



# **THE STRATEGY OF REVENGE**

The New *Blitz Plan* of the  
German General Staff

BY ERNST HENRI

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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ERNST HENRI is a European journalist and author, long a student and observer of German politics. He is the author of two books, published in the 1930's: *Hitler Over Europe?* and *Hitler Over Russia?* In these books he exposed the plans of the German General Staff for World War II, long before the events which confirmed his predictions.

James S. Allen, who provides the preface, is an American student of foreign affairs, and an author. One of his books, *World Monopoly and Peace*, published shortly after World War II, warned against the consequence of a policy directed toward restoration of the German monopoly and military power.

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## Preface

The shocking revelations contained in this pamphlet raise a fateful question before the American people. Are we to entrust the power of decision on war or peace to the resurgent aggressive militarism of Western Germany? This is the real issue involved in the so-called Berlin crisis and in the German question.

The facts brought out by Mr. Henri are incontrovertible. The Germany of Adenauer has in fact become the strongest and biggest military power in Western Europe, the spearhead of the NATO forces on the Continent. Under present plans, it will be armed with nuclear rockets. Rear bases have already been assured the Bundeswehr in Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Denmark and Norway. A big German submarine and surface fleet is again to appear on the Baltic, armed with Polaris missiles. The present German General Staff of the Bundeswehr carries on, mostly with the same generals and Admirals of Nazi Germany, from where Hitler left off. It is permeated with the spirit of revenge for defeats in two world wars. One of its general, Speidel, is in command of NATO forces in Central Europe; another, Heusinger, is chairman of the NATO committee in Washington charged with military planning. In line with traditional German military theory, the present General Staff has a new Blitz plan—the sudden nuclear strike. Far from acting merely as an instrument of NATO or the Pentagon, the German General Staff has aggressive ambitions of its own—ambitions which, if realized, would start a nuclear war.

It should be remembered that Bonn Germany is a big power, second only to the United States in the Western world. It has outstripped Britain industrially, and holds the



commanding economic positions in Western Europe. The continuity of the German General Staff, so graphically depicted here, is paralleled by the continuity of the same monopoly power which supported Hitler. The same Generals, and the same Krupps, Thyssens, and I. G. Farben. Let it also be noted that the same American Big Business groups which helped restore German monopoly after the first world war have contributed even more heavily to the restoration of that power after World War II. In fact, they have a far greater stake in the cartel and corporate network of Adenauer Germany than they had in the Weimar Republic.

Further, resurgent German militarism has been nurtured by massive financial, political and military support from the U.S. Government ever since the beginning of the cold war. It was by unilateral decision of the United States, supported by Britain and France, that the Federal Republic of Germany was set up in 1949, inaugurating the national division of Germany in violation of the Potsdam agreement. By similar unilateral action, Bonn Germany was remilitarized and brought into NATO, with the Bundeswehr assigned the role of NATO "shield." And now the unmistakable trend in the "position of strength" policy is to make the resurgent German military power the chief ally of the United States in Europe, as spear-head of NATO.

We must also note, that the indifference of the German General Staff to the fate of the German people in a nuclear war is matched in the United States by the revived McCarthyite ultra-Right, which does not hesitate to advocate nuclear war whether the issue be Berlin, Laos or Cuba. Senator Goldwater's infamous phrase that he would rather be dead than Red is the same deceptive and criminal slogan under which the Munichites and appeasers supported Hitler as their super-weapon against Communism. Those of this mentality—including the John Birchers, the Dixiecrats and the racist hate-mongers—have a natural affinity with the neo-Nazis and the German militarists, and openly proclaim it. Today, the danger of this new "Fifth Column" to the peace and secur-



ity of the United States is immeasurably greater than in the thirties.

The present-day world is radically different than it was in 1938.

If we are to have a policy that will curb the resurgent West German militarists and assure peace, we must truly assess the realities of today's world. Socialism cannot be reversed; colonialism is finally on the way out; people everywhere want peace. These are the decisive forces in the world today—and not the resurgent past, in Germany or elsewhere. If almost twenty years ago Hitler's army met disaster on the Russian front, a similar venture today would prove an utter fiasco almost instantaneously. The German revanchists know this. Is it not, therefore, in order to ask, as does Mr. Henri: Against whom will the new Blitz plans of the German General Staff be used?

We have had more than enough rebuffs, defeats and fiascos as the result of a cold war policy which is proving more and more bankrupt. "Firmness" in the service of this policy can lead to complete bankruptcy, to increasing the tempo and number of fiascos. Rather do we need a firm resolution to reverse this trend. We need an established national policy of peaceful coexistence that will seek a mutual understanding with the Soviet Union for a peace treaty with both Germanys, for the mutual withdrawal of armed forces, demilitarization of Germany and Central Europe, and disarmament. In this manner can we assure peace and defend democracy in the United States.

JAMES S. ALLEN







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## I. The German General Staff Plays Its Last Card

More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the shadow of Hitler fell over Europe and people in the 1930's began to think seriously of the possibility of a second world war. Everything in the world has changed in the course of these decades, the most dynamic in history.

There is a new world situation, an entirely different relation of class forces; there are new machines, new weapons, new men at the head of states, and a new map of the world. There is no Hitler, no National Socialist Party, no Gestapo. Nor is there that German state from whose bowels the flames of the Second World War emerged. The rising generation knows of the storms that raged over Europe only from books and hearsay.

Everything looks different. Tremendous changes are taking place even in outer space. Never before has life advanced so rapidly as in our days. And only in one respect, apparently, has the world stood still, as if unable to move from the spot. Anybody who makes a study of the policy of German militarism, will find the same question, the same problems on the agenda today as he found a quarter of a century ago.

What are Western Germany's intentions? Is it true that certain generals in Bonn are planning a third world war?



What is their concept of such a war under present-day conditions? Is it possible that in the sixties of the present century such plans could be nurtured in a small state like the German Federal Republic? And if the answer to that is yes, then what do the Bonn militarists hope for, what are their strategic plans?

One thing is beyond doubt. The old Germany does not exist but the German General Staff does. Nor is there any doubt that its leaders are again at work, poring over the same old maps.

The German General Staff is an institution that has always played a special role in European history. One would find it hard to point to any other organization anywhere in the world, that has spilled so much blood. An accident of history? Certainly not. A number of factors have made German militarism the scourge of Europe, and one of them is the activities of the German General Staff.

German militarists have always believed that their country exists primarily for war. They handed this idea down from generation to generation. "Prussia is not a state possessing an army, but an army possessing a state," said Comte de Mirabeau, a French statesman, at the end of the 18th century. A hundred and fifty years later an American general came to the same conclusion.

"The German General Staff itself must be utterly destroyed. These wars of Germany's have been, from the standpoint of the general staff, merely campaigns—merely incidents. They [members of the German General Staff] started back in 1806, under Scharnhorst, and they have determined to rule Europe."

The general who came to this conclusion after the Second World War was Dwight D. Eisenhower.

## "Clairvoyants"

There is one other circumstance to be considered. The leading spirits of the German General Staff have never aban-



doned their plans and never remain idle in peacetime. No matter what the condition of bourgeois Germany may have been, no matter how devastating the defeats she suffered, the German General Staff has always, methodically and painstakingly, continued to prepare aggressive plans. It has no other concepts. Its generals do not recognize documents of capitulation, disarmament commitments and treaties aimed at strengthening peace; the desire for peace expressed by the people of their own country does not interest them. Following each capitulation, they have bent all their efforts towards the creation of a new aggressive army and the selection of the time, place and method for the next aggressive act.

Whether bourgeois Germany is a monarchy, a fascist state or a republic, the war machine always remains in their hands. The German General Staff is content with any social system except socialism. At the head of the military caste, that in the years of Hitler's rule numbered about 300,000 officers, the General Staff is a tightly-closed corporation that surrounds itself with the aura of semi-divinity. It is no exaggeration to say that the German militarists believe themselves to be something in the nature of "*Uebermenschen*" (supermen). "There must be something superhuman, something not of this world in the leader of an army," wrote their teacher and leader, Graf Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff in the years preceding the First World War. It was he, too, who called the army leader "a clairvoyant."

