with the application of disarmament, or which, in the view of the Permanent International Commission of Control or its organs, give rise to doubts concerning the observance of the undertakings solemnly entered into with regard to disarmament and the discontinuance of all military preparations.

Article 56. The decisions of the Permanent International Commission of Control shall be taken by a majority vote and shall be binding on all the contracting States.

Article 57. The costs of maintenance of the Permanent International Commission of Control and its organs, as well as the expenses relating to the work of control, shall be defrayed by all the contracting States in a proportion to be settled in a special convention.

The expenses of the national and local Commissions of Control shall be defrayed by each of the contracting States.

CHAPTER V

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS; BREACHES OF THE CONVENTION; RATIFICATIONS

Article 58. Within one year of the entry into force of the present Convention, all the contracting States shall enact legislation providing that a breach of any of the stipulations of the Convention shall be regarded as a grave offence against the State.

At the same time, all acts of national or international importance which are contrary to the above-mentioned clauses shall be repealed or amended.

Article 59. Within nine months of the entry into force of the present Convention, the following conventions shall be concluded:

(a) In conformity with Article 8 of the present Convention, a convention on the number of staffs, commands, establishments and institutions left to each of the contracting States until the completion of full and general disarmament.

(b) In conformity with Article 15 of the present Convention, a convention on the quantity of arms allowed for personal defence and sport.

(c) In conformity with Article 28 of the present Convention, a convention on the number of aircraft required for the social and economic needs of each of the contracting States.

(d) In conformity with Article 29 of the present Convention, a convention giving a list of the fortresses, fortifications and naval and air bases to be destroyed.

(e) In conformity with Articles 34, 35 and 39 of the present Convention, a convention concerning the storage and production of, and trade in, a minimum quantity of war material.

(f) In conformity with Articles 41, 42, 43 and 44 of the present Convention, a convention concerning protection at sea, the allocation of the areas of protection at sea and the number of vessels required for maritime police and Customs purposes.

(g) A convention laying down the constitution of the Permanent International Commission of Control and of its organs, as well as the allocation of the costs connected therewith.

(h) A convention regarding the measures of nonmilitary pressure to be taken against States disturbing the normal progress of disarmament as provided for in the present Convention and in the supplementary agreements thereto.

Note—The International Commission of Control shall be responsible for arranging to summon the States participating in the present Convention to a Conference for the conclusion of all the supplementary conventions mentioned in the present article.

Article 60. In the case of a direct breach of the present Convention by one of the contracting States, an extraordinary assembly of the representatives of the contracting States participating in the present Convention shall be summoned as expeditiously as possible by the Permanent International Commission of Control to decide upon the steps to be taken.

The steps taken to exercise pressure must not be of a military character.

All disputes between States shall be settled by the Permanent International Commission of Control.

Article 61. The present Convention shall enter into force as from its ratification by all the States in conformity with the legislative practice of each of the contracting States.

Article 62. In order to determine the attitude to be taken in regard to States not ratifying the present Convention, the contracting States shall convene a world Congress in the month of.....192..... at.....

Article 63. The instruments of ratification shall be drawn up in five copies and shall be deposited in the capital of one of the States in the five continents.

The ratification of the present Convention in conformity with the provisions of Article 61 shall be notified to all the contracting States by.....

APPENDIX D—MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE DRAFT CONVENTION FOR IMMEDIATE, COMPLETE AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT

1. The Draft Convention on General, Complete and Immediate Disarmament is based on the destruction of the principal elements which form the armed strength of a country, that is to say, the organised armed forces on land, on sea and in the air, their material, and the industries connected with the production of armaments.

The Draft Convention further provides that, at the expiry of a year after its coming into force, the land, naval, and air forces of all countries shall be reduced to an establishment which would be useless for warfare, thus limiting the possibility of armed conflict, even before disarmament has been completed.

2. The Draft Convention merely sets forth the general principles of disarmament applicable to the armed forces of all countries, without going into the details of each, on the supposition that, when the essential principles have been adopted, all these details will be dealt with in a subsequent discussion of the whole question of disarmament.

Thus in any case there is no need to work out the technical details, this being a matter for a special body to be set up after the Convention has come into force.

3. Chapter I of the Draft Convention embodies the principles of disarmament so far as they relate to effectives.

For the first year, it provides for the discharge of half the total establishment of officers, officials, and other ranks, the closing-down of military schools, Ministries of War, Marine and Military Aviation, military staffs, commands, institutions and establishments, and, at the same time, the destruction of mobilisation plans for the armed forces and trained reserves.

By these means, armies and fleets will be reduced to a condition in which they cannot easily be used for attacks by one country on another. What is left of them will be principally occupied in effecting disarmament in connection with the destruction of material, which requires a certain amount of personnel for various kinds of work.

In this connection, questions concerning the organisation of armed forces for carrying out the first state of disarmament are looked upon as domestic questions for each country.

As regards armies organised on the territorial system, with small cadres periodically supplemented by variable effectives, disarmament will be carried out on the same principle, namely, that at the end of the first year 50 per cent of the cadres and 50 per cent of the trained reserves included in the variable effectives will be discharged.

For the rest, Chapter I of the Draft Convention develops and explains in detail the proposals put forward by the U.S.S.R. delegation at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

4. Chapter 2 contains the most important provisions regarding the destruction of material:

(a) This chapter again deals with the principal aspect of disarmament during the first stage—the destruction of all reserve stores intended for

mobilisation, of which the first to be destroyed are to be those that might be employed against the civil population.

(b) After the first stage of disarmament, the army of each country will retain such arms and munitions as are strictly necessary for the establishment maintained during the succeeding years. The scale of technical war material will be limited by a special convention. The object of this limitation, as of all the measures contemplated in Chapter I, is to prevent the armaments maintained during those years from being used for purposes of war.

(c) By the destruction of material is meant its reduction to a condition in which it cannot possibly be used for purposes of war.

The technique of the destruction of material will be worked out later in all its details, on the principle that the utmost possible use should be made of material which has value for purposes of other than military production, and for the increased welfare of peoples.

(d) Article 15 of the Draft Convention provides that sporting guns of nonmilitary pattern and revolvers for sporting purposes and for self-defence may be retained. In view of the general social situation, these measures are particularly necessary in countries where communications are undeveloped.

(e) As regards naval armaments, the Draft Convention provides in the first place for the destruction of capital ships, cruisers, aircraft-carriers, etc., all of which are mostly used in the pursuit of imperialistic aims. The classes of warship enumerated above are removed from the effective battle fleet by the immediate discharge of the entire ship's company, which will limit the possibility of using the vessels; thereafter, all the ship's ordnance will be rendered useless and then removed and destroyed (the first to be removed will be the indispensable parts of the guns, gun-laying apparatus, fire-control apparatus, mine-laying and torpedo-firing apparatus, etc.). When the material is rendered useless, the ammunitions, mines and torpedoes will at the same time be destroyed. It will thus become impossible to use these warships for war purposes without lengthy preparation.

The Draft Convention allows of the use of disarmed warships as merchant vessels when necessary alterations have been made.

By dismantling warships is meant their disarmament by the removal of their armour-plating, the destruction of special apparatus such as turrets, gun platforms, control positions (*roufs de guerre*), aircraft platforms, war signalling apparatus, and any other special devices for war purposes.

(f) The disarmament of military air forces involves in the first place

the destruction of heavy aircraft as engines of war. Taking into consideration the social importance of aircraft as a means of communication, the Draft Convention does not make the destruction of the material essential to disarmament, since some of the aircraft can be converted to social and economic uses; but as there is no great difficulty in fitting aircraft for bomb-dropping, and as this can be done very quickly, the number of aircraft in the civil fleet must admittedly be proportionate to the country's genuine needs, and this is provided for in Article 28 of the Draft Convention.

(g) Fortifications and bases must be destroyed, since they can be used as bases for aggression.

(h) The question of the destruction of war industries is particularly complicated, because a highly developed industry contains great potential forces for the production of armaments. Here, again, however, there are a number of essential appliances by the destruction of which the manufacture of armaments can be made very difficult. These include drawings, measuring instruments, models, frames, machines, tools and appliances specially designed for the manufacture of armaments. Further, the actual demilitarisation of military factories, their use for the manufacture of nonmilitary products, the employment in other factories of plant that is not specifically military, and the destruction of everything necessary for mobilisation preparations, will make it a very complicated matter to use these factories for war purposes.

