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BELGRADE-

the
conference
of
non-
aligned

STATES

by Homer A. Jack



President Nkrumah and Emperor Haile Selassie

BELGRADE: THE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED STATES

INTRODUCTION

The Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries was held at a time—early September, 1961—when U.S. opinion, both official and public, was never more favorable toward the so-called “neutrals.” When Mr. Khrushchev suddenly announced the resumption of nuclear weapons tests and thus gave the 25 heads of state assembled in Yugoslavia a clear opportunity to use their independent judgment and their “moral force,” the Conference displayed a curious and dismaying double standard. Editorial writers and cartoonists in the West pointedly criticized the “noncommitted.” Even the friends of these countries in the West were seriously jolted.

This pamphlet describes the origins of the Belgrade Conference and its accomplishments. There is no attempt to gloss over the double standard on the nuclear test issue, but an effort is made to explain it. In addition, the pamphlet puts the Conference's reaction to the resumption of nuclear tests in perspective. The heads of state made many wise decisions on a host of other issues. The non-aligned states are likely to continue as a formidable political force in the world and at the United Nations, if not a third bloc.

This pamphlet is dedicated to U Thant of Burma. He was a delegate to the Belgrade Conference on the eve of the tragic death of Dag Hammarskjöld. His experience, temperament, and non-alignment combined to make him the unanimous choice of the 100 or more member nations—many aligned—as Acting Secretary General of the United Nations.

—Homer A. Jack

Dr. Jack represented the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy at the Belgrade Conference. He was accorded official observer status, the only American to be given this opportunity. He also attended the Bandung Conference in 1955 as a journalist and the first All-African People's Conference in 1958 as a fraternal delegate from the American Committee on Africa. Since 1959 Dr. Jack has been a nongovernmental observer at the United Nations.

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FROM BANDUNG TO BELGRADE

"This Conference is not an isolated event in the emergence of the new social forces. It is one of a series of major events in this process of emergence."—*President Sukarno*

The Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April, 1955, was one of the most important international gatherings in the twentieth century. Conceived by the Columbo Powers (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon), the Conference was an effort to consolidate the multiple revolutions in Asia against colonialism, racism, poverty, and disease and to spread these revolutions to Africa. Present were the leaders of the ex-colonial world: Nehru, Chou En-lai, Sukarno, Nasser, U Nu, and many others. Some 27 independent Asian and African nations attended the Conference as well as representatives from two African colonies on the threshold of independence: the Gold Coast (Ghana) and the Sudan.

Although the Bandung Conference communique provided for consultations among the five Columbo powers to convene a second conference, none has been called. Indonesia has continued to encourage the convening of a second Bandung, but so far without success. Several of the original Columbo powers were hesitant to form a bloc; neither did they want to face the difficult decision of whether or not the U.S.S.R. should be invited to any second Asian-African conference. One continuing outcome of the original Bandung Conference has been, however, the close and fruitful cooperation of the Asian-African states as a caucussing group at the U.N.

Since Bandung, Africa has come into the world spotlight. At the Bandung gathering, Africa was quite a junior partner, with only six nations in attendance: Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, and Sudan. With the birth of many new nations, the African states since 1958 have held their own continental conferences. In April, 1959, Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana convened the first Conference of Independent African States. Eight nations were present: Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. This stimulated the formation of the African caucussing group at the U.N. The second meeting of this group was held in Addis Ababa in June, 1960, with a wider representation. In December, 1958, Prime Minister Nkrumah sponsored, also in Accra, the first All-African People's Conference. This has been called "the African Bandung," for present were such nationalist leaders as Tom Mboya, H. Kamuzu Banda, Patrice Lumumba, Kenneth Kaunda, Holden Roberto, and Joshua Nkomo, as well as Prime Minister Nkrumah. A permanent secretariat was established and subsequent con-

ferences were held in Tunis in January, 1960, and in Cairo in March, 1961.

The unity of Africa has since been fragmented, partly in trying to solve its own problems, especially the Congo. After a preliminary meeting in Abidjan in October, 1960, organized by Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, statesmen of many of the African nations formerly part of the French Community met in Brazzaville in December, 1960. They tried to find a common judgment on the tangled Congo situation and to induce France to reach a solution to the Algerian impasse. The "Brazzaville Twelve" included Cameroun, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. In January, 1961, still another grouping of African states met in Casablanca, partly on Morocco's urging to support her opposition to the seating of Mauritania at the U.N. and partly to bolster the Stanleyville regime in the Congo. Present were the heads of state of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the U.A.R., and representatives from Libya, Ceylon, and the Provisional Government of Algeria. Still a third configuration of African states gathered in Monrovia, Liberia, in May, 1961. Present were the heads of state of Cameroun, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta. In addition, delegations were present from Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, and Libya. This was the largest official African conference to date, although Nkrumah of Ghana, Nasser of the U.A.R., and Sékou Touré of Guinea were conspicuously absent.

In the autumn of 1960, when the heads of many states converged upon New York for the opening of the 15th U.N. General Assembly, the prime ministers of Ghana, India, Indonesia, U.A.R., and Yugoslavia found themselves working together in an unsuccessful effort to induce Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower to enter into talks to lessen world tensions. On this occasion seeds were planted for further contact amongst these leaders of the non-aligned nations. This desire for closer consultations was enhanced by the travels of President Sukarno and President Tito, especially the visits of the latter to Accra in March, 1961, and to Cairo in April, 1961.

Thus on April 26, 1961, presidents Nasser and Tito addressed a communication to the heads of state of 21 non-aligned countries suggesting that, in view of world developments and increasing tension, a conference be held before the convening of the 16th U.N. General Assembly. President Sukarno of Indonesia associated himself with the need for such a meeting. On May 18, 1961, the presidents of Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and the U.A.R., joined by the Prime Minister of India, invited a number of non-aligned countries to send representatives to a

preparatory meeting in Cairo beginning on June 5th. To this meeting came delegates from the following states: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, U.A.R., Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Nine of these countries were represented by their foreign ministers. Brazil sent an observer.

PREPARING FOR BELGRADE

“When I had the honor of meeting my friend, President Josip Broz Tito, in Cairo and Alexandria at the end of April, this year, we reviewed the international situation since our last meeting in September, 1960, at the General Assembly session.”—*President Gamal Abdel Nasser*

At the preparatory meeting in Cairo, it was initially proposed that immediate invitations go to the Provisional Government of Algeria and to the Stanleyville (Gizenga) regime of the Congo. After prolonged discussion, it was the preponderant view that the Provisional Government of Algeria be invited to the preparatory sessions, but that the Stanleyville government be invited only to the Conference. Several delegations strongly dissented from this decision and this controversy led to a consideration of the total composition of the Conference. It was decided to adopt certain criteria to decide which countries could be invited “to participate effectively and in the spirit of wholehearted cooperation.” Some delegates wanted to guard against invitations to countries “which were ‘non-aligned’ in name only.” Also it was agreed, in some cases, to make informal approaches to prospective invitees, so embarrassment would be avoided both to the countries invited and to the sponsors if the invitations were rejected. Finally, five criteria were adopted as the basis of issuing invitations to states to attend the Conference:

“1. The country should have adopted an independent policy based on the co-existence of States with different political and social systems and on non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favor of such a policy.

“2. The country concerned should be consistently supporting the movements for national independence.

“3. The country should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of great power conflicts.

“4. If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a great power, or is a member of a regional defense pact, the agreement or

pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of great power conflicts.

"5. If it has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of great power conflicts."

The practical application of these criteria raised additional questions. It was finally agreed to form a continuing credentials committee consisting of countries present which had diplomatic representation in Cairo. This committee was charged with securing additional acceptances using the approved criteria.

At the preparatory meeting the agenda of the Conference was also discussed. The following draft agenda was adopted:

"I. Exchange of views on the international situation.

"II. Establishment and strengthening of international peace and security.

1. Respect for the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, struggle against imperialism, liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States; noninterference and nonintervention in internal affairs of States.
3. Racial discrimination and apartheid.
4. General and complete disarmament; banning of nuclear tests; problem of foreign military bases.
5. Peaceful co-existence among States with different political and social systems.
6. Role and structure of the U.N. and the implementation of its resolutions.

"III. Problem of unequal economic development; promotion of international economic and technical cooperation.

"IV. Any other matters.

"V. Communique of the Conference."

Three nations—Yugoslavia, Cuba, and the U.A.R.—offered to be hosts to the Conference. It was voted to hold the Conference in Yugoslavia beginning on September 1, 1961. The host country was given the task of administering the Conference. The official languages were to be Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. The expenses of the Conference were to be shared in an equitable manner.

Between the end of the preparatory meetings on June 12th and the opening of the Conference on September 1st, the committee of

ambassadors in Cairo made a number of inquiries in an effort to enlarge the number of states to be present. Some of the initial sponsors wanted a wider range of states represented. Togo, Upper Volta, and Nigeria publicly turned down invitations and it was reported that other states (e.g., Mexico) did so privately. Additional states which were not present at the Cairo preparatory meetings but which did attend the Conference included the Congo (Premier Adoula as well as Vice-Premier Gizenga), Cyprus, Lebanon, Somalia, Tunisia, and Yemen. In addition to Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador agreed to send observers.

By the end of July, two meetings were held in Belgrade to reach agreement on administrative procedures. On August 27-28, a committee on organization met also in Belgrade. Draft rules of procedure for the Conference were adopted. Yugoslavia agreed to meet all Conference expenses incurred, except those for translation and transcription. U.N. and U.A.R. personnel were hired for simultaneous translation. These expenses were shared by all states represented except Algeria, with India paying 25 per cent and several of the smaller states paying only 1.21 per cent each. Leo Mates, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, was named secretary of the Conference.

THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE

"In the present extremely tense international situation, this Conference is the most competent forum, outside the United Nations, where the representatives of non-aligned countries can state, as simply and as strongly as possible, their views regarding . . . promoting world peace and constructive cooperation among peoples."

—*President Josip Broz Tito*

The Conference opened on September first with 24 states represented by heads of state or government or by ranking diplomats. Before its conclusion, the premier and vice-premier of the Congo (Leopoldville) also appeared. A list of the heads of state present is given in Table 1. Each head of state was accompanied by a delegation of diplomats. It was estimated that these delegations totalled more than 500 persons. The well-known personalities present who were not heads of state included V. K. Krishna Menon and B. K. Nehru of India, Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia (chairman of the Bandung Conference), and U Thant of Burma.

In addition, Yugoslavia accredited official observers from non-governmental organizations. These included Holden Roberto of the

TABLE 1.

The Heads of State or Government and Chiefs of Delegations Present at the Belgrade Conference

- AFGHANISTAN: Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan.
- ALGERIA (PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT):
Prime Minister Ben Youssef Ben Khedda.
- BURMA: Prime Minister U Nu.
- CAMBODIA: Prince Norodom Sihanouk (head of state).
- CEYLON: Prime Minister (Mrs.) Sirimavo R. Bandaranaike.
- CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE): Premier Cyrille Adoula.
- CUBA: President Osvaldo Dorticos (Torrado).
- CYPRUS: President (Archbishop) Makarios.
- ETHIOPIA: Emperor Haile Selassie I.
- GHANA: President Kwame Nkrumah.
- GUINEA: Luis Lansana Beavogui
(Minister of Foreign Affairs).
- INDIA: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
- INDONESIA: President Ahmed Sukarno.
- IRAQ: Hashim Jawad (Minister of Foreign Affairs).
- LEBANON: Prime Minister Saeb Salam.
- MALI: President Modibo Keita.
- MOROCCO: King Hassan II.
- NEPAL: King Maharajadhiraja Bir Bikram.
- SAUDI ARABIA: Sheikh Ibrahim Sawayel
(Minister of Foreign Affairs).
- SOMALIA: President Aban Abdullah Osman
- SUDAN: President Ibrahim Abboud.
- TUNISIA: President Habib Bourguiba.
- U.A.R.: President Gamal Abdel Nasser.
- YEMEN: Prince Seyful Islam El Hassan
(Permanent Representative to the U.N.).
- YUGOSLAVIA: President Josip Broz Tito.
- BOLIVIA: Jose Tellman Valorde
(Minister of Education).
- BRAZIL: Afranio de Melo Franco
(Ambassador to Switzerland).
- ECUADOR: Dr. Jose Joaquim Silva
(Ambassador to West Germany).

Union of the Peoples of Angola, Oliver R. Tambo of the South African United Front, Sam Njoma of the South West Africa People's Organization, Michael Scott of the Africa Bureau (London), and Homer A. Jack of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (New York).