Almost all the German generals of the past 150 years have come from this group of brass-hatted megalomaniacs who have passed on their plans for aggression as though by right of succession. This succession in the German General Staff has been uninterrupted since the beginning of the 19th century. The post of Chief of the General Staff, which the German militarists, according to one of their number, General Gröner, consider the most important post in the world,



has at various time been occupied by people like Moltke, Schlieffen, Hindenburg, Seeckt, Blomberg, Balder and Gu-derian. Each of them elaborated plans for the conquest of Europe. Schlieffen, Hindenburg, Mackensen and other generals who served under the Kaiser were Moltke's pupils. Ludendorff, and the Wehrmacht generals, Gröner and Seeckt of the Weimar Republic, were Schlieffen's pupils, and their successors, Hammerstein and Fritsch, were Gröner's pupils. The generals of Hitler's Wehrmacht, Keitel, Jodl, Brauchitsch, Rundstedt, Halder and dozens of others were trained by that same group of hereditary "clairvoyants" from the General Staff who launched the First World War.

This thread from the past extends to our day. Heusinger, the builder of the Bonn Bundeswehr, is a former Operations Chief of the Army General Staff; the same post was once held by Ludendorff and by the chief of the Reichswehr, Fritsch. Another of the Bundeswehr generals, Speidel, served in the General Staff in the thirties and headed the Western Armies Division (*Abteilung-Fremde Heere West*). Of the 140 generals and admirals of the Bundeswehr, 81 had belonged to the General Staff by the end of the Second World War. These are the pupils of Blomberg, Halder, Brauchitsch, Rundstedt and Keitel.

The members of the German General Staff belong to different generations; they are men of varying abilities and frequently of different military schools and tendencies. They cannot be reduced to a common denominator or likened to automatons. But in one respect they are as alike as peas in a pod.

In whatever period they may have lived, whatever the condition to which their country may have been reduced, when preparing their adventurous military plans they have never paid any attention to the dangers in which they involve their nation. To them the nation is a military concept—so many divisions, so many people producing weapons, so many possible rebels. Their thinking actually never ex-



tends beyond a certain circle of ideas: assault—armistice—assault. To them everything else is of secondary importance. When they lose the game and the ruling class puts them back in their former places in their staffs, they sit down to the card table and make a fresh stake without hesitation.

Some bourgeois historians have even gone so far as to suggest that the German militarists are possessed of an hereditary psychosis, a mania for mass annihilation that is systematically injected into them in the schools and military academies. The theory of "Teutonic madness" has been elaborated and German militarism interpreted as a psychological phenomenon. The authors of these theories have overlooked, or have not wanted to see, the main thing.

The German General Staff is not a self-sufficing force that operates far away from people and classes, and revolves in its own orbit. The generals of any bourgeois state are appointed by the ruling class, live at the cost of that class and fulfill its orders. The real significance of German General Staff strategy arises out of its always having been the exact, concentrated expression of the policy of the class that inspires the militarists to adventurous gambles in the interests of profit—in the scramble for foreign lands, natural resources and markets. Everything specific, violent and maniacal in that strategy emanates from the class forces that engender and inspire German militarism.

In the past it was the robber barons, the Junker landowners and feudal lords whom Engels called "uncouth, ignorant scoundrels," "butchers" and "bone-breakers." While still at school they were taught the words of the ideologist of German militarism, the historian Treitschke: "War must not leave the defeated enemy anything but his eyes that he may weep over his misfortunes." In our times the "psychosis" of the German militarists reflects the politics of the monopolies and the avarice of the Prussian Junkers. The owners of concerns that did profitable business in supplying poison gas for the death camps went farther in their militarist lust than Treitschke. Their business did not allow them to leave their



enemies even their eyes.

One should make a distinction between cause and effect. If it is true that the German General Staff displays symptoms of an aggression mania, the roots of the disease are not to be found in the psychology of the brass hats but in the contradictions specific to German capitalism that has for a long time been doing its best to devour all Europe. This, however, does not change matters. Whatever the nutritive medium of German military mania may be—ground rent or profit—there is no doubt whatsoever that to this very day the reactionary generals of bourgeois Germany are possessed of that mania. Their sands are running out, but the gambling fever, instead of dying down, grows stronger. Every two or three decades they place a new stake on the card of war, and the heavier the losses in the previous war the higher the new stake.

In September 1924, Lieutenant Colonel Otto von Stulpnagel, operations chief of the secret German General Staff, sent a confidential message to the Foreign Minister in which he touched on the possibility of “beginning a war of revenge in the not too distant future.” Stulpnagel assumed that war would break out within the next “ten to twenty years.” Events proved the accuracy of his calculation. Stulpnagel envisaged the “use of air forces . . . against open cities and factories, the ruthless use of chemical weapons, etc.,” in the future war.

That was fifteen years before the outbreak of the Second World War and nine years before Hitler came to power. It was the time when Germany was preparing to offer Britain and France the so-called “West-European Treaty,” later known as the Locarno Pact. Stresemann’s first draft recognized Germany’s western frontiers but refused to give guarantees in respect of her frontiers in the east. The Pact was signed in December, 1925. British, American and French newspapers made a solemn announcement to the effect that Germany had joined the “concert” of Western Powers and that “a new era had opened up in Europe.” And all the time the General Staff was methodically preparing a Blitzkrieg against Britain and France.



## A Suicide's Testament

At the end of 1944, when Germany's defeat in the Second World War was obvious, the French newspaper *Combat* published a secret German memorandum. The author was that same Otto von Stulpnagel, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the German occupation forces in France after the Wehrmacht invasion. In this memorandum, running into 60 pages, Stulpnagel examined in detail the cause of Germany's defeat in the Second World War and outlined the conditions that would bring Germany victory in the Third World War.

"We do not have to fear that the peace terms will be similar to those we would have enforced ourselves, because our enemies will be divided and estranged," wrote Stulpnagel. "We must even try to sow the seeds of future discord in the next peace treaty. . . . No defeat is ultimate. Defeat is a lesson that must be learned while preparing the next, more powerful blow. Our defeat in the present war must be regarded merely as an unfortunate occurrence in Germany's victorious advance towards the conquest of the world. . . ."

Stulpnagel hanged himself in a Paris prison in February, 1948. His former subordinate in the German General Staff, Heusinger, became the creator of the Bundeswehr.

History never forgets anything and somehow manages to save the most secret and compromising documents. At some future date, the archives of the Bonn General Staff will probably yield memoranda, orders and letters by which researchers will be able to give an exact account of how the Third World War was planned in that institution in the fifties and sixties. The writings of Stulpnagel's pupils will be found in which they execute his last will and testament; dispositions for an attack on all West Germany's neighbors and allies; memoranda with advice and instructions addressed to the Bonn Foreign Office showing how that ministry must stress the peaceful intentions of the German Federal Republic precisely in that period when the Bundeswehr Staff is sending out fresh instructions on war preparations.



Everything will come to the surface on the last day of judgment, which will not leave even the ashes of German militarism. At the present time, however, the researcher is not in possession of all the data, mere fragments of documentary evidence being available. The present-day Stulpnagels, Guderians and Keitels are taking every precaution to keep their plan for World War III a deep secret. Nevertheless, the main features of that plan are gradually being revealed.

Disposition No. 3 differs greatly from No. 2, yet they are the same in essence. As in the past, the strategy of German militarism is dictated by class forces that ignore the interests of the German people and regard them merely as cannon fodder. Today, as in the twenties and thirties, maniacal generals are inspired by insane monopolists. Now, as then, both of them are hidden behind diplomats who incessantly harp on "Germany's rights." The world has changed beyond recognition, mankind is progressing at cosmic speed, world communist society is not far away. Yet German militarism lives in the past and not in the present. On the eve of its last appearance in history, German militarism is making its biggest and most desperate stake on the last card. In 1933, the author of these lines said in his book, *Hitler Over Europe?*:

"It seems impossible that Germany, after twenty years of struggle, hunger and crisis, after the destruction of the whole of her military power, after a terrible internal convulsion, can today risk again a new world war with any prospect of success. . . . It seems unthinkable that Hitler—for a reasonable, considerable time—can on the whole dare anything here, without the hundred-to-one certainty of being pulverized more terribly than ever Wilhelm II was pulverized."

Nevertheless, an analysis of the facts, in particular a study of the strategy of the German General Staff in the early thirties, produced the inexorable conclusion—German militarism was again preparing to set a match to the fuse. "That is the last stopping-place before the finale," wrote the author; "the attack on the Soviet Union, the heart of the socialist sector of the world—the start of the Holy War of Hitlerism for the



conquest and barbarization of the world.”

An analysis of German militarism's present war policy leads to a similar conclusion, although circumstances and conditions are now quite different. But before getting down to the kernel of the problem we must examine some of the arguments of those who do not want to believe that it is possible for German militarism to pursue an aggressive policy in our day. There are people in the West who do not believe that the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany are capable of planning aggression, even if only for purely military and military-political reasons.

Are these people right?

## 2. The Dialectics of Insanity

Those who doubt the possibility of fresh aggression on the part of German militarism offer a number of military and political reasons for their doubt that at first sight seem impressive.