5. Chapter 3 deals with the organisation of protection and, in this connection, in order to prevent any possibility of using the various forces for military purposes or as a nucleus for disguised military forces, the establishments of the police forces or militia, gendarmerie and other kinds of guards must be kept strictly within their present limits throughout the period of four years provided for the completion of general disarmament. Subsequently, the establishments of the Customs and revenue guards and local police will be fixed by a special convention on a scale proportionate to population, length of communications, property to be protected, and development of forestry.

Police forces of every kind must be armed with modern weapons of the simplest pattern, because, if a more complicated armament were retained, it might be easier for these formations to be used as armed forces in attacks by stronger upon weaker countries.

Naval policing is regarded not as a matter to be dealt with separately by each country, but as providing for the needs of a whole group of countries, so that it cannot possibly be turned to imperialistic ends. Maritime police will only be provided with the armament strictly necessary for the performance of their duties.

6. Although complete and general disarmament is wholly conditional upon the good will of all countries, it seems necessary to make definite arrangements for its successive stages and for the maintenance of proportions, and to establish a special body to work out the technical details of disarmament and settle any disputes that may arise.

With this object, Chapter 4 of the Draft Convention lays down the principles of the control which is based upon the widest reciprocity, full publicity, and participation in the work by those classes of the population which are most interested in the speedy completion of disarmament.

As there is at present in the world no authority whose decisions must be obeyed by all countries, this status might be conferred upon a Permanent International Commission of Control—which of course presupposes the good will and the consent of all countries. The composition of this Commission would be a guarantee of the impartiality of its decisions and, as there would be a Committee of Experts attached to it, technical questions could be quickly settled.

7. Chapter 5 contains suggestions for the conclusion of supplementary conventions on various questions connected with disarmament, and indicates the procedure for ratifying conventions and settling any questions arising out of violations.

It is this group of questions that are the most complicated; but the Draft Convention does not allow of any military pressure being brought to bear on any country, because such measures are apt to give rise to serious international conflicts, and it is hoped that most countries are so genuinely anxious to effect complete and general disarmament that other means will always be found to compel any country seeking to violate the obligations it has assumed to discharge them faithfully.

APPENDIX E—DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS⁴

Considering that the immense growth in armaments and in militarism imposes a general and heavy burden on the peoples of the entire world and lowers the level of their culture and their material well-being;

And considering that the atrocious struggle between the various States for predominance in armaments and the tendency to increase the number of weapons for murderous and destructive military purposes are one of the

⁴ For the full text, see Korovine, E. A., "The U.S.S.R. and Disarmament," No. 292 of the *International Conciliation* series, September, 1933, at pages 334-349.

factors which increase the possibility and the likelihood of armed outbreaks:

And desiring to protect to the fullest possible extent the peaceful population of workers against the immediate dangers which threaten their life and property in the event of the outbreak of armed strife;

The Contracting States have decided, with the object of taking a first serious and genuine step towards general and complete disarmament, to conclude the present Convention by appointing as their representatives

.....

 who, having communicated to each other their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

General Provisions

Whereas a comparatively small number of the most powerful States, which aspire to a role of world domination, which expend on land, naval and air armaments a large portion of the national budgets, and which possess the power at any moment to increase unduly the armaments which support their aggressive policies by availing themselves of highly developed industries, have at their disposal by far the greater proportion of land, naval and air armaments,

The Contracting States recognize that the only just course to pursue is that of a progressive reduction of all kinds of armaments as regards their composition and number, this method being the least injurious to the interests of the weakest States, which are economically dependent on the stronger, and it is accordingly desirable to take this principle as a basis for the reduction of armaments.

CHAPTER I.—ARMED LAND FORCES

Section 1.—Effectives

Article 1. In accordance with the Preamble to the present Convention, the Contracting States, when effecting the reduction of the armed land forces, agree to divide all States into the following main groups:

(a) Group A: States maintaining armed land forces numbering over 200,000 men serving with the colours in the active army, or having in the cadres of the armed land forces more than 10,000 regular officers or more than 60 regiments of infantry (180 battalions);

(b) Group B: States maintaining armed land forces numbering over 40,000 men serving with the colours in the active army, or having in the

cadres of the armed forces more than 2,000 regular officers or more than 20 regiments of infantry (60 battalions);

(c) Group C: All other States maintaining armed forces inferior in number and composition to the figures given for Group B.

(d) Group D: States disarmed after the world war.

Remarks.—1. In all the calculations mentioned above, account shall be taken of the total number of the armed land forces maintained by the State in question in the home country, in occupied territories and in the colonies, including military police, military gendarmerie corps and depot guards.

The numbers of the police forces organised on a military basis, gendarmerie, Customs guards, train guards, forest guards and other armed corps organised for the needs of the Customs preventive service, for the maintenance of order within the country and the protection of Government and public property shall be determined by means of a special Convention.

2. By persons "serving with the colours in the active army" are understood all persons serving permanently in the cadres of the armed forces and all persons serving in the army cadres as conscripts.

3. By "officers" (commanders) are understood all persons who have received specific military training and are described as "officers" (commanders) under the military law of the contracting countries.

Article 2. Recognising that, among the methods of reducing armed land forces, the simplest and the fairest for all the States concerned, and that which at the same time least affects the system of organising, recruiting and training such forces, consists in applying the same coefficient of reduction to all States in the same group (Article 1 of the present Convention), the Contracting States agree to fix the coefficient at the following figures:

(a) States in Group A shall reduce their armed land forces by one half;

(b) States in Group B by one third;

(c) States in Group C by one fourth.

Remark.—The proportionate strength of the armed land forces for States in Group D shall be fixed under special conditions to be determined by the Disarmament Conference.

APPENDIX F—SOVIET DRAFTS OF DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION

ORIGINAL PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 29, 1946⁵

(1) With a view to strengthening peace and international security in

⁵ *The New York Times*, November 29, 1946.

conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations, the General Assembly recognizes the necessity of a general reduction of armaments.

(2) The implementing of the decision concerning the reduction of armaments should include as primary object the prohibition to produce and use atomic energy for military purposes.

(3) The General Assembly recommends that the Security Council should insure the effective implementing of the principles laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

(4) The General Assembly appeals to the Governments of all the States to give to the Security Council all the assistance necessary to enable it to discharge its responsibilities arising out of this task, the achievement of which lies within the scope of its mission to establish an enduring peace and maintain international security. This task is also in the interest of the peoples who would be released from the heavy economic burden caused by the excessive expenditure on armaments which do not correspond to peaceful postwar conditions.

SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION, AS OF NOVEMBER 28, 1946⁶

(1) With a view to strengthening peace and international security in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations, the General Assembly recognizes the necessity of a general reduction of armaments.

(2) The implementing of the decision concerning the reduction of armaments should include as primary object the prohibition to produce and use atomic energy for military purposes.

(3) To insure the adoption of measures for the reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, there shall be established within the framework of the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security, international control operating on the basis of a special provision which should provide for the establishment of special organs of inspection, for which purpose there shall be formed:

(a) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments;

(b) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

⁶ *The New York Times*, November 29, 1946.

AMENDMENTS TO NOVEMBER 28 RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY SOVIET
DELEGATION ON DECEMBER 4⁷

1.

To draft paragraph 2 as follows:

"As an essential step toward the urgent objective of eliminating from national armaments atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, the General Assembly urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of January 17, 1946. Accordingly, in order to insure that the general regulation and reduction of armaments are directed toward the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely toward the minor weapons, the General Assembly recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the report which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council before 31 December, 1946, and facilitate the progress of the work of that commission and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons."

2.

To add to paragraph 3 the following:

"To insure the adoption of measures for the reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes there shall be established within the framework of the Security Council, who bear the main responsibility for international peace and security, international control operating on the basis of a special provision which should provide for the establishment of special organs of inspection for which purpose there shall be formed:

(a) A commission for the control of execution of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments.

(b) A commission for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes."

APPENDIX G—CANADIAN DRAFT DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION⁸

(1) With a view to strengthening international peace and security, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the General Assembly recognizes the necessity of an early and general regulation and reduction of armaments.

⁷ *The New York Times*, December 5, 1946.

⁸ *The New York Times*, November 29, 1946.