A huge press corps converged on Belgrade for the Conference. They totalled more than 1,000 reporters, photographers, and writers. There were 121 journalists from the United States, only outnumbered by the Yugoslavian press (140 persons). Other large press contingents included West Germany (59), U.K. (45), U.A.R. (44), France and Italy (38 each), and India (20). The U.S.S.R. sent nine reporters and China was represented by seven.

Most of the plenary sessions of the Conference were held in the Federal Parliament Building in downtown Belgrade, built in Italian Renaissance style and flanked by two huge sculptured horses. The pink and yellow marble chamber was fitted with a huge circular table and with a seat for each head of state. There were chairs for five members of each delegation behind the head of state. On the main floor were also seats for distinguished guests from Yugoslavia and the Conference stenographers and space for television cameras. In the balcony were separate sections for the diplomatic corps accredited to Belgrade, the press, and official nongovernmental observers. There was simultaneous translation into English, Arabic, and French by means of individual transistor radios. Two of the plenary sessions were closed and held in the Federal Executive Council Building in New Belgrade.

The several hundred persons allowed in the balcony and the thousands of Yugoslavs watching the full coverage of the plenary sessions on television saw interesting sights. Archbishop Makarios planted a kiss on the cheek of President Nasser. The latter and President Bourguiba slapped each other on the shoulder. President Nkrumah tried to amuse Emperor Haile Selassie.

National costumes predominated. Sheikh Sowayel and his colleagues from Saudi Arabia wore the black bisht, white kaffiyeh, and gold agal of Bedouin tradition. Foreign Minister Beavogui of Guinea wore a flowing striped robe with a red skullcap embroidered in gold. The ladies from Guinea wore rainbow-hued organdie gowns and headscarves. Archbishop Makarios wore the black robes and high-crowned hat of a Greek Orthodox prelate. Prince Seyful of Yemen had a white turban while Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia wore a white duck jacket. V. K. Krishna Menon sported his cane and Jawaharlal Nehru wore the Gandhi cap and a rosebud in his tunic. President Sukarno was dressed in a white double-breasted suit, rows of military ribbons, and a black caracul hat. Many heads of state wore traditional, subdued Western clothes, such as President Tito, Emperor Haile Selassie, President Nasser, and President Nkrumah.

There were several informal receptions and dinners during the Conference. At the largest in the Metropole Hotel, Marshal Tito played host to the heads of state, and other special guests, while several thousand persons watched this "family party" for which protocol was disregarded. Along with caviar and lobster, there was whisky from Britain, vermouth from Italy, vodka from the Soviet Union, and plum brandy (slivovitz) from Yugoslavia. A 12-piece band played jazz while the guests drank and ate.

The city of Belgrade was tidied for the "konferencija." Buildings were whitewashed, fluorescent street lights emplaced, and fountains and flower-arrangements constructed. Uniformed militiamen were brought to Belgrade from the provinces.

The heads of state were quartered in private villas, although some preferred to live in the big hotels. The press had its working headquarters in a large trade union center on Marx and Engels Square.

THE PLENARY SESSIONS

"Belgrade, which has throughout its long history seen many wars of conquest, invasions and invaders . . . now for the first time has the opportunity to welcome in its midst the highest representatives of 27 countries—champions of peace."—*President Josip Broz Tito*

The principal business of the Conference was transacted during 17 plenary sessions. An outline of each session follows.

SEPTEMBER FIRST

FIRST PLENARY SESSION. President Tito opened the Conference at 10:00 a.m. with a minute of silence honoring all those who lost their lives in the struggle for freedom and independence. He then made a speech of welcome. The agenda of the first session was adopted. The presence of 24 delegations and two observers was affirmed. The Conference agenda and rules of procedure were adopted as well as a report on financial and organizational matters. President Sukarno initiated the general debate.

SECOND PLENARY SESSION. General Abboud was chairman. President Nasser spoke. The session adjourned at 1:00 p.m.

THIRD PLENARY SESSION. President Bourguiba was chairman. Conference secretary Leo Mates read messages from King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, President Sékou Touré of Guinea, President Victor Paz

Estenssoro of Bolivia, and Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China. He also announced that greetings had been received from a number of non-governmental organizations and nationalist movements. Speeches were given by General Abboud and President U Nu.

FOURTH PLENARY SESSION. President Nasser was chairman. Speeches were delivered by President Bourguiba and Prime Minister Daud.

SEPTEMBER SECOND

FIFTH PLENARY SESSION. Prince El Hassan was chairman. Emperor Haile Selassie I and President Nkrumah participated in the general debate. President Nasser proposed that a drafting committee be appointed. After some discussion, it was decided to continue the general debate and to form a drafting committee to which every delegation would appoint one representative. The first meeting of the committee was held in the afternoon.

SIXTH PLENARY SESSION. Prime Minister Daud was chairman. Secretary Mates read messages from Premier A. K. Kassem of Iraq, President Kennedy, and Premier Khrushchev. Speeches were given by Prime Minister Nehru (the only extemporaneous address) and President Dorticos.

SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION. Prime Minister Ben Khedda was chairman. The Secretary read a message from the President of the Royal Council of Cambodia. Prime Minister Saeb Salam and Foreign Minister Sheikh Sowayel spoke.

EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION. Prime Minister U Nu was chairman of this evening session which began at 6:40 p.m. King Mahendra Bir Bikram and Dr. Hashim Jawad spoke in the general debate.

SEPTEMBER THIRD

NINTH PLENARY SESSION. President Dorticos was chairman. Speakers included President Tito and Archbishop Makarios.

TENTH PLENARY SESSION. Archbishop Makarios was chairman, with Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Prince Sihanouk as speakers.

ELEVENTH PLENARY SESSION. Emperor Haile Selassie I was chairman. Speeches were made by King Hassan II, President Modibo Keita, and Jose Tellman Valorde (of Bolivia).

SEPTEMBER FOURTH

TWELFTH PLENARY SESSION. President Nkrumah was chairman. Foreign Minister Beavogui and President Osman spoke in the general debate.

THIRTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. Foreign Minister Beavogui was chairman and addresses were made by Prime Minister Ben Khedda and Prince Hassan.

FOURTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. This was a closed meeting. It was attended only by the leader of each delegation accompanied by one adviser. The session opened at 4:50 p.m. and closed at 8:30 p.m.

SEPTEMBER FIFTH

FIFTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. Premier Salam was chairman. Prince Sihanouk announced that his government decided to recognize de jure the Provisional Government of Algeria. President Khedda welcomed this action and asked other countries to follow Cambodia's example. Presidents Tito and Nkrumah announced that their governments would grant de jure recognition to the Provisional Government of Algeria. Speeches were made by Premier Adoula and Vice-Premier Gizenga. A minute of silence was observed in tribute to Patrice Lumumba of the Congo.

SIXTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. This was a closed meeting, again attended only by the heads of delegations and one other member from each delegation. The text of documents drawn up by the drafting committee was discussed, amended, and approved. The session ended at 1:15 a.m.

SEPTEMBER SIXTH

SEVENTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. King Hassan II chaired this closing session which began at 2:00 a.m. A representative of Brazil took his seat as an observer. James Barington of Burma read the final Conference documents. King Hassan II gave the closing address. The Conference adjourned before 3:00 a.m.

WHAT IS NON-ALIGNMENT?

"The non-aligned countries represented at this Conference do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc. They sincerely desire to co-operate with any Government which seeks to contribute to the strengthening of confidence and peace in the world. . . . They consider that the further extension of the noncommitted area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs, and intensification of cold war policies."—*Belgrade Declaration*

The Belgrade Conference was organized by non-aligned states to project the non-aligned judgment of world problems on the world stage. If the preparatory conference in Cairo had difficulty in creating a definition of non-alignment (see p. 5), the heads of state in the general debate added several facets to the world's understanding of their own concept of non-alignment.

In a real sense Prime Minister Nehru has been the architect of the concept of non-alignment. He and his country faced misunderstanding and criticism for a decade because of this position. Mr. Nehru was able at Belgrade to observe: "It is a strange thing that some few years ago—six, seven, or eight, if you like—this business of non-alignment was a rare phenomenon. A few countries here and there talked about it and other countries rather made fun of it, or at any rate did not take it seriously. 'Non-alignment? What is this? You must be on this side or that side.' That was the argument. Well, that argument is dead today; nobody dare say that, because the whole course of history of the last few years has shown the growing opinion, the spread of this conception of non-alignment." If more countries have now accepted this concept, most still differ somewhat on its essence. And much of the aligned world is still unclear about its meaning.

The non-aligned nations at Belgrade agreed that they are not neutral. Thus President Makarios declared: "Our neutrality is not conceived in the sense of remaining indifferent and passive to world problems." President Nkrumah criticized "negative neutralism" and those states which avoid "taking a definite stand on issues which affect the balance of power in the world today." He added that "negative neutralism is no shield at all; and in my view negative neutralism is a completely impracticable policy, and even dangerous." President Sukarno also said that "non-alignment is not neutrality; it is not the sanctimonious attitude of the man who holds himself aloof—'a plague on both your houses.'" There was, however, one kind of neutrality which some of the heads of state in Belgrade endorsed—neutrality in the power struggle between the two blocs and thus in the cold war. Emperor Haile Selassie declared: "We mean, in sum, that we are all, in the ultimate sense, neutral in the cold war which rages unabated in the world today." With this frequent exception, the heads of state do not like to be called "neutrals" or "noncommitted."

Objectivity and independence were two concepts used repeatedly by the non-aligned. These statesmen felt that, because of their non-involvement, they could approach world problems with more objectivity and independence than nations wedded to one bloc or the other. King Hassan II spoke of their choices being "guided by constant objectivity." Foreign Minister Sowayel suggested that "non-alignment means that our souls must be innocent of any bias towards any bloc in a dispute.

Freed of any bias, our feelings can examine problems freely." Archbishop Makarios also talked of non-alignment as being "the source of our freedom of judgment and independent approach to world problems."

There is only a short distance from this concept of objectivity to one of morality. The non-aligned states are not a military force or an economic force, but their leaders often call them a moral force. Thus Archbishop Makarios labelled the Conference a "world moral force." Emperor Haile Selassie talked of their serving as "the collective conscience of the world." President Nkrumah used the designation, "moral force." So did President Sukarno in calling the Conference a "co-ordinated accumulated moral force." President Osman hoped that they would always "act in accordance with the moral dictates of our conscience." President Bourguiba likened the group to a "moral 'striking force' which, if well directed, will sooner or later overcome another well-known 'striking force.'" President Nasser hoped that they would be "the power of conscience in this world."

The non-aligned states have some common commitments, but they were not explicitly designated at Belgrade. One can, however, generalize in suggesting that the commitments of the "noncommitted" include initially peaceful co-existence and then peace and not war, independence and not colonialism, equality and not racism, economic development and not continued poverty, and support for the U.N. No such systematic platform was constructed at Belgrade.

The dangers of non-alignment were not ignored at the Conference. The chief one expressed was the fear that the nations assembled would form their own bloc. President Makarios said that it was "not the purpose of this Conference to create a third bloc." This would "involve limitations on objectivity." President Sukarno declared that "we abhor the very idea of blocs." President Tito asserted that "fears that this meeting might mark the beginning of the formation of a third bloc are groundless." However, several heads of state hoped that there would be more co-ordination amongst the 25 states than before. For example, Prime Minister Bandaranaike said: "We must not allow our spirit of unity and purpose which has been so evident at this Conference to disintegrate and fall apart. . . . We cannot, in my view, rely on the haphazard form of consultation which we have employed in the past. . . . We must adapt our procedures to meet that challenge. I would, therefore, suggest that some method should be devised by this Conference to enable our individual countries to ascertain the maximum area of agreement among ourselves, without the need of a formal Conference of Heads of State." But Prince Sihanouk warned that "the solidarity so essential to the non-aligned nations must not be permitted to develop into a rigidly exclusive bloc spirit." Because of this fear, the Conference

adjourned without announcing the establishment of any machinery even for the limited objectives suggested by Mrs. Bandaranaike.

Some of the additional dangers of non-alignment were not mentioned by the heads of state. The objectivity of some nations is qualified by their commitments. Also it is qualified by the stature of their leaders, all of whom are affected—as all human beings—by matters of power and prestige. Prince Sihanouk admitted that it has been suggested that the non-aligned countries try to establish their influence “by shamelessly exploiting the rivalry between the two nuclear blocs.” He denied that he and his fellow statesmen would do so, but some of this exploitation is probably inevitable.