First of all, they point to the difference in the military situation of the Federal Republic and that of Germany in the Kaiser's and Hitler's time. And this is not only a matter of a decided change in the balance of power between bourgeois Germany and other countries; it is not only because the Federal Republic cannot be regarded as a great power capable of contraposing itself as a military force to the leading states of the modern world.

There is a more important circumstance, say those who do not believe in the existence of revanchism. Any big war would today threaten Western Germany, not with mere defeat or even debacle, with with complete destruction. A country situated on the European frontier of the bourgeois world, with an area of 248,000 square kilometers and a population of about fifty million, would be doomed if it took part in a nuclear war, and still more so, if it unleashed that war.



A few hydrogen bombs would be sufficient to wipe the Federal Republic off the map of Europe. Some experts believe that Western Germany would be turned into an "atom desert" within a few minutes of the outbreak of war. Never before has German militarism been faced with such a prospect.

How could the Germans who have still not forgotten what happened to them in the forties go the length of such a risk—not even a risk, indeed, but an absolutely irrevocable fate in the event of aggression?

Without doubt the argument is a serious one. It might even seem that this alone is quite enough to discourage the Germans from any idea of a new war.

Such an argument stands in need of very substantial amendment. The Germans, the German nation, have nothing to do with it. We are talking about German militarists, and that is not the same thing.

The Bundeswehr generals, of course, realize full well what would happen to the Federal Republic of Germany if it were to plunge into a nuclear war. Since war is their profession, they naturally know this better than anybody else in Western Germany. We pose the question differently: Would that stop them? And the answer is: No! There is consistency in madness.

On January 27, 1942, when the Second World War was at its height, Hitler made the following announcement: "In one respect I am absolutely cold-blooded. If the German nation does not want to risk itself, then let it disappear."

On another occasion Hitler said: "The sacrifice of the entire German youth is not too high a price to pay for German domination of Europe." And in 1945, on the eve of the collapse, the Fuehrer announced: "If the war is lost, let the German people perish. It is not worth considering the preservation of primitive foundations for the further existence of the people. We had better destroy it all ourselves."

That is how Hitler taught the German militarists to look upon the risk of national suicide. Has their attitude to the question changed in the nuclear age?



## The Stake Is Life or Death

A book called *Germany's Trump Cards*, by J. Barnick, was published in the German Federal Republic in 1958. The West German radio called it "the most significant publication on the German question since 1945." Minister of War Strauss told the publisher that he had read the book "with tremendous attention."

If a nuclear war breaks out, writes Barnick, "Germany must do her part irrespective of what is going on around her or what may happen subsequently. She must fight again. . . . But will that war have any sense? Will not the loss of human life in a radioactive mist devalue all victories and everything else besides? Well, that is something we cannot know in advance. The stake is life or death—in any war, not only in an atomic war."

Barnick outlines Germany's position at the moment a war begins; he makes no bones about the fact of the Federal Republic being an "ideal target" for modern weapons of mass destruction. "A massed nuclear attack on Western Germany," he says, "could, in the course of a few days, that may soon be reduced . . . to a few hours, make ash-heaps of all the big cities and industrial centers and reduce the population from fifty to fifteen million. . . . In that case what should we do? We must fight. Only then will war really begin. . . ."

Seven out of ten inhabitants of the Federal Republic will perish. But Barnick already has visions of a "victorious campaign in the East," with "German troops quartered in Ufa and Kursk." "Acting as a fearful force," he says in another place, "the army will break a road for itself through chaos, cries of horror and seas of blood."

A maniac? Possibly. But he is a maniac whose delirious ravings are read by the Minister of War with "tremendous attention" and are offered to the public under the title of "Germany's Trump Cards." Barnick is far from being alone.

In April, 1960, lectures were delivered in a number of West German cities by an American-German journalist, a certain Schlamm, whose book in defense of the revanch pol-



icy—*The Ultimate Miracle*—was another sensation in the West. Schlamm has influential connections in Bonn. When he proposed, in the town of Wuppertal, that the Federal Republic of Germany should demand, by way of an ultimatum, the extension of her territory to the 1938 frontiers of the Reich, he was asked:

*Question:* And if the ultimatum is rejected?

*Answer:* Marschieren!

*Question:* By that you mean that if the ultimatum does not bring results, we should attack?

*Answer:* Jawohl!

*Question:* Even if it cost a hundred million lives?

*Answer:* Yes.

It may be said that it is more important to know the opinion of the generals than that of the Schlamms and Barnicks. That is true, although it is obvious that the generals and ministers will not be so outspoken on such a subject. Still, at times interesting phrases drop from their lips. True enough, they do not speak straightforwardly, but in vague hints. Even that is enough.

Heusinger, the Bundeswehr chief, said, when speaking of war: "If . . . our offensive collapses and the enemy goes over to the offensive, we must leave Hamburg, Hanover, Kassel, Nuremberg, Munich and other cities to the enemy only as heaps of ruins." Secret instruction No. 145/59, issued by the Bonn staff and published in the German democratic press, envisages "the transfer of the government and other authorities to safe areas" (evidently to Spain) in the event of war. But where can the German people be transferred to?

Such is the present-day thinking of the Bonn staff. Is it so very different from what Hitler said?

The successors to Keitel, Jodl and Guderian are pondering over plans for revenge. The dispositions are plotted on the map. Operation orders have been drafted. Before them lies atom death. Aggression is tantamount to national suicide. Will the revanchist generals tear up their plans after coming to this conclusion? They will not. What is important to



them is not the lives of thirty-five million Germans in Western Germany which Barnick takes as the starting point, but vengeance on other nations for 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, for the defeat of Ludendorff and Hitler. Therefore, as Barnick says, "we must fight."

We repeat—psychiatrists may possibly detect symptoms of insanity in these arguments. We know, however, that madmen have started wars on more than one occasion. There is something more important for us to consider. The argument that the German militarists could not risk a war because it threatens the physical destruction of their country does not hold water. The German militarists are prepared to risk war even if the Federal Republic of Germany is reduced to a heap of ruins and they have to seek asylum in Spain. The consequences of their plans are in howling contradiction to their aims. That however, is the paradox of insanity.

The second argument. It is said in the West that the Bonn generals are not the same as their predecessors. It is asserted that they are soldiers of a completely different, new caliber; they are not the German militarists that the world has known for centuries but some sort of hybrid generals of dual nationality, half-German, half-NATO, or "Europeans." Such generals are supposedly not dangerous to anyone. They are even said to be "democratic, humanists and enemies of war."

None of these assertions come anywhere near the truth. They are the same generals. Nothing has changed—neither their faces, nor their brains, nor their *idée fixe*. The only thing that has changed is the uniform they wear.

All the leading generals in the Bundeswehr served under Hindenburg and were promoted under Hitler. The Bonn corps of generals in its entirety emerged from the staff of the old Wehrmacht. There is not one of them who held a rank lower than that of lieutenant-colonel in the Wehrmacht. But even this is still not the chief point.

It is frequently stressed in Bonn that the Bundeswehr leaders did not in former times belong to the most loyal pro-Nazi clique headed by Keitel, Jodl, Kesselring, Guderian and



the others but to the so-called opposition group of Beck, Witzleben and Rommel.

This is only a half-truth. The present heads of the Bundeswehr belonged to both groups. At first they belonged to the pro-Nazi clique and during the second half of the war to the group headed by Beck, the group that tried to get rid of Hitler and take his place. It is this very fact, however, that shows their affiliation to the central group of the most dangerous strategists of German militarism. The leaders of the present Bundeswehr deserted Hitler only when he had obviously begun losing the war, and then only because they wanted to correct his "miscalculations," to apply a more effective strategy and win the war.

## Heusinger's Secret

This is a circumstance of great significance. The past of the leaders of the West German General Staff does more than anything else to explain the present policy of the Federal Republic. The generals in command of the Bundeswehr do not want to put an end to Hitler's policy—*they want to surpass Hitler*. For that reason some of them at one time took the risk of going to the gallows.

In June, 1960, on the occasion of the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Colonel-General Beck, who committed suicide in 1944, after the collapse of the conspiracy of the generals' "opposition," the Bundeswehr semi-official publication *Wehrkunde* published an article in praise of the general. "He once more turned the German theory of war and defense back to its sources," said the article. "He thereby indicated the direction of present military policy" (of the Federal Republic). The magazine named "the present leading soldiers of the Bundeswehr who . . . like Speidel rely on Beck's ideology, or who were taught directly by Beck, like Heusinger. . ."