(2) The General Assembly recommends to the Security Council that, as the first step toward a general regulation and reduction of armaments, the Security Council, without further delay, proceed to negotiate with members of the United Nations under Article 43 of the Charter the special agreements making available to the Security Council on its call the armed forces and other assistance and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

(3) In order that atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction shall be eliminated from national armaments at the earliest possible date, the General Assembly urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its task under the terms of reference set forth in Section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of 24 January, 1946, by which the commission is required to proceed with the utmost dispatch and to make the following specific proposals:

(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes;

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

(4) The General Assembly considers that, since the activities in the domain of atomic energy leading to peaceful and destructive ends are so intimately interrelated as to be almost inseparable, the control of atomic energy to insure its use only for peaceful purposes, the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments and the provision of effective safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions must be accomplished through a single international instrument or treaty designed to carry out these related purposes concurrently.

(5) The General Assembly recommends a system for the general regulation and reduction of armaments based on a treaty or convention accepted by virtually all States and providing for effective international safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. It further recommends that there be set up, under the treaty or convention, a permanent international commission of control with power to make such investigations, including the appointment of permanent inspectors and special commissions of inquiry, as it may deem necessary to detect a breach or threatened breach of the treaty or convention and of subsequent supplementary agreements on the regulation and reduction of armaments.

(6) To the end that an international treaty or convention of disarmament may be concluded as soon as possible, the General Assembly recommends to the Security Council that, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, it submit plans at the earliest practicable date to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments as is provided for in Article 26 of the Charter. These plans should be coordinated with the recommendations which are made from time to time by the Atomic Energy Commission.

(7) The General Assembly, being confident that the attainment of these objectives would contribute greatly to the establishment of enduring peace and the maintenance of international security, and, being convinced that it would make possible a rise in the standards of living of all the peoples of the United Nations by lightening the heavy economic burden imposed on them by excessive expenditures for national armaments which do not correspond to peaceful postwar conditions, calls upon the Governments of all States to render every possible assistance to the Security Council, the Military Staff Committee and the Atomic Energy Commission to enable them to attain speedily the objectives set forth in this resolution.

APPENDIX H—UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DRAFT DISARMAMENT RESOLUTION⁹

(1) With a view to strengthening international peace and security in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the General Assembly recognizes the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments. Accordingly, the General Assembly recommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to working out the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments pursuant to international treaties and agreements and to assure that such regulation and reduction will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by some of the participants.

(2) The General Assembly recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments is the early establishment of international control of atomic energy and other modern technological discoveries to insure their use only for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, in order to insure that the general regulation and reduction of armaments are directed toward the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely toward the minor weapons, the General Assembly recommends that the

⁹ *The New York Times*, December 1, 1946.

Security Council give first consideration to the report which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council before December 31, 1946, and facilitate the progress of the work of that commission.

(3) The General Assembly further recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions. Accordingly, the General Assembly recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connection with the control of atomic energy and other limitation or regulation of armaments.

(4) The General Assembly calls upon the Governments of all States to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in order to promote the establishment of international peace and collective security, with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

APPENDIX I—SPEECH OF MR. MOLOTOV, DECEMBER 4, 1946, AND ANSWER OF SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS¹⁰

MOLOTOV STATEMENT

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen:

A considerable number of delegates have expressed their views here on the question of the reduction of armaments. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that the majority of the speakers took a positive attitude toward this proposal. Therefore, it may be considered that the prevailing opinion among the United Nations is that it is necessary to set about the reduction of armaments.

If any reference is to be made to individual speeches, I must dwell, in the first place, on the statements of the British delegate, Sir Hartley Shawcross. His attitude is somewhat contradictory. Sir Hartley Shawcross may be understood to mean, on the one hand, that he, like other speakers also, is in favor of adopting a resolution for the general reduction of armaments, but on the other hand his speeches reflect great dissatisfaction that this question has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration.

Sees Stream of Suspicions

This is the only explanation that can be given for the stream of doubts

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, December 5, 1946.

and suspicions that pours out when he speaks and warns against the possibility of deception, pitfalls and propaganda, to which he has devoted so much of his eloquence. Let us hope, however, that he will also clearly realize, when the question is decided, who is in favor and who is against the general reduction of armaments, who is in favor and who is against the prohibition of atomic weapons.

When you hear speeches of that kind, various questions arise. Perhaps the Soviet Government was wrong to raise the question of a general reduction of armaments? But nobody here has said so openly. Perhaps, however, this question has been placed before the General Assembly inopportunistically? Here again, nobody has said so definitely.

Sometimes it is hinted that we should first insure collective security and only after that has been done should we set about disarmament. It is quite easy to perceive the falseness of this argument. It is comprehensible to everyone that the general reduction of armaments under the direction of the United Nations will strengthen international security.

Therefore, it is precisely those who are anxious for international peace and security who should strive to bring about the general reduction of armaments. Otherwise, references to the necessity of strengthening general security would only serve as a screen for those who, in reality, do not admit the necessity of a general reduction of armaments.

What did the Soviet Government have in mind when it submitted the question of the general reduction of armaments to the General Assembly for consideration?

Our purpose was a very simple one. It was that the General Assembly should take the first step in solving this important problem. We considered and still consider it quite sufficient that the General Assembly should express its mind on the following three questions.

First, the General Assembly would do a great deed by declaring in a firm voice that the time has come to set about the general reduction of armaments.

Second, the General Assembly is faced with the task of expressing its mind on the question of the prohibition of atomic energy, since it is known that the menace of atomic weapons is causing great alarm among the nations.

Third, the General Assembly should recognize the necessity of establishing reliable international control over the execution of the decision for a general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, so that this international control should have at its disposal means of inspection for verifying the situation in all countries.

The adoption of these three resolutions by the General Assembly would really constitute an important step forward in the cause of the general reduction of armaments. After such a resolution the Security Council should take up the task of working out concrete measures. This is the substance of the Soviet Government's proposal.

If we are all agreed upon the necessity of this, the General Assembly will be able to adopt such a resolution for the reduction of armaments, which will have historical significance.

Since the Soviet plan was submitted, we have received also a number of other plans on the question of the reduction of armaments. It is necessary to mention, above all, the proposals of the Australian and Canadian delegations. Finally, in the last few days the plan of the United States of America has been submitted to us, on the subject of which Senator Connally gave his explanations on December 2.

To a greater or less extent the initiative of the Soviet Union is finding support in all these plans.

It seems to us that in this respect the American plan merits particular attention.

Calls United States Plan One-Sided

I will not hide the fact that the American plan in its present form cannot satisfy us. We consider it to be insufficiently clear and rather one-sided. We are going to submit amendments to this plan, which express our desires.

While pursuing the aim of achieving unanimity in the resolution of the General Assembly for the general reduction of armaments, we are prepared not to insist on the plan submitted by us and express our willingness to take the American plan as a basis for further discussion. We hope that this step by the Soviet delegation will enable us to achieve unanimity so that the General Assembly, sitting in New York, may take the first step in this important cause.

Further, I wish to say a few words about the amendments which the Soviet delegation would like to make in the American plan. There are in all three amendments.

I will begin with the amendment relating to paragraph one. On the one hand, this paragraph speaks of the Security Council, which should work out practical measures for the reduction of armaments. On the other hand, the same paragraph speaks of international treaties and agreements for the reduction of armaments. The question arises, in what way will the decision on the reduction of armaments be taken: will it be taken by

concluding international conventions or by a resolution of the Security Council?

If we take the view that the reduction of armaments is to be carried out by means of international agreements, this will give rise to a good many pretexts for all sorts of delays. For this reason the Soviet delegation is of the opinion that the decision on the reduction of armaments should be taken by means of a resolution of the Security Council. It is very important that the General Assembly should adopt this point of view; then the cause of the reduction of armaments will be considerably expedited. The wording of the first paragraph must be amended accordingly.

With regard to paragraph 2 of the American plan, the Soviet delegation would suggest that it be adopted in the following form:

“As an essential step toward the urgent objective of eliminating from national armaments atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, the General Assembly urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in Section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of 24 February, 1946. Accordingly, in order to insure that the general regulation and reduction of armaments are directed toward the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely toward the minor weapons the General Assembly recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the report which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council before 31 December, 1946, and facilitate the progress of the work of that commission and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons.”

Now permit me to make some clarifications on the subject of this proposal.