The objectivity of the non-aligned is also tempered by strategy. Some heads of state evidently feel that plain-speaking often heightens tensions, not lessens them, and thus again both objectivity and morality are qualified. For example, Prince Sihanouk observed that while “certain Powers have committed and are still committing reprehensible acts, acts which we denounce,” he felt that “to denounce these Powers by name, to insult them and threaten them has never—according to our humble experience—done anything but make them more stubborn and entrench them still more deeply in their evil ways, for it is for them a question of humiliated pride.”

A final danger of non-alignment was suggested by Prime Minister Nehru. He told his fellow delegates that they could not issue mandates: “We must not overestimate our own importance. After all, we do not control the strings of the world, not only in the military sense but in other senses also. We must realize both our actual and our potential strength that we have, and also the lack of strength that we have.”

Most of these realities of non-alignment were discussed in one form or another in the general debate.

NUCLEAR TESTS—A DOUBLE STANDARD?

“The participants in the Conference consider it essential that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by all countries.”—*Belgrade Declaration*

When the Belgrade Conference was first conceived in the spring

of 1961, U.S.-U.S.S.R. tensions were high. By the time the heads of state were preparing to attend the Conference, and writing their speeches for the general debate, the Berlin and German situation made tensions even more acute and World War III a possibility. Then on the very eve of the Conference, Premier Khrushchev publicly revealed that the Soviet Union would resume nuclear weapons tests. The announcement by President Kennedy that the U.S. would resume underground tests did not reach Belgrade until the final hours of the Conference.

Premier Khrushchev's announcement shocked the heads of state and their delegations as it did much of the non-Communist world. Some heard of the Soviet move while enroute to Belgrade. For example, Indian reporters asked Prime Minister Nehru for his reaction to the Soviet announcement as soon as he landed at the Belgrade airport. He replied that he did not have the full details, but added: "I am against nuclear tests by any power."

Although the resumption of Soviet tests heightened world tensions and constituted an added reason to hold the Belgrade Conference, Premier Khrushchev's act did not change the Conference itself. In the general debate, about two-thirds of the heads of state referred to the resumption of Soviet tests (see Table 2). Some wove this reference into their speeches in an extemporaneous manner, while a few perhaps did not refer to it at all because their speeches had been composed and printed weeks before. There was no move in the general debate to send an urgent resolution to Mr. Khrushchev to stop his testing program. Indeed, there is evidence that discussion in the drafting committee of the paragraph on nuclear tests was very brief. It appears that there was so much controversy on other issues—to emphasize world peace or colonialism, to send delegations to Moscow and Washington, to word the Berlin-Germany statement judiciously, and to set a deadline on the ending of colonialism—that scant time was given in committee to the wording of the statement on nuclear tests. What is hard to believe is that none of the foreign ministers on the drafting committee and none of the heads of state in the penultimate plenary session realized that the wrath of the Western world would be directed to the Conference if it did not make some judgment, however mild, on the resumption of nuclear tests by the U.S.S.R. Such a judgment was lacking and all the Declaration did was to ask that a moratorium be resumed and observed by all countries.

A second deficiency of the Belgrade Declaration relating to tests was its refusal to make a judgment on the substance of the test-ban negotiations in Geneva. The West had reason to hope that the Belgrade Conference would evaluate the Geneva talks and at least acknowledge that the West was bargaining in good faith and that the world could not countenance a troika control of any test-ban administration. Instead,

TABLE 2.

Excerpts from Speeches of Heads of State Pertaining to the Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests by the U.S.S.R.

PRIME MINISTER BEN KHEDDA OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ALGERIA: "We must, of course, fight for the discontinuance of nuclear explosions. . . ."

PRIME MINISTER BANDARANAIKE OF CEYLON: "Unfortunately, disarmament negotiations, regarding both nuclear tests and general disarmament, have come to a standstill, and, what is worse, nuclear tests have been resumed by the Soviet Union."

PREMIER CYRILLE ADOULA OF THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE): The resumption of nuclear tests "defies the legitimate hopes of mankind. . . . The nuclear race is in fact genocide."

PRESIDENT DORTICOS OF CUBA: "The problem of the cessation of thermo-nuclear tests is subordinated to the general problem of disarmament and the elimination of situations of conflict which constitute a peril of war. A total agreement on disarmament would, at the same time, bring about the cessation of such tests."

ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS OF CYPRUS: "We were shocked to hear that the Soviet Union had declared its intention to resume nuclear tests and still more shocked to hear yesterday that it had already started such tests. In this connection I would also wish to place on record our concern over the carrying out of nuclear tests by France in Africa, against world opinion and in disregard of the protests of the people of that continent."

PRESIDENT NKRUMAH OF GHANA: "Only last night, the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device. This was a shock to me, as it must have been to you all. But it is a shock which forcibly brings home to us the supreme danger facing mankind."

FOREIGN MINISTER BEAVOGUI OF GUINEA: "We should propose that the Conference should . . . decide that we shall support efforts to reach agreement on general and controlled disarmament and to stop all nuclear blasts immediately."

PRIME MINISTER NEHRU OF INDIA: "This danger of war comes nearer and nearer, has been enhanced and has become nearer to us, perhaps, by the recent decision of the Soviet Govern-

ment to start nuclear tests. Now I am not in a position, and I suppose no one else here is in a position, to know all the facts which underlie these decisions—all the military considerations, political, non-political considerations, whatever they may be—but one thing I know: that this decision makes the situation much more dangerous. That is obvious to me; therefore I regret it deeply because it may well lead to other countries also starting this and then, apart from the danger inherent in nuclear tests—that is radioactive substances falling and all that—all this brings us to the very verge and precipice of war. That is why I deeply regret it, and because of all this it has become even more urgent that this process of negotiation should begin without any delay, without thinking of who is going to ask whom first. The person who asks first will deserve the credit, not the person who shrinks from asking others.”

FOREIGN MINISTER JAWAD OF IRAQ: “It is therefore extremely essential, in the scheme of total disarmament, to abolish the production and use of all nuclear weapons; prohibit once for all any kind of atomic tests, and to place these matters under an effective system of international control.”

PRESIDENT SALAM OF LEBANON: “We are truly astonished, as was the whole world, by the Soviet Union’s resumption of nuclear weapons tests on an unimaginable scale. Our pain was increased by the fact that the declaration of this intention was issued on the very eve of our meeting here where we plan to urge all the powers to listen to the dictates of reason, and avoid for humanity a war of annihilation. This announcement should however increase our faith in the soundness of our objective.”

KING HASSAN II OF MOROCCO: “A limited agreement on discontinuing nuclear tests could at least have removed the danger of any increase in the number of countries in possession of atomic weapons. The three-power conference, however, that has been meeting for this purpose for more than two years has still not completed its work at Geneva. Morocco, a victim of the continuation of nuclear tests, took decisive action in the U.N. which resulted in the adoption by the latter of a resolution condemning the French explosions in the Sahara; there has, alas, been no attempt to implement this resolution. Unfortunately, the news of the resumption of nuclear tests by the U.S.S.R. has caused us serious concern, coming as it does at a time when the whole

world and we at this Conference were awaiting the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests as a preliminary and decisive stage in progress towards general and complete disarmament."

KING MAHARAJADHIRAJA OF NEPAL: "The course of negotiations on the ban of the nuclear tests has been equally tenuous, though more progress has been made in this field than in the other field (general disarmament). We believe the Conference must make it clear that the non-aligned countries are unitedly in favor of complete banning of nuclear tests."

FOREIGN MINISTER SOWAYEL OF SAUDI ARABIA: "The removal of the causes of fear and terror which lie behind the armaments race and nuclear tests must be one of the most important aims of this meeting; the parties concerned must be persuaded of the essential need to disarm and halt nuclear tests."

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA OF TUNISIA: "Is it not a fact that what restrains the atomic powers—France excepted—from new nuclear tests is world public opinion and the will to peace of the people? At the present time it is more than ever necessary for us to assert the determination of our peoples to oppose a united front to nuclear tests or the threat of the resumption of such experiments whatever may be the source of these tests or of such a threat. It is in this spirit that we express our opinion of the unexpected decision recently announced by a Great Power. This decision is liable to heighten international tension and increase the anxiety of the peoples."

PRESIDENT NASSER OF THE U.A.R.: "Another cause for deep regret is the fact that in this atmosphere filled with anxiety, the Government of the Soviet Union found itself in a position which, according to its own point of view, leads it to the resumption of nuclear tests. This decision shocked me just as it shocked world public opinion. Yet, whatever the motives of the Soviet Government that prompted this decision, the main thing in it is its clear bearing on the deterioration of the dangerous international situation. It is painful that the armament race is not confined to the U.S. and the Soviet Union alone, but we actually found other countries such as France which persist in provoking world public opinion by holding nuclear tests in the homeland of peoples who refuse to allow their land to be the field of such experiments."

PRESIDENT TITO OF YUGOSLAVIA: "The negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests have also reached an impasse. What is even worse, a Western power which is a member of the Atlantic Pact—France—has failed to comply with the resolutions of the U.N. on the discontinuance of atomic tests, but continues to carry out such tests, while the other Western powers possessing atomic armaments have not taken any resolute measures against this. The matters have now reached a point where the Soviet Government has published a statement on the resumption of nuclear weapons tests. We are not surprised so much by the communique on the resumption of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, because we could understand the reasons adduced by the Government of the U.S.S.R. We are surprised more by the fact that this was done on the day of the opening of this Conference of peace. All this has alarmed the world to an even greater extent."

the Conference merely asked for an immediate resumption of negotiations, either separately (as the West wanted) or as part of general disarmament negotiations (as the Soviet Union desired).

It has generally, but not uniformly, been concluded that the non-aligned states displayed a double standard by their handling of the test-ban issue at Belgrade. Had the West resumed nuclear tests first, the Belgrade Conference would have been much more outspoken. While some of the non-aligned states have made a habit of deflating the moral pretensions of the West, this double standard has called into serious question the objectivity and moral force of the non-aligned states themselves.

Numerous conclusions have appeared to explain this double standard. Following are some of the more common explanations.

The non-aligned states are pro-Soviet. There is little evidence to substantiate this claim. One or two of the 24 independent states represented at Belgrade may have voted in recent months with the Soviet bloc at the U.N., but all 24 states have generally had an independent foreign policy.

The non-aligned states are impressed by the Soviet potential. Others may feel that Communism is the ideology of the future, especially since

the recent Russian conquests of space. They do not want to cut themselves off from what they feel may be the ultimate winner in the current ideological struggle.

The non-aligned states are intimidated by Soviet military power. Some are contiguous neighbors of the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China and they feel that they cannot afford to oppose blatantly a powerful neighbor. Some smaller states fear Soviet atomic and rocket power. They fall victims of Soviet atomic blackmail. Terrorized, they see no alternative to war other than to urge the West to accommodate to Russian demands.

The non-aligned states hate the West. The legacy of colonialism and racism is so deep that some Asian and African states are unable to side with the West even on an issue in which the Soviet Union is wrong. The memories of recent European colonialism—from which the U.S. has not completely disengaged itself—remain vivid. Thus these states cannot bring themselves to denounce the Soviet Union since, by that act, they would be placing themselves on the side of their erstwhile colonial masters in the cold war.

The non-aligned states expect far more from the West. The attitude of many of the non-aligned states toward the West is not one of simple hate, but consists of an ambivalent quality. Such leaders as Prime Minister Nehru and President Nkrumah have been schooled in the West and in many ways they are more Western than Asian or African. When the West does wrong, they are critical because they expect more from the West. When the Soviet Union does wrong, they are not surprised, because they expect less. This expectation of better political behavior from the West, despite the West's long period of colonial and racist misbehavior, may be a compliment to the West, but it does not weigh on the pragmatic scales of the cold war.

The non-aligned states know how to influence Western public opinion. In trying to modify the actions of the nuclear powers, the non-aligned states have to use different approaches. There is public opinion in the West. Public criticisms can, in time, affect Western public opinion which in turn can change Western policy. The non-aligned states feel that there is not the same kind of public opinion affecting policy under Communism. If they want to bring about changes in Soviet policy, they must act in a different manner, probably through diplomatic channels.

The non-aligned states think they understand the power struggle within the Soviet Union. Some of the states present at Belgrade insisted that public criticism of Mr. Khrushchev would not help stop nuclear tests, but only make Mr. Khrushchev's position within the Soviet hierarchy more difficult. They felt that if Mr. Khrushchev were to be

overthrown, his replacement would be far worse in terms of peaceful coexistence. Thus for these strategic reasons they tried to prevent any sharp criticism of Mr. Khrushchev during the Conference (coming as it did only a few weeks before the 22nd congress of the Soviet Communist Party).