These are true facts. These two, who have been leaders of the Bundeswehr since its foundation, came from Beck's school. Heusinger was serving in the operations division of the General Staff, the most important and most secret unit of



the Wehrmacht machine, its "brain," at the time when Beck was Chief of the General Staff. Information available shows that Heusinger betrayed his confederates in the 1944 conspiracy in order to save his own life. That, however, only confirms his affiliation to the Beck group.

In 1944, Speidel was the Chief of Staff to Rommel, whom Beck had in mind as Commander-in-Chief when Hitler was removed. He was one of the officers in Beck's immediate entourage. Beck's book, *Investigation*, published in the Federal Republic after the war, appeared with a preface by Speidel.

What did the Beck group regard Hitler's chief "mistake" to have been? It was the same miscalculation that leading theoreticians of the General Staff found in the Kaiser's strategy after the First World War: the inability to avoid a war on two fronts. The 1944 conspiracy was intended to correct this mistake. Beck's idea boiled down to the conclusion of a separate peace with the Western powers and, jointly with them, to check the Soviet Army's advance on Berlin. The draft agreement that Beck was to conclude with Eisenhower after Hitler had been removed was drawn up by none other than Speidel. Judging by available information, Beck, Rommel, Heusinger and Speidel regarded this agreement as nothing more than a chess move to save the Wehrmacht at the last moment. None of them even dreamed seriously of abandoning the plan for the conquest of Western Europe. It is typical that in his book *Disobedience of Orders*, Heusinger had no scruples in reproaching Hitler for having missed the opportunity to completely destroy the British Army at Dunkirk in 1940.

No, West German generals of the Heusinger and Speidel type are no "hybrids"; they are not humanists and are not the enemies of war. They are the most inveterate and stubborn of the German militarists, the revanchists of revanchists, those in whose eyes Hitler himself was a poor militarist, those who tried to take revenge and re-play the second world war while it was still being fought.



Are these generals incapable of thinking of revenge now that they themselves are in the saddle and Beck's plan to conclude an alliance with the West has been put into effect, even if delayed for one decade?

This second argument of those who do not believe that there is a real danger of a threat on the part of German militarism will no more hold water than the first.

The third argument. It is said that even if there really are mad generals in the Federal Republic prepared to risk national suicide for the sake of revenge, the same cannot be said of the politicians who now rule in Bonn. When the German militarists went over to aggression in the thirties, they were able to do so only with the aid of fascism. The Federal Republic today is not ruled by fascism but by republican clericalism. Adenauer is not Hitler, the Bonn President Lübke is not Hindenburg and the Christian Democratic Union is not the Nazi Party.

Of all the arguments we have discussed this is undoubtedly the least convincing. Those who use it have simply forgotten the past.

Who ruled Germany before Hindenburg and Hitler?

Fascism does not emerge of its own accord and does not come to power immediately without any intermediaries. Let us recall the chain reaction that took place in Germany between the two world wars. Militarism begat revanchism, revanchism begat fascism—all almost automatically, with the regularity of a law.

Without the revanchist Hindenburg there would not have been Reichskanzler Hitler. But there would have been no President Hindenburg without General Schleicher, without the sabre-rattling Reichwehr, without the Stahlheim and the Herrenklub, without monopolies that urged the General Staff to action. No serious student of politics would dare assert that an identical or very similar chain reaction is out of the question in Adenauer's state. Is clericalism guaranteed against development into fascism?

Our contemporaries remember the past too well to treat



this question lightly. Hitler's predecessors were the Catholic Chancellors Ferenbach, Wilhelm Marx, Bruenning and Papen. Behind their backs there were always two general staffs hidden—that of the monopolies and that of the Reichswehr. Until the time came, the monopolies and the generals allowed the clericals and even the Social-Democrats to rule. Bruenning and Papen were appointed on General Schleicher's proposal. In 1933, when the preparations of the Reichswehr had gone far enough and the German working class had clearly demonstrated its unwillingness to follow the path of revanchism, the militarists in Hindenburg's palace pulled up their stakes. To keep the people in check, an open dictatorship was needed—the abolition of the parliamentary regime, terror and concentration camps. In the course of one night, clericalism gave up its place to fascism without a murmur.

We must not forget the past.

Can Adenauer prevent the development of a chain reaction that he himself has started? Can he, even if he wants to? It can be done by other forces in Germany, but not by the clericals.

It is possible that open revanchism in the Federal Republic will require leaders different from those now officially in power. It is not out of the question that to force the country into the fires of an atomic war against the will of the people, the militarists, as in the thirties, will want to establish a military dictatorship in some neo-fascist form. This is what may well happen in the future. It is no accident that Strauss, the Minister of War, is making such a rapid career in the Federal Republic. But the foundation for such a dictatorship is being laid, as before, by jesuitical clericalism. Adenauer is not a guarantee against a policy of revenge, but a prerequisite to it.

We have discussed the main arguments against the "hypothesis" of revenge. It has to be admitted that they are ungrounded and unconvincing. We have no substantial grounds for doubting that the German militarists are actually aiming at a new war.



But how, ultimately, do they picture West Germany's military strategy under present conditions? Even the most desperate adventurers do not plunge into adventures without some sort of plan. The most feverish roulette players always bet on a "system."

A number of facts tell us that the "system" of today's Schlieffens and Guderians has been worked out.

### **3. The Five Commandments of the Bundeswehr**

There is no reason whatsoever to doubt that the German militarists are thinking seriously of revenge. Only the most superficial observer, however, could suppose that they are ready to take action immediately. They need time for their preparations, as they did before the Second World War. To expand and equip its forces, to elaborate an operations plan and occupy positions, the Bundeswehr must go through a phase of "peaceful" growth. A study of the Federal Republic's military policy shows that the Bonn General Staff now has five principal aims: (1) to create an army that is the strongest in Western Europe, both numerically and as a striking force; (2) to equip that army with the most modern weapons of mass destruction; (3) to convert all Western Europe and part of Africa into the hinterland of that army; (4) to wrest the NATO leadership out of American hands and turn NATO into a Bundeswehr auxiliary organization; (5) to compile an effective strategic plan for a new aggression, selecting the time, place and method.

These are the five commandments that the Bundeswehr has observed from the time of its inception. The whole policy of the Federal Republic today is based on these five points; in actual fact every step by the Bonn Government takes its start from there. The fulfillment of such a program obviously



takes time, but there can be no doubt that the Bonn General Staff has already gone a long way towards fulfilling the first four points. The Bundeswehr generals had advanced somewhat farther by the beginning of the sixties than the Reichswehr generals had by the beginning of the thirties. The German war machine is being built faster today than it was three decades ago.

It took Seckt, Blomberg, Hammerstein and Beck seventeen years to build the Wehrmacht (counting from 1918 to 1935, when Hitler announced the existence of a big army). It has taken Heusinger and Speidel something like seven years to build the Bundeswehr up to its present strength (from 1954 to 1960). Can the 1961 Bundeswehr be compared with the 1935 Wehrmacht? It can, if we take as our yardstick the strength of the German army as compared with that of the other armies of Western Europe.

In the spring of 1958, the British military expert, Captain Liddell Hart, wrote:

“The Bundeswehr is preparing to become the strongest army in Western Europe. Apparently few people realize this fact and its inevitable consequences. . . . The fighting units constitute a much greater part of the total strength of the Bundeswehr than of any other Western army. The Bundeswehr has its tail between its legs but it has sharp teeth. . . . With the exception of the American NATO divisions, no other country has yet reached this level. . . .”

That was how matters stood three years ago. At the time Liddell Hart made his prophesy the strength of the Bundeswehr was 125,000. Today it is almost 350,000. This, however, is only the skeleton of the future army. The Reichswehr, the predecessor of the Wehrmacht, had 4,000 officers; by 1962 the Bundeswehr will have more than 22,000 officers.

The “teeth” of the third generation of German militarists are sharp indeed. The introduction of conscription in the Federal Republic, which means an army a million strong, is already planned. One of the Bonn ministers once said:

“If we get twelve divisions we get supremacy in Europe.”



This year the Bundeswehr will have its twelve divisions. It accounts for 43 per cent of the NATO land forces under the command of Speidel. What will be the ratio of forces within NATO if conscription actually is introduced!

The West German air force is also on the way to reaching first place in Western Europe. The American *Aviation Week* recently prophesied that the Bonn *Luftwaffe* would become a striking force equal to the air forces of all West Germany's European allies combined.

The Wehrmacht is being rebuilt at such speed that Bonn and Washington already consider Britain and France second-rate allies such as Austria and Italy were for Germany in former times. It has been estimated that more money is actually being spent on building up the Bundeswehr than Hitler spent on the Wehrmacht in the thirties.