A study of the text submitted will show that the first sentence of this draft, replacing the corresponding sentence of the second paragraph of the American draft, is taken bodily from the second paragraph of the Australian draft. The value of this sentence consists in the fact that it recalls the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 January of this year regarding the establishment of a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, and also that, in accordance with the resolution referred to, that commission must consider as an urgent aim the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. We consider that such a proposal ought not to meet with objections here.

In the second sentence of this paragraph of the American draft, in addition to a slight amendment in the text, the following words are added at the end: “And also that the Security Council expedite consideration

of a draft convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons." This addition eliminates that one-sidedness which exists in the text of the second paragraph of the American draft, recalling the necessity to examine also a draft convention for prohibiting atomic weapons.

I have to state that the Soviet delegation would consider it necessary to mention more precisely the prohibition of atomic weapons, as was done in the second paragraph of the Soviet draft. However, the Soviet delegation is prepared not to insist upon its original proposal, if the text of the second paragraph of the American proposal is accepted, with those amendments which I have just mentioned.

For Two Commissions

The text of the third paragraph of the American proposal we consider to be acceptable. We consider, however, that there should be added to the end of this paragraph what is stated in the third paragraph of the Soviet proposal where, as you are aware, the creation of two control commissions is mentioned: One—for the control of execution of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments, and the other—for the control of the execution of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes. As far as it has been possible to judge from the course of discussion, such a proposal should not meet with any objections here.

The fourth paragraph of the American draft is acceptable and no amendments are necessary. There is no necessity to dwell at present on the other amendments of lesser importance.

I will proceed to the question of veto, or, more accurately speaking, to the question of the application of the principle of unanimity of the great powers. In the present case, it is necessary to dispel the obvious misunderstanding which has arisen in the course of discussion.

As you already know, the Soviet Government takes the stand that a decision on general reduction of armaments and on the prohibition of atomic weapons should be adopted by the Security Council. The adoption of such a decision offers no small difficulties. It is possible that various points of view will be expressed in the Security Council on this or that question connected with this problem. Only the attainment of unanimity in the Security Council and, above all, of unanimity between the five permanent members can guarantee the adoption of the decision to reduce armaments.

"Right of Veto" Maintained

There can be no doubt of the fact that, not any one power but the Security Council in its entirety—and, inter alia, all the five powers who

are permanent members—are interested in the attainment of that unanimity. Consequently, in the formulation of a decision by the Security Council to reduce armaments, the “right of veto” can be exercised by any one of the great powers, as long as unanimity is not reached between all the great powers, and as long as the Security Council does not take its decision in accordance with the rules of the Charter.

Observance of the principle of unanimity of the five great powers is also necessary for those decisions by the Security Council referring to the establishment of a commission for control of armaments reduction, and of the prohibition of atomic weapons. But when decisions regarding the composition of the control commissions are taken and the control commissions begin their task, they will, of course, work in accordance with those rules drawn up for them by the Security Council.

It should be quite obvious that the question of the well-known principle of unanimity operating in the Security Council has no relation at all to the work of the commissions themselves. Consequently, it is entirely wrong to consider the matter in the light that any Government possessing the “right of veto” will be in a position to hinder the fulfilment of the control and inspections.

The control commissions are not the Security Council, and, therefore, there are no grounds whatsoever for saying that any power making use of the “right of veto” will be in a position to obstruct the course of control. Every attempt to obstruct the control or inspection carried out in accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council will be nothing other than a violation of the decisions of the Security Council.

That is why talk about a “veto” in connection with control and inspection is devoid of foundation. Such talk cannot be understood as anything other than an attempt to substitute one question for another, as an attempt to evade a straight answer to the question raised regarding the general reduction of armaments.

Thus, we must take an important decision. The General Assembly must take the first step in dealing with problems of general reduction of armaments. We must prepare that decision and not allow any further procrastination in this matter.

The Soviet delegation hopes that the American draft and the Soviet delegation’s amendments thereto will make for a good fundamental decision by the General Assembly.

SHAWCROSS ADDRESS

(1) The atomic side of regulation and disarmament must continue to be handled by the Atomic Energy Commission. The Assembly must do nothing to interfere with or discourage their work.

(2) No partial system of disarmament must be agreed to, in the sense that we must not get into a position where, for instance, the manufacture of atomic bombs is prohibited, but the manufacture of other weapons, for instance, rockets, is not. It might happen that we might be able to secure unanimous agreement on the atom bomb, but that, having abolished that, we could not secure unanimity on other dangers, possibly not less dangerous, perhaps even more dangerous. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Commission must complete its present work and put forward a plan for control and regulation. When that has been generally accepted, it should come into operation contemporaneously with a similar plan—the preparation of which would not involve anything like the same difficulties—for the abolition or control of the other mass-destruction weapons. I say that a plan for these would not present the same difficulties as the atomic energy. We only want to prohibit and destroy the rocket, but while we must prohibit the use of atomic energy for warlike purposes we must make its vast potentialities for peace available to the whole world.

(3) Any system of disarmament must provide for an immediate and effective system of control and inspection. There must, of course, be full disclosure of information about armaments to be contemporaneous with the establishment of the organization for control and verification.

(4) The operation of the control and inspection agency and the extension of its work to newly invented weapons must not be subject to any veto. We regard that as very vital. There must be some international organization which can deal with newly invented weapons. For when the atom bomb is abolished scientists will, I dare say, devote themselves to the discovery of something even more terrible. There must be an international body, not subject to veto, which can at once deal with any such situation.

I am sure that Mr. Molotov's statement gave us reason to hope that by free and frank discussion, in a reasonable spirit of give and take, we may reach a composite resolution embodying the best points of all drafts.

APPENDIX J—TEXT OF FINAL UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON DISARMAMENT¹¹

(1) In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charter and with a view to strengthening international peace and security in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the General Assembly recognizes the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Accordingly, the General Assembly rec-

¹¹ Adopted December 14, 1946; text as published in *The New York Times* of the previous day.

ommends that the Security Council give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures according to their priority which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction will be generally observed by all participants, and not unilaterally by only some of the participants. The plans formulated by the Security Council shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Members of the United Nations for consideration at a special session of the General Assembly. The treaties or conventions approved by the General Assembly shall be submitted to the signatory States Members for ratification in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter.

(2) As an essential step toward the urgent objective of eliminating from national armaments atomic and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and the early establishment of international control of atomic energy and other modern scientific discoveries and technical developments to insure their use only for peaceful purposes, the General Assembly urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference as set forth in Section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946. In order to insure that the general prohibition, regulation and reduction of armaments are directed toward the major weapons of modern warfare and not merely toward the minor weapons, the General Assembly recommends that the Security Council expedite consideration of the reports which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council and that it facilitate the work of that commission, and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction, and the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes.

(3) The General Assembly further recognizes that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions. Accordingly, the General Assembly recommends to the Security Council that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to provide such practical and effective safeguards in connection with the control of atomic energy and other limitation or regulation of armaments.

To insure the adoption of measures for the early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, for the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for warlike purposes and the elimination from

national armaments of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction, and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes, there shall be established within the framework of the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, an international system, as mentioned at the end of paragraph 2, operating through special organs, which organs shall derive their powers and status from the convention or conventions under which they are established.

(4) The General Assembly, regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament, recommends the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter. It recommends the members to undertake the progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking account of the needs of occupation, of their forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal without delay of forces stationed in the territories of members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements. It further recommends a corresponding reduction of national armed forces, and a general progressive and balanced reduction of these national armed forces.

(5) The General Assembly calls upon all Members of the United Nations to render every possible assistance to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission in order to promote the establishment of international peace and collective security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

(6) Nothing herein contained shall alter or limit the resolution of the General Assembly passed on January 24, 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission.

The significant section of the Assembly's resolution of January 24, 1946, follows:

V. Terms of Reference of the Commission

The commission shall proceed with the utmost dispatch and inquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular the commission shall make specific proposals:

A. For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

B. For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes;

C. For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

D. For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

The work of the commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.

The commission shall not infringe upon the responsibilities of any organ of the United Nations, but should present recommendations for the consideration of those organs in the performance of their tasks under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

APPENDIX K—SPEECHES OF SECRETARY OF STATE BYRNES, FOREIGN SECRETARY BEVIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER MOLOTOV, DECEMBER 13, 1946¹²

ADDRESS BY BYRNES

The United States supports wholeheartedly the proposed resolution which has as its objective a general reduction of armaments with effective safeguards to insure complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

Ever since the close of hostilities it has been the policy of the United States to hasten the return of conditions of peace. We want to enable the fighting men of the United Nations to return to their homes and their families. We want to give the peoples of all lands the chance to rebuild what the war has destroyed.