The non-aligned states have their own priorities of interest. To most of the inhabitants of the non-aligned world, the cold war is of little or no concern. Berlin and Germany are distant—geographically and psychologically. Their people have more immediate political and economic problems. For example, Mr. Nehru in a television program with Mr. Adlai Stevenson on November 12, 1961, attributed the lack of strong protests against Soviet tests to the fact that the newer nations of Africa are not personally involved. He suggested that the African nations are militant if there are tests in Africa, but tests in the Soviet Union are a long way away. Then Mr. Nehru added: "But the thing is the same, whether it is in Africa, Europe, or somewhere else." The fact remains that most of the non-aligned states are not as concerned about the line which divides the West from the Communist world as they are about that which divides the developed from the nondeveloped world.

The non-aligned states are neutral in the cold war for economic reasons. The ex-colonies are not by coincidence the present underdeveloped countries. By treading carefully, despite the cold war, and refusing ideological commitments, they have managed to begin the long process of economic and industrial development with billions of dollars and rubles of economic aid. In order not to jeopardize the continuance of this help from both ideological camps, they pay the political price of trying to maintain the status quo by maintaining an equidistance between the two blocs. Being more neutral than non-aligned, some of these nations may praise one bloc, or another, but they never criticize either to the point that they become aligned and thus would be cut off from economic aid from the other side.

The non-aligned states want to end the cold war, not help win it. They feel that they must talk softly to all nations, disagreeing with policies, but not attacking the great powers for purely propagandistic motives. If they spoke too critically, they would not—in the words of President Tito—"bring about a relaxation of tension in the world, but would, on the contrary, add to the tension." This is a denial that they do possess a double standard. The non-aligned nations insist, however belatedly, that they would not have reacted differently had the U.S. first resumed nuclear testing. They would also have disagreed with a U.S. resumption of explosions, but they insist that they would not have done so in a way which would have made the international climate worse.

WAR AND DISARMAMENT

"War has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than today. On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy in international relations."

—*Belgrade Declaration*

Prime Minister Nehru asserted that "nothing is more important or has more priority than this world situation of war and peace." His priority for the Belgrade Conference was adopted by the drafting committee and the heads of state. Quite independently most statesmen present automatically emphasized the worsening international situation. Mrs. Bandaranaike said that she attended the Conference "as a woman and a mother who can understand the thoughts and feelings of those millions of women, the mothers of the world, who are deeply concerned with the preservation of the human race." For this utterance, she received one of the rare applauses during the plenary sessions. She also stated that there is not a single mother "who could bear to contemplate the possible danger to her children of being exposed to atomic radiation and slow and lingering death, if not swift annihilation." She warned the statesmen of the world that they do not "have a mandate to precipitate a nuclear war and immense destructive power either to defend a way of life or to extend a political ideology." Prime Minister U Nu felt that the cold war had taken a "sharp turn for the worse." There was a "palpable drift toward open conflict." Man today lives "his entire life in a fear-laden atmosphere," with a "nagging fear that every day may be the last for him and his family." Archbishop Makarios reflected that mankind is living "in the agony of what might happen tomorrow in the shadow of the dread of possible destruction under the menace of a new war." Because the means of total destruction have now been placed in the hands of man, "humanity will have to abolish war or perish." Prime Minister Nkrumah likewise warned that if war ever comes, "the missiles and rockets cannot be prevented from reaching us at our non-aligned doors."

In addition to denouncing war, the heads of state tried to find means of eliminating it. They discussed the necessity of negotiation and of disarmament, quite apart from the special issues of nuclear weapons tests and of the role of foreign military bases. The principle of peaceful coexistence was also reaffirmed.

The general impasse between the West and the Soviet Union, and the particular stalemate over Berlin, were discussed from many viewpoints. The necessity of negotiation was repeatedly underlined. President Nasser admitted that the Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in Vienna "did not achieve the objectives hoped for." Yet he added that "negotiations are

essential and if they do not succeed we must try anew." He called negotiations the "only safe way in such a clouded atmosphere." And the heads of state in their Appeal for Peace urged the President of the U.S. and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to "make most immediate and direct approaches to each other to avert the imminent conflict and establish peace."

The Conference also urged continued U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations "until both they and the rest of the world achieve total disarmament and enduring peace." The discussions about disarmament at Belgrade were more sophisticated than at previous Asian-African conferences, partly because the non-aligned states are devoting more attention to disarmament problems and partly because there has been more discussion of this issue recently on the world stage. Many disarmament ideas were aired. Prince Sihanouk suggested that disarmament control should "not be entrusted to the two great powers," but to a neutral commission composed of the non-aligned countries. President Nkrumah also said the inspection teams should be composed exclusively of non-aligned states since "it would eliminate all suspicion, create confidence in the inspection method, and help solve this crucial and vital issue." He urged that representatives from the non-aligned world be represented at all future disarmament conferences. President Tito called for a "new approach" to disarmament, one which involved the "broad and active participation of countries which have neither been involved in the arms race nor directly engaged in disarmament negotiations." He felt the time had come to convene a general world disarmament conference in an effort to take the disarmament problem "off dead center." He also advocated initial and partial measures, but not as a substitute to complete disarmament which remained "the basic and increasingly urgent task." Mrs. Bandaranaike reminded the heads of state that she and the heads of Cyprus, Ghana, and India discussed disarmament at length at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in March 1961 and she commended their communique on disarmament.

One aspect of current Western military posture drew widespread criticism: foreign military bases. Prime Minister Daud called them "a threat to the peace of the world," especially those which "have been forced on the soil of people against their wishes." Prince Sihanouk declared that no country has the right to maintain a military base in a nation "in the face of opposition from its legitimate Government." President Dorticos urged the dismantling and abolition of foreign bases, and said the U.S. base in Guantanamo was used "to wound our national dignity, to harbor counter-revolutionary forces, and to introduce arms into the country for use against the liberating forces of the Revolution."

A key to the foreign policies of many of the countries represented at Belgrade was the concept of peaceful coexistence. Prime Minister

U Nu said: "We believe that man must learn to coexist, regardless of his differences, and that he must not be deterred or discouraged because of differences, because differences will exist as long as man lasts." Prince Sihanouk defined co-existence as "simply a renunciation of the use of force to impose an ideology." Coexistence should create a climate of confidence, relaxed tension, and friendship among all nations. The Belgrade Conference reflected this concern. It suggested that different social systems do not constitute an "insurmountable obstacle for the stabilization of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference in the international development of other peoples and nations are ruled out." The Declaration pointedly asserted that "any attempt at imposing upon peoples one social or political system or another by force and from outside is a direct threat to world peace." This principle of co-existence is the "only alternative" to the continuance of the cold war and ultimately a nuclear catastrophe.

BERLIN AND GERMANY

"The countries participating in the Conference consider that the German problem is not merely a regional problem but liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments in international relations. Concerned at the developments which have led to the present acute aggravation of the situation in regard to Germany and Berlin, the participating countries call upon all parties concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin, in accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of State or Governments on 5 September, 1961."

—*Belgrade Declaration*

The Conference convened when the Berlin crisis was severe and thus many heads of state understandably emphasized Berlin and Germany in their speeches in the general debate. Some made general observations, while others presented specific solutions. Prime Minister U Nu, for example, deplored the military response of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to the Berlin crisis, as if "the facts of nuclear warfare have not yet sunk in deep enough." What "shocked" him was that "the responses and counterresponses have been undisguisedly military in character." The willingness of the Great Powers to go to war if necessary over Berlin "represents a bankruptcy of common sense and reason." He asserted that "there is no problem in this world, however intractable, which cannot be solved by negotiations and without loss of honor to either side."

Prime Minister Daud of Afghanistan urged that it was the duty of the non-aligned states to prevent war over Berlin by taking the initiative in bringing about negotiations. Several heads of state, including Emperor Haile Selassie and President Salam, suggested that the issue be taken directly to the U.N. Prime Minister Nehru spoke of the "two independent entities, powers, countries" of East and West Germany as "a fact of life." He added: "It is not a matter of my or anyone else's liking or disliking it; it is a fact that has to be recognized." President Sukarno declared: "Common sense demands the recognition of the temporary de facto sovereignty of two Germanies as a big reality." Several heads of state mentioned the reality of the Oder-Neisse line. Thus President Nkrumah observed: "The Oder-Neisse Frontier which emerged from the last war should be respected."

Access to West Berlin was discussed. Emperor Haile Selassie supported the concept of "free access to West Berlin." President Nkrumah, in Belgrade after an extensive visit to the Soviet Union and China, asserted that access to West Berlin "has been guaranteed over and over again by those who have authority to give such a guarantee." Prime Minister Nehru was "glad" that Mr. Khrushchev himself indicated that such access "will not be limited." He felt that "if that is made perfectly clear and guaranteed by all concerned . . . one of the major fears and major causes of conflict will be removed." President Sukarno observed that "the people of West Berlin should have free access to the other part of the world and the people of the world should also have free access to West Berlin."

Other solutions to the German problem were also proposed. Several speakers talked of the reunification of Germany. Thus Prince Sihanouk urged reunification "on the express condition that it remain neutral." Also the concept of self-determination was suggested. Archbishop Makarios said: "Any solution of the problem of Germany should not disregard the will of the German people whose right to determine freely their status and future cannot be denied." He felt that "any negotiations for the solution of the Berlin crisis and of the German problem in general must be based on the will of the German people freely expressed." He suggested that the "Germans themselves decide through a plebiscite under the auspices of the U.N. their form and system of government and as to whether Germany should be united or remain divided." President Sukarno urged that "the Germans themselves decide their future destiny." And President Salam declared that a permanent solution to the Berlin situation can be found if the German people are permitted to exercise their fundamental right to self-determination."

President Dorticos advocated "the immediate signature of a peace treaty which would confirm the frontiers of Germany as they were

established at Potsdam." President Tito urged negotiations toward "at least a provisional solution, which would not prejudice a final settlement to be achieved later."

With the specter of nuclear war over Berlin hanging above the Conference, and the advocacy of many different solutions, the drafting committee faced a difficult decision. Should it merely ask the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to negotiate or should it suggest the lines of negotiation? A number of members of the Committee urged that a strong paragraph be put into the Declaration, at least acknowledging the existence of the two German states and the necessity of not changing the Oder-Neisse line. The Indian delegation, however, felt that specific recommendations from the Conference would not aid negotiations. Prime Minister Nehru in the general debate warned: "We may have our ideas, and when the time comes we may even say so, but our indicating 'these are the lines for your settlement, for negotiation,' instead of helping may hinder, because we are dealing with proud nations and they may react wrongly." He added: "Therefore, we cannot really lay down any terms on which they should negotiate; but it is our duty and function to say that they must negotiate, and any party that does not do so does tremendous injury to the human race." In maintaining this position, the Indians in the drafting committee not only had the support of the Southeast Asians (except the Indonesians), but they also had the vote of the Arab states, including the U.A.R. The rather mild statement in the Declaration on Berlin and Germany had this origin and reportedly was adopted in the drafting committee by a vote of 15 to 9.

COLONIALISM AND NEO-COLONIALISM

"In so far as any historical perspective is concerned, the era of classic colonialism is gone and is dead, though of course it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet; but essentially it is over."—*Prime Minister Nehru*

During his speech in the general debate, Prime Minister Nehru turned the Belgrade Conference from a traditional gathering of the ex-colonial nations into one perhaps primarily devoted to reducing world tensions. In the preparatory meetings, the Indians and others made the point that there was no need to convene a meeting of busy heads of state just to discuss regional issues, such as Goa, West Irian, or Guantanamo. These problems would be inevitably solved, perhaps at the United Nations. Yet most heads of state nevertheless came to Belgrade eager to discuss and document their favorite colonial theme. Thus Prime Minister Nehru astounded his peers by suggesting that "there is a time

and a place to press any subject and today the time and the place and the occasion are here to take up this question of war and peace." He acknowledged that they all "stand for anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism, and all that." He added that these goals "may be very important but they are secondary." While Mr. Nehru won his battle for a separate statement on Big Power negotiations, the twin evils of colonialism and racism were heatedly debated. And a new evil was added—neo-colonialism.

If the traditional emphasis on anti-colonialism was softened by the decision that it did not have top priority of importance, anti-imperialism in its many forms still took high priority in debate, especially in the drafting committee. There were two contentious issues: whether or not a date should be set for the ending of colonialism and whether or not Israel should be castigated as a colonial center of imperialism in West Asia.