Until recently, however, the Bundeswehr lagged behind another European NATO country, Britain, in one important respect. The West German General Staff did not possess that weapon without which a modern army cannot participate in a major war—it had no nuclear missiles and no rockets. But that was in 1958. Today the situation is different. The new Wehrmacht hopes to lay its hands on hydrogen weapons in the near future. From the standpoint of the German militarists, Heusinger has thereby already regained a good part of what Hitler lost.

## Bundeswehr Plus Polaris

The conversion of the Bundeswehr into a nuclear-rocket army is the kingpin of the West German strategy of revenge. If this condition is not fulfilled, all the calculations of the Bonn staff will be in vain. If it is fulfilled, the West German generals consider that the road will be open. In Heusinger's eyes the sum of these two magnitudes—the Bundeswehr plus rockets with hydrogen warheads—means as much as the Reichswehr plus tanks meant to Hitler, and, perhaps, a little more.



Up to 1960, the Bundeswehr was armed only with the simplest American short-range guided missiles such as Honest John, Nike and Corporal, missiles intended for tactical use. The Bundeswehr is now preparing to take over American Polaris rockets with nuclear warheads and a range of over 2,000 kilometres. This will bring further changes to the ratio of military forces in Western Europe. Polaris rockets are an offensive weapon—and it is precisely Western Germany that is earmarked as NATO's principal nuclear rocket arsenal. The prospect is obvious enough. As matters are now, the Bundeswehr will become the leading *atomic* army in Western Europe.

“France, like Britain, must renounce the creation of an atomic striking force,” said the French general Valluis, commander of the NATO forces in the Central European Zone. “Britain has already renounced its striking force. France must also renounce hers.” The inference is obvious.

The Federal Republic of Germany already has its atomic and rocket industries. Frantic efforts are being made to create a West German atomic bomb as soon as possible and to make use of the French atomic bomb. American nuclear weapons, however, are already within reach of Bonn. The new Norstad Plan, according to which the NATO command in Western Europe should be provided with or allowed to purchase a hundred Polaris rockets with hydrogen warheads, actually comes from the West German generals. And there is no doubt whatsoever that they will decide how those rockets are to be used.

The necessary preparations have already begun. The reorganization of the Bundeswehr as an atomic army began as long ago as 1958 following the autumn maneuvers in which 150,000 men participated. The radical reorganization of the ground forces was the same as that made by Hitler and Beck in 1935. In Hitler's time infantry divisions were recast as armored and motorized divisions—this was the armor that in 1940 cut through the French defenses like a knife through butter and raced for the English Channel meeting practically



no resistance. The Bundeswehr today is being recast as atomic brigades which, according to Strauss, should, after massed nuclear attacks "drive rapidly into the rear and flanks of the enemy."

The skeleton of an aggressive army has been built and the weapons are at hand. All that remains is to provide a hinterland.

On January 14, 1960, Strauss announced in London that not more than 30 per cent of the West German military bases should be in West Germany. Here is what is actually taking place while Strauss is making speeches. (We give the data for only one year—February, 1960, to February, 1961):

At the beginning of 1960, the Federal Republic's negotiations with the Franco government became known; they concerned the location of West German air and rocket bases in Spain. It then transpired that secret negotiations were taking place between West Germany and Switzerland on the building of Bundeswehr bases in Switzerland. In March, it was reported that the Federal Republic was trying to get permission to build military bases in Africa. In July, there were secret talks with the Portuguese Minister of Defense on the establishment of military cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal. Then Heusinger conferred with the Chief of the Greek General Staff on the conclusion of a military pact between the Federal Republic and Greece.

In September, Adenauer had top secret talks with the Italian Prime Minister, Fanfani. The Bundeswehr was granted permission to build bases on Sardinia. In October, the French-Bonn agreement on the establishment of Bundeswehr bases in France was signed. In December, an agreement on military cooperation was concluded between the Federal Republic and Norway. In January, 1961, Heusinger went to London to negotiate on the location of Bundeswehr bases in Britain.

This is a far from complete list of the Federal Republic's attempts to obtain bases on foreign territories. What is the idea behind it all?



Military geography provides a straightforward answer to this question. Heusinger intends to re-establish the hinterland that the Wehrmacht had at its disposal in Western Europe during the Second World War when he was Chief of the Operations Division of the German General Staff. He wants to begin where he left off when Hitler prevented him and his friends from carrying out "real" aggression.

If the Bundeswehr has bases in Denmark, Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, if the territory of these countries is the strategical hinterland of the Bundeswehr in which its forces can be echeloned in depth and maneuvered, Heusinger's German army will have much deeper hinterland than Hitler had. From the point of view of the Bonn generals this, it seems, is not a bad base for aggression in an atomic war. What might actually happen to this hinterland in wartime is another thing. The decision will not rest with the aggressors. The Bonn gamblers, however, are staking their all.

It has become quite obvious that their plans envisage the whole NATO military set-up as nothing more than the foundation of the new Wehrmacht. If all these plans and projects are put into operation it is only a matter of time before NATO is finally swallowed up by the Bundeswehr. The NATO sign-board will, of course, continue to hang over Western Europe, but Bonn will be in command and not the Pentagon.

It is not only that the Bundeswehr is already superior to other NATO land armies on the European continent and will soon take first place for air, atomic and rocket power; it is not only a matter of the network of military bases with which the Bundeswehr is encircling Western Europe; it is not even a matter of the direct military alliance that has, in actual fact, been established between Western Germany and the United States over the heads of the other NATO members, and that Washington is gradually handing the keys of that organization over to Heusinger.

Early in 1961, the post in the NATO leadership which is probably the most important of all, passed into the hands of



the Bundeswehr—Heusinger was appointed chairman of the NATO permanent military committee in Washington. In this capacity he is entrusted with the guidance of all NATO military planning. In this way the former Chief of the West German General Staff has become the factual Chief of the NATO Staff. The military forces and threads leading to all the staffs of the North Atlantic bloc are concentrated in one and the same hands. But the important thing is: *the present strategy of NATO is being more and more adapted to the Bonn strategy of revenge.*

## The "Shield" Becomes the "Sword"

This was not true a few years ago. The American military school and its ideas were dominant in the West, and German generals had to stand at attention in front of the Americans. NATO strategy was based on what was known as "the sword and the shield" doctrine.

The "sword" was American jet aircraft armed with atom and hydrogen bombs; the "shield" was the West European NATO ground forces with the Bundeswehr in the vanguard. The "sword" was considered of decisive importance; a secondary and risky role was allotted the "shield." It was envisaged that when the West entered a war the chief "massed" blow would be struck from the air by the U.S. Strategic Air Forces. The Bundeswehr was allotted the task of taking upon itself the drive of superior enemy forces and "containing" them as long as possible, thus covering the "heart of Europe" which in fact meant being wiped out to gain time for the transatlantic atomic bombers. Under such circumstances there could be no talk of the possibility of the Bundeswehr applying its strategy of revenge. At that time, the West German army was supposed to think only of dying for the glory of the Pentagon.

But things have changed.

It is well known that the outworn doctrine of American strategic superiority in the air has had to be relegated to the



archives. The growing might of Soviet rocket technique has made ridiculous the concept of a crushing blow by the Pentagon "sword." Rockets have proved to be much more effective than aircraft and the Soviet Union is able to deal the aggressor a much more crushing blow than the aggressor can deal the Soviet Union. The whole strategical position has changed and Heusinger wasted no time in taking advantage of the collapse of the American military doctrine for his own purposes.

The new NATO strategic concept, adopted under the direct influence of the Bonn General Staff, judging by all the signs, is radically different from the old concept. Nobody speaks any longer of the auxiliary role to be played by the "shield." When Speidel spoke to the U.S. Army Association in Washington on August 8, 1960, he said openly that, on the contrary, "the decisive factor" for the Western bloc is now "the forces of the shield," that is the NATO army in Western Europe. The transatlantic strategic air force has been pushed into the background. In other words, the Bundeswehr and not the American war machine is now regarded as the strategic core of the North Atlantic bloc. It is clear that sooner or later strategic hegemony will grow out of this strategic "core." This is a fact of great significance to the Bonn government's political as well as military plans.

Heusinger and Speidel are obviously insisting that the appropriate conclusions be drawn from this fact. Bonn no longer limits itself to demanding the speedy equipment of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. The West German General Staff claims, first, that the number of divisions at Speidel's disposal in the NATO Central European zone be increased; secondly, that North and Southeast Europe be included in the Bundeswehr sphere in addition to that zone, for the purpose of "covering NATO flanks." Repeating the situation at the time of the Second World War, Scandinavia, the Mediterranean countries and even the Middle East must come within the sphere of influence of the West German armed forces.