The tasks of reconstruction require all the human, material and spiritual resources that can be made available.

There need be no concern about the willingness of the American people to do everything within their power to rid themselves and the world of the burden of excessive armaments.

In the recent past the concern of peace-loving nations has not been that America maintained excessive armaments. The concern has been that America failed to maintain adequate armaments to guard the peace.

When Hitler started the world war in September, 1939, Germany had been preparing for war for more than five years. But at that time there were in active service of the United States in the Army, Navy and Air Force only 330,000 men. It was our military weakness, not our military strength, that encouraged Axis aggression.

¹² *The New York Times*, December 14, 1946.

Pacific Islands Mentioned

After World War I, Japan was given a mandate over strategically important islands in the southwest Pacific which bound her to keep those islands demilitarized. Although the evidence showed that Japan was violating the terms of the mandate, the United States delayed in building bases on islands under her sovereignty in the Pacific.

The result was that when the United States was treacherously attacked at Pearl Harbor she had no adequately fortified base in the Pacific between Pearl Harbor and the Philippines.

Japan's covenant not to use the mandated territories as military bases contained no safeguards to insure compliance. Japan's covenant misled the United States, but it did not restrain Japan. That was our mistake. And we do not intend again to make that mistake.

While before World War II the peace-loving nations were seeking peace through disarmament, aggressor nations were building up their armaments. And all the while aggressor nations were building up armaments they were claiming that they were being smothered and encircled by other nations.

While we scrapped battleships, Japan scrapped blueprints. While we reduced our army to the size of a large police force, Germany trained its youth for war.

Too late, those who had taken a leading part in the struggle for general disarmament before World War II discovered that Axis agents were deliberately organizing and supporting disarmament movements in non-Axis countries in order to render those countries powerless to resist their aggression.

Too late, those who had taken a leading part in the struggle for general disarmament discovered that it was not safe to rely upon any disarmament which is not collectively enforced and made a part of a system of collective security.

It will take time, patience and good will to achieve really effective disarmament. The difficulties are great and the complexities many. The defense needs of States vary greatly. The elements which make up the military strength of States likewise vary greatly and cannot readily be compared or appraised.

Effective disarmament cannot be secured by any simple mathematical rule. Demobilized divisions can be speedily recalled to the colors. But a scrapped plane or a scrapped battleship can never be recommissioned.

Disarmament to be effective must look to the future. It's easy for us

now to see what folly it would have been, when gunpowder was discovered, to start disarming by limiting the use of the bow and arrow.

We must see to it that disarmament starts with the major weapons of mass destruction.

We must see to it that disarmament is general and not unilateral.

We must see to it that disarmament rests not upon general promises which are kept by some States and ignored by other States.

We must see to it that disarmament is accompanied by effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means under international control which will protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

We must see to it that these safeguards are so clear and explicit that there will be no question of the right of complying States, veto or no veto, to take immediate action in defense of the rule of law.

No disarmament system which leaves law-abiding States weak and helpless in face of aggression can ever contribute to world peace and security.

But in meeting the problems of disarmament first things should come first. The first task which must be undertaken is the control of atomic energy to insure that it will be used only for human welfare and not for deadly warfare.

There are other weapons of mass destruction, but unless we can meet the challenge of atomic warfare—the most dreadful weapon ever devised—we can never meet the challenge of these other weapons.

The United States, with Britain and Canada, have demonstrated their awareness of the grave responsibility inherent in their discovery of the means of applying atomic energy.

In a world of uncontrolled armaments, atomic energy would be an advantage to the United States for many years to come.

But it is not the desire of the United States to be the leader in an armament race. We prefer to prevent, rather than to win, the next war.

That's why President Truman announced as soon as he knew that the atomic bomb would work, that it was our purpose to collaborate with other nations to insure that atomic energy should not become a threat to world peace.

Shortly thereafter the heads of the three Governments responsible for the discovery of atomic energy met at Washington and urged that the United Nations set up a commission to recommend proposals for the effective international control of atomic energy and of all other instruments of mass destruction.

Moscow Accord Recalled

One of the primary reasons for my trip to Moscow in December, 1945, was to ask the Soviet Union to join with Britain and Canada in sponsoring a resolution to this effect before the General Assembly.

As soon as the agreement of the Soviet Government was obtained, France and China were also asked, and they agreed to join in sponsoring the resolution. These efforts resulted in the unanimous passage of the resolution by the General Assembly in January, 1946, only six months after the discovery of the atomic bomb.

Long discussion in the United Nations and public debate on the details of the United States proposals have perhaps blurred the real significance and magnitude of the United States initiative.

The resolution was no idle gesture on our part. Having the knowledge of atomic energy and possession of the atomic bomb, we did not seek to hold it and to threaten the world. We didn't sit back and play for time. We came forward with concrete proposals designed fairly, effectively and practically to carry out the tasks assigned to that commission.

Our proposals when fully operative would leave with the States responsible for the discovery of atomic energy no rights which would not be shared with other Members of the United Nations.

Our proposals outlaw the use of atomic weapons and contemplate the disposal of existing atomic weapons.

They set up an international authority with power to prevent the national manufacture and use of atomic weapons for war purposes and to develop atomic energy for human welfare.

Our proposals also provide effective and practical safeguards against violations and evasions. They enable States that keep their pledges to take prompt and collective action against those who violate their pledges.

We do not suggest any diminution of the right of veto in the consideration of the treaty governing this subject. We do say that once the treaty has become effective then there can be no recourse to a veto to save an offender from punishment.

We are willing to share our knowledge of atomic weapons with the rest of the world on the condition, and only on the condition, that other nations submit, as we are willing to submit, to internationally controlled inspection and safeguards.

From the statements made in the committees and in the Assembly we have been encouraged to believe that others likewise are willing to submit to international inspection.

If other nations have neither bombs nor the ability to manufacture them it should be easy for them to agree to inspection.

But the world should understand that without collective safeguards there can be no collective disarmament.

The resolution we proposed here urges the expeditious fulfilment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference. Those terms include the control not only of atomic energy but the control of other instruments of mass destruction.

With its specific studies and its accumulated experience that commission is best equipped to formulate plans for dealing with major problems of disarmament.

Let us concentrate upon those major weapons and not dissipate our energies on the less important problems of controlling pistols and hand grenades.

If we are really interested in effective disarmament, and not merely in talking about it, we should instruct our representatives on the Atomic Energy Commission to press forward with its constructive proposals. The commission has been at work six months. They can file an interim report next week. I do not want the work of that commission to be sidetracked or sabotaged.

I am glad that the proposed resolution raises in connection with the problem of disarmament the question of disposal of the troops and the justification of their presence on foreign soil. For disarmament necessarily raises the question of the use which may be made of arms and armed forces which are not prohibited. Reducing armaments will not bring peace if the arms and the armed forces that remain are used to undermine collective security.

The United States has persistently pressed for the early conclusion of peace treaties with Italy and the ex-satellite States. We want to make possible the complete withdrawal of troops from those States.

The United States has persistently urged the conclusion of a treaty recognizing the independence of Austria and providing for the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Austria, in our view, is a liberated and not an ex-enemy country. The United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union, as signers of the Moscow Declaration of 1943, are obligated to relieve her of the burden of occupation at the earliest possible moment.

The United States believes that armed occupation should be strictly limited by the requirements of collective security.

For that reason we proposed to the Council of Foreign Ministers that

we should fix agreed ceilings on the occupation forces in Europe. We could not secure agreement this week, but we shall continue our efforts to reduce the occupation forces in Europe. We are also prepared to fix agreed ceilings for the occupation forces in Japan and Korea.

United States Troop Figures Given

On V-J Day we had over five million troops overseas. We had to send with them extensive supplies and equipment which could not be disposed of overnight.

But despite the tremendous problem of liquidating our extensive overseas war activities, today we have less than 550,000 troops outside of American territory. Most of these troops are in Germany, Japan and the Japanese Islands, Korea, Austria and Venezia Giulia.

The great majority of the troops we have on the territory of the other States outside these occupation areas are supply or administrative personnel. Let me state specifically just what combat troops we have in these other States.