The President of Cuba in the general debate was among those who urged that the Conference set a date for the "end of colonialism, within a fixed period." President Nkrumah proposed that "by 31st December, 1962, all Colonial powers should withdraw from Africa." President Sukarno demanded "that a time limit be imposed for the complete removal of all forms of colonial subjugation of one nation by the other." He felt that "in the case of every remaining colonial regime, that time limit must not exceed two years, and must, if possible, be less than that." President Tito also called for "precisely defined target dates" for the implementation of the U.N. anti-colonial resolution. After much debate, this recommendation was approved by a narrow vote in the drafting committee. In the penultimate plenary session, however, the heads of state deleted the date. Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister U Nu, and others felt that a uniform date would be impracticable. They did, however, support the U.N. resolution granting independence to colonial countries and recommended "the immediate, unconditional, total, and final abolition of colonialism . . . in all its forms and manifestations."

There was a similar debate in the drafting committee on a paragraph about Israel. Some of the heads of state wanted a strong indictment of Israel in the Declaration. Prime Minister U Nu was chiefly responsible for softening the initial statement by threatening to object to the final Declaration. While several heads of state sharply criticized Israel in the general debate, the Declaration blandly condemned "the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations."

The continuing war in Algeria was high in the thoughts of all delegates, especially since Prime Minister Ben Khedda of Algeria was

present. He was accompanied by many of his diplomatic associates and found the Conference a fertile environment for political achievement. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan in his speech in the general debate announced "our official recognition" of the Provisional Government of Algeria. At the 15th plenary session, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia revealed that his government would grant *de jure* recognition to the Provisional Government of Algeria. This stimulated both President Tito and President Nkrumah also to announce *de jure* recognition.

The action of the French at Bizerte was, next to Algeria, in the minds of all present, and this led to a general discussion of what has been called neo-colonialism. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan explained that "although colonialism is being forced to withdraw, it still seeks through intrigue and deception to retain its self-interest in other forms and shapes." Prince Sihanouk referred to "certain countries which have never lost their independence" but are "in fact under severe economic subjection and consequently are not at liberty to pursue their political life in accordance with their own wishes and interests." He urged that they be liberated with "fraternal assistance" from the non-aligned states since they "belong in fact to our non-committed world." Emperor Haile Selassie observed that "colonialism, defined in the classic sense, is forever finished, both in Africa and in Asia," but he urged his fellow heads of state to "recognize and deal with the attempts being made from all quarters to perpetrate colonial exploitation under new forms and to introduce into our continents new systems no less inimical to freedom and liberty." President Dorticos stated "new methods for exploitation of peoples are being developed by means of the economic, political, and military penetration of neo-colonialism." He talked of "client's sovereignty" and "a pretended economic aid which cripples national development and lays down political conditions." These are "odious forms of that neo-colonialism which today throws a threatening shadow over the Afro-Asian countries."

Undoubtedly the problem of neo-colonialism was discussed more at Belgrade than at similar conferences and this discussion is reflected in the Declaration. Of the several sections devoted to this topic, one key paragraph asserts: "All nations have the right of unity, self-determination, and independence by virtue of which right they can determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance."

The savage repression of Angolans by Portugal was discussed by most heads of state. Roberto Holden, head of the Union of the Peoples of Angola, listened in the gallery. The Declaration contained a special paragraph on Angola, urging "a free and independent state without delay."

Apartheid was denounced, but without the adoption of any concrete

proposals for its elimination. However, there was determination that a new kind of racism should not develop elsewhere. Prime Minister U Nu hoped the non-aligned states would "resist any temptation to brand all the white races as evil merely because their particular rulers happen to be white." If they did, they would make "a tragic division of the world on the basis of color." He urged that, in combating evil, they "need to have both a large heart and a level head." Prince Sihanouk likewise urged that they eradicate from their mind "all traces of that racialism of which we are not guiltless." He hoped the Conference would issue a resolution "solemnly proclaiming the right of ethnic or religious minorities to treatment on an equal footing with the people among which they live." He asked that they "take care not to let past humiliations develop today into an anti-white racialism which would be as deplorable as the anti-black or anti-yellow racialism of the past."

The relationship of the U.S. to Cuba elicited comment in the general debate and in the drafting committee. The President of Cuba drew a long indictment of the "imperialist conduct of the U.S. Government towards the struggle for national liberation of the Cuban people." He also urged that the "colonialist domination in Puerto Rico be condemned." Not many heads of state referred to the Cuba situation, although President Tito said the "best illustration of how deeply ingrained are the aspirations of the people to liberate themselves from all elements of colonial and semi-colonial dependence is provided by the recent attempt at aggressive intervention in Cuba, where the whole people unanimously rose in arms to oppose it." President Dorticos was able to include two references to Cuba in the final Declaration.

THE UNITED NATIONS

"The participating countries consider it essential that the General Assembly of the U.N. should, through the revision of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council in order to bring the composition and work of these two most important organs of the General Assembly into harmony with the needs of the Organization and with the expanded membership of the U.N. The unity of the World Organization and the assuring of the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the U.N., bearing in mind equitable regional distribution. Those of the countries participating in the Conference who recognize the Government of the People's

Republic of China recommend that the General Assembly in its forthcoming Session should accept the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of that country in the U.N."—*Belgrade Declaration*

The heads of state in their speeches in the general debate supported the U.N., generally denounced the Russian proposal for a troika, and made moderate suggestions for strengthening the U.N. and giving it greater effectiveness. President Bourguiba called the U.N. "in spite of its imperfections . . . the great hope of mankind . . . the instrument without which the law of the jungle would prevail." President Tito suggested that "the weakening of the U.N. would have an extremely negative effect upon the general development of international relations."

Several speakers reflected the special value of the U.N. to the smaller countries. Prime Minister U Nu said: "We believe that this need (for the U.N.) is greater for the smaller, weaker countries than for the big, powerful ones." He added that it would be "a black day indeed for the world, and particularly for the smaller countries, if the U.N. were to suffer the fate of the League of Nations." Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, whose history was so bound up with the League, poignantly spoke of the "supreme importance which we, and particularly the smaller nations among us, must continue to attach to the role played by the U.N. in the field of international relations." He also said that "it is not the great powers that need or benefit from the existence of the U.N.; it is the small powers, which depend on and require and demand that it live." He added knowingly: "It is we who have the most to lose should it one day be relegated to a tidy niche in history, a niche already occupied by the League of Nations."

Several statesmen condemned those states which bypassed the U.N. Thus President Tito suggested that it is "essential to wage a resolute fight against all tendencies to bypass and weaken the Organization and to distort its role." The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Algeria discussed "the attitude of contempt towards the U.N. shown by certain States—France in particular—an attitude adopted with an assurance of impunity." He felt it resulted in the diminution of the U.N.'s prestige and authority. Prime Minister U Nu expressed "concern at the attitude adopted towards the U.N. by some of the Great Powers, since it goes without saying that the U.N. would be no U.N. without the participation of the Great Powers." Emperor Haile Selassie recalled how "the great powers, while prepared to use the U.N. when it suits their convenience, have been equally willing to ignore and bypass it and act independently of it when their interest so dictated."

The proposals for enhancing the U.N. were both general and specific. Archbishop Makarios urged that the U.N. be "helped in its

evolution towards becoming an effective instrument of governments for peace based on world law." The King of Nepal hoped that the U.N. would "grow in such a manner as would inspire the confidence of (small) nations." The President of Somalia asserted that the U.N. "deserves our full support" and he paid tribute "to the colossal and marvellous results achieved by the U.N. in the Congo under the most difficult conditions imaginable." The King of Morocco called for charter review: the convening "of a general conference of all states members of the organization with a view to undertaking a full and comprehensive revision of the Charter."

There were repeated suggestions that the People's Republic of China be allowed to take her place in the U.N. Prime Minister U Nu said that "this refusal to accept one of the major political facts of life of today's world has been a serious source of weakness to the U.N. as a world organization." Prime Minister Bandaranaike hoped that "wise counsels will prevail and China will take her legitimate seat in the U.N." President Dorticos said the China problem at the U.N. "does not admit of spurious temporary solutions, such as the proposal that the lawful government of China should be represented in the U.N. side by side with that of Formosa." Emperor Haile Selassie complained of hundreds of millions of Chinese unrepresented at the U.N. President Nkrumah spoke of the "anomaly of China's exclusion."

Many heads of state discussed Russia's proposals for changing the character of the secretariat. Only the President of Cuba supported the Soviet suggestion. He said: "We must acknowledge that the Secretariat should no longer remain under the control of a single individual, whose assumed neutrality—as has been shown by events in the Congo and by the murder of Lumumba—does not offer any guarantee that the Organization's executive powers will be properly used." President Nkrumah felt the present organization of the Secretariat "outmoded," especially because of the tragic experiences in the Congo. He proposed a troika of deputies and also an executive body elected by the General Assembly "to ensure that the decisions of both the General Assembly and the Security Council would be faithfully and promptly implemented by the Secretariat." President Sukarno said the structure "requires reorganization."

Other heads of state upheld the concept of a single executive and some specifically criticized Russia's intrusion of the troika. Prime Minister U Nu spoke of being "disturbed by the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union towards the U.N. because she finds herself in disagreement with some decisions taken by the world organization." He felt the troika would "seriously impair the value and effectiveness of the organization." He hoped the Soviet Union "would not press this matter." Prime Minister Bandaranaike specifically criticized the troika and the

triumvirate of deputies, saying: "We feel that the Secretary-General should retain sole executive authority for carrying out the directives of the General Assembly, and Security Council, and the other bodies of the U.N." The King of Nepal called the troika "clearly unworkable." The President of Somalia felt there are "no grounds for altering the structure" of the U.N. without destroying its effectiveness. He called for every effort "to resist any deviation from the principle of an independent International Civil Service." President Bourguiba favored "a strong Secretary-General invested with powers of interpretation and enforcement." President Tito suggested that a certain revision of the Secretariat might be helpful, but "not in a way which would amount to a freezing of present divisions in the world."

It remained for Premier Cyrille Adoula of the Congo to say the last informed word on this topic: "In regard to the problem of the U.N. Secretary and the proposals that he should be replaced by a three-member committee, we hold that the Congolese experience provides an important argument against such proposals. Really, the power of veto, used by any member of such a triumvirate, would undermine every practical decision and would reduce the executive functions of the Organization to ineffectiveness without precedent."

AN EVALUATION

"The Conference may be proud of the fact that it has not fulfilled the expectations of the bad prophets."

—*King Hassan II*

Any evaluation of the Belgrade Conference must include an enumeration of both its achievements and its disappointments. While a preliminary weighing of these against each other can be done today, the ultimate evaluation can only be made by history.

ACHIEVEMENTS

The principal achievement of the Belgrade Conference was its effort to induce President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev to help turn the world away from war and toward negotiations. Prime Minister Nehru was influential in urging the heads of state at Belgrade to give highest priority to peace-making, saying the world situation was "by far the most dangerous that has arisen in the last 15 years or so since the last war ended." Thus there were repeated discussions on war and peace in the general debate and extensive considerations in the drafting com-

mittee and in the closed plenary sessions on the best approach to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Conference discussed and approved an Appeal for Peace. The day after the Conference formally adjourned, a committee of eight heads of state composed identical letters to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. These letters were followed by discussions with Mr. Khrushchev in Moscow by Prime Minister Nehru and President Nkrumah and with Mr. Kennedy in Washington by President Sukarno and President Keita. While it is hard to evaluate the results of these activities, both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev felt it important to respond in full to these visits and communications. (See documents in Appendix).

A second achievement of Belgrade was to identify and enhance the non-aligned position in the world. The Bandung principle—continental affiliation—has become increasingly unsatisfactory, although the Asian-African caucussing group formed after the Bandung Conference has had a significant influence at the U.N. Yet the 29 Bandung nations covered too broad a political spectrum (e.g., People's Republic of China to Turkey). At the same time the Bandung formula was geographically limiting, with Europe and even Latin America excluded. Under the Belgrade formula, non-alignment is a position if not a force which is potentially universal. It is no longer bound by continent and color, with the admittance of Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and Cuba into the group. While the aligned states in Asia, such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey have been excluded, it is expected that additional states will gravitate to the Belgrade "no bloc." Inevitably some states will leave as their policies in the U.N. and elsewhere become more aligned either toward the Soviet Union or the West.

The third achievement of Belgrade was to underline the multiple and continuing concerns of the 25 nations for a variety of common goals. They demanded that the U.N. continue, not in a weaker form, but stronger. They underlined the importance of disarmament. They showed the need for economic development. And they emphasized the huge areas of remaining colonialism as well as the dangers of neo-colonialism. The Conference held high these issues and asked for their continued priority on the world's agenda, including that of the U.N.