Concessions made to the Bundeswehr by the U.S.A., Brit-



ain and France follow one after another. Suffice it to recall the latest of the NATO reorganization plans—the merging of the U.S. 7th Army in West Germany with the Bundeswehr in a “bi-national” army. In practice this would lead merely to the expansion of the Bundeswehr by the inclusion of the American units and the acceleration of its equipment with atomic rockets. Not for nothing did Strauss, overcome by the exuberance of his own verbosity, once say: “When the Bundeswehr is ready for action we shall talk to the crazy people who visit Moscow in the proper way, in the German way, and we will show them who the real leaders of NATO are.”

On the other hand preparations are being made in Bonn for another eventuality—for the possibility that the American army may, for some reason or other, and at some future time, leave Europe altogether. In that case, the European members of NATO who have been weakened in the interests of the Bundeswehr and surrounded by the network of West German bases would be face to face with the Bundeswehr.

There is no need to explain what such a situation would mean. In addition to other things, the Bundeswehr does not intend to limit its forces to the NATO contingents. Plans are being made for the creation of a mass army subordinated only to the orders of the Bonn General Staff.

And so the structure of the Western military bloc is changing, changing almost imperceptibly, from within. The helm is being placed into the grasping hands of the successors to Keitel and Guderian. This means that NATO strategy is being gradually and without any great fuss, but persistently and methodically, adapted to the strategic needs of German militarism.

How is it being done? The plans of the Bonn generals being discussed here concern the preparatory stages of the program. Each of the “five commandments” serves the purpose of raising the strength of the Bundeswehr to the utmost before the start of military operations. The revanchists, however, are also considering how to act when the aggression begins.



## 4. The Fiction of West European "Defense" Strategy

When Hitler armed his troops for revenge he did not attempt to hide what he was up to. The policy of present-day German militarism, however, is kept carefully under cover; the camouflage, too, is different—not the guns, but the place and time of their use are camouflaged.

Although it is labelled "defense"—the defense of Western Europe within the framework of NATO from some mythical enemy in the East—the whole strategy of the Bonn militarists has no other meaning than revenge. Heusinger and Speidel apparently regard their almost unhindered success in developing their real strategy of revenge under cover of this fictitious strategy of defense to be a sure sign of their military-political virtuosity. It must be admitted that in NATO they are actually effecting the "synthesis" of the two forms of strategy with some success.

Hindenburg and Hitler, the open revanchists, were for some time compelled to hide the arming of the German army. Heusinger and Speidel, taking on themselves the role of "confirmed enemies" of military revenge, are arming before the eyes of the whole world and are doing their best to overtake their former enemies in the West. Every step taken by the German militarists is represented as meeting the "defense" requirements of NATO strategy.

This "strategy" is loudly proclaimed in all highways and byways. The Bonn generals deliver long speeches on the theme at sessions of the NATO Council and even at public meetings. Strauss and Speidel grant interviews, in which they willingly and expansively speak of their plans and ideas. The West German newspapers carry numerous articles by military experts giving details of Bundeswehr participation in the



military preparations of the anti-Soviet coalition, showing what share in the common effort it taken upon itself and what sacrifices it is prepared to make in the common cause.

In 1957, Heusinger demanded that the NATO army in Central Europe be brought up to thirty divisions, showing this to be necessary to "hold the American bridgehead in Western Europe." And when General Eisenhower, in March 1959, spoke against the demilitarization of the Federal Republic, he said: "We [the Americans] do not, of course, intend to go to war on land in Europe. What sense is there in sending a few thousand soldiers or even a few divisions to Europe?" Thus, Heusinger and Eisenhower put forward what is essentially the same argument. It is made to appear that the Federal Republic is arming solely for the purpose of pulling American chestnuts out of the fire in Western Europe.

This theory is untenable both from the military and political standpoints. One has only to analyze the strategical concepts of the Bundeswehr to see that either they have nothing to do with West European "defense" but a great deal to do with West German revenge plans, or that they are not to be taken at all seriously.

According to official NATO concepts the Bundeswehr will undertake the "defense" of the Central European front for 700 kilometers along the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. In depth, this front embraces the territory from the Elbe to the Seine, an area of 755,000 square kilometers with a population of 120,000,000. The alleged task of the Bundeswehr is to cover the roads to the Rhine, the exits from the Baltic and the approaches to South Germany. In the Western press, especially in Bonn periodicals, picturesque descriptions appear from time to time of "the future battle for the Rhine"; in these descriptions the Bundeswehr is called upon to stand firm against a mythical enemy forcing his way to the Atlantic. Ways in which Heusinger can "save Europe" are ardently discussed.

Leaving out of account the well-known peace policy of the Soviet Union, all this extravagant verbiage that we hear from



the German militarists, when viewed from the standpoint of modern armaments and the present ratio of military forces, bears a strange resemblance to an adventure novel, and one dating back to Napoleonic times at that. A glance at the map will be sufficient evidence of this. But let us suppose that the army "holding" the NATO Central European front thinks of offense and not defense. The map is still the same, the ratio of forces does not change. Viewed from this angle the strategy of the Bundeswehr becomes quite clear. *The river the German militarists have in mind is the Elbe and not the Rhine.*

On August 8, 1960, General Speidel, Commander-in-Chief of the NATO forces in the Central European zone, spoke from the Washington rostrum on the ideas and plans of his staff. What did he stress in particular? Mainly, only one idea—"the defense of the land mass" in the Central European zone must be organized "as far as possible to the east." "Today," said Speidel, "we are planning the defense of Central Europe on its most distant eastern frontiers." And he immediately went on to explain exactly what he meant. The sector under Speidel's command, according to him, "embraces all the territory of the Central European states" and his army does not intend to be deprived of "depth for real freedom of operations."

This sounds very profound, even if not too intelligible. However, even a layman can comprehend Speidel's military philosophy and his concept of "real freedom." Which states are usually included in the Central European zone? In addition to the Federal Republic, there are the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Austria.

## Plan to Invade the G.D.R.

In 1959, the German democratic press published some of the details of the Bundeswehr Plan DEKO II, signed by Heusinger himself. The plan envisages the "military occupa-



tion of the Central German area up to the Oder-Neisse line," i.e., all the German Democratic Republic up to the Polish frontier. In September of the same year, NATO maneuvers were held in the Federal Republic; they were given the code name of "Step Aside." The exercises followed the pattern of Hitler's Blitzkrieg operations. The task set the Bundeswehr in those maneuvers was to seize the G.D.R. with the aid of atomic weapons in the course of twenty-four hours.

Some months later, the recorded evidence of a West German officer who went over to the G.D.R. became known. This officer formulated the Bundeswehr concept as follows: "Operations must follow Hitler's pattern—the annexation of Austria and the invasion of the Sudeten area. The invasion of the G.D.R. must be a lightning stroke. . . ." It must be remembered that Heusinger played a prominent part in drawing up plans for the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia in the thirties, when he was in the German General Staff.

In August, 1960, a French newspaper published an interview with two Bundeswehr officers who had gone over to the G.D.R.; they were Major Wintzer and Captain von Gliega who had been aides de camp to General Kammhuber, commanding the Federal Republic's air forces. Wintzer said that during an attack on the G.D.R. the Bundeswehr would try to cut the Warsaw Treaty countries off from each other as a preliminary maneuver. It was planned to "use" the territory of neutral Austria for this purpose. Bonn apparently has the following plan:

The aggressors' first army group develops its offensive by advancing along the southern frontier of the G.D.R. as far as the Oder-Neisse line. By this means it is proposed to separate the G.D.R. from Czechoslovakia. This group will then turn north in the direction of Frankfurt-an-der-Oder and Berlin to separate the G.D.R. from Poland. Simultaneously, the second army group will advance along the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Austria, surround Czechoslovakia and invade Hungary to cut her off from Czechoslovakia and Poland. At the same time the West German fleet will attack



the northern seaboard of the G.D.R. in the Rostock area and the mouth of the Oder. The German Democratic Republic will be surrounded. At least, that is what Heusinger's plan envisages.

The most extensive maneuvers in the history of the Federal Republic were carried out in September, 1960. The newly-formed atomic brigades of the Bundeswehr participated side by side with American units. Ground, naval and naval-air forces operated in the north. Each of the maneuvers carried out was part of a single integral plan. The overall picture was the following:

Armored units are hurled into the breach created by the atomic attack. NATO troops advance from Bavaria on Dresden, from Schleswig-Holstein on the Baltic port of Strahlsund in the vicinity of which the West German navy makes a landing. Berlin is the object of a parachute attack. The Bonn General Staff expects to squeeze the People's Army of the G.D.R. in a double "pincers" somewhere to the west of the capital.