We have a total of 96,000 military personnel in the Philippines but only about 30,000 are combat forces, air and ground, and of these 17,000 are Philippine Scouts. These troops are in the Philippines primarily to back up our forces in Japan. Substantial reductions are contemplated in the near future.

Of the 19,000 troops we have in China, about 15,000 are combat troops and roughly one half of these are to be under orders to return home.

We have about 1,500 troops in Panama, excluding the Canal Zone. One thousand of these, composed of a small air unit and some radar air warning detachments, can be classified as combat forces. We have, of course, our normal protective forces in the Panama Canal Zone proper.

We have no combat units in countries other than those I have just mentioned.

Our military personnel in Iceland number less than 600 men. They include no combat troops. They are being withdrawn rapidly and all will be withdrawn by early April, 1947, in accordance with our agreement with the Government of Iceland. The military personnel have been there only to maintain one of our air transport lines of communication with our occupation forces in Germany.

In the Azores, on the southern air transport communication line to Germany, we have about 300 men. Again there is not a single combat soldier among them. They are technicians and administrative officials. They are there under agreement with the Government of Portugal.

Our combat troops are in North China at the request of the Chinese National Government. Their task is to assist in carrying out the terms of surrender with respect to the disarming and deportation of the Japanese. Their mission is nearly completed. Instructions have been issued for the return of half of our forces now in China, although the Chinese Government has urged that they be retained there until conditions become more stabilized.

We have made it clear that our troops will not become participants in civil strife in China. But we are eager to do our part, and we hope other States are eager to do their part, to prevent civil war in China and to promote a unified and democratic China.

A free and independent China is essential to world peace. We cannot ignore or tolerate efforts upon the part of any State to retard the development of the freedom and independence of China.

The United States Government repudiates the suggestion that our troops in China or elsewhere, with the consent of the States concerned, are a threat to the internal or external peace of any country.

Because the representative of the Soviet Union has referred to our troops in China, it is fair for me to say that I am confident that the number of American troops in North China are far less than the number of Soviet troops in South Manchuria in the Port Arthur area.

Under the Finnish peace treaty the Soviet Union acquires the right to lease the Porkkala naval base in Finland and maintain troops there. The temporary presence of a few thousand United States troops in China, at the request of that country, certainly raises no essentially different question than the permanent presence of Soviet troops in another country under treaty arrangements.

It is our desire to live up to the letter and the spirit of the Moscow declaration. We do not intend to use our troops on the territories of other States contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The implementation of the Moscow declaration is not made easier by loose charges or counter-charges. The declaration requires consultation. That is the method we should pursue if we wish to advance the cause of disarmament and of collective security.

Last December at Moscow we consulted the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom regarding our troops in China. We have now asked for consultation in the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding the number of troops to be retained in Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary and Rumania upon the conclusion of the peace treaties with the ex-satellite States.

Asks Respect for Sovereignty

The task before us is to maintain collective security with scrupulous regard for the sovereign equality of all States. This involves more than the question of armaments and armed forces.

Aggressor nations do not go to war because they are armed but because they want to get with their arms things which other nations will not freely accord to them.

Aggressor nations attack not only because they are armed but because they believe others have not the armed strength to resist them.

Sovereignty can be destroyed not only by armies but by a war of nerves and by organized political penetration.

World peace depends upon what is in our hearts more than upon what is written in our treaties.

Great States must strive for understandings which will not only protect their own legitimate security requirements but also the political independence and integrity of the smaller States.

It is not in the interest of peace and security that the basic power relationship among great States should depend upon which political party comes to power in Iran, or in Greece or in China.

Great States must not permit differences among themselves to tear asunder the political unity of smaller States. And smaller States must recognize that true collective security requires their cooperation just as much as that of the larger States. Without the cooperation of large States and small States, our disarmament plans are doomed to failure.

A race for armaments, a race for power is not in the interest of any country or of any people. We want to stop the race for armaments and we want to stop the race for power.

We want to be partners with all nations, not to make war, but to keep the peace. We want to uphold the rule of law among nations. We want to promote the freedom and the well-being of all peoples in a friendly civilized world.

THE ADDRESS BY BEVIN

I desire to make just a few observations on this problem of disarmament and security. Like the representative from the United States, we were involved in the production of the atomic weapon, and immediately after the war was over my Government took steps, through Premier Attlee, to raise the issue for getting control of this deadly weapon. This resulted in the conference that was held with the three producing powers in Washington last year.

Our great desire has been to try to control the development of this discovery, so wonderful if used for peaceful purposes but such a deadly thing if used for war; and to try and find a way, as is so essential in the development of confidence between nations, which will make control and use efficient.

Therefore, we entered into the agreement for the setting up of the Atomic Energy Commission. We regard ourselves as bound by that decision now and are pledged to support the Atomic Commission until it has completed its task.

The task it has to perform, I suggest, is one of the most difficult that has been given to any commission to perform. It will need very great care, and, if I may suggest, it cannot be settled if it is dealt with on a basis of political conflict. It can only achieve success if all the parties to that commission bend their energies and intellects to try to discover the right solution.

I believe, and my Government believes, that it is possible to separate this new discovery of atomic energy from the dangers of being used for war providing all powers can be brought to realize their responsibility.

And therefore, the first point I want to make is that in any consideration of this problem, we cannot be diverted or cannot agree to be diverted from the work and the responsibilities of the Atomic Commission which has already done so much.

Turning to the general question of disarmament I said in the committee, and I repeat here, that we have been engaged as a country in two long wars, and I think the whole conference will agree that whatever may be said about us—and lots of things are said about us—we fought on the right side; that is to say, we fought against the aggressor on both occasions, and we were in it from the start to the end and our people never flinched and never failed.

Obviously then, there can be no country in the world that has got a greater desire to see peace and disarmament and security which, though used in three words, is one really, that is, the collective action by a world government organization which can secure the peace and which will act collectively at all times against anyone who dares to attempt the role of aggressor.

No country, I say, in the world has a greater interest or a greater desire to see that accomplished.

The conference will pardon me, I am sure, if I say that we approach it with caution; that the carrying of resolutions, compromise resolutions, without careful study of long duration and deliberate intent may mislead the public into a false sense of security. That is what happened in 1919.

The document that was produced in the League of Nations was perfect. But before we knew where we were, first one nation had gone, then another nation had gone, and even then, my country proceeded first by promoting the limitation of naval armaments, and secondly by promoting the disarmament conference at Geneva to try to get some sane approach to this problem of war and its dangers.

But while the very act was being performed, let me remind the United Nations, with all that had been put down, one nation secretly, designedly, was violating it long before although they had been admitted to the League before they withdrew. And in the end, they flouted the whole international organization.

Therefore, there seems to us to be two things necessary—not merely to prosecute disarmament but to organize the pacific nations, the pacifist nations, the liberty-loving nations, so that those who love liberty and democracy are ready to defend it notwithstanding their pacifism and their love of peace.

It is in that sense that my country is studying this thing and I say to every nation represented in this great conference, we are ready, ready at any moment to supply you with any information you desire in order to give effect to the Charter of the United Nations. We are ready to discuss any scheme, and, indeed, to bring the benefit of such experience as we have to bear to get a correct scheme that we believe will work.

And may I say, we are not influenced at all if resolutions are put on this Assembly agenda for any other purpose than the carrying out of obligations under the Charter.

If it is done—and I want to be quite frank—to pick a nation out or to put it on the spot or to use it for propaganda, however much we may be abused, we cannot sacrifice the interest of our people on that account. But we will go deeply and soundly and honestly with any other nation that will come into this great study.

Britain's Demobilization

Now, sir, Mr. Byrnes, on behalf of the United States, has made references to the action of that great country on demobilization and the changes in the forces. I am not in possession here at this conference of detailed figures but we have announced our figures to our Parliament. We have reduced our forces from well over 6,000,000; compared to the categories he quoted, we are now well below a million. And were it not for the commitments of occupation that we have in Germany and Austria and Venezia Giulia, they would go down still further.

It is obvious that a country like ours that has had to spend in two wars over five thousand million of its accumulated savings and foreign investments and destroyed its totaled exchanges in the world, it is so obvious that we cannot afford, even afford in our own interests, to carry great forces of arms and we are not going to do it except if we are attacked. We can again, as we always have, try to defend ourselves to the best of our ability.