DISAPPOINTMENTS

If there were achievements at Belgrade, there were also disappointments. The chief one was, of course, the double standard displayed especially on the issue of the resumption of nuclear weapons tests but also on Communist colonialism. A discussion of the Belgrade reaction to the nuclear test issue is discussed at length elsewhere (p. 15). That the Conference did not discuss Communist penetration of Tibet

and the continued Communist occupation of the Eastern European countries, such as Hungary, are indications that most of the nations present at Belgrade still refuse to recognize that colonialism and imperialism can derive from other than Western and capitalistic sources.

A second disappointment was the refusal of the Conference Declaration to deal with the Berlin and German problem except to call upon all parties not to use or threaten force. While a judgment on Berlin or Germany from basically a Communist viewpoint would have been disastrous and embarrassing for the Conference, a judgment of at least the minimum facts about Berlin and Germany would have been valuable. Such a statement by the Conference early in September 1961 would have been a timely contribution to world discussion when there was so much unreality about the Berlin and German problem. By not saying anything more about Berlin than what appeared in the Declaration, the heads of state lost an important opportunity to give prudent leadership to help solve a crucial problem.

A third disappointment was the absence at Belgrade of some states which were expected to attend. The Bandung Conference consisted of 27 independent nations. Certainly after the birth of so many African states since 1955, one would expect many more than the 24 independent nations which appeared at Belgrade, even if some of the original Bandung nations could not be invited because of their political alignments. The absence of otherwise eligible states was due in some cases to unfortunate decisions by the preparatory meetings in Cairo and in others to belated invitations which some of the heads of state invited felt they had to reject under the circumstances. The absence of some states was due to their own wish not to be aligned even with the non-aligned! It is expected that many additional states will attend any second conference. Yet at Belgrade such important non-aligned states as Nigeria, Togo, and Tanganyika (the latter nearer to independence in September 1961 than Algeria) were conspicuously and unfortunately absent.

A final disappointment lay in the problems evidenced in even the non-aligned states themselves. Below the unity there was considerable disunity. There tended to be continuing commitments among the "non-committed" to the right (Cyprus, Nepal) and to the left (Cuba, Yugoslavia). A polarization developed on several occasions between the Casablanca group (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, U.A.R. and the Provisional Government of Algeria) and the Southeast Asia group (India, Burma, and Ceylon, but not Indonesia). In addition, there were the usual personality conflicts and power struggles. Regional disagreements also intruded, such as the border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. Despite these disappointing divisions, the unity was still impressive, especially at a first meeting of the group.

WHO WON AT BELGRADE?

"We look forward to continued friendly relations with the Government and peoples participating in the Belgrade meeting."—*President Kennedy, Sept. 13, 1961*

"It is gratifying that the views of the Soviet Government on the obtaining world situation coincide in many respects with the considerations set forth in the letter from the Conference participants."

—*Premier Khrushchev, Sept. 16, 1961*

Although the Belgrade Conference was confined to non-aligned states, the two great power blocs watched the Conference closely. And the question has frequently been asked, who won at Belgrade?

There was widespread initial disappointment with the Belgrade Conference in official and nongovernmental circles in the West. Many considered the Conference a stunning "defeat" for the U.S. Yet originally official U.S. policy toward the Belgrade Conference was opposite of that toward the Bandung Conference. In 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tried to persuade America's allies in Asia (e.g., the Philippines and Turkey) not to accept an invitation to attend the Bandung Conference. He was unsuccessful, but he persuaded President Eisenhower not to send a message of greetings to Bandung. During the intervening six years, U.S. policy changed and Mr. Dulles' dictum that neutrality is immoral was abandoned, both in the closing months of the Eisenhower Administration and in the early period of the Kennedy Administration.

If the Kennedy Administration did not exactly welcome the Belgrade Conference, it certainly "prepared" for it. American ambassadors to nations attending the Conference were asked to brief the foreign officers on the status of the Geneva test-ban negotiations. President Kennedy even sent Ambassador Arthur Dean back to Geneva (after an absence of two months) with new proposals in an effort to show the Belgrade Conference that the U.S. was seriously pursuing the test-ban negotiations. While at least two U.S. ambassadors urged nations invited to Belgrade not to attend, their actions were officially repudiated by the State Department. The official policy was one of hope, if not enthusiasm, toward the Conference.

Despite conflicting advice from his ambassadors to non-aligned states, President Kennedy announced at a press conference that he was cabling the following greeting to the Conference: "It is always encouraging when responsible world leaders join together to consider the problems that beset mankind. We recognize that most of the countries at Belgrade do not consider themselves committed on

certain issues which confront us today, but we do know that they are committed to the U.N. Charter. The people of the U.S. share this commitment. We know that those gathering in Belgrade are committed to finding a way to halt the waste of the earth's resources in the building of the implements of death and destruction, and the people of the U.S. have constantly pledged themselves to this goal. We believe that the peoples represented at this conference are committed to a world society in which men have the right and the freedom to determine their own destiny, a world in which one people is not enslaved by the other, in which the powerful do not devour the weak. The American people share that commitment, and we have pledged the influence of this nation to the abolition of exploitation in all of its forms. The peoples represented at Belgrade are committed to achieving a world at peace in which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and economic systems and to live their own way of life, and since our earliest beginnings this nation has shared that commitment. All this and much more the leaders at Belgrade have in common. This and much more the people of the U.S. have in common with them. So for myself and I'm sure for the American people I express the hope that their deliberations there will bring us all nearer these goals."

American hopes for signs of approval by the Belgrade Conference of some of its official policies were heightened by the announcement of the resumption of nuclear tests by Russia. Just what the Kennedy Administration expected the heads of state at Belgrade individually or collectively to do in response to the Russian announcement is unclear. Probably it was hoped that the delegates at Belgrade would pause from their deliberations and issue a rhetorical blast at the Russians equal to the nuclear blast of the Russians. Instead, the Conference continued its work as scheduled, despite the great uneasiness caused by the Russian announcement. Many heads of state modified their prepared addresses to refer to the Russian announcement and the Conference Declaration contained a modest paragraph on nuclear tests. There was, however, no reprimand to the Soviet Union. The mild reaction to the Russian tests immediately prevented most Americans from perceiving any other accomplishments of the Conference. This reflex set in motion a train of second-thoughts about Belgrade, non-alignment, and the U.S. position toward the countries represented at Belgrade.

While the Conference was still in session, President Kennedy had occasion to sign the foreign aid bill and he expressly appended this sentence: "It is my belief that in the administration of these funds we should give great attention and consideration to those nations who have our view of the world." Also there were reports from Washington that continued U.S. economic and agricultural aid to Yugoslavia and economic aid to the Volta River project in Ghana were being recon-

sidered because of the deportment of the presidents of these two states at the Belgrade Conference. It has also been suggested that the President resumed American nuclear tests in reaction to the Belgrade Conference. Had the resumption of Soviet tests been criticized, the U.S. Government would have been more sensitive to non-aligned opinion.

Just how anti-American (or anti-West) was the Belgrade Conference? The President of Cuba made some sharp statements during the general debate on the relationship of the U.S. to Cuba (and Puerto Rico) and on America's lack of hospitality to non-white delegates at the U.N. On his insistence, the Belgrade Declaration contained a paragraph on the U.S. military base at Guantanamo. Otherwise, there was nothing explicitly anti-American at the Conference. The Declaration did endorse policies—such as the seating of the People's Republic of China in the U.N.—which had long been opposed by the U.S. and favored by the U.S.S.R. But such action by the Conference cannot be considered anti-American any more than the attacks on some of America's closest NATO allies—France and Portugal—for their colonial and neo-colonial activities in Africa.

If disenchantment with Belgrade developed in the U.S., there curiously developed enchantment in the U.S.S.R. In 1955 the Soviet Union welcomed the convening of the Bandung Conference and has since tried to make use of the Bandung mystique. For one thing, the U.S.S.R. had hoped for the convening of a second Bandung Conference which would not only include the People's Republic of China, but probably herself, since she is partly an Asian power. The Belgrade formula of non-alignment resulted in the exclusion of both China and the Soviet Union. Also the Russians were probably annoyed that Yugoslavia should have been selected as host for the Conference. Thus the Soviet press did not reflect any enthusiasm for Belgrade in the weeks before the Conference was held. It dispatched only nine reporters to Belgrade (the Chinese sent seven), but Chairman Khrushchev did cable an official message to the heads of state quite apart from his nuclear blast heralding its opening. He said in part: "Pursuing the lofty humanistic aims of ensuring peace and eliminating the remnants of the past war, the peace-loving states cannot but take measures to put out the remaining sources of war danger and curb the forces of aggression and revenge."

Somewhere in the midst of the Conference, the Soviet Union suddenly found that the meeting was not going as badly as she had feared. As the U.S. lost interest, the U.S.S.R. gained interest. But just how pro-Soviet was the Belgrade Conference? No head of state made any sharp statements against Soviet policy, but no head of state endorsed many of Russia's current political ideas either. No head of state directly praised Russia for resuming nuclear tests. Nobody endorsed

her troika proposal, either for the U.N. or for the test-ban control body. While some heads of state advocated a deadline for the end of Western colonialism—as Russia had advocated—the Conference itself voted down any date. Again, while several heads of state tended to reflect the Russian position on Germany, and many advocated a compromise position on Germany, the Conference itself took no substantive position on Germany and only pleaded for big power negotiations. The Conference did urge the admission of the People's Republic of China and changes in the United Nations, and it did make massive attacks on colonialism and neo-colonialism, but these are certainly not "Soviet" issues. The Soviet Union made negative gains at the Belgrade Conference: the Russian resumption of tests was not officially condemned; neither was Communist colonialism in Hungary or Tibet. Thus the Belgrade Conference was only pro-Soviet in the sense that the Soviets tried belatedly to make it so and, in the attempt, they received the psychological help of many Americans.

With the passage of time, the U.S. is having second thoughts about its initial reaction to the Belgrade Conference. Already both power blocs are trying to use the Belgrade mystique for their own ends. President Kennedy, speaking to the U.N. less than three weeks after the Conference ended, discussed the risks inherent in disarmament and said that they pale in comparison with the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race. Then he observed: "It is in this spirit that the recent Belgrade Conference—recognizing that this is no longer a Soviet problem or an American problem, but a human problem—endorsed a program of general, complete and strictly internationally controlled disarmament." One day later, on September 26, 1961, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, also speaking during the general debate of the 16th General Assembly, asserted that the wider international recognition given to the two German states, the stronger will be the foundations of peace in Europe. He then gave a nod to Belgrade when he added: "Many participants in the recent Belgrade Conference of non-aligned countries were quite justified in pointing out that the need for this is long since ripe." Mr. Gromyko also found it useful to appeal to the Belgrade powers, even if he had to echo several individual speeches and not the official Belgrade Declaration.

Who won at Belgrade? The verdict of history may be that no bloc triumphed overwhelmingly, not even the non-aligned states themselves.

DOCUMENT 1. Danger of War and Appeal for Peace.

This Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries is deeply concerned that, even apart from already existing tensions, the grave and critical situation which, as never before, threatens the world with the imminent and ominous prospect of conflict, would almost certainly later develop into a World War. In this age of nuclear weapons and the accumulation of the power of mass destruction, such conflict and war would inevitably lead to devastation on a scale hitherto unknown, if not to world annihilation.

This Conference considers that this calamity must be avoided, and it is therefore urgent and imperative that the parties concerned, and more particularly the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., should immediately suspend their recent war preparations and approaches, take no steps that would aggravate or contribute to further deteriorations in the situation, and resume negotiation for a peaceful settlement of any outstanding differences between them with due regard to the principles of the United Nations Charter and continue negotiating until both they and the rest of the world achieve total disarmament and enduring peace.

While decisions leading to war or peace at present rest with these great powers, the consequences affect the entire world. All nations and peoples have, therefore, an abiding concern and interest that the approaches and actions of the great powers should be such as to enable mankind to move forward to peace and prosperity and not to the doom of extinction. In the certain knowledge that they seek peace, this Conference appeals to the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to make most immediate and direct approaches to each other to avert the imminent conflict and establish peace.

This Conference expresses the earnest hope that all nations not represented here, conscious of the extreme gravity of the situation will make a similar appeal to the leaders of the Powers concerned thereby proclaiming and promoting the desire and determination of all mankind to see the achievement of lasting peace and security for all nations.

DOCUMENT 2. Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. (The Belgrade Declaration.)

The Conference of Heads of State or Government of the following non-aligned countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia and of the following coun-

tries represented by observers: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador was held in Belgrade from September 1 to 6, 1961, for the purpose of exchanging views on international problems with a view to contributing more effectively to world peace and security and peaceful co-operation among peoples.