In February, 1961, maneuvers were again held in the south of the Federal German Republic in which "atomic attacks" were staged.

There is no great need to make an assessment of these plans from the military standpoint. Those who were badly beaten in the forties, today have to earn their living as professional strategists in some way or another. We have other interests.

What has all this got to do with the "defense" of Western Europe? These are not plans of defense but purely offensive plans, military aggression in the full sense of the word, and, furthermore, aggression in which the German militarists, by force of habit, include a breach of the neutrality of their neighbor, Austria, in the case under discussion. As we see, the Napoleons of Bonn again do not deem it possible to avoid this flaunting of neutrality.

## The Baltic "Pivot"

The plan, however, does not end at the Elbe and the Oder.



And what have the strategic plans of the Bundeswehr in the Baltic Sea, another sector of the Speidel front, to do with defense?

This same Speidel also has command of the NATO forces in the Baltic area, where about three-fourths of the Bonn navy is now concentrated. Here again we come directly up against aggression in its purest form.

The official NATO thesis says that its forces are needed in the Baltic to prevent an enemy fleet breaking through the straits into the Atlantic Ocean and threatening the ground forces of the Western powers on the continent, in particular their communications and supply lines. The Baltic must be closed to the enemy, say the American and British strategists. The Baltic must be kept open for our attack, is the way the West German generals understand it. And the command is in their hands.

On January 25, 1957, Heusinger spoke in Hamburg to the Hansa Club, the club of the German merchant and industrial aristocracy. According to plan "the West German navy must be built up as an offensive force," he said. "The fleet [of the Federal Republic] must attack and deliver its blow in the Baltic Sea." In December, 1958, the journal *Wehrkunde*, called the Baltic Sea "the sea in which the fate of NATO will be decided." In August, 1959, the journal *Bundeswehr* said: "The Baltic Sea has changed from a secondary factor in world politics to the pivot of NATO strategy on the northern flank."

These, of course, are all words, the words of the defeated. Nevertheless, they reflect definite plans, concrete preparations. Like the land area to the east of the Elbe, the Baltic Sea is regarded by Bonn as the object of lightning aggression.

The building of the new West German fleet is subordinated to this one idea alone. Priority is given to the submarine fleet, and the possibility of arming the vessels with Polaris rockets carrying hydrogen warheads is envisaged. These rockets have a range of over 2,000 kilometers, which is greater than the distance from any point on the Baltic Sea to



either Moscow or London. What are such submarines required for—offense or defense?

There is no need even to look at the map and weigh the ratio of forces—or even the rocket ratio alone—to guess what any attempt to launch such attack in the East would cost Western Germany. What the attempt would end in for the aggressor is only too obvious. But it is of interest to us because it gives further proof to our argument. The last thing the Bundeswehr command is thinking of is the “defense” of Western Europe.

There are other points in the program of the Bonn General Staff that indicate the same thing. For instance, the demand to allot the new Wehrmacht “a deep hinterland” in the western and southern parts of the continent. As though the location of the aggressor’s bases, some hundreds or even thousands of kilometers from Western Germany and not on their own territory, would save them from destruction by long-range rockets! Those bases actually are necessary, but for purposes that have nothing at all to do with defense. If, for example, the Bundeswehr at some time intends to establish its dictatorship over Western Europe suddenly, it would be easier to do so if its bases were located in the countries concerned.

The strategy of the Bonn militarists is adapted only to adventures (and hopeless ones at that!); from the standpoint of defense it is not worth a brass farthing. No right-minded person could seriously consider it as such. And it is exceedingly interesting that prominent generals in Western Germany have exactly this attitude towards it.

Ten years ago, the former Chief of Hitler’s General Staff, General Guderian, published a book in which he proved that NATO strategy in Western Europe was groundless and senseless. The old Blitzkrieg specialist of Wehrmacht days went straight to the point and simply ridiculed NATO plans. We imagine that in his heart Heusinger must have agreed with Guderian, even if he does consider him a political simpleton.

In 1955, Colonel von Bonin raised an open revolt against



the NATO and Bundeswehr command; von Bonin was the man who succeeded Heusinger in 1944 as Chief of the Operations Division of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht land forces and who again occupied the same post in the Bundeswehr. His action created a real uproar. Von Bonin said that NATO plans were staking the existence of Western Germany on a single card and were a challenge to the East. "I am convinced," said this prominent Bonn staff officer, "that the NATO Supreme Command shares my opinion of the hopelessness of the defense of Europe in the event of war." In these words von Bonin gave his readers to understand that the strategical projects of Heusinger and Speidel had nothing in common with their real plans. Von Bonin was removed from his post.

Some interest attaches to the fact that Strauss himself, the political leader of the Bundeswehr, once let the cat out of the bag in a burst of that insolence peculiar to German militarism: "It is intolerable that we Germans should be bowmen on foot while the American atomic knights are mounted." This is expressive enough. Obviously Strauss and Heusinger are laying claim to the role of "atomic knights on horseback."

In more recent times, when the world has been following with great attention the feverish activities of the Bundeswehr and the preparations that are being made to equip it with weapons of mass destruction, spokesmen of that army have been speaking more frequently and more eloquently of the "defense" of Europe. Strauss said that NATO is a defensive alliance and that the German Federal Republic does not pursue any aims of its own. West German generals are stressing at every available opportunity that all their efforts and endeavors are subordinated to one single idea—the defense of the continent.

The more they shout and thump their breasts, the more obvious it becomes that what they are saying is fiction and not fact. Under cover of the strategy of the American vanguard in Europe, the new Bonn strategy of revenge is being put into effect, step by step, point by point.



## 5. The Super-Blitz Doctrine

It is said that the German militarists' passion for aggressive wars and their subservience to their masters, the big monopolies, take on the form of a mania that drives them on from war to war, from defeat to defeat, from catastrophe to catastrophe. Anyhow, they are maniacs of a specific type who are always planning—methodically, precisely and pedantically. They wind up the spring of aggression and when it bursts open and slashes them across the face, they just wipe away the blood, harness the people anew, and settle down to plot and plan the next assault.

What have the revanchists planned this time? How does plan of aggression No. 3 appear to their fevered brains?

As we know, there is little real documentary evidence available. The time is not yet ripe for opening the archives; the German militarists of today are keeping their real strategical plans more strictly secret than ever before. Nevertheless, the general pattern of their newest strategical concepts is gradually leaking out.

Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen, who was chief of the Kaiser's General Staff from 1891 to 1905, is considered the founder of the modern German school of war; he was the author of *Cannae*, which West German militarists still regard as a sort of Book of Revelations in the sphere of military science. Almost all the generals of the Weimar Republic and of Hitler's Reich called themselves Schlieffen's disciples, although they admitted that his ideas had proved untenable in practice. They believed, however, that their defeats were to be explained by the clumsy political blunders made first by the Kaiser and later by Hitler. One of those who tried, in the thirties and forties, to correct these errors and adapt German politics to Schlieffen's strategy, was General Beck, the teacher of Heusinger and Speidel.

What did Schlieffen teach the German militarists? The art of dealing a sudden blow at a decisive moment, employing



a decisive concentration of forces on a decisive flank.

In his book *Cannae*, Schlieffen wrote: "In order to be victorious we must strive to be the strongest at the point of contact with the enemy. This can be achieved only if we determine the course of operations and do not wait passively for what the enemy has decided to do to us. . . . It is hardly possible to defeat a stronger enemy without taking risks. . . . It is in times of misfortune that strength of character and the ability to find a means of changing the situation manifest themselves."

Every single word of this passage is a revelation to the Bonn militarists' army.

Schlieffen hoped to apply his concept of a sudden, overpowering blow in the first world war by concentrating nine-tenths of the German forces to be employed against France on the frontiers of neutral Belgium, leaving only a skeleton defense on the southern part of the Western front and on the frontier between Russia and East Prussia. After dealing with Belgium and France by means of one flanking movement, seizing Paris and surrounding the French Army, he intended using all available forces for an assault on tsarist Russia and terminating the war in a few months. Even today, German militarists are of the opinion that in 1914 Schlieffen's plan was ruined by his successor, Moltke Junior, who weakened the right flank of the German Army. Both the Kaiser and, later, Hitler, launched a war on two fronts which made it necessary to divide their forces—this, say the German militarists, was their chief fault. But with due allowance made for this political blunder, the Schlieffen strategical principle is still accorded the profound confidence of the German militarists.