Therefore, if numbers of troops are wanted by the Security Council, at home or abroad, let them write for it. Send the same letter as they do to all other nations and we will give the figures. We shall not hesitate. But we want to feel that when they are asked for, they are asked for the purposes required by the Charter in order that that knowledge, which we readily give, will be used by that Council and by the organization to defend collective security and regional defense and all the other obligations we have entered into.

Now, I have read this resolution with very great care and I have also read the resolution of the First Committee which calls upon the Security Council "to determine, as soon as possible, the information which the States members should be called upon to furnish in order to give effect to the resolution," and the resolution refers to the information on armed forces of the United Nations.

I accept that resolution. On behalf of my Government, I accept this general resolution which I regard as a basis for real work to be commenced. And I trust that it will be adopted and not merely adopted, but that it will be taken as a directive to the organizations of the United Nations to begin seriously working with the best brains they can get in order to achieve this objective as early as they possibly can. The quicker, the better.

A Matter of Confidence

I would utter this warning, however. I believe in this matter, like in the organization itself, it will be a matter of growth and confidence. I once said in our own House of Commons in a debate that if you live long enough together and trust one another enough without too many rules and regulations, you grow together and you arrive at a common understanding in that way. And therefore, in dealing with this problem, the Military Committee, the Security Council and the other organs are being given one of the greatest jobs that has ever been handed on to men to try to grapple with.

And I pledge my country—indeed, their history is well known in this field—to do what we can to make it a success.

I would only use one closing word with regard to troops in other countries. This Government that I am now a member of has been in office since July, 1945. During that time we have been doing nothing else but striving to create the situation to establish freedom over as wide an area of the world as we can, and I think the steps we have had taken indicate our attitude of mind.

We are striving to settle the great problem of India, and I pray and hope that all parties will be able to combine to achieve the right results for that great subcontinent, which will make it unnecessary for us having to keep troops there at all.

We had a ten-year treaty, a solemn treaty between Egypt and ourselves. I think all the Allies are indebted to Egypt for the great service it rendered during the war in disposing its territory and communications, which prevented the enemy from joining hands through the Middle East and probably making the war much longer and much more disastrous; but when we were approached to revise it we readily agreed, and negotiations are going on for the same results. And in other fields, too. As soon as we can see peace and get resettlement and changes my Government is endeavoring to carry out a long-term progressive policy in these fields.

I apologize to nobody for our conduct. We have based our attitude on the establishment of this United Nations, but I have been, as I said, both in the committee and elsewhere, cautious, cautious, and the reason I am cautious is because we based it there once before, and our country was nearly wiped out.

We were within an ace of being defeated. Therefore, this time we want to see that we build sound, safe; not merely on a basis of sentiment, but on a basis of collective responsibility in which every nation, great and small, takes its share to obliterate war forever.

MOLOTOV'S SPEECH

I have already had occasion to set forth from this rostrum the views of the Soviet Government on the subject of a general reduction of armaments, which we are discussing now. The reasons which guided the Soviet Government in this question were set forth in my statement which I made on October 29 from this rostrum.

With all the more attention and interest we heard the statement of the views of other Governments, both in the committee and in the General Assembly. Indeed, the present-day international situation differs in many respects from that which existed after the first World War.

We all are mindful of this difference. We well knew that Germany,

after World War II, is not the Germany that existed after World War I. And we add to this fact that the Japan of the postwar period, after World War II, is not the same Japan, but is also a defeated country.

And if we are mindful of these facts, and also of the fact that Germany and Japan were the countries—one of which set its home in the East and the other in the West—that they were the countries that plunged countries both small and great into the vortex of the war, this fact is of tremendous importance.

It goes without saying that if, in our policy toward the aggressive States defeated in this war, we are determined to pursue that policy to its conclusion and to demilitarize and disarm the aggressive countries, and see to it that they never become aggressors again—if we pursue that struggle for the democratization to the end, and if we try to rid these countries of fascism, the necessity of which we recognized during the war, and the necessity of which we recognize now, it will mean that, as far as the former aggressors are concerned, we shall create favorable conditions that will help us to resolve the tasks before us in accordance with the interests of peace and the necessity for prevention of a new aggression.

World Solidly for Peace

The fact is essential that there are no countries now which stand aloof from the objectives of the international organization which was created to maintain peace and security. Therein lies the difference in the situation as compared to that after World War I.

Now, all the countries which may be called democratic countries are able to take part in the measures that are destined to safeguard peace and security, and all those countries are now members of the United Nations organization.

This is an important condition for the solution of the problem of disarmament; and now it depends upon our desire to cooperate with each other, upon our unwillingness to set off one party against the other, and upon our determination not to permit the creation of blocs against other countries, and not to strive to submit other countries to one's dominating influence. If we work along the lines of the principles underlying the United Nations organization, we are sure to safeguard the peace and security of all peoples.

Now, I shall return to the resolution which we have before us for consideration. The Soviet delegation, when it suggested that proposal to the General Assembly for consideration, was guided by two basic ideas. We considered it necessary that the United Nations organization

should state its opinion regarding the question of disarmament and, in the second place, that the United Nations organization should declare for the prohibition of the development and use of atomic energy for military purposes.

The draft resolution now submitted to the General Assembly embodies two objectives. I shall not conceal, however, that the Soviet delegation would like to see these two ideas expressed by it, embodied in the resolution in a clear and more definite form. However, they are embodied in the resolution, and the Soviet delegation, therefore, is satisfied with the work of the committee and the resolution as it is submitted now.

The Atomic Weapon

Today, particularly, much was said here with regard to atomic energy and its use for military purposes. It is quite clear that this type of weapon is worthy of particular attention. Therefore, the Soviet draft originally submitted laid stress on the prohibition of atomic weapons as its primary objective.

It is clear that the atomic weapon is not a defensive weapon, and, therefore, when people tell us about the interests of the defense of their country, it goes without saying that what is necessary for the defense of one's security and for the defense of one's country is not the task that can be accomplished by the use of atomic weapons. The atomic weapon is not destined for use in one's own territory—it is destined for use in another's territory.

The resolution which is now submitted to the General Assembly, and the decision which the General Assembly will take, will constitute the first step toward general disarmament. After this, other steps will be required, which will have to be taken by the Security Council. This is a very important task that will face the Security Council, and it remains for us to wish the Security Council all possible success in its accomplishment.

Today, the Soviet delegation wishes to express its satisfaction that the first results have already been achieved in that direction, as well as for the cooperation which we achieved in submitting this resolution to the General Assembly. We also heard today that disarmament causes fears to certain people, and sometimes one is verbally in favor of a reduction of armaments, but somehow he says so in not quite a firm voice.

Of course, haste in such an important matter as this is inappropriate and no one will advise anyone to be hasty in this important matter. But this is a serious problem, a serious pass which we must undertake to

accomplish. We must not believe that the more we have troops on foreign territories, the more we have naval and air bases beyond the confines of one's countries.

References were made here to the information regarding troops stationed on foreign territories, but it goes without saying that such information cannot be properly submitted and in full and be comprehensive at such a meeting as this.

Asks No Delay in Count

The Soviet delegation is anxious that decision on the question of the census of troops on foreign territories should not be delayed. Let us take this decision and then we shall know where troops of the Members of the United Nations are stationed, where they have got their bases. The elucidation of this question will only be helpful. At the moment when we are about to adopt a decision regarding the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, this information will be particularly useful.

The adoption of a decision on the reduction of armaments will influence the military budgets, which, it is an open secret to everyone, are inflated beyond all proportions by certain States. It is clear that the populations of our countries will hail our decision on the reduction of armaments and on the reduction of military budgets because these decisions will result in reducing the burden of taxation that rests on the populations and will bring prices down, because this affects the daily needs of the populations.

Therefore, one of the objectives that will be achieved by the reduction of armaments will be the reduction of military budgets and this fact will be hailed with a sigh of relief in all countries.

In adopting our decision regarding the reduction of armaments, we cannot overlook the fact that now, in certain cases, now that the recent war is ended, there is still going on frenzied propaganda in favor of a new war. At all events, the encouragement of this propaganda cannot be conducive to the adoption of the decision now before us.

When we are told about the freedom of the press, then one naturally wonders why this freedom of the press cannot be used in order to counteract this propaganda in favor of war, why this freedom of the press can only be used for propaganda in favor of a new war and why we adversaries against a new war should not utilize the press to offer resolute resistance to the propaganda in favor of a new war.