The Heads of State or Government of the aforementioned countries have met at a moment when international events have taken a turn for the worse and when world peace is seriously threatened. Deeply concerned for the future of peace, voicing the aspirations of the vast majority of people of the world, aware that, in our time, no people and no government can or should abandon its responsibilities in regard to the safeguarding of world peace, the participating countries—having examined in detail, in an atmosphere of equality, sincerity and mutual confidence, the current state of international relations and trends prevailing in the present-day world—make the following declaration:

The Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, noting that there are crises that lead towards a world conflict in the transition from an old order based on domination to a new order based on cooperation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and social justice for the promotion of prosperity; considering that the dynamic processes and forms of social change often result in or represent a conflict between the old established and the new emerging nationalist forces; considering that a lasting peace can be achieved only if this confrontation leads to a world where the domination of colonialism-imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations is radically eliminated; and recognizing the fact that acute emergencies threatening world peace now exist in this period of conflict in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America and big power rivalry likely to result in world conflagration cannot be excluded; that to eradicate basically the source of conflict is to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept and practice a policy of peaceful coexistence in the world; that guided by these principles, the period of transition and conflict can lay a firm foundation of co-operation and brotherhood between nations; state the following:

I

War has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than today. On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy in international relations.

Imperialism is weakening. Colonial empires and other forms of foreign oppression of peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America are gradually disappearing from the stage of history. Great successes have

been achieved in the struggle of many peoples for national independence and equality. In the same way, the peoples of Latin America are continuing to make an increasingly effective contribution to the improvement of international relations. Great social changes in the world are further promoting such a development. All this not only accelerates the end of the epoch of foreign oppression of peoples, but also makes peaceful co-operation among peoples, based on the principles of independence and equal rights, an essential condition for their freedom and progress.

Tremendous progress has been achieved in the development of science, techniques and in the means of economic development.

Prompted by such developments in the world, the vast majority of people are becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that war between peoples constitutes not only an anachronism but also a crime against humanity. This awareness of peoples is becoming a great moral force, capable of exercising a vital influence on the development of international relations.

Relying on this and on the will of their peoples, the Governments of countries participating in the Conference resolutely reject the view that war, including the "cold war," is inevitable, as this view reflects a sense both of helplessness and hopelessness and is contrary to the progress of the world. They affirm their unwavering faith that the international community is able to organize its life without resorting to means which actually belong to a past epoch of human history.

However, the existing military blocs, which are growing into more and more powerful military, economic and political groupings by the logic and nature of their mutual relations, necessarily provoke periodical aggravations of international relations.

The cold war and the constant and acute danger of its being transformed into actual war have become a part of the situation prevailing in international relations.

For all these reasons, the Heads of State and Representatives of Government of non-aligned countries wish, in this way, to draw the attention of the world community to the existing situation and to the necessity that all peoples should exert efforts to find a sure road towards the stabilization of peace.

II

The present-day world is characterized by the existence of different social systems. The participating countries do not consider that these differences constitute an insurmountable obstacle for the stabilization of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference in the internal development of other peoples and nations are ruled out.

All peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and potentialities.

Furthermore, any attempt at imposing upon peoples one social or political system or another by force and from outside is a direct threat to world peace.

The participating countries consider that under such conditions the principles of peaceful coexistence are the only alternative to the "cold war" and to a possible general nuclear catastrophe. Therefore, these principles—which include the right of peoples to self-determination, to independence and to the free determination of the forms and methods of economic, social and cultural development—must be the only basis of all international relations.

Active international cooperation in the fields of material and cultural exchanges among peoples is an essential means for the strengthening of confidence in the possibility of peaceful coexistence among States with different social systems.

The participants in the Conference emphasize, in this connection, that the policy of coexistence amounts to an active effort towards the elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national oppression, guaranteeing, at the same time, to every people their independent development.

Aware that ideological differences are necessarily a part of the growth of the human society, the participating countries consider that peoples and Governments shall refrain from any use of ideologies for the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure, or imposing their will.

III

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries participating in the Conference are not making concrete proposals for the solution of all international disputes, and particularly disputes between the two blocs. They wish, above all, to draw attention to those acute problems of our time which must be solved rapidly, so that they should not lead to irreparable consequences.

In this respect, they particularly emphasize the need for a great sense of responsibility and realism when undertaking the solution of various problems resulting from differences in social systems.

The non-aligned countries represented at this Conference do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc. They sincerely desire to co-operate with any Government which seeks to contribute to the strengthening of confidence and peace in the world.

The non-aligned countries wish to proceed in this manner all the

more so as they are aware that peace and stability in the world depend, to a considerable extent, on the mutual relations of the Great Powers.

Aware of this, the participants in the Conference consider it a matter of principle that the Great Powers take more determined action for the solving of various problems by means of negotiations, displaying at the same time the necessary constructive approach and readiness for reaching solutions which will be mutually acceptable and useful for world peace.

The participants in the Conference consider that, under present conditions, the existence and the activities of non-aligned countries in the interests of peace are one of the more important factors for safeguarding world peace.

The participants in the Conference consider it essential that the non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues.

They consider that the further extension of the noncommitted area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs, and intensification of cold war policies. The non-aligned countries provide encouragement and support to all peoples fighting for their independence and equality.

The participants in the Conference are convinced that the emergence of newly-liberated countries will further assist in narrowing of the area of bloc antagonisms and thus encourage all tendencies aimed at strengthening peace and promoting peaceful co-operation among independent and equal nations.

1. The participants in the Conference solemnly reaffirm their support to the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," adopted at the 15th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and recommend the immediate unconditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and resolve to make a concerted effort to put an end to all types of new colonialism and imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations.

2. The participants in the Conference demand that an immediate stop be put to armed action and repressive measures of any kind directed against dependent peoples to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence and that the integrity of their national territory should be respected. Any aid given by any country to a colonial power in such suppression is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. The participating countries respecting scrupulously the territorial integrity of all states oppose by all means any aims of annexation by other nations.

3. The participating countries consider the struggle of the people of Algeria for freedom, self-determination and independence, and for the integrity of its national territory including the Sahara, to be just and necessary and are, therefore, determined to extend to the people of Algeria all the possible support and aid. The Heads of State or Government are particularly gratified that Algeria is represented at this Conference by its rightful representative, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Algeria.

4. The participating countries draw attention with great concern to the developments in Angola and to the intolerable measures of repression taken by the Portuguese colonial authorities against the people of Angola and demand that an immediate end should be put to any further shedding of blood of the Angolan people, and the people of Angola should be assisted by all peace-loving countries, particularly member states of the United Nations, to establish their free and independent state without delay.

5. The participants in the Conference demand the immediate termination of all colonial occupation and the restoration of the territorial integrity to the rightful people in countries in which it has been violated in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the withdrawal of foreign forces from their national soil.

6. The participating countries demand the immediate evacuation of French armed forces from the whole of the Tunisian territory in accordance with the legitimate right of Tunisia to the exercise of its full national sovereignty.

7. The participating countries demand that the tragic events in the Congo must not be repeated and they feel that it is the duty of the world community to continue to do everything in its power in order to erase the consequences and to prevent any further foreign intervention in this young African state, and to enable the Congo to embark freely upon the road of its independent development based on respect for its sovereignty, unity and its territorial integrity.

8. The participants in the Conference resolutely condemn the policy of apartheid practiced by the Union of South Africa and demand the immediate abandonment of this policy. They further state that the policy of racial discrimination anywhere in the world constitutes a grave violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

9. The participating countries declare solemnly the absolute respect of the rights of ethnic or religious minorities to be protected in particular against crimes of genocide or any other violation of their fundamental human rights.

10. The participants in the Conference condemn the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations.

11. The participating countries consider the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, particularly against their express will, a gross violation of the sovereignty of such States. They declare their full support to countries who are endeavoring to secure the vacation of these bases. They call upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously their abolition as a contribution to world peace.

12. They also acknowledge that the North American military base at Guantanamo, Cuba, to the permanence of which the Government and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, affects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country.

13. The participants in the Conference reaffirm their conviction that: a) All nations have the right of unity, self-determination, and independence by virtue of which right they can determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance. b) All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. The participating countries believe that the right of Cuba as that of any other nation to freely choose their political and social systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and possibilities should be respected.

14. The participating countries express their determination that no intimidation, interference or intervention should be brought to bear in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, including their right to pursue constructive and independent policies for the attainment and preservation of their sovereignty.

15. The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament.

16. The Heads of State or Government point out that general and complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination

of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes of internal security; and the total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories.

17. The participating countries call upon all States in general, and States exploring outer space at present in particular, to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They express the hope that the international community will, through collective action, establish an international agency with a view to promote and coordinate the human actions in the field of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

18. The participants in the Conference urge the Great Powers to sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used for the peaceful economic and social development of all mankind. The participating countries also consider that: (a) The non-aligned Nations should be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament; (b) All discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices of the United Nations; (c) General and complete disarmament should be guaranteed by an effective system of inspection and control, the teams of which should include members of non-aligned Nations.

19. The participants in the Conference consider it essential that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by all countries.

20. The participants in the Conference recommend that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to discussion of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament.

21. The participants in the Conference consider that efforts should be made to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and imperialism. They consider it necessary to close, through accelerated economic, industrial and agricultural development, the ever-widening gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced

countries and the many economically less-developed countries. The participants in the Conference recommend the immediate establishment and operation of a United Nations Capital Development Fund. They further agree to demand fair terms of trade for the economically less-developed countries and, in particular, constructive efforts to eliminate the excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade and the restrictive measures and practices which adversely affect the trade and revenues of the newly-developing countries. In general, they demand that the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution be applied in all fields of economic development to hasten the achievement of international social justice.

22. The participating countries invite all the countries in the course of development to co-operate effectively in the economic and commercial fields so as to face the policies of pressure in the economic sphere, as well as the harmful results which may be created by the economic blocs of the industrial countries. They invite all the countries concerned to consider to convene, as soon as possible, an international conference to discuss their common problems and to reach an agreement on the ways and means of repelling all damage which may hinder their development; and to discuss and agree upon the most effective measures to ensure the realization of their economic and social development.

23. The countries participating in the Conference declare that the recipient countries must be free to determine the use of the economic and technical assistance which they receive, and to draw up their own plans and assign priorities in accordance with their needs.

24. The participating countries consider it essential that the General Assembly of the United Nations should, through the revision of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council in order to bring the composition and work of these two most important organs of the General Assembly into harmony with the needs of the Organization and with the expanded membership of the United Nations.

25. The unity of the World Organization and the assuring of the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the United Nations, bearing in mind equitable regional distribution.

26. Those of the countries participating in the Conference who recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China recommend that the General Assembly in its forthcoming Session should accept the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of that country in the United Nations.

27. The countries participating in the Conference consider that

the German problem is not merely a regional problem but liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments in international relations. Concerned at the developments which have led to the present acute aggravation of the situation in regard to Germany and Berlin, the participating countries call upon all parties concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force to solve the German question or the problem of Berlin, in accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of State or Governments on September 6, 1961.

The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries resolve that this Declaration should be forwarded to the United Nations and brought to the attention of all the Member States of the World Organization. The present Declaration will be also forwarded to all the other States.

DOCUMENT 3. Letter Addressed to President Kennedy (and Premier Khrushchev).

Your Excellency,

We, the Heads of States and Governments of our respective countries attending the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade from September 1 to September 6, 1961, venture to address Your Excellency on a subject of vital and immediate importance to all of us and to the world as a whole. We do so not only on our own behalf, but at the unanimous desire of the Conference and of our peoples.

We are distressed and deeply concerned at the deterioration in the international situation and the prospect of war which now threatens humanity. Your Excellency has often pointed to the terrible nature of modern war and the use of nuclear weapons, which may well destroy humanity, and has pleaded for the maintenance of world peace.

Yet we are at the brink of this very danger that menaces the world and humanity. We are fully aware that Your Excellency is anxious as any of us to avoid this dreadful development which will not only end the hopes that we all have cherished for the advancement of our peoples but is a challenge to human survival. We are certain that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to avert such a calamity.

Having regard, however, to the gravity of the crisis that menaces the world and the urgent need to avert the developments that may precipitate it, we take the liberty of urging on the Great Powers concerned that negotiations should be resumed and pursued so that the danger of war might be removed from the world and mankind adopts ways of peace. In particular, we earnestly request for direct negotiations between Your Excellency and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers

of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,¹ who represent the two most powerful nations today and in whose hands lies the key to peace or war. We feel convinced that devoted as both of you are to world peace, your efforts through persistent negotiations will lead to a way out of the present impasse and enable the world and humanity to work and live for prosperity and peace.

We feel sure that Your Excellency will appreciate that this letter is written because of our love of peace and our horror of war and the compelling desire that a way out must be found before mankind is faced with a terrible disaster.

We are sending a letter in identical terms to this to His Excellency, N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.²

With assurance of our deep regard,

Yours sincerely,³

Belgrade, September 6, 1961

DOCUMENT 4. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to President Modibo Keita and President Sukarno.

September 13, 1961

Dear Mr. President:

I have studied with care the message from the conference of non-aligned nations which you were good enough to present in person. The United States Government is aware that the non-aligned powers assembled at Belgrade represent an important segment of world opinion, and, especially, that their peoples share with ours a vital stake in the maintenance of the peace. In our continuing deliberations within the United States Government and with our allies, we will give the message from the conference most careful consideration.

1. In the letter to Mr. Khrushchev, the phrase is substituted, "and the President of the United States."

2. In the letter to Mr. Khrushchev, the phrase is substituted, "to His Excellency Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America."

3. The original draft of the letter was signed by Prime Minister Daud, Prime Minister Khedda, Prime Minister U Nu, Prince Sihanouk, Prime Minister Bandaranaike, Premier Adoula, President Dorticos, and President Makarios. It was drafted and signed on September 6, 1961, when some of the heads of state had already left Belgrade. A later draft of the letter was published signed by all heads of state or government or heads of delegations attending the Conference.

As regards the proposal that I enter into direct negotiations with Premier Khrushchev, we are prepared to use existing and appropriate channels to establish the possibility of surmounting the present impasse.

It has been and continues to be our policy to seek to settle our problems with others by peaceful means. We have not attempted to create crises, and we believe it is incumbent upon all responsible governments to explore all possible avenues, including negotiations at the highest levels, for mutually acceptable solutions of current international problems.

However, unless such negotiations are carefully prepared beforehand they risk failure and may lead to deterioration of the situation. We therefore feel that at a time of great tension it is particularly necessary that negotiations of the kind proposed by the Belgrade Conference not only have careful preparation but also a reasonable chance of success. . . .

The channels of diplomacy are open for the exploration of constructive steps toward a reduction of tension. Other means are available when they can serve a useful purpose. Meanwhile, it is clearly of the utmost importance that there be no unilateral acts which will make peaceful progress impossible.

Given a realistic approach and a sincere desire on the other side as well as ours to reach a mutually acceptable solution, we see no reason why eventual negotiations should not be successful in coping with the present crisis. However, we do not intend to enter into negotiations under ultimata or threats. It is also clear that we do not propose to discuss either abdication of our responsibility or renunciation of the modalities for carrying out those responsibilities.

Nevertheless, we believe it possible to find a solution which can accommodate vital interests on both sides of the crisis.

The United States has carefully noted the statements in the Belgrade declaration recognizing that the Berlin and German situations are of vital importance to future developments in international relations. It has consistently been, and will continue to be, our policy to settle differences with realism and responsibility.

We would note that this crisis has been initiated by Soviet, not by American action. We endorse the declaration's reference to the right of all nations to unity, self-determination, and independence, and its condemnation of intimidation, intervention, and interference in the exercise of the right of self-determination. We presume that these principles apply equally to the people of Germany and Berlin.

Our policies in this area have sought to respect these principles. We have absolutely no intention of resorting to force or threats of force to solve the Berlin and German problems, but we are determined

to honor our commitments and are prepared to meet force with force if it is used against us.

While the United States and its allies are all agreed there must be negotiations on the problem, the Soviet Union must give indication of a readiness to engage in discussion based on mutual respect. The only conditions it has yet exhibited any willingness to consider are conditions which involve the surrender of Western rights.

The United States continues to believe that conclusion of an adequately controlled test ban agreement is a matter of greatest urgency. We wish to reaffirm, however, our belief that test ban negotiations should be resumed separately from negotiations on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet resumption of atmospheric testing has increased the urgency which attaches to the signature of a complete treaty test ban. Complex negotiation on general disarmament should not be permitted to delay the achievement of this significant step forward.

I would emphasize again my regret that the Soviet Union has rejected the offer of the United Kingdom and the United States Government to halt atmospheric tests creating fallout.

Only after a searching review of vital United States security interests and after the utmost provocation did we announce our intention to resume underground tests. The non-aligned nations may be assured of our continued willingness to negotiate an effective treaty; but, meanwhile, the national security interests of our country and of our allies in the free world must be protected. . . .

The United States is pleased to note that the participants in the recent conference in Belgrade mentioned the importance of an effective system of inspection and control. This is the crux of the matter. It is clear from United States proposals in the nuclear test negotiations that the United States contemplates inspection and control procedures in the disarmament field in which the non-aligned countries, as well as others, would participate.

For some months the United States has been conducting an intensive study of the problem of general disarmament which resulted in a request to Congress to create a disarmament agency. The study has also resulted in the development of a comprehensive plan for general and complete disarmament which is in the final stage of preparations for public presentation.

This plan provides for a program which will insure that the disarmament is general and complete; that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes; and that disarmament is accompanied by the creation of reliable procedures for peaceful settlement of disputes and maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. . . .

Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed Sept. 6 in New York in a further effort to bring the two sides closer together and to work out a satisfactory disarmament forum. The proposals put forth by the United States by these talks provides for participation of non-aligned countries in future broad disarmament negotiations. They also provide for negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations if the Soviet Union will agree. . . .

In conclusion, let me say, Mr. President, that we found elements in the message and in the declaration which reflected a genuine desire to bring about a relaxation of tensions and which, if applied in a truly neutral and objective manner, could be of positive benefit in easing world tensions.

We respect, as always, the desire of other nations to remain non-aligned. We understand with sympathy and share their passion for peace. We are, as always, prepared to cooperate with all initiatives to bring about an improvement in the world situation. We look forward to continued friendly relations with the Government and peoples participating in the Belgrade meeting.

DOCUMENT 5. Letter from Premier Khrushchev to Prime Minister Nehru.

September 16, 1961

Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister,

I have studied with close attention and interest the letter from the recently ended conference of the heads of state and government of twenty-five non-aligned nations and I am deeply touched that you took the trouble to bring it to Moscow and deliver it to me in person. I express heartfelt gratitude to all distinguished Conference participants for this letter. It is gratifying that the views of the Soviet Government on the obtaining world situation coincide in many respects with the considerations set forth in the letter from the Conference participants. I was also favorably impressed by the other Conference documents full of concern for the destinies of the world.

How can one fail to rejoice that the governments of neutral states, whose population comprises a third of mankind, have lifted their voice in defense of peace and resolutely denounce the policy of war preparations. This will be of the greater importance for world developments since struggle to prevent war and consolidate peace was and remains the backbone of the entire foreign policy of the Socialist states, which compose another third of mankind.

This is how broad the circle of states which regard concern for peace as their vital cause has become.

The Conference's insistent call for the immediate conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament will unquestionably attract the attention of all people. Yes, it is indeed the most pressing and urgent matter, as it is in it that we have a reliable key to stable peace on earth.

The Soviet Government regards with great respect the Conference's considerations and conclusions on a number of other international questions, including the question of complete and final liquidation of colonialism. It can now be confidently said that soon, very soon, the pressure of joint forces of the peoples will break the resistance of states clinging to their colonial possessions which have served them for decades as a source of enrichment, but only because the colonialists robbed and brutally exploited the colonial peoples. The sweat and blood of these peoples—such is the source of the wealth of the colonial powers. The day is near when colonialism will be forever wiped off the face of the earth.

In the letter delivered to me the Conference participants expressed deep concern over the aggravation of the international situation and the danger of war. The Soviet Government fully shares this concern. In all the postwar period the threat of war has never, perhaps, been felt as keenly as today. As you are well aware, of course, this state of affairs has not come of itself. It is a result of the activities of definite forces which are interested in anything but stable peace.

One cannot escape the thought that the policy of the NATO powers is being increasingly influenced by circles which simply seek war, push to war. They apparently realize that time works against the old imperialist system founded on domination and oppression, on flouting the basic rights of the peoples, and are considering if the time has not come to stake everything on an attempt to stop by war the great shifts that are taking place in the life of the peoples throughout the world, and especially on the continents which only yesterday groaned under the whip of the colonial overseers.

This conclusion imposes when you see that the governments of the Western powers intensify military preparations in every way, increase the already inflated military budgets, call up reservists, and instill among the population of their countries a spirit of militarism of which there is already too much in some NATO powers. It appears that these countries are not averse to using for a general showdown the central question which brooks no delay—the question of a German peace treaty whose conclusion would radically improve the situation in Europe considering the actual situation which has developed in Germany in connection with the formation of two sovereign German states, and would render a serious service to the cause of universal peace. . . .

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to declare that we are deeply convinced that the measures we have taken are in the

interests not only of the Soviet people, of our allies, who like ourselves, defend the cause of peace, the need of drawing a line under World War II and concluding a German peace treaty for this purpose, but also in the interests of all other peoples who crave a peaceful life. We express satisfaction with the fact that, on the whole, our defensive measures have been understood correctly by most broad public circles in many countries.

I should like to tell you openly and frankly, although that will be no news to you, that the Soviet Union would not like to follow in the rut of military rivalry with the Western powers. This is not our policy, this is not our road and we should not like to follow along this road unless forced to do so. Our greatest and most sacred desire is to live in friendship with all states, to live in a world without wars. It is for this reason that we are demanding so persistently that statesmen responsible for the destinies of the world take the only correct decision: to put an end to remnants of the Second World War, to smash completely the war machinery of states, destroy all armaments, including nuclear weapons which would finally remove the question of nuclear weapons tests; both of these questions are bound up organically, inseparably and can be solved only simultaneously. It is this that I tried to stress in every way during my recent meeting with President Kennedy in Vienna.

In their letter the participants in the conference of noncommitted nations urge negotiations between the great powers to remove the danger of war. In particular they suggest direct talks between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President of the United States of America.

What can one say to that? You know, of course, that the Soviet Union always stood for a negotiated settlement of outstanding issues. Naturally now too we believe that talks between states, especially between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, as the mightiest and most influential countries, can and must play an important role in cleansing the international atmosphere. In the name of insuring peace we are ready for talks any time, any place and at any level.

The need has been ripe for a long time for statesmen of nations which fought against Hitler Germany to sit down at a peace conference table and together with representatives of both German states, in a calm atmosphere, without stirring up passions, work out a peace treaty which would quench the smouldering embers left after the world conflagration which raged a decade and a half ago. These do exist, and not just anywhere but in the center of Europe from which spread that conflagration in whose flames tens of millions of people had perished. We, the Soviet people, better than anyone else know what this tragedy had cost and how many human lives it carried away.

It goes without saying that negotiations on mature international

problems are needed and we have said so on more than one occasion. But they are needed not for the negotiations' sake. Bitter experience has taught us to speak about this straight. Talks would be useful only if statesmen go to these talks with a serious desire and readiness to achieve agreements which would represent a basis for strengthening peace. The participants in the talks must have courage to face realities and clearly realize that no one can turn the tide of events which reflect the national development of human society.

One has to speak about this because some Western leaders are not averse to striking attitudes even when most serious matters are at stake: "Just look at us, how we do not let ourselves listen to reason." Is it not a fact that certain Western leaders keep interspersing their statements with utterances to the effect that they are holding tough positions and savor this word "tough" in every way?


. . . I want you to get me right. The Soviet Government is ready to take part in negotiations which would be really aimed toward the speediest solution of pressing international problems, in the first turn in a peace conference on the question of concluding of a German peace treaty and normalizing the situation in West Berlin on this basis. It is convinced that the sooner such serious negotiations start the better it would be. It would be an expression of great statesmanship if such a treaty was concluded on an agreed basis at the earliest date.

To strengthen peace and normalize the situation in Europe and throughout the world it would be a good thing if other countries which have not recognized yet both German states—the German Democratic Republic [East Germany] and the Federal Republic of Germany—would recognize them de jure, establish relations with them. The admission of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations would serve the same purpose.

All this would raise a serious barrier to revenge-seeking circles in West Germany which, as it is known, are rallying forces to change the conditions which have arisen after World War II.

The entry of both German states into the United Nations and the establishment of relations with them would fix the situation which exists in Germany and that would be a great contribution to the cause of strengthening world peace.

Allow me, Mr. Prime Minister, to express once more satisfaction over the efforts which you personally, together with leading statesmen of other noncommitted nations, are making to cleanse the international atmosphere. I should like to assure you that faithful to its policy of peace, the Soviet Government, for its part, will continue to spare no efforts to enable the peoples to live without fear of war, in conditions of peace and prosperity.



President Sukarno and Prime Minister Nehru

Back cover: The oval table seating the 25 heads of state in the Federal Parliament Building of Yugoslavia