What is more, they believe that the real author of the most aggressive of all strategic doctrines now in vogue in the West, the doctrine that occupies the minds of the most desperate imperialists, is not the Pentagon at all but Schlieffen and, consequently, the German school of war. It is certainly true that ever since his death Schlieffen's disciples have per-



sistently stressed the idea of a sudden massed attack. The most prominent of them, General Seeckt, who founded the Reichswehr at the time of the Weimar Republic, defined the task of an army accomplishing an aggressive attack in the following words: "Strike a sudden, lightning, paralyzing blow that employs the maximum available forces during the first hours of the war for the purpose of creating chaos among the enemy's forces before he has even begun mobilization." Fundamentally, this is precisely the idea that is now being so widely discussed by Pentagon theoreticians.

Schlieffen wrote his *Cannae* at the beginning of the century. He thought in the military categories of his day and his strength naturally lay in howitzers, mortars and machine guns and not in hydrogen bombs, rockets, aircraft and tanks. With only old-fashioned weapons at his disposal, the formation of a super-powerful striking force to deal the enemy a treacherous blow was, nevertheless, his main strategical concept. As far as Schlieffen was concerned, it was not the type of weapon to be used, but concentrated might and unforeseen aggression that was important. This does not differ in the slightest from the idea behind the latest theory, the doctrine of an unexpected atomic attack that occupies the minds of the Bonn militarists.

The essence of the modern art of war, the Pentagon more recently asserts, is to shower the enemy with hydrogen bombs suddenly and without warning to put him out of action immediately, giving him no time to recover and reply. In 1959, General Power, commanding the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, told Congress that he would like to speak of the philosophy of unleashing war and of the tremendous advantages on the side of the one who starts it. Power said that the U.S.A. must always be ready to strike the first blow, and added that whoever gained superiority in long-range nuclear rockets and made a sudden attack, could destroy the enemy's nuclear forces in thirty minutes and decide the outcome of the war.

That is what the transatlantic potential aggressors think. They are only worried by the fact that those who have gone



mad on the idea of a sudden, treacherous attack do not possess superiority in rocket weapons; superiority belongs to the Soviet Union, a country that champions the maintenance and consolidation of peace. The American militarists realize this and know they are powerless against the rocket might of the U.S.S.R. But they still believe that they are the authors of the "sudden attack" theory. In secret, their German allies dispute their priority and they are probably right.

What is the actual difference between the sudden atomic attack doctrine and Schlieffen's *Cannae* doctrine. The only difference is a still greater concentration of means of destruction in the striking force at the decisive moment; instead of tons, they now think in terms of megatons. In what way does this doctrine differ from Hitler's Blitzkrieg strategy? Only in the faster tempo of aggression; instead of days and weeks, they now think in terms of minutes and hours. Different weapons, different tempos. In essence, the idea is still the same—a lightning attack when least expected. "Don't wait," as Schlieffen said, "determine events yourself."

We can now see how the new variation of the Schlieffen plan is refracted through the prism of Bonn war politics.

Captain von Gliega, a former aide-de-camp of the Commander-in-Chief of the West German Air Force, who recently went over to the German Democratic Republic, speaking of the "basic concept" of military planning in Bonn "in its present form," said that "it is no doubt intended to deal the first blow, so that no counter-blow will be necessary."

For obvious reasons, the West German revanchists avoid an open discussion on such topics. Nevertheless they now and again let a word slip out.

## A Military Gamble

In July, 1960, the semi-official Bundeswehr journal, *Die Wehrkunde*, published an article on "Military Leadership in the Atom Age," obviously for purposes of instruction. The author, J. Krumpelt, was a colonel on Hitler's General Staff.



Krumpelt asserted that the old Blitzkrieg doctrine stood in need of revision and stressed the following: "In view of the long range of atomic weapons . . . blitz campaigns as formerly conceived will scarcely be possible. . . . New forms of blitz operations must, therefore, be planned." What forms?

Colonel Krumpelt arrives at the conclusion that the task is one of "launching an atomic assault on the enemy at the right moment. The assault must have as its targets . . . centers where the enemy's man power and material resources are concentrated. In general, the first use of the atomic weapon is decisive. If the blow is dealt at decisive targets in the enemy camp he will have no opportunity to reply at that stage of the battle with either atomic or conventional weapons." The targets to be attacked, according to the article, are Moscow, the Urals, Soviet oilfields and oil pipe-lines. Krumpelt, furthermore, said that there should be no fear of using atomic weapons: "Fear is a bad counsellor in wartime."

This is the doctrine of sudden atomic aggression in its purest form. And the die-hard from Hitler's General Staff is teaching it to Bundeswehr officers as if he had forgotten how the last Blitzkrieg ended.

When Speidel spoke to the U.S. Army Association he enlarged on the strategy of an assault launched "almost or completely without warning." The object of the attack, he said, was to "destroy the enemy, especially his reserves in depth." Speidel, of course, played a rather crude trick in ascribing his own strategy to the enemy.

It would be a mistake to assume that matters ended with such isolated or accidental remarks. The facts leave no room for doubt that Bonn has already evolved a complete theory of the actual application of the doctrine of a sudden blow to the specific "possibilities" of the German Federal Republic.

The theory starts from the assumption that under present-day conditions the key to a strategical solution is to a great extent in a Navy armed with medium and long-range rockets. The combination of submarines and rocket weapons, the potential aggressors maintain, furnishes sea strategy with new



possibilities. First place is no longer taken by the battleship, or the aircraft carrier of the thirties and forties, but by the atom-propelled submarine. Since a vessel of this type is independent of the weather at sea, can lay submerged and in good time take up its position in the vicinity of important enemy targets, it is supposed to be particularly suitable for sudden assault strategy. It is assumed that the atomic submarine fleet, "invisible" when submerged, will begin by plastering the enemy with hydrogen missiles.

Nor is there any need to analyze in detail the military theories of the revanchists since they are fallacious in concept. We have only to remember that the aggressors are not the only ones who have rockets; or that, from the military point of view, any sea can be viewed from the east as well as from the west; or that submarines are really not an elusive weapon of war. The German militarists have always been distinguished for their lack of foresight—planning to stab their enemies in the back, they always forget their own heads. Who can doubt that the knife will be knocked out of their hands at the first thrust, in the first second of any aggressive act? There is another interesting point: the intoxication of the Bonn militarists with the sudden-attack doctrine explains their noisy propaganda about the role of the Baltic Sea in a future war.

It is becoming obvious why Heusinger and Speidel are making feverish attempts to get their hands on NATO forces in the Baltic area after establishing their supremacy in the Scandinavian countries. We begin to understand why the journal *Die Wehrkunde*, as long ago as December, 1958, said that the Baltic "is the sea in which the fate of NATO will be decided" and demanded that it should "be in the center of NATO military planning." We can also understand why Admiral Heye, the ruling Christian Democratic Union's military expert, told the Bonn Parliament in 1955 that "the future navy [of the German Federal Republic] is not important in itself" but will serve to fill a breach in "the bridgehead region" that is "decisive" for the entire NATO system. From



the defense point of view, the Baltic Sea is certainly not of decisive importance to Western Germany. In Bonn, apparently, it is believed that the case is different when viewed from the standpoint of aggression.

The entire structure of the Federal Republic's navy provides a picture from which we may judge the planned method of aggression. As we have said above, the West-German naval program involves mainly the building of submarines and small, fast surface craft. Connected with the Baltic fleet, too, is the plan to arm Western Germany with American Polaris rockets that has recently been so noisily discussed in the Western press. *Bonner Korrespondenz* said on June 10, 1960, that the range of the Polaris is 2,000 kilometers and may be increased to 5,000 kilometers in the future. On this score, the London *Daily Express* said Polaris rockets will be a "German weapon" and that the "majority of them will be concentrated in Western Germany." Obviously, this is all part of the same "Baltic strategy."

This is not the first time Heusinger has compiled aggression plans. There was a time when he wrote under Hitler's orders and Keitel's supervision. The first of these committed suicide, the second was hanged. Possibly, Heusinger's eyes are again turned to the east. But it is not out of the question that he is also interested in other points of the compass. It is pointed out in London that Polaris rockets, fired from the Baltic Sea, would reach Moscow. Is it, however, any farther from the Baltic Sea to London than it is to Moscow? Any book of reference will tell us that the distance to London is shorter.

A study of revanchist strategy leads to one very definite conclusion. It is an insane strategy built up around the "renewed" Schlieffen doctrine—the idea of a sudden and "invisible" atomic assault. Heusinger, Speidel and Foertsch apparently believe that they have made a step forward in comparison with Hitler and have invented something in the nature of a "super-blitz."

They have invented it—but against whom?



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