The General Assembly has adopted a number of decisions. Some of them are important and others are less important and this will be recognized

by everybody. It seems to me that there need be no doubt on the part of anybody that the decision regarding the reduction of armaments is to be counted as one of the most important decisions adopted by the General Assembly. The fact that this decision was adopted unanimously in the committee goes to prove that it is a timely decision.

If we adopted this decision unanimously, it was because we all recognized the urgent nature of this decision and its timeliness and the fact that it serves the interests of all peoples and that it serves the cause of peace. Therefore the Soviet delegation expresses its confidence that the unanimity which was displayed in the formulation of this decision in the committee will be manifested by us in the General Assembly when we come to adopt it.

INTERNATIONAL NOTES

DECEMBER 16, 1946—JANUARY 22, 1947

Prepared by the Editorial Assistant, Division of Intercourse and Education

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Atomic Energy Commission—On December 30, the Commission adopted its first report to the Security Council by a vote of 10 to 0, the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. The report, which recommends the establishment of "a strong and comprehensive international system of control and inspection," the scope and functions of which should be "defined by a treaty or convention in which all of the nations Members of the United Nations should be entitled to participate on fair and equitable terms," stipulates that this international system "should become operative only when those Members of the United Nations necessary to assure its success by signing and ratifying the treaty or convention have bound themselves to accept and support it." The treaty or convention, the report says, should provide for the establishment in the United Nations of an International Authority with powers broad and flexible enough to permit "the prompt and effective discharge of the duties imposed on it" and to enable it to "deal with new developments that may hereafter arise in the field of atomic energy." The Authority would be charged with the task of promoting the beneficial uses of atomic energy and would have "the exclusive right to carry on atomic research for destructive purposes." The Soviet Union abstained from voting because of its objection to inclusion in the report of a clause stating that "Once violations constituting international crimes have been defined and the measures of enforcement and punishment therefor agreed to in the treaty or convention, there shall be no legal right, by veto or otherwise, whereby a willful violator of the terms of the treaty or convention shall be protected from the consequences of violation of its terms." (For text of recommendations, see *New York Times*, Dec. 31, 1946.)

Bernard M. Baruch and the other members of the United States delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission resigned on January 4. In submitting the resignations to President Truman, Mr. Baruch expressed the opinion that now that the

problem of general disarmament is before the Security Council, the United States would be better served to have identic representation on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission. Former Senator Warren R. Austin, United States representative on the Security Council, has since been appointed to represent the United States on the Atomic Energy Commission also.

The Security Council—A Soviet request that the question of general disarmament be placed on the agenda for the Security Council meeting of December 31 contained a proposal that the Council establish a commission, on which each Council member would be represented, to work out practical measures to implement the General Assembly's decision of December 14 on disarmament and that the proposals agreed upon by the commission be submitted to the Security Council "within a period of from one or two months but not later than three months." (See *New York Times*, Dec. 29, for text of note.) At the December 31 meeting, the United States representative proposed that in its discussions on disarmament the Council accord priority to the question of atomic weapons. (See *New York Times*, Jan. 1, for text of resolution.) Debate held on January 9 and 15 was inconclusive. A United States request of January 15 that all disarmament discussion be postponed to February 4 was approved by the Council on January 20 by a vote of 9 to 2, the Soviet Union and Poland opposing the delay.

In accordance with a Council decision of December 19, a commission on which the eleven members of the Council are represented (the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, France, China, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Poland, and Syria) has been sent to the Balkan area to investigate conditions "in Northern Greece along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other . . . to ascertain the facts relating to the alleged border violations along the frontier." (For text of resolution establishing the commission, see *New York Herald Tribune*, Dec. 20.)

With Australia abstaining, the Council agreed on January 10 to assume responsibility for guaranteeing the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste, as was provided for in the permanent Statute of the Free Territory approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers at its recent meeting in New York.

THE PEACE TREATIES

The official drafts of the peace treaties for Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania were distributed at Washington on January 17 to the diplomatic missions of the Allied and associated Powers of the Second World War. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, whose resignation for reasons of health was announced on January 7, signed the treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania (the United States is not a party to the treaty with Finland because that country was never formally at war with the United States) on January 20 as a final official act before turning over his office to his successor—General George C. Marshall. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery will act for the United States when the treaties are signed at Paris on February 10 by representatives of the Allies and of the five former enemy countries. (*The New York Times* published the full texts of the treaties on January 18.)

Deputies of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and the United States began the preparatory work on peace treaties for Austria and Germany at London on January 14. The four Foreign Ministers are to open discussions of the peace settlements with Austria and Germany at Moscow on March 10.

In an address before the National Newspapers Association on January 17, Mr. John Foster Dulles, a participant in the work of framing the peace treaties, stressed the need of the adoption by the United States of a more decisive foreign policy—a thesis held also by Republican leaders in Congress. Mr. Dulles devoted a part of his talk to the task confronting the coming conference at Moscow and outlined a program in respect to Germany calling for its political decentralization through application of the federal formula and for the development of “the industrial potential of western Germany in the interest of the economic life of western Europe, including Germany.” (For full text, see *New York Herald Tribune*, January 18.)

CHINA

On January 7, the date on which his appointment as Secretary of State was announced, General George C. Marshall's statement

on the situation in China was made public at Washington. General Marshall, who went to China a year ago to act in a mediatory capacity in negotiations between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese Communists to bring about peace and the establishment of a stable democratic form of government in China, mentioned as factors involved in the recent breakdown of the negotiations: "the almost overwhelming suspicion" with which the Chinese Communists and government leaders regard each other; the presence in the National Government of "a dominant group of reactionaries" who have opposed his efforts, sometimes openly and sometimes covertly; and the unwillingness of the Communists "to compromise in the national interest." (For text, see *Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 7; *New York Times* or *New York Herald Tribune*, Jan. 8.) General Marshall's report supplemented President Truman's summary of the past year's developments in China issued December 18. (For text, see *New York Herald Tribune* or *New York Times*, Dec. 19; *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XV, No. 391, December 29, 1946.)

A new Constitution designed to end Kuomintang one-party rule in China was adopted by the National Assembly which met at Nanking from November 15 to December 25. General Marshall remarked in his report that it was "unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the Constitution . . . adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted." The Constitution, which comes into force December 25, 1947, following the holding of elections, calls for the election of three representative bodies: "the Legislative Yuan or lawmaking body, Control Yuan or upper house, with mainly censorial powers, and a large National Assembly. The Assembly will be named every six years and will elect the President and Vice-President and 'exercise political powers on behalf of the people.'" (For fuller details, see *New York Times*, December 26.) It was reported from Nanking on December 30 that the Young China party and the Social Democratic party (the only organized political groups, other than the Kuomintang, which took part in the National Assembly) have been formally invited to join the government.

The National Government's most recent offer to resume

negotiations with the Communists was rejected on January 18. The Communists are said to demand as a condition for resumption of negotiations, annulment of the new Constitution and a return to the military positions of a year ago.

FRANCE

For the first time in seven years, France has a completely constitutional government. In a joint session on January 16, the two houses of Parliament—the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic—elected Vincent Auriol, a Socialist, as President of the Republic. Solid support from the Communists and Socialists enabled M. Auriol to win 452 of the 883 votes cast. Installed at once, M. Auriol received the resignation of Premier Léon Blum and his all-Socialist Cabinet and commissioned Paul Ramadier (also a Socialist) to form a new government. The Cabinet selected by M. Ramadier and presented to President Auriol on January 22 was described in a Paris dispatch as “combining a wide coalition of party groups based on a central nucleus of Socialists, who will retain most of the important economic posts.” Georges Bidault, who was Provisional President and Premier from June 26 until his resignation on November 28 when the newly elected National Assembly held its first meeting, holds the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new government. (For list of Cabinet members, see *New York Times*, Jan. 23.)

When Léon Blum resigned the Premiership on January 16 he had just returned from a two-day discussion with British officials in London concerning “problems of common interest to the Governments of France and the United Kingdom.” Prime Minister Attlee’s office announced, January 15, that as a result of the discussions the two governments will open negotiations shortly for the conclusion of “a treaty of alliance . . . within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations,” objectives of which are the prevention of any further aggression by Germany, the preservation of peace and security, and improvement in Anglo-French economic relations. (For text of statement, see *New York Times* or *New York Herald Tribune*, Jan. 16.)

